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This dissertation examines the strategic deployment of evidential resources in com-
municative interactions among Nantis, an Arawak people of Peruvian Amazonia. In
particular, this work focuses on Nantis’ uses of evidentials to modulate representa-
tions of responsibility, and shows that two distinct types of responsibility must be
distinguished in order to account for the socially instrumental properties of eviden-
tial resources: event responsibility and utterance responsibility. Event responsibility
concerns praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for happenings in which the relevant
individual is causally implicated; while utterance responsibility concerns the socially
salient attributes of an utterance (e.g. truthfulness), and not the utterance’s con-
sequences. Evidential resources are shown to mitigate event responsibility in Nanti
ix
interactions by serving as a pragmatic metaphor, whereby the sensory directness or
indirectness encoded by evidentials yields inferences regarding individuals’ partici-
pation in, and responsibility for, events. The use of evidential resources, principally
quotative resources, to modulate utterance responsibility operates on quite differ-
ent principles. Specifically, quotative resources serve to individuate utterances by
attributing them to a particular source, thereby rendering explicit that individual’s
commitment to the stances expressed by the quoted utterance. In doing so, the
use of the quotative resource emphasizes that individual’s responsibility for the ex-
pressed stance. Quotative resources are also employed to decrease a first party’s
responsibility for a stance, by attributing it to a third party. In this case, inferences
based on the Maxim of Quantity lead interactants to infer reduced commitment on
the part of the first party on the basis of the attribution of strong commitment to
a third party. Both epistemic stance and a variety of moral and evaluative stances
are relevant to utterance responsibility. Significantly, utterance responsibility is one
of the few areas in which a pragmatic tie exists between evidentiality and epistemic
modality, indicating the relative marginality of epistemic modality to evidentiality
in Nanti, even at the level of pragmatics. An ethnographic and historical sketch of






List of Tables xxiii
List of Figures xxv
Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 Introduction: empirical and analytical aims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Ethnographic and historical background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1 Ethnographic Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1.1 Nanti social organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.1.1.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2.1.1.2 Residence groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1.1.3 Kinship groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1.2 Specialized social roles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.1.3 Subsistence and surplus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.1.3.1 Farming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.1.3.2 Fishing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2.1.3.3 Hunting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
xi
1.2.1.3.4 Wild-gathering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2.1.3.5 Animal husbandry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2.1.4 Geography and demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.2 Historical Sketch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.2.1 To the limits of memory and beyond: 19th century
– 1965 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.2.2.2 Conflict and social reorganization on the Upper Timṕıa:
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1.1 Introduction: empirical and analytical aims
This dissertation examines the ways in which Nantis employ evidential resources
in communicative interactions, focusing on how they deploy evidential resources to
modulate representations of individual responsibility in discourse.
The overarching goal of this dissertation is to advance the study of eviden-
tiality as a part of communicative practice. That is, I am interested in the patterned
deployment of linguistic structural resources in the context of real-time communica-
tive interactions and as part of interactants’ efforts to pursue interactional and social
goals of various scales. I intend this study of evidential practice, as I call it, to serve
both ethnographic and linguistic projects.
In the domain of ethnographic scholarship, my goal is to further our un-
derstanding of the social instrumentality of evidentiality, a topic that is still in its
infancy (Fox, 2001; Sidnell, 2005). In particular, I seek to refine our understanding of
the relationship between evidentiality and responsibility, which has been identified
as the critical nexus between social action and evidential resources (Hill and Irvine,
1993b). In this regard, I argue that Nanti interactional data show us that we need
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to distinguish two quite different forms of responsibility that have been largely con-
flated in the literature to this point: event responsibility and utterance responsibility.
Event responsibility, as I explain in detail in Chapter 3, is based on an individual’s
role in causing some event or state of affairs; while utterance responsibility, discussed
in detail in Chapter 4, concerns the praiseworthiness or blameworthiness that at-
taches to an individual by virtue of an utterance’s attributes, such as its factuality
or politeness. With regard to event responsibility, I show that in the Nanti case,
individuals may deploy evidentials to distance themselves from events, thereby cre-
ating a representation of mitigated responsibility for that event. I also explicate the
process by which evidentials achieve this distancing effect, which is based on a prag-
matic metaphor (Silverstein, 1976) that relates increasingly indirect sensory modes
of access to a given event encoded by evidentials to decreased causal responsibility
for that event. With regard to utterance responsibility, which is modulated by quo-
tative resources in Nanti discourse, I show that quotative resources ultimately serve
to individuate the stances expressed by utterances, thereby rendering explicit an in-
dividual’s commitment to a given stance. I argue that the responsibility-mitigating
function commonly attributed to quotative resources results from inferences based
on communicative maxims regarding the expression of commitment, and is not in-
herent to quotative resources. I also show that in the Nanti case, commitment to the
factuality of utterances – which has been the focus of scholarship on responsibility
in discourse – is but one type of stance that quotative resources may be used to
express, and that Nantis also use quotative resources to indicate commitment to
moral evaluative stances.
In the domain of linguistic scholarship on evidentiality, I aim to make two
contributions. First, I seek to contribute to the debate concerning the relationship
between evidentiality and epistemic modality. As discussed in detail in Chapter
2, an important school of thought has treated evidentiality as intimately related
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to epistemic modality, either at the grammatico-semantic level or at the pragmatic
level (e.g. Chafe and Nichols, 1986; Palmer, 1986; Willett, 1988). I show that Nanti
evidential practice is only partially concerned with epistemic modality, even at the
pragmatic level, and only as part of a broader practice by which Nantis individuate
stances and indicate their commitment to them. This argument is a thread running
through both Chapters 3 and 4. Second, I argue that although evidentiality is in
some languages an inflectional category, in many languages that exhibit grammat-
icalized evidentiality, evidentiality is most perspicaciously treated as an aspect of
communicative practice. I argue that efforts to treat evidentiality in purely struc-
tural terms, without reference to the social and interactional goals of speakers, leads
to significant gaps in our understanding of this phenomenon.
The fieldwork on which this dissertation is based was carried out entirely
monolingually. All glosses and translations are therefore my own.1 Since monolin-
gual work of this sort raises epistemological questions about data and analysis, I
have included in this dissertation a grammatical description of Nanti, in Chapter
6. Apart from providing basic linguistic documentation of a minimally described
language, this grammatical description serves as a means for the reader to critically
evaluate the translations I give.
1.2 Ethnographic and historical background
1.2.1 Ethnographic Sketch
1.2.1.1 Nanti social organization
Social life in Montetoni is organized along two principal axes: residence groups
and kin groups. Residence groups are constituted by spatially proximal households
among which exist strong social ties. These ties are often based on kinship relations,
1I have also consulted with another speaker of both Nanti and English, Christine Beier, regarding
the faithfulness of the glosses and translations presented in this work.
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but need not be, since at the same time, it is not unusual for a group of adult kin to
be scattered across multiple residence groups. Despite belonging to different resident
groups, however, kin frequently interact with each other by visiting, sharing food,
and participating in collaborative labor. In this section, I describe the organization
of households and residence groups, and the social importance of kinship relations.
1.2.1.1.1 Households Households minimally consist of a couple or triple (if a
man has two spouses) and their children. It is not unusual, however, for households
to be organized around a senior couple, with one or more resident younger couples
and their children.2 In the majority of cases, younger co-resident couples consist
of a daughter of the senior couple and her in-marrying husband,3 although in rare
cases the connection between the senior and junior couple may be between an older
and a younger sibling.
In physical and spatial terms, Nanti households in Montetoni typically consist
of two dwellings, a kosuna4 or cooking hut, in which all cooking, as well as most
manufacturing and socializing, is carried out; and a magantarira, or sleeping hut.
The sleeping hut has a raised floor, and in most cases, walls; it serves as a space
to store valued material goods, as well as a sleeping area for the senior couple of
the household. While in the village, Nantis spend the majority of their time in the
cooking hut, seated by the fire. Cooking huts are always walled and have bare earth
floors, which are covered by shitatsi mats. A small number of cooking huts have a
small raised platform inside, but this is unusual. Normally each adult woman in the
household has her own cooking fire inside the kosuna, although junior women may
2Note that at this point, all triples in Montetoni are senior in their households.
3Note that although I use the terms ‘wife’, ‘husband’, ‘spouse’, and ‘marriage’ to refer to certain
types of long-term relationships that Nantis form, I do so reluctantly, as Nantis do not participate
in ritualized “marriages” as such; rather, couples are formed and broken through a series of locally
salient interpersonal negotiations. In Nanti, the term koriti refers to a long-term domestic partner
of either gender, thus nokoriti, ‘my partner/spouse’; pikoriti ‘your partner/spouse’; okoriti ‘her
partner/spouse’; ikoriti ‘his partner/spouse.
4Also, kosena.
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share a fire with a senior woman if space is lacking. Typically, the main entrance of
the sleeping hut and cooking hut face one another, and are separated by some 4 to
6 meters.
1.2.1.1.2 Residence groups A residence group is constituted by a group of
spatially proximate households, which are typically clustered together closely around
a common open area. Hunting, fishing, and gathering areas are shared by the mem-
bers of a residence group, and it is common for members of a residence group to
participate in collaborative subsistence activities. Food gathered by one member of
a residence group is normally shared with other households of the residence group,
but the sharing of food between residence groups normally only transpires when
hunting or fishing has been unusually successful, or when a member of one residence
group is attempting to build closer social relations with a member of another resi-
dence group.5 While social interaction among members of a residence group is very
frequent, interactions among members of different residence groups are considerably
less frequent, even when the homes of the other group are nearby. During the 2003
to 2005 period in which I carried out my dissertation fieldwork, Montetoni had 33
households, organized into seven residence groups. Conversations with Nantis have
led me to believe that contemporary residence groups are socially analogous to the
communal dwellings Nantis lived in until the foundation of Montetoni, when they
adapted to the use of quasi-nuclear family dwellings.
1.2.1.1.3 Kinship groups Like other Kampan peoples, Nantis exhibit a Dra-
vidian kinship terminology system, in which a given individual and all same sex
siblings are referred to with the same kin term. Thus, for example, both a person’s
5In this case, food is normally shared ‘up’, with food being given to more socially prominent
individuals by less socially prominent individuals, without expectation of reciprocity.
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biological mother and all of her sisters are referred to as ina.6
The significant kinship relationships for adults are quite different for men
and women. Women typically retain strong ties with their mothers and sisters, who
often play an important role in helping a woman raise her children. Indeed, in cases
in which a man has two wives, it is common for the co-wives to be sisters. For men,
however, relationships with parents and siblings weaken considerably as they enter
adulthood, and in their place, strong ties normally develop with his wife’s male
siblings (ishobanirite) and his wife’s father (igonkirite). The relationships between
brothers-in-law tend to be very close, and brothers-in-law typically provide a great
deal of labor assistance to each other, as when clearing gardens or constructing
houses. Men tend to be deferential to their fathers-in-law, who have considerable
authority over their young sons-in-law.7 Typically, men leave the household of their
parents to acquire a wife, and take up residence with the wife’s family, while women
typically remain with their family even after acquiring a husband. Even when a
couple establishes its own household, however, the relationships of brother- and
father-in-law remain very important for most men.
Although Nanti kinship terminology retains the traces of the cross-cousin
marriage pattern common to the Kampan peoples (e.g. the inalienable nominal root
nebata indicates both sister’s daughter and son’s wife for the male ego, while tineri
indicates both brother’s son and daughter’s husband for the female ego.), there is
no indication that Nantis now have any preference for cross-cousin marriage. Bride
service to the wife’s father is the norm for a man’s first marriage, and matrilocality
is the norm for at least the first several years of a couple’s partnership. Most senior
men in Montetoni now have two wives, and neither bride service nor matrilocality
is associated with the second of two wives. Nantis characterize second wives as
6Biological parents can be distinguished from their siblings with the suffix -sano, as in the case
of the term apasano ‘my true father’, (cf. apa ‘my father’).
7Note that in recent years, Nantis have begun to speak of the role of peresetente, or community
leader, as analogous to the role of a father-in-law.
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principally resulting from the initiative of the woman in question, an observation
that appears to bear out in the majority of cases with which I am familiar. Many
second marriages do not endure for more than a few years, and in most stable second
marriages, the co-wives are sisters.
1.2.1.2 Specialized social roles
Beyond the specialized social roles immanent in kinship groups, historically Nanti
society did not exhibit recognized specialized social roles. However, in the years since
Nantis initiated contact with the neighboring Matsigenka people, a number of spe-
cialized social roles have arisen, including that of peresetente, or community leader;
poromotoro, or health worker; and operatoro, or communications radio operator.
In regards to specialized social roles in traditional Nanti society, perhaps
the most striking fact is the absence of a specialized role of shaman or medici-
nal/spiritual specialist, a role which is common to all other Kampan peoples. The
cognate terms for these specialists in other Kampan languages clearly reconstruct
to Proto-Kampa *seripigari (identical to the synchronic term in Matsigenka, serip-
igari, literally, ‘tobacco seer’), suggesting that this role is an old one among the
Kampan peoples.
It should be noted that a number of practices which are related to shamanism
among other Kampan peoples are also absent in Nanti society; these include belief in
witchcraft, belief in female impurity, and extensive plant-based medicinal practices.
Many of the duties of the seripigari in other Kampan societies are non-
specialist duties in Nanti society. For example, the preparation and use of shinkihato
‘ayahuasca’ for curing purposes is an ability that most, if not all, adult men possess.
Apart from the use of shinkihato, most Nanti curing practices are in the hands of
women. Women make extensive use of stinging plants to treat skin conditions and
deep body pain; and they also perform minor surgery on injuries, including sewing
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wounds closed.
Of the new specialist social roles to emerge in Nanti society, the most im-
portant is that of the peresetente, or community leader. This role was originally
introduced by Araña, the Matsigenka schoolteacher who lived among the Nantis
between 1991 and 1998 (see §1.2.2.6), primarily so that he would have a lieutenant
and intermediary for maintaining his control over the Nanti population. During the
period of the Nanti resistance to Araña (1996-1998), however, Migero, who then
occupied the position of peresetente of Montetoni, reconfigured his role as that of
a legitimate community leader, and actually spearheaded the resistance to Araña’s
excesses. Since then, the role of peresetente has become central to emerging Nanti
ideologies of communal life, and the activities of the peresetente have become very
important in both the relationships between Montetoni and the rest of the world,
and in intra-settlement relationships. Subsequent to the fission of Montetoni and the
establishment of Marankehari in 1998, each of these communities has continuously
had an acknowledged peresetente, and currently the residents of both Montetoni
and Marankehari consider this position indispensable to community life.
Above all, the peresetente is a mediator and an organizer of collective activi-
ties. Community-internally, Migero is frequently involved in mediating relationships,
and especially conflicts, between individuals from distinct households or residence
groups. Note that relationships of this sort are new to the multi-family group settle-
ment pattern that emerged in the Nanti communities subsequent to their migration
to the Camisea River basin (see §1.2.2.6), and the mediating role of the peresetente
fills a gap that might otherwise exist in conflict resolution strategies. The peresetente
also mediates community-level relations – both between Montetoni and Nanti indi-
viduals from other communities; and between Montetoni and non-Nanti individuals
and institutions.
The peresetente also organizes community-level collaborative labor and sub-
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sistence activities, including the periodic movement of the entire community, in
order to exploit new farming areas or to take advantage of superior village sites;8
the intermittent but regular clearing of village areas to impede forest encroachment;
and the occasional large-scale, village-wide fishing trip using either kogi poison or
fishing nets (see §1.2.1.3.2 below).
It merits mention that the peresetente has very little power to enforce his
opinions or decisions; rather, his effectiveness depends heavily on his ability to
persuade and convince others. As a result, he works to maintain a reputation for
fairness, and generally avoids taking stances that would be unpopular with the
majority of Nantis.
Two of the new specialist social roles in Nanti society on the Camisea River
have emerged in recent years in direct connection with the introduction of new
technology; these are the roles of communications radio operator (operatoro) and
health worker (poromotoro, from the Spanish promotor de salud ‘health promoter’).
Montetoni presently has two operatoro, both young men who are Migero’s
(biological or classificatory) sons. The operatoro are expected to turn on the ra-
dio each morning between 7:00 and 7:30 and make contact with the Matsigenka
communities within radio range. On rare occasions, Nantis need to communicate
information to individuals in these communities, but for the most part, the opera-
toro simply chats with the Matsigenka radio operators, sometimes picking up news
that they pass on to the peresetente and other community members.
The poromotoro is a considerably more demanding role, requiring medical
training from Ministry of Health personnel. The poromotoro keeps a small supply of
Western medicines, which he9 dispenses to people who come seeking his assistance.
He also assists visiting medical teams and oversees the administration of courses of
8Montetoni has moved a short distance twice, once in 1999, and again in 2001.
9Thus far, every Nanti poromotoro has been a young adult man, due to the relative freedom and
mobility of this particular social group.
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treatment recommended by visiting doctors, or by medical personal communicating
over the radio.
1.2.1.3 Subsistence and surplus
A considerable fraction of the waking hours of any Nanti individual’s life is devoted
to obtaining, preparing, and consuming food; or to manufacturing the tools and
tending to the resources necessary for doing so. Subsistence activities constitute
the topic of much everyday conversation and form the context of many social in-
teractions, making knowledge of this material basis of Nanti life indispensable for a
properly socially-situated understanding of Nanti discourse.
Nanti subsistence practices are based on a combination of farming, fishing,
hunting, and wild gathering of forest plant products and insects.
1.2.1.3.1 Farming Farming could be considered the basis of Nanti subsistence,
as garden products are always available, regardless of hunting or fishing success; in
fact, manioc is so essential a part of the diet that Nantis consider it harmful to eat
meat or fish without consuming manioc at the same time.10
Nanti gardens generally consist of one-half to one hectare plots in which the
primary cultigen in manioc, although plantains, corn and taro are also important
crops. Nanti gardens have a productive life of approximately two years, and at
any given time a man is likely to have three of them: a newly cleared garden,
a productive garden (itsamaitira), and an older garden (magashipogo) from which
some items remain to be harvested. The current abundance of metal tools has
revolutionized Nanti farming practices on the Camisea, enabling Nantis to clear
large gardens with relative ease. The result in Montetoni has been a tremendous
abundance of garden produce, especially manioc, which in turn has allowed the
10Consider the verb root somank ‘to consume manioc with’.
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Montetoni Nantis to considerably increase the frequency and size of manioc beer
feasts.
Agricultural labor is organized along gender lines: the clearing and planting
of gardens is considered to be exclusively men’s work,11 and weeding is mainly
performed by men. Harvesting, on the other hand, is mainly performed by women,
although men frequently accompany women in an assistant’s role. Gardens per se
are considered to be men’s property, but the produce is considered to be women’s
property. Currently in Montetoni, most adult men have at least one productive
garden, with some having up to three, especially if he has two wives. In addition,
some men clear ‘hunting gardens’, far away from the village in their favorite hunting
grounds, in order to support long hunting or fishing trips. Otherwise, Nantis seek
to have their gardens close to their homes – preferably within half a kilometer.
1.2.1.3.2 Fishing Nanti fishing practices include bow-fishing, hand-nets, throw-
nets, hook-and-line fishing, hand-gathering, and the use of kogi poison. The first
four methods are employed exclusively by men and boys; while men, women, and
children all participate in the hand-gathering of fish.
For much of the year, the waters of the upper Camisea are crystal clear,
making bow-fishing in its shallow waters a highly productive fishing strategy. Es-
pecially during the dry season, the scene of a lone man stalking fish in the shallows
is common one. Nanti fishing arrows are distinctive in that they lack fletching and
have barbed heads, made either of kuri palm, in the case of kurikii arrows, or in
recent years, of cold-hammered penny nails, in the case of karabatonki arrows.
The clear waters of the Camisea also make the hand-gathering (okobagake)
of fish a highly productive strategy. A number of species of fish, but principally the
ubiquitous hetari, rest on the undersides of rocks, making them easy prey for skilled
gatherers. Unlike bow-fishing, which is carried out exclusively by men, the hand
11The sole exception of which I am aware is the planting of magona, which is done only by women.
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gathering of fish is carried out mainly by women, although men also participate.
Although hand-gathering is not viable at times when the river is laden with sediment,
it is a consistently productive strategy, meaning that at almost any time a Nanti
can put together a small meal with less than an hour of gathering activity.
In contrast to bow-fishing and hand-gathering, hand-nets, throw-nets, and
hook-and-line fishing are most productive when the river is thick with sediments.
Pogori hand-nets, for example, are employed mainly during periods of intense flood-
ing, when small fish seek shelter against steep river banks. Larger nylon throw-nets,
first introduced by Matsigenka visitors in the late 1990s, are used in similar river
conditions, though only a small number of younger adult men are competent in their
use. Hook-and-line fishing, using shamentotsehi thorns and tamarotsa cord, was also
a traditional fishing technique, but a marginal one. However, since the mid-1990s
the availability of metal fishhooks and nylon fishing line has made hook-and-line
fishing more successful, and during periods of the year in which the water is turbid
for weeks at a time, it is an important substitute for bow-fishing. For the most part,
however, hook-and-line fishing remains largely the province of young and teen-aged
boys.
All the preceding fishing strategies are essentially solitary ones, although a
small group of men may work together when using a throw-net. In contrast, the use
of kogi for fishing (ikonahati), is a collaborative activity that minimally involves a
single household. Kogi (Tephrosia toxicofera, known as barbasco in Peruvian Span-
ish) is a plant whose roots release a milky fluid when pounded. This fluid contains
rotenone, a chemical which impedes the ability of fish to absorb oxygen through
their gills, either stunning or killing the fish, without rendering the flesh toxic. Nan-
tis typically employ kogi in shallow water, which reduces the dilution of the chemical
and facilitates the recovery of stunned fish by hand or by delivering a coup de grace
with an arrow or machete. Kogi is unusual in that it is harvested exclusively by
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men, and the plant itself is the sole plant that is treated as grammatically animate
and exhibits masculine grammatical gender (see Chapter 6, §6.3.2).
Nantis frequently build dams (ikamotake) to reduce the water level and
thereby increase the efficacy of the kogi. Dams are built in areas where the river
splits into several channels, an especially common phenomenon in the dry season
when river levels drop considerably. One channel is dammed off, shunting water
into the other channels and causing the water level in the dammed channel to drop.
Because of the substantial labor that is frequently involved in building dams, and
the large catches that result, multiple residence groups are usually involved. On
several occasions, Migero has organized kogi-fishing trips in which the entire village
of Montetoni participated. In large kogi-fishing trips, the catch can be huge, reach-
ing 30 to 50 kilos of fish per household, for as many as 30 households. Kogi-fishing
is by far the largest cooperative subsistence activity, involving, men, women, and
children; and large trips are usually initiated by senior, socially prominent men who
are able to attract companions at an early stage to assist with the labor to get the
event off the ground.
1.2.1.3.3 Hunting Nanti men spend a considerable amount of time hunting,
despite the fact that hunting is normally much less productive than fishing. Never-
theless, bird and mammal meat is highly prized by all Nantis, and hunting stories
form a very important men’s discourse genre.
Nantis hunt with bows and arrows,12 using bows (ibihane) carved from the
wood of the kuri palm. Arrows (ichagore) are made from chakopi, the slender flower
stalks of saboro (Gynerium sagittatum) cane. All the chakopi for a year, around
200-300 stalks per man, must be gathered and dried in the brief 4 to 6 week period
in which they are available (roughly late January to early March). The huge demand
12In 2005, Montetoni received a single shotgun from the Dominican mission, but as of 2006, this
item essentially remained a toy for young men.
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this creates necessitates that Nanti men go on some of their longest trips, sending
them on visits to distant headwaters regions which they otherwise rarely frequent.
Subsequently, men spend many hours of the wet rainy season by their fires, making
arrow after arrow, waiting for the weather to clear.
The primary Nanti hunting strategy focuses on visits to sites where animals
are likely to feed, such as fruiting trees and salt licks. However, almost any time
that a Nanti man leaves the village he will carry his bows and arrows with him,
to take advantage of chance encounters with birds and animals. Nanti men make
frequent use of hunting blinds, which they position near plants that animals or birds
feed on. Ibankotira are small, dome-like shelters built on the ground with room for
one or two people and are normally placed at the edges of gardens, which draw
agoutis (sharoni; Dasyprocta variegata), pacas (samani; Cuniculus paca) and pecar-
ries (shintori; Pecari tajacu, and imaranipage; Tayassu pecari); near posuro plants
(a small, sweet, wild plantain), which draw squirrel monkeys (tsugeri; Saimiri spp.),
coatis (kapeshi; Nasua nasua), and birds like the olive oropendola (paronpe; Gym-
nostimops yuracares); or near the base of fruiting trees, which draw certain largely
terrestrial birds, such as the (kontona; Geotrygon sp.). Imenkotira are platforms
hidden in the foliage of trees, which are positioned for firing on monkeys, especially
woolly monkeys (komaginaro; Lagothrix lagothricha) and spider monkeys (matsirari
or osheto; Ateles sp.), and large birds such as the kusi (Pipile cumanensis) that
come to feed on flowering trees, such as the vividly yellow shimashiritiga and the
red taheri.
Hunting is normally a solitary activity, or one carried out by small groups.
There are two important exceptions: pecarry-hunting and tapir-hunting. White-
lipped peccaries (shintori, Pecari tajacu) form herds of up to two hundred animals,
and when such a herd is spotted near the village, every available man sets out
to help entrap the herd. Successful hunts of this sort sometimes yield more meat
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than can be consumed. Nanti women will also frequently cooperate with men when
large herds of peccaries are being hunted, serving as spotters, and helping to cut
off the herd’s escape. Tapirs (kemari, Tapirus terrestris) are also frequently hunted
in groups. These large animals, which can weigh up to 200 kilos, are difficult to
kill, and frequently must be chased and wounded several times before they can be
brought down. Nantis’ interest in dogs, which they first encountered in the early
1990s, is largely related to their utility in worrying wounded tapirs.
Nanti men also employ traps, especially for hunting birds. One ingenious
trap, kabehari, consists of a set of slip-knots hung on the branch of a fruiting tree.
Birds who seek to eat the fruits must stick their heads through the slipknots, and
in doing so, cause the knots to tighten, which eventually strangles them.
1.2.1.3.4 Wild-gathering Both men and women wild-gather a range of food-
stuffs, from kahebi fungus to manataroki palm fruits, as they fortuitously come
across them in the course of pursuing other activities in forest. Such fortuitously
discovered foodstuffs are frequently eaten on the spot, and Nantis do not set out on
general wild-gathering trips, without a specific objective, in the way they may set
out on a general hunting trip. Instead, gathering trips tend to be focused on specific
resources that are normally available for only narrow windows of a few weeks every
year.
The number of wild-gathered plant foods that are the object of concentrated
collecting activity is limited, consisting of keta, a nut strongly reminiscent of a
walnut; kuri palm fruits; and hetsiki, a fruit that is harvested primarily for its
nutty seeds, although the sweet flesh of the ripe fruit is also desultorily eaten. The
hearts of a variety of palms, including kamona, kuri, and sega, are also sought out
sporadically.
Wild-gathered insects, on the other hand, form an important component of
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the Nanti diet.13 At several times of the year, the caterpillars of various moth and
butterfly species are abundant, and other hunting and fishing activity wanes as men,
women, and children go out in groups to collect these caterpillars in vast quantities.
Some species are simply toasted in the coals of a fire, such as the hairy kapoti, which
is scraped off of tree trunks, where they congregate in large numbers. Others, such
as the smooth-skinned tsuharo, are gathered by climbing into the crowns of tall
trees. Tsuharo must first be turned inside out to rid them of the toxic leaves of
the koho tree, then subsequently cooked in large packets of tsupana (Heliconia sp.)
leaves in great volcano-shaped fires. Grubs (beetle larvae), which are also seasonal,
are highly prized for their fattiness, but are rarely gathered in large quantities, and
only when chanced upon. The adult form of certain beetle species, especially maho,
which are found in cane brakes, are also gathered when encountered.
Although wild-gathered plants do not form a major part of the Nanti diet,
many wild-gathered plant materials are employed in the manufacture of the con-
siderable majority of Nanti tools. Palm woods are very strong, and are used for
bows, fishing arrowheads, spindles, and looms (kuri); raised house floors (kamona);
and house walls (tantikota). Before the introduction of large metal cooking pots,
large vessels (kamonaki), were made by hollowing out kamona trunks. A variety of
palm leaves are used for thatch, the most prized being kapashi. The soft bark of
the tamarotsa tree is processed for the common spun twine used by Nantis (and for-
merly also used to weave fabric), while the strong fibers taken from the bark of the
kabehari tree are used to spin kabehatsa, the tough cord used in bowstrings and bird
traps. Saboro cane yields flower stalks used for the shafts of arrows, and the central
vanes of the plant’s long leaves are used to make the ubiquitous shitatsi mats that
Nantis sit and sleep on. Bamboo (kapiro) is used in making arrowheads (kapirokota,
13In addition to wild-gathered insects, Nantis also raise two kinds of fly larvae, mogurontsi and
kaho. Piles of manioc tuber skins are left in quiet spots near the village, and every few weeks the
piles are taken to the river, where the larvae are rinsed out to be consumed raw.
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serikota), single-use vessels for steaming fish (kapirosanpi), and for making torches.
The gathering of plant and insect foods and of plant materials is usually
a mixed gender activity, as well as an activity that children frequently participate
in. Women tend to form the majority of the groups that gather materials used in
women’s manufactory tasks, such as the weaving of shitatsi mats, and also tend to
initiate these trips. Men, on the other hand, tend to initiate and form the bulk
of groups that gather materials used in men’s manufactory tasks, such as house
construction. Men also usually lead activities that involve climbing trees, since tree-
climbing requires the use of magitentsi, a climbing tool consisting of a loop of cords,
and which, worn across the shoulders and chest, in past generations served as men’s
sole garment.
1.2.1.3.5 Animal husbandry Nantis are enthusiastic raisers of a wide array
of birds and mammals that they capture as young and raise to adulthood – from
monkeys to macaws, and even, on occasion, tapirs – and it is not uncommon for
twenty species of animals to be represented in the village at one time. Animals are
normally raised (opiratakero) by women, although men sometimes take a special
interest in an animal. Some of these raised animals are eventually eaten, but most
come to a natural end. Captured animals, especially birds, are highly prized by
Matsigenkas, who commonly trade manufactured goods for them. However, Nantis
do not explain their fondness for raising animals in utilitarian terms – they simply
like doing it.
It is in this context that Nantis’ large flocks of chickens (chaberi) are best
understood. Although Nantis had some exposure to chickens in the Timṕıa re-
gion, prior even to their contact with Dominican missionaries, Nantis began raising
chickens in earnest in 1993, when Araña brought the first breeding pairs. Chickens,
which are owned exclusively by women, are now so numerous that they outnumber
the Nantis themselves. Like captured pets, however, Nantis only eat chickens in
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extremis, and the village’s chicken population is kept in check mainly by wild preda-
tors, especially eagles and ocelots, and through trading them to visiting Matsigenkas
and mestizos.14
1.2.1.4 Geography and demographics
The geography of the regions in which the Nantis presently live and formerly lived
has played an important role in Nanti history. In particular, the geography of these
regions has permitted Nantis to maintain a relatively high degree of political auton-
omy and independence from Peruvian national society and the Peruvian state. The
geography of these regions also significantly shapes present-day Nanti subsistence
practices and community politics.
This study concentrates on the Nanti communities of Montetoni and Maranke-
hari. These two communities are located at the navigable limits of the Camisea
River, which is a tributary of the Urubamba River, one of the major rivers of the
southern Peruvian Amazon. The headwaters region of the Camisea River, where
Montetoni and Marankehari are situated, occupies a transitional zone between the
lowland tropical rainforest, which stretches for thousands of kilometers to the north
and east, and the cloudforest of the Andean foothills, which rise in ranks to the
south and west.
A distinctive feature of this area of southeastern Peruvian Amazonia is a
series of east-west ridges that march down from the Vilcabamba Range in the south,
diminishing in altitude towards the north until they merge with the extreme lowland
region of the Purús River basin, near the border with Brazil. These ridges create a
distinctive geography of gorges and precipitously steep river valleys that makes both
river and ground travel more difficult in this area than in most parts of Amazonia.
To the east, these ridges are bracketed by the Fitzcarrald Bridge, a spur of hills
14Thus far, the only Peruvian mestizos who have visited Montetoni have been associated either
with the government, the ministry of health, or the petrochemical companies.
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running from south to north from the Cordillera de Carabaya. The Fitzcarrald
Bridge closes off the valleys formed by the sets of ridges at their eastern extreme,
thereby creating a series of narrow, steep watersheds that drain from their eastern
headwaters (adjacent to the Fitzcarrald Bridge) towards the west. This results in
five major rivers, which, from south to north, are: the Yavero, the Tikompińıa, the
Timṕıa, the Camisea, and the Mishagua. Towards their western extreme, the ridges
in question are bisected by the Urubamba River, into which these five rivers drain.
The Urubamba runs south-to-north from its sources in the Andes to its confluence
with the Tambo River, at which point the river is re-named the Ucayali. The Ucayali
continues north for some 1500 kilometers until it joins the Marañon River, forming
the Amazon River proper.
Two of the previously mentioned river basins have been especially important
for Nantis: the Timṕıa basin and the Camisea basin. Until the mid-1980s, all Nantis
lived on the upper reaches of the Timṕıa River. The middle reaches of the Timṕıa
are choked by a series of gorges that stretch for over 20 kilometers, making river
travel completely impossible and making foot travel slow and dangerous.15 Upriver
of these gorges, the river valley opens up somewhat, providing a small quantity
of arable land. Peaks as high as 2350 meters rise sharply from the valley floor
(at roughly 800-900 meters), surrounding the territory in which the major Nanti
settlements of Marihentari, Paryantimashiari, and Inkonene were found. This set
of forbidding natural barriers provided a haven that apparently allowed the Nantis
to avoid most of the ravages of the Rubber Boom era and to maintain relative
independence from later missionary and government projects. Nantis have described
the two grave disadvantages of this rugged terrain, however: a relative scarcity of
arable land; and a relative scarcity of fish and game. These factors contributed
15Efforts by Dominican missionaries to contact the Timṕıa Nantis during the 1970s and again
in the early 2000s required a week of trekking from the Dominican mission at the mouth of the
Timṕıa to reach the area in which most of the Nanti settlements were located.
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to the attactiveness of the lands in the Camisea basin, to which Nantis began to
migrate in the 1980s.
The Camisea basin lies immediately to the north of the Timṕıa basin and runs
roughly parallel to it. The Nantis’ migration to the Camisea required crossing a ridge
with 1850 meter peaks and 1600 meter passes. In its extreme headwaters region, the
Camisea basin is similar to the steep-sided Timṕıa basin, but arable land is more
plentiful. Moreover, after passing the Montetoni gorge, some five kilometers upriver
of the community of Montetoni, the hills suddenly drop off, and the valley opens up
into a large, relatively flat area in which arable land is abundant. In addition, having
come so far north, the Fitzcarrald Bridge is diminished to a small ridge that rises a
mere 50 meters above the surrounding terrain, allowing easy access from the Camisea
basin to the extensive Manu river basin in the east, and thereby vastly increasing the
area available to Nantis for hunting and fishing. The Camisea is a slower flowing
river than the Timṕıa, and is mostly navigable, but it is nevertheless dangerous
above the downriver areas in which the Matsigenka communities of Segakiato and
Cashiriari are located, due to the river’s steep rapids. Not far upriver from the
community of Montetoni, the Camisea ceases to be navigable, as the river is dotted
with huge boulders and numerous closely-bunched rapids.
Presently we estimate that there are no more than 450 Nantis, of whom some
260-300 live in the Camisea River basin, and some 100-150 live in the Timṕıa River
basin. In the Camisea basin there are two major settlements: Montetoni, with a
population of approximately 170; and, located five kilometers downriver, Maranke-
hari, with a population of approximately 50 individuals. A small settlement of
approximately 20 individuals who left Marankehari in 2005 is located at the mouth
of the Sakontohari river, some 10 kilometers downriver of Marankehari. In the oppo-
site direction, about five kilometers upriver of Montetoni, two separate households
are located near the mouth of the Pirihasanteni river, with a total population of
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approximately 20 individuals.
My demographic information on the Timṕıa basin is less certain. Reports
given by Nantis visiting Montetoni from the upper Timṕıa indicate that the com-
munities there have been heavily hit by epidemics since the Dominican mission
re-initiated contact efforts in 2001, and that the population has dropped signifi-
cantly since then. Based on conversations with Nanti visitors to Montetoni from the
Timṕıa, I estimate that prior to the epidemics there were approximately 150 Nantis
still living in the upper Timṕıa region, but in the aftermath of the epidemics, that
number may be considerably smaller. Most Nantis on the upper Timṕıa apparently
live in the vicinity of Marihentari, with a number of smaller settlements located
upriver of there.
1.2.2 Historical Sketch
Nanti oral history is quite shallow, reaching back only as far as the late 1930s or early
1940s.16 Nantis with whom I have discussed myths mention that their grandparents,
who are described as having taught them the myths, directly witnessed the mythic
events in question, placing the Nanti mythic era in the early 20th century. My brief
summary of Nanti here reflects this characteristic of Nanti oral history, although I
have supplemented it, where possible, with other sources of information. A more
detailed account of Nanti history can by found in (Michael and Beier (2004)).
1.2.2.1 To the limits of memory and beyond: 19th century – 1965
In the early 1950s, when the current eldest generation were children, Nanti territory
was limited to the Timṕıa River valley, from the area of the Inkonene settlement
at its upriver extreme, to the area of the Shipetihari settlement, at its downriver
16This state of affairs is in striking contrast with Matsigenka oral history that I have recorded,
which regularly describes events of the 19th century, and also describes events that are probably
Pre-Columbian.
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extreme. Nantis had occasional amicable contacts with Matsigenkas of the neigh-
boring Sotileha and Tikompińıa River basins, but not with Matsigenkas living on
the lower Timṕıa. Limited intermarriage between Nantis and Sotileha Matsigenkas
took place until approximately 1940.
Nantis describe a settlement pattern and set of subsistence practices for this
period that largely persisted until the 1980s, when Nantis began to migrate to the
Camisea basin. Settlements consisted of 10 to 40 individuals living in one or two
communal dwellings, which generally housed a single extended family each. Since
Nantis practice shifting swidden agriculture, a settlement typically endured for some
five to ten years before it was necessary to relocate it in order to have sufficiently
close access to new land for farming. Land suitable for Nanti farming techniques was
scarce in the Timṕıa basin and most arable land was concentrated near the mouths of
major tributaries, from which settlements took their names. Consequently, despite
the periodic relocation of settlements, the basic settlement areas in the Timṕıa basin
remained stable.
Links of friendship between the scattered settlements were maintained by
periodic manioc beer feasts, to which neighbors who live as far as several days’ walk
might be invited. At other times, Nantis – especially young men – made visits
to the most distant Nanti settlements, keeping alive ties of friendship and seeking
marriage partners. The residents of the roughly 10 settlements that were linked by
visiting and manioc beer feasts constituted an in-marrying group with a common
set of material practices, a common history, and a common set of experiences that
still serves Nantis to define noshaninkahegi ‘my fellows, my countrymen’.
One surprising aspect of Nanti history is the lack of any mention of contact
with whites, or indeed, of any other indigenous group apart from the Matsigenkas,
prior to the 1970s. This suggests that Nantis were already quite geographically
isolated by the time the Rubber Boom swept through the Amazon basin with such
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tragic consequences in the late 19th century. The upper Timṕıa basin is probably
one of the least accessible regions of the Amazon basin, which may account for the
Nantis (apparently) having escaped the ravages of that era. Only a short distance up
from the mouth of the river, the Timṕıa River is no longer navigable, thus requiring
anyone who wishes to visit the upper Timṕıa to trek approximately a week through
a rugged terrain of cliffs and narrow river gorges, until they finally arrive in the
relatively open area at the headwaters of the Timṕıa River which constituted the
heart of Nanti territory.
1.2.2.2 Conflict and social reorganization on the Upper Timṕıa: 1966 –
1973
The Nanti polity described above was unexpectedly shaken by a series of violent
incidents that took place in the mid- to late-1960s. These incidents ruptured the
friendly relationships among many Nanti settlements, a division that has continued
to have profound consequences to this day.
The incidents included a series of attacks on Nanti settlements that resulted
in number of deaths, as well as several threatening encounters which Nantis describe
as abortive attacks. The first and most notorious of these attacks occurred in
approximately 1961, when a man named Guŕıguri and several of his allies attacked
the settlement of Inkoneni, the uprivermost of the major Nanti settlements at that
time. All 15-20 adults in the settlement were killed, and only five children escaped,
fleeing to the settlements of the Marihentari area, where they were taken in and
raised. Although the Camisea Nantis can identify the attackers, they have difficulty
in explaining the motivation for this and the other attacks. Nantis indicate that
the perpetrators were enraged (itsimankake), and suggest that the attack may have
by triggered by the theft of produce from the attackers’ gardens by the residents of
Inkoneni.17
17The attack seems a disproportionate response to garden theft, and I suspect that this expla-
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In response to this and the subsequent smaller attacks, the communities of
the Marihentari area broke off all contact with the upriver communities, and began
to refer to the upriver Nantis as sarihanntatsirira ‘attackers’. According to Tyogura,
a former resident of Inkonene with whom I conversed in 2002, contact between Nantis
and the Matsigenka communities of the upper Sotileja region also ceased at about
this time. In the space of a few short years, then, the former Nanti polity was split
in two, and friendly contacts with the Sotileja Matsigenkas ceased.
1.2.2.3 Unexpected contacts and their consequences: 1974 – 1983
The next major development in the lives of the Nantis was a series of unexpected
encounters with Dominican missionaries and their Matsigenka agents, which began
in approximately 1974. A Dominican mission had been established at the mouth of
the Timṕıa River in the late 1950s; and in the early 1970s, the mission attempted
to expand its operations to include the Nantis of the upper Timṕıa.
The mission made at least two major expeditions to the Nanti communities
of Kinkateni and Marihentari, and made overflights of the Inkoneni area, where
they dropped goods for the settlements they encountered. Initially terrified by the
visitors, the residents of Marihentari and Kinkateni fled into the surrounding forest.
After some time, however, they returned to their settlements and received presents
of metal tools from the expedition, which included both missionaries and Matsigenka
intermediaries.
After the initial exploratory expeditions, the mission founded a school and
a small settlement at a site called Ibakichaa,18 roughly half a day’s walk downriver
from the Nanti settlements of Kinkateni and Heteriha. According to the Nantis, the
nation is a post hoc explanation based on Nanti beliefs that theft triggers catastrophic and fatal
consequences for the perpetrators. According to Glenn Shepard (personal communication), Mat-
sigenkas in the Manu basin also learned of these attacks, and attribute them to a conflict over
metal tools. Although I find this explanation plausible, Nantis with whom I have discussed this
hypothesis have rejected it, saying that there were no metal tools in the region at that time.
18This site is known to Matsigenkas as Pakitsaari.
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students for this school were taken by force and threat of violence from these two
nearby settlements, and many of the residents of these settlements fled upriver to the
Marihentari area after these events. Residents of Marihentari recall that an effort
to bring children from Marihentari to Ibakichaa was frustrated when, forewarned of
the arrival of the school teacher, the children of the settlement fled into the forest
until the teacher returned downriver.
According to Nantis, the school and the adjacent settlement proved very
unstable because the students fled repeatedly from the school to rejoin their families.
The location of the school, far up the Timṕıa, also presented logistical problems for
the school teacher and the mission, and after several years the school was closed, in
approximately 1980. When the school was disbanded, some of the students and their
families were taken to resettle close to the mission, at a site known as Kimaroari,
while others fled to Marihentari until they felt it safe to return to the Kinkateni
area, a few years later.
Another major consequence of this period of contacts was a number of severe
epidemics that swept through the Nanti settlements, resulting in the death of a
significant fraction19 of Nantis from respiratory and gastro-intestinal illnesses. Fear
of epidemics became so great during this time that residents of settlements would
scatter into the forest at the first sign of major illness in order to wait out the
epidemic. According to Nantis, once contact with the mission and its representatives
ceased, the epidemics abated.
The experiences of the Timṕıa Nantis with the mission and the school had a
number of important consequences. First, Nantis learned a great deal about whites
and their indigenous allies, who were simultaneously sources of highly valued metal
goods and inclined to kidnap Nanti children. Second, they became highly conscious
19It is difficult to arrive at precise mortality figures for this period, but genealogical investigations
indicate that at least 30% of the Nanti population died from introduced illnesses between the mid-
1970s and the early 1980s. Note that ‘virgin soil’ epidemics like these are estimated to have mortality
rates as high as 60% in other areas of Amazonia (Napolitano, 2007).
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of the threat of illness from downriver regions. These factors combined to make the
outside world both enticing and profoundly frightening. A third major consequence
of contact with the mission was the introduction of a small quantity of metal tools,
which significantly increased the ease with which Nantis could clear land for farming.
At the same time, the scarcity of these tools resulted in closer ties between many
of the Nanti settlements, as the sharing of these limited tools became an important
aspect of Nanti subsistence practices. As we shall see, these closer ties, and Nantis’
concerns about outsiders, play an important role in the next major event in Nanti
history that we consider: the Nanti migration to the Camisea basin.
1.2.2.4 Migration to the Camisea basin: 1983 – 1986
In approximately 1981, contact between the Inkonene area settlements and the
Marihentahari area settlements was re-established on an intermittent basis, after
approximately ten years of mutual estrangement. Although relatively amicable re-
lationships were eventually established, the first several encounters between these
two groups were the source of great anxiety for the residents of the Marihentari-
area settlements, as they suspected that the encounters with upriver Nantis were
preliminaries to an attack. Although in retrospect this fear appears to have been
unfounded, it played a pivotal role in a crucial event in Nanti history.
On one occasion in either 1981 or 1982, the residents of the Marihentari
settlement panicked and fled from the settlement and crossed the 1500 meter ridge
between the Timṕıa and Camisea basins to seek safety from the attack they feared
was imminent.20 This group remained in the Camisea headwaters region for several
weeks, and what they found there impressed them. Fish and game were abundant
in the region, and comparatively large areas of arable land were numerous. Signifi-
20The residents of Marihentari were never attacked by the upriver Nantis, but this incident
became the source of a story widely disseminated by Matsigenkas in subsequent years (and by some
missionaries and anthropologists) that there had been an attack on Marihentari.
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cantly, this rich area was unpopulated.21
The discovery of this new region soon led to a major migration of Nantis from
the Timṕıa basin to the Camisea basin, motivated by a number of factors. Foremost
among them was the desire to exploit the abundant resources of the Camisea basin,
but some Nantis also hoped that it would be possible to acquire new metal tools
to replace those that had been lost or worn out since they were acquired from
the Dominican missionaries and their agents in the 1970s. Another motivation
mentioned by some Camisea Nantis was to distance themselves from Nantis of the
Inkonene region, who they still mistrusted, despite the renewal of peaceful relations.
Within a year or two of the discovery of the upper Camisea, Hoha, who in
future years became a politically very important individual, cleared a small garden
on the banks of the Makitihari, a small tributary of the upper Camisea, to support
extended hunting and fishing trips in the upper Camisea basin. By 1983, his brother
Bikotoro and his father-in-law Hoshi did likewise. Shortly thereafter, their extended
family resettled to Makitihari, and began clearing new gardens a short distance
downriver, on the banks of the Mayobeni, another tributary of the upper Camisea.
When this family group resettled in Mayobeni in approximately 1984, other residents
of Marihentari took over the abandoned Makitihari settlement. By 1986 a new set of
gardens were cleared at Pirihasanteni, and the leading edge of the Nanti colonization
of the Camisea basin expanded further downriver. As groups living in Mayobeni and
Makithari left for the Pirihasanteni settlement, new migrants from the Marihentari
area settled in Makitihari and Mayobeni.
The new gardens in Pirihasanteni were so fruitful that a group from Pirihas-
anteni, led by Samoero (died 1996) a socially prominent man at that time, made
21The upper Camisea basin previously had been a Matsigenka settlement area, although it was
never heavily populated. At the time that the Marihentari Nantis arrived in the region, however,
it had been unpopulated for some 5 to 10 years, due to raids by a Panoan group based in the
upper Manu basin against isolated Matsigenka households on the upper Camisea, which had led
Matisgenkas to abandon the region.
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trips to the more distant downriver Timṕıa settlements of Shipetihari, Hetariha,
and Kinkateni, to invite the residents of these communities to relocate to Pirihas-
anteni. The invitation was received warmly, and within a few months, the residents
of all these communities had resettled in Pirihasanteni. With these new arrivals,
the population of Pirihasanteni had grown to approximately 100 individuals, by far
the largest Nanti settlement ever, in the memories of the Nantis of that time. Piri-
hasanteni was also highly significant because it consisted of multiple family groups
that lacked strong kinship ties, and thus represented a new type of settlement, and
one which formed a model for the larger Nanti settlements founded in the 1990s.
1.2.2.5 Voluntary contact and new relationships: 1987 – 1990
By 1987, residents of Pirihasanteni were making extended hunting and fishing forays
down the Camisea River that took them downriver of the precipitous Montetoni river
gorge, which formed a significant barrier to most Matsigenka travel further up the
Camisea. It was during a fishing trip far downriver of the Montetoni gorge that
Nantis first voluntarily initiated contact with outsiders.
The fishing party, which included Hoha, Tito, and Migero (all three served
as community leaders in later years), saw a small group of Matsigenkas who were
cutting palm fronds for thatch, near the mouth of the Marankehari, without being
seen themselves. The Nantis noticed that the Matsigenkas were using machetes,
and after some discussion, Tito decided to approach the Matsigenkas to negotiate
for a machete. The encounter was at first frightening for both the Nantis and the
Matsigenkas, and the two groups had difficulties in communication, but each side
soon determined that the other had peaceful intentions, and a friendly interaction
ensued.
Significantly, the Matsigenka group included a man named Mart́ın Vargas, a
retired schoolteacher who had worked closely with the Summer Institute of Linguis-
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tics (SIL) during the time that the SIL was establishing contact with voluntarily
isolated groups in the Manu region. Vargas promised the Nantis two machetes in
exchange for help cutting thatch, and for two days the two groups worked together.
As he got ready to return downriver to Segakihato, where he lived, he promised the
Nantis to return the following year with more metal tools for them, but asked them
to relocate their settlement downriver of the Montetoni gorge, to make it possible
to visit them.
Encouraged by the prospect of more metal tools, and their fears of outsiders
allayed by Vargas’ friendly manner, the Nantis soon began clearing new gardens
just downriver of the Montetoni gorge at a site called Pihegihato. By the time
Vargas returned in 1988, Pihegihato already had approximately 40 residents. Vargas
brought new axes and machetes, as well as some used cooking pots, all of which were
eagerly received by the Nantis of Pihegihato. Vargas visited again in 1989 and 1990,
each time bringing more gifts. Although Vargas clearly sought to ‘civilize’ Nantis
by, for example, attempting to convince them to wear clothes, Nantis describe him
as affable and kind, and he was remembered fondly when news of his death arrived
in 2001.
1.2.2.6 Imposition of a Matsigenka hegemony: 1991 – 1995
Unknown to the Nantis, Vargas’ policy towards the Nantis became part of broader
plan that developed among certain politically-powerful Matsigenkas to concentrate
the Nantis in a single settlement and bring them under Matsigenka control. The
motivations for this plan were complex, and included a desire to gain control over
the natural resources of the region, a move to gain an advantage in the political
jockeying between the two rival Matsigenka indigenous federations, and the fact
that many Matsigenkas have internalized an anti-indigenous ideology of civilización
advanced by missionaries and the mestizo-controlled educational system.
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With Vargas having convinced the Nantis of the good intentions of the Mat-
sigenkas, the next step was to install a schoolteacher, Silvero Araña, in the Nanti
community of Pihegihato. Araña arrived in approximately April 1991, accompanied
by Vargas, who promised that Araña would be a steady source of metal goods and
help maintain good relations between the Nantis and Matsigenkas. Little was said
about the school that Araña would form. The Nantis, trusting the promises of the
Matsigenkas, accepted Araña enthusiastically.
Although it did not become evident to the Nantis for some time, Araña’s
goal was nothing other than the total transformation of Nanti society into his vision
of an ideal indigenous community, which was largely modeled on his understanding
of Peruvian mestizo society. Araña soon came to express open disdain for the Nanti
language, which he considered a broken form of Matsigenka, and for most Nanti
material and cultural practices, from hunting with bows and arrows, to wearing
traditional Nanti clothing, to karintaa poetry, the central event of Nanti manioc
beer feasts.
Araña’s first major goal after settling into Pihegiato was to concentrate all
the Montetoni Nantis in a single settlement, which required a larger village site.
Before the end of 1991, Araña had convinced the Pihegihato Nantis to clear a site
for the settlement of Montetoni, and by the end of 1992, the residents of Pihegihato
had relocated to the new settlement. Araña blamed the periodic epidemics that
began to sweep through the Nanti settlements with his arrival on the communal
dwellings the Nantis used until this point, and employed this argument to convince
the Nantis to construct nuclear family dwellings in the new settlement.
At this point, Montetoni had approximately 100 inhabitants, but Araña also
sought to concentrate in Montetoni the other 150 Nantis living in the Camisea basin.
His swift success in doing so was due in large part to his reliance on Hoha, who,
as one of the leaders of the migration from the Timṕıa, was widely respected by
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Nantis. Hoha transmitted Araña’s promises of metal goods for everyone who moved
to Montetoni, and by the end of 1995, all but a handful of the Camisea Nantis
were living in Montetoni. Not long after this point, Araña appointed Hoha the
presidente22 of the new community, and delegated to Hoha the enforcement and
implementation of many of the directives he issued to the community regarding the
community labor he demanded.23
As his power in the Nanti community grew, Araña began to use violence,
intimidation, and threats of withholding metal goods to coerce Nantis to carry out
clearing and construction tasks to build the community he envisioned. After Araña
was satisfied with the basic infrastructure of the community, he began a campaign of
coercion and humiliation aimed at ridding the Nantis of all practices that he deemed
‘uncivilized’, such as traditional dress and ornamentation. In the school he sought
to ‘correct’ the language of his students by criticizing the use of lexical items that
differed from their Matsigenka counterparts.
As the years wore on, he increasingly used Nanti labor for personal profit,
especially for commercial logging, and he began a regular pattern of sexual assault
on Nanti women and girls. In effect, Araña had come to treat Montetoni as his fief.
Despite the worsening conditions under Araña, Nanti resistance remained
muted. Nantis expressed to me their profound fear of Araña’s temper and inclination
towards violence; and moreover, collective action against Araña was impeded by the
fact that the Nantis’ nominal leader, Hoha, was allied with Araña. In 1996, however,
Araña finally overplayed his hand significantly, allowing Montetoni to escape from
22The presidente is one of the three principal elected roles in the legal structuration of titled
Peruvian native communities. Araña adopted this term without adopting any other part of the legal
structuration. As described in greater detail below, the Camisea Nantis subsequently reconfigured
the role of peresetente to satisfy their own political ends.
23I first travelled to Montetoni in 1993 in the company of two Matsigenkas men. This visit lasted
less than two weeks, but my observations of the interactions between Araña and the Nantis began
at that time. For detailed discussion of my subsequent involvement in and relationship with the




1.2.2.7 Nanti resistance: 1996 – 1998
Not long after the Camisea Nantis were concentrated in Montetoni in 1995, Araña
began planning to relocate the community further downriver, principally to make
feasible the commercial agricultural activities he hoped to carry out using Nanti
labor. In early 1996 he had the Nantis clear a five hectare space near the mouth
of the Marankehari, which he then had them plant with achiote for subsequent
sale downriver. In late 1996 he and some 80 Nantis moved to the new settlement,
with the expectation that the other Nantis would follow soon after. The Nantis
who relocated with Araña included a group of some ten young men, who as his
students had embraced the vision of ‘civilization’ that he promoted in the school
and were personally very loyal to Araña; a group of young women who served
both as household servants and as additional wives; and the parents and siblings of
these young women. Significantly, many of the Nantis who relocated with Araña,
including Hoha, presidente of the new community, identified with Araña’s evaluation
of traditional Nanti practices as inferior to Matsigenka practices, and even more so,
mestizo ones.
As the months passed, it became increasingly clear that the approximately
170 residents of Montetoni were in no hurry to relocate to Marankehari, and so Araña
began to step up pressure on them, threatening to withhold new metal goods, and
even threatening to confiscate ones they already owned. These threats were delivered
by Hoha to Migero, the peresetente of Montetoni that Araña had appointed in Hoha’s
place, and brother to Hoha. Migero, however, had no desire to serve as Araña’s
enforcer, and instead argued that the threats were unwarranted and unreasonable.
After many months of stalling, Migero also clearly articulated that the Montetoni
Nantis had no intention of relocating to Marankehari.
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Tension between Araña and the Montenoni Nantis escalated, and Araña’s
threats became increasingly extreme – such as vowing to prevent a visiting govern-
ment medical team to visit Montetoni – and outlandish, as when he warned the
Nantis that the Peruvian military would bomb Montetoni unless they relocated.
With the leadership of Migero, however, and out from under the threat of immedi-
ate violence,24 the Montetoni Nantis became increasingly outspoken about Araña’s
behavior with visitors, including the author.
The information provided by the Montetoni Nantis eventually led, in 1998, to
the Peruvian government investigating Araña’s conduct, and then issuing a warrant
for Araña’s arrest on 14 counts of sexual assault against a minor. Tipped off by
Matsigenka allies downriver, however, Araña evaded capture and subsequently fled
with a group of approximately 15 Nantis, including his three wives and the young
men who were his closest adherents. After living as a fugitive for some six months
on the lower Camisea, he abandoned these Nantis, and fled to the distant Mipaya
River. Although Araña was eventually stripped of his teaching position, he has
remained free, despite a number of attempts to capture him.
1.2.2.8 Negotiating autonomy and a new social order: 1999 – 2002
Nantis’ experiences with Araña and their resistance to him had profound effects
on Nanti political organization and on Nanti attitudes towards a variety of outside
institutions and groups. The abrupt departure of Araña from the upper Camisea
also put the Nantis in uncontested control of their own communities for the first
time since early 1991.
One of the major results was strong opposition from Nantis to the presence
of schoolteachers in their communities, and a profound suspicion of Matsigenka
24The threat of violence remained very real to the Nantis living in Marankehari, however. At
one point, one of the oldest women in the village objected to Araña’s rape of her granddaughter,
leading Araña to assault her with a rock. She died from her injuries within a few days.
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intentions. During the conflict between Araña and the Nantis, a number of Matsi-
genka leaders had sought to intimidate the Nantis into withdrawing their accusations
against Araña, a course of action that led the Nantis to identify the Matsigenka po-
litical leadership as allied with Araña.
Nantis’ resolve regarding school teachers was repeatedly tested, and Migero
rejected a number of efforts to place Matsigenka teachers in either Montetoni or
Marankehari. For example, in approximately March of 2001, a new government-
appointed Matsigenka teacher arrived in Marankehari, without prior consultation
with Nantis. Despite their reservations, the residents of Marankehari acquiesced in
the face of the teacher’s promises. However, when the news of his arrival reached
Montetoni, Migero and a group of socially prominent men immediately travelled
downriver to face the new teacher. Migero explained in no uncertain terms that
his presence was unwelcome, and ordered him to depart. The teacher attempted
to convince Migero to relent, but failing to do so, returned downriver the next day,
and never returned.
Montetoni’s conflicts with Araña also resulted in the explicit ideologization
among the residents of Montetoni of their community as a moral and social collec-
tivity, hashihegi komoniraro ‘our (incl.) community’. This new understanding of
community membership was clearly in play in 1999, when Migero advocated that
the community re-situate itself on the opposite bank of the river in order to be
closer to the newer gardens and larger areas of arable land. Community members
enthusiastically collaborated in the clearing of the new village site and in the con-
struction of new dwellings, and explicitly characterized this collaborative work as a
joint effort by the community, and not simply kinship-based collaboration. Led by
Migero, periodic collective labor to cut the grass in the center of the ring-shaped
village also became ideologized as a manifestation of komoniraro.
The construction of the new settlement marked a period of increasing promi-
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nence of manioc beer feasts in community life. Prior to this point, manioc beer
feasts were held roughly every two to three weeks in Montetoni, and endured some
8 to 10 hours. In the new village, however, the tempo began to increase, until they
came to be held roughly every seven days. The amount of manioc beer prepared for
the feasts also increased, allowing feasts to last up to 24 hours, and in later years,
up to 48 hours. As I describe in §1.3.1, manioc beer feasts are one of the primary
contexts for inter-household interactions, and it is easy to see the increase in the
frequency of the primary context for inter-family interactions as related to efforts in
Montetoni to create a new form of multi-family community.
In the years immediately after Araña’s departure, the most important rela-
tionships that the Nantis had with outsiders were with Ángel Dı́az, a Matsigenka
evangelical pastor, and with myself and Christine Beier. Dı́az had begun visiting
the Nanti communities intermittently in the mid-1990s, but his involvement with
the Nanti communities intensified in 1997, when the Summer Institute of Linguis-
tics (SIL) became interested in translating a Nanti New Testament. Between 1998
and 2001, Dı́az visited Marankehari two or three times each year, staying for sev-
eral weeks each time. Dı́az collected some linguistic data to aid in the translation
project, organized the creation of a new school, and also began evangelical work in
the community. The Camisea Nantis had a very high opinion of Dı́az at the time,
in part because of the role he had played in legal charges being brought against
Araña, and they generally welcomed his presence. Also beginning in 1998, pairs of
Nanti men were brought for a number of visits to the then SIL base in Yarinacocha,
where they worked first with David and Judy Payne, and later with Wayne and
Betty Snell,25 on linguistic matters related to the preparation of Nanti educational
materials and the translation of the New Testament. Dı́az’d direct involvement in
25The Paynes were involved with the Nanti translation project due to their expertise on the
Ashéninka variants in the Kampan family. The Snells were involved due to their knowledge of
Matsigenka, and had in fact themselves produced the existing translation of the New Testament
into Matsigenka.
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the Nanti communities tapered of significantly after 2001, when the SIL completed
the translation project and ceased financing Dı́az’ visits to the Nanti communities.
Dı́az’s effort to found a school in Marankehari met with Nanti approval be-
cause he sought to meet their condition that any teacher in their communities be
Nanti. Two young men who were considered the most promising students from
Araña’s school, Berenarto and Tekori, were provided with training and started teach-
ing in Marankehari in 1999. Despite initial enthusiasm on the part of children and
community members, however, the effort proved unsustainable, and Berenarto and
Tekori stopped teaching. Although the school had little success from an educational
standpoint, it did temporarily serve to relieve the pressure being put on the Nantis
to accept a Matsigenka teacher.
In the period under discussion, Migero’s influence in Montetoni grew con-
siderably, due to his remarkable leadership, which met with the approval of the
community’s residents. However, during the same period, the political leadership
of Marankehari became a source of contention. Hoha had always displayed a much
more authoritarian leadership style than his brother Migero, and in July of 2000,
increasing dissatisfaction with Hoha came to a head when he interfered with the
burial of a woman who had recently died. In the dispute that followed, other com-
plaints surfaced – such as the fact that Hoha had stepped in to arrange marriages
that left several young women and their families unhappy; and in some cases had
even resorted to physical coercion to assure that the young women stayed with their
chosen husbands. In the aftermath of these events, several residents of Marankehari
left to live in Montetoni, and others formed a new settlement at Sakontohari, several
hours walk downriver of Marankehari. Hoha’s social influence dropped significantly,
and he left the position of peresetente towards the end of 2000. At this point, Dı́az
intervened and chose Berenarto, one of the two Nanti teachers, to replace Hoha as
peresetente. Although Berenarto was well-liked, his youth (he was approximately 19
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at the time) severely affected his ability to serve as an effective leader, which ham-
pered the Marankehari Nantis’ ability to organize concerted responses to outside
pressures. Beginning in 2002, Hoha began a series of efforts to return to power, at
least in substance if not in name. In response, Berenarto asked his father Anteres,
who lived at that time in Montetoni and was one of the most respected Nanti men,
to relocate to Marankehari. Anteres acquiesced to Berenarto’s request. With his
father by his side, Berenarto’s efficacy as a leader increased significantly. Hoha’s
continued efforts to usurp Berenarto’s power led to a series of conflicts between Mon-
tetoni and Marankehari in 2003 and 2004, and in their aftermath, the the residents
of Marankehari expelled Hoha from the community.
1.2.2.9 The present and future: new challenges and new opportunities:
2003 – 2007
Beginning in 2003, the Nanti communities began to have increasingly frequent con-
tact with outside entities, including officials from the Manu National Park, petro-
chemical company representatives, and representatives of the Dominican mission.
In the first months of 2003, the Montetoni Nantis received an unexpected
visit from officials of the Manu National Park, which lies some three kilometers to
the east of Montetoni. I was not in the village at the time, and once I arrived I was
unable to glean the principal reason for their visit; to the Montetoni Nantis, the
most newsworthy aspect of their visit was that the park officials reportedly forbade
the Nantis to either hunt or fish in the park without obtaining prior permission for
each trip, and completely forbade agricultural activity within the park. These pro-
hibitions initially caused great concern to the residents of Montetoni, since roughly
half of the Nanti hunting and fishing territory lies in the park. Migero in particular
sought to avoid a conflict with the park officials and at first sought to convince the
families whose hunting areas lay in the park to hunt elsewhere. This suggestion was
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highly impractical, however, and Migero soon sought only to stop the clearing of
new gardens. Even in this, however, he was unsuccessful, and he eventually decided
to wash his hands of the matter entirely. As of late 2006, park officials had not
returned, or attempted to enforce their prohibitions.
In 1996, Shell announced plans to exploit the Camisea natural gas fields,
one of the largest known deposits of natural gas in South America. In 1997, Shell
began a projected 40-year multi-billion dollar project in the lower Camisea region
with the active encouragement of the Peruvian government, but over the objections
of numerous environmental and human rights groups. Shell anthropologists and
environmental consultants made a number of brief visits to the Nanti communities,
and installed a communication radio in Marankehari, but their presence, some 50
kilometers downriver of the Nanti communities, otherwise did not greatly interest
or impact the Nantis. In 1998, Shell withdrew from the Camisea project due to
disagreements with the Peruvian government.
The Peruvian government, however, was eager to have the Camisea fields
developed, seeing them as a major boon to the Peruvian economy, and solicited
new bids for the project. In 2000 the Peruvian government awarded the Camisea
project contract to a consortium of international companies, led by the Argentinian
company PlusPetrol.
PlusPetrol eschewed many of the environmental and social safeguards adopted
by Shell, and has displayed much less concern for avoiding contact with indigenous
peoples who themselves have chosen to avoid direct contact with mestizo society.
Rather, PlusPetrol has supported a policy of integrating populations like the Nantis
into Peruvian society.
An influential institution that has developed close ties with PlusPetrol is the
Dominican mission, to the degree that the Timṕıa mission even received helicopter
logistical support from the consortium to make contact with the Nantis of the up-
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per Timṕıa in 2001. In 2003, the Dominican mission began a long-term effort to
missionize the Nanti communities on the Camisea. This effort is being led by Padre
David Martinez de Aguirre, an enthusiastic young priest who sees the increased in-
tegration of Nantis with Peruvian mestizo society as a desirable goal. Padre David
made visits to Montetoni in 2003 and 2004, bringing gifts, and through Matsigenka
translators, sought to convince the Montetoni Nantis to accept a mission school
staffed by a mission-supervised Matsigenka schoolteacher. The community in gen-
eral was quite unenthusiastic about this proposal, but Padre David was determined
to convince the Nantis to accept the school, and made additional visits to attempt
to sway them.
Then in approximately December 2004, PlusPetrol informed Migero that his
presence was required for a meeting in Lima, and flew him there. Although Migero
never learned the purpose of the meaning, the experience affected him profoundly. In
particular, he found that because he was unable to speak Spanish, he was effectively
shut out of all serious discussion at the meeting. Having become accustomed to
being a central participant in all matters of political importance affecting Montetoni,
since assuming of the position of peresetente some eight years earlier, Migero found
his abrupt marginalization highly troubling. Migero’s analysis of the situation was
that it was his lack of mastery of Spanish that placed him in this disadvantageous
position.
In this context, Padre David’s arguments regarding the utility of Spanish
suddenly had great weight, and upon his return to Montetoni, Migero set about
attempting to turn the tide of opinion in the community in favor of the proposed
school. In April 2005, Padre David made another visit to Montetoni, and Migero ac-
cepted the mission’s proposal, but with the proviso that the proposed schoolteacher
live in Montetoni with his wife, and only during the times of year that he would be
actively teaching.
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At the time that Migero agreed to the mission’s proposal, the majority of
the community opposed the decision to permit the Dominican mission to install a
teacher and school. However, Migero convinced several of Montetoni’s most socially
prominent men of the wisdom of having a school in the community, and he appeared
to have calculated that with their support, he would eventually be able to win the
support of the majority of the community.
Padre David also wanted the Montetoni Nantis to agree to build an airstrip
in the community, to facilitate the arrival of mission personnel in the community.26
Migero was, however, much less enthusiastic about the proposal to build an airstrip
in the commmunity, and did not organize communal labor to clear it. The mission
eventually responded, in 2006, by sending a group of hired Matsigenkas to clear the
strip with chainsaws. It is unclear, however, whether the airstrip will prove viable
in the longterm, at it must be regularly re-cleared, and it is by no means certain
that Nantis will be interested in investing the labor necessary to do so.
The new Matsigenka school teacher, Willy Prialé, arrived in Montetoni in
August 2005 to set up the school and begin teaching, and returned again in 2006.
During my visit to Montetoni in December 2006, the residents of Montetoni ex-
pressed to me their general satisfaction with the behavior of the school teacher.
Recently, the nature of the mission’s involvement in the Nanti communities
has also been rendered uncertain, due to charges brought against the mission to the
American Court of Human Rights by AIDESEP, Peru’s national Amazonian indige-
nous federation, accusing the mission of making contact with voluntarily isolated
indigenous groups in legally protected areas, including the Reserva Kugapakori-
Nahua.
26As mentioned in §1.2.1.4 the terrain in the upper Camisea region is such that river travel is
quite hazardous, especially to non-local travelers, and the mission, already having its own plane,
would have far more frequent access to Montetoni were an airstrip available.
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1.3 Nanti communicative life
The purpose of this section is to provide a brief ethnography of speaking, focusing on
the major Nanti discourse genres. I provide information on the participation struc-
tures that typify each genre, restrictions on participation, and the distinguishing
topical and formal features of each genre.
The most striking feature of the overall discourse ecology into which Nanti
discourse genres fit is the division between manioc beer feasts and the remainder
of Nanti social life. Several important genres are restricted to manioc beer feasts;
and others that may occur outside of feast contexts are much more common within
them. Significantly, multi-party genres are restricted to feasts, and feasts are the
principal context in which Nantis interact with individuals outside their own resident
groups. In fact, for many Nantis, especially women, feasts are the only time that




Shitatsi talk is a multi-party interactional genre restricted to feasts, when Nantis are
seated, normally on shitatsi mats, drinking manioc beer. Topically, shitatsi talk fo-
cuses on entertaining, and typically humorous, themes. The genre is distinguishable
acoustically by the prevalent intermixing of laugh tokens with utterances, and by the
frequent laughter by non-speaking participants.27 At any given time, shitatsi talk
is typically focused on a single topic, say, an amusing mishap, to which any adult
in the participating group may contribute. In striking contrast with many other
Nanti discourse genres, shitatsi talk interactions are not dyadic; rather, speakers
27In stark contrast, the small number of women who are distributing manioc beer to the seated
group generally maintain a serious demeanor, and do not contribute to the interaction.
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typically make their contributions in very loud voices, and without directing them
to a particular individual (evidenced by eye gaze).
This genre is also characterized by a distinctive spatial arrangement, in which
participants tend to seat themselves very closely to one another, often touching. The
majority of the group is normally oriented towards a central area, which is situated
in front of a cluster of the most highly socially prominent men present, who are
usually seated together.
1.3.1.2 Ikantagenati
Ikantagenati, perhaps best glossed as ‘ribbing’, is an interactional genre that occurs
principally during the early stages of a feast, while most attendees are still seated
on shitatsi mats, drinking manioc beer. The topics of ikantagenati are typically
ones that would be considered grievously insulting in other contexts; but in this
context, they elicit raucous laughter from the assembled group. A favorite topic
of ikantagenati is sexual joking involving encounters with other people’s partners.
Typically ikantegenati is organized around a dyadic interaction in which one party
makes a variety of outrageous proposals to a second person, who is the embarrassed
butt of the joke. Overhearers, who are typically laughing at the humor, may also
join in with humorous commentary of their own. The person who is the butt of the
joke largely maintains an embarrassed silence, but any responses he or she musters
which turn the tables are highly appreciated by the audience of overhearers. Both
men and women participate in the genre, although it is rare for women to be in the
role of the primary ‘ribber’.
1.3.1.3 Peresetente oratory
Along with the novel social role of peresetente, or community leader, has emerged a
new discourse genre: peresetente oratory. This genre is in large part the innovation
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of Migero, the long-term peresetente of Montetoni, but its occasional use by others
indicates that the genre is recognized as such by Nantis, and cannot simply be
considered a personal speaking style.28
Peresetente oratory is nominally dialogic, in that the speaker’s attention is
primarily focused on a particular individual, who responds with continuers appro-
priate to a typical Nanti conversational interaction. It is clear, however, that the
speaker considers all the ratified overhearers to be recipients, in that his voice is
normally much louder than typical for a dyadic conversation, and his gaze often
flickers to the group of overhearers, suggesting that he is monitoring their reactions
to his utterances. For their part, the ratified overhears are normally silent during
peresetente oratory, suggesting that they recognize the existence of a conversational
floor that extends beyond the nominal dyadic pair, and their gaze is often directed
at the speaker.
Peresetente oratory is characterized by turns at talk that are considerably
longer than is typical for Nanti conversation, sometimes lasting several minutes.
This genre also exhibits considerable thematic cyclicity, through which a small set
of major themes are repeated several times in the course of the oration. Migero
marks the transition from conversation to peresetente oratory with a unique form
of throat clearing that is normally successful in both drawing the attention of the
group of ratified overhearers and signalling to the nominal dyadic recipient that his
or her responses should be limited to continuers.
I have witnessed peresetente oratory performed in a wide range of social
contexts, but it is much more common in feast contexts than in non-feast ones. This
is no doubt in large part due to the fact that this genre is generally employed to
communicate matters of wide import to the community, and feasts are the principal
28Migero has on occasion sought to groom young Nanti men to be able to replace him when he
eventually steps down from the role of peresetente. As part of this process, Migero has encouraged
these young men to perform peresetente oratory in appropriate contexts.
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context in which large groups of individuals assemble. In fact, I have seen Migero
deliberately postpone the discussion of a topic until a feast, so that he could address
the topic, using peresetente oratory, in the presence of a large group of ratified
overhearers.
1.3.1.4 Karintaa Chanting
Karintaa is a genre of extemporaneous chanted poetry performed during manioc
beer feasts. Karintaa chanting breaks down into two major subgenres: one genre
performed by both men and women, and one performed exclusively by women. The
former genre is performed considerably more frequently than the latter.
Both genres share the same basic features.29 After several hours of seated
drinking at the manioc beer feast, individuals rise, form lines by joining hands,
and begin to chant. As they chant, the lines of chanters move fluidly around the
open areas near to those seated. These lines may range from two to 40 individuals,
depending on various situational factors, and there may be as few as one or as many
as five or six lines moving around the open areas simultaneously. The chanting
itself consists of alternations between a fixed refrain and couplets of improvised
lines, the karintaa proper. There are upwards of a hundred fixed refrains, which
range from sequences of uninterpretable vocables to easily parsable clauses. At any
given time, a group of chanters will chant the same refrain, though not necessarily
in a synchronized manner. Switches between refrains, which typically occur every
ten to twenty minutes, are normally initiated by a socially prominent individual
who simply begins chanting a new refrain, upon which the other members of the
line switch to the new refrain.
Karintaa couplets consist of a pair of seven-mora lines, to which the impro-
vised verses must conform. The beginning of each line corresponds to the beginning
29For detailed desciption and discussion of this impressive verbal genre, the reader is referred to
Beier (2001, 2003); Michael (2004a).
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of a word, but pairs of lines may exhibit enjambment. The end of each couplet,
however, corresponds to the end of a sentence. Verses are made to conform to the
metrical constraints of the line through the morphophonological processes of vowel
lengthening, syllable reduplication, word truncation at the ends of lines, and the
addition of vocable suffixes.
Karintaa chanting is frequently performed dialogically, or even in the manner
of a multi-party conversation, as chanters respond to the extemporaneous verses of
others with their own extemporaneous verses. Almost any topic may serve as an
acceptable topic for karintaa couplets, but the genre’s principal significance for the
local discourse ecology lies in the fact that it is considered a socially appropriate site
for expressing strong criticisms of others, for making significant requests of others,
and for moralizing about others’ behavior – all of which are communicative stances
that are strongly dispreferred in other contexts.
The women’s karintaa genre is principally distinguished by lines of women
chanting a distinct set of refrains that are never performed by men, and by the fact
that only other women may serve as dialogical chanting partners.
1.3.1.5 Myth and oral history narration
The narration of both oral history and myths is referred to with the verbal root
kenkitsa – although the narrations of oral history and myths are clearly distinguish-
able, as I discuss below. Nevertheless, Nantis have clearly and explicitly expressed to
me that the telling of these two kinds of narratives is appropriate only during man-
ioc beer feasts.30 Both forms of narration are mainly performed by men, although
I have also heard older women participate in the narration of oral history.
30A small number of Nanti men, especially my close friend Bikotoro, are sometimes happy to
narrate oral history for my benefit outside of this context.
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1.3.1.5.1 Myth narration Myths are told dialogically, with the two male nar-
rators treating each other as recipients of the narrative. The two narrators typically
alternate narrating scenes in the myth, although it is common for the ‘resting’
narrator to provide additional commentary at the same time, such that his contri-
butions overlap considerably with those of the ‘primary’ narrator. Although the two
narrators treat each other as recipients, there is typically a large group of ratified
overhearers, who frequently interject questions that the narrators may respond to,
while each still treats their co-narrator as the focal recipient.
I have never heard a myth narrated outside of the context of a feast, and in
fact I have found Nantis to be flatly unwilling to narrate myths outside of the feast
context. Indeed, myth narration is rare even in such contexts, and the instances
I have witnessed have all been triggered by events that make the content of the
myth relevant to everyday concerns. For example, the first and only time I have
ever heard the myth that concerns the near-destruction of the world – which was
triggered by the extinction of the moon, and subsequently averted by the re-ignition
of the moon by the primordial tapir – was on the evening of a lunar eclipse. On that
impressive occasion, the entire village was awake for several hours during the middle
of the night, with men firing flaming arrows into the sky, and both men and women
shouting a fixed phrase at the moon, all in order to help re-ignite the moon and
prevent it from falling to earth and crushing everyone beneath it. In this context,
I heard the relevant myth narrated numerous times in dyadic pairs. Even the very
next day, however, I had no success in finding anyone who was willing to narrate
the myth to me, despite the fact that several men had been very concerned that I
hear and understand the myth the previous evening.
1.3.1.5.2 Oral history narration Interestingly, from the perspective of evi-
dentiality, the narration of myths does not involve the use of quotative resources
except for the quoted dialogue of characters within the myth, despite the fact that
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narrators will happily clarify from whom they learned the myth (stereotypically, a
grandparent). As such, in evidential terms, the narration of myths patterns with
the relation of generally accepted facts and personal experience.
The narration of oral history is considerably more monological than myth
narration, although such narratives are usually told to a specific recipient who re-
sponds with continuers and asks questions regarding the unfolding narrative. How-
ever, the recipient is not expected to co-narrate an oral history narrative, and on
several occasions I have seen narrators express irritation when another individual
seeks to contribute to the narrative, and even ask that they be permitted to continue
their narrative without interruption. As with myth narration, there is normally a
large group of ratified overhearers.
Oral history narration, unlike myth narration, makes extensive use of quo-
tative resources, and evidential resources more generally. Personal experience and
knowledge acquired through verbal report are normally carefully distinguished.
1.3.1.6 Hunting talk
Hunting talk is a narrative genre mainly performed by men, and mainly in the
context of feasts. However, women may participate in hunting talk if they were in-
volved in the events being narrated, and may sometimes be the recipients of hunting
talk narratives when no other men are available as recipients. Although this genre
reaches its greatest expression during feasts, it is also often performed by men when
they narrate their hunting experiences outside of the feast context.
Hunting talk is a highly dramatized form of narration of a recent hunting
experience, in which the details of the events surrounding a successful kill or a
near miss are recounted in extreme detail. The genre is characterized by a number
of characteristic phonetic features, including highly modulated speech and unusual
intonational contours in which pitch drops dramatically over the course of the first
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vowel of a word, which is also noticeably lengthened, and then rises back to the
initial pitch level (Beier (2005)). The result is a highly rhythmic pitch and prosody
that makes hunting talk instantly recognizable.
During feasts, hunting talk frequently becomes a multiparty interaction, in
which others who were participants in the narrated hunting event contribute their
own perspective; and others who were not involved in the focal event instead narrate
their own recent experiences that bear similarities to the focal hunting event. Multi-
party hunting talk is distinctive in that it is characterized by a high degree of
overlapping talk, which is otherwise unusual in Nanti interactions.
1.3.2 Non-feast communication
1.3.2.1 Visiting talk
During non-feast times, interaction between members of separate residence groups
is quite limited, and is largely restricted to deliberate inter-household visits by one
or a few individuals (ikamosoti). Although inter-household visits may be paid at
any time of day, the hour or so before dusk is a favored time for visiting among men.
Visiting talk is characterized by a distinctive participation structure, a small
set of stereotypical topics, and a sober, polite interactional tone. Visiting talk is
strongly dyadic, which is reflected in the fact that visitors frequently frame their
visit as a visit to a particular individual, using the formulaic expression given in
(1.1), where X is a kin term or personal name.
















‘I said, “Wait a sec, I’m going to visit X.”
Typically, a visitor will at first direct his (or her) attention to the single
individual he is visiting, while other members of the household apart from that
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visitee disattend the visitor. If the interaction eventually spreads to include other
members of the visitee’s household, it is common for interactions between the visitor
and the other household members to be routed through the visitee, rather than for
the visitor and the other household members to address each other directly.
The stereotypical topics for visiting talk are the subsistence activities of the
visitor and the visitee and, to progressively lesser degrees, the activities of the other
members of each of their households, and of their neighbors. Individuals participat-
ing in visiting talk generally keep their voices at a moderate volume, eschew joking,
carefully avoid arguments, and tend to avoid overlapping the utterances of their
interlocutors, all of which give the interaction a constrained and sober tone.
Participation in visiting talk is structured by gender and age. Men tend to
visit more socially prominent men and equally socially prominent men, although
some men systematically visit every household in the village, or in a given part of
the village, in the hour or so before dusk. As a result of the practice of ‘visiting up’,
socially prominent men, such as the peresetente, are overwhelmingly the recipients
of visits, while comparatively socially marginal men tend to be the givers of visits. A
woman’s visiting activity, in contrast, is mainly focused on the households in which
she reside her sisters or mothers (the category ina ‘mother’, includes both a person’s
biological mother and her sisters), although a small number of women visit broadly,
in the manner described above for men.
Only Nantis that ‘count’ socially as adults participate in visiting talk, and
the change in inter-household visting activity is a sign of an individual’s transition
to adulthood (roughly 17 for males and 15 for females). Children normally pass
from household to household with little attention paid to them by adults, slipping
into casual conversations and playing with their peers. As they become adults,
however, their interhousehold visiting activities become more constrained. Young
men frequently appear tongue-tied and inarticulate as they visit their elders and
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strive to hold appropriate conversation, while the easy-going visiting of young women
drops off considerably in comparison to that of their childhood.
1.4 Fieldwork and data
The data on which this dissertation is based are almost exclusively my own record-
ings of naturally-occurring discourse, mostly conversations between Nantis or con-
versations between myself and Nantis. The vast majority of my recordings were
made in the two main contexts for interactions between members of distinct house-
holds: manioc beer feasts and inter-household visiting. Recordings from the former
context include a number of distinguishable genres including peresetente oratory,
karintaa chanting, and shitatsi talk.
My corpus contains a relatively small proportion of recordings of intra-
household interactions outside of feast contexts. The main reason for this is that
by visiting another household, I key the ‘visiting’ frame, which demands the use
of the visiting talk interactional genre. Since I am a socially-prominent resident of
the community, it would be impolite for Nantis to let me slip into the interactional
background during visiting talk, and consequently, my recordings of visits to other
households principally consist of conversations between myself and the adult male
head of household. Recordings made while Nantis visited my household, however,
show more demographic and topical variety.
1.4.1 Grammatical description
The Nanti fieldwork setting imposed two conditions on my study of Nanti grammar
that are unusual for contemporary linguistic descriptive work and therefore merit
comment: complete reliance on monolingual fieldwork; and almost complete reliance
on naturally-occurring conversational data.
The tidy monological linguistic text, which is the staple of much descriptive
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work, is basically absent from corpus. Instead, my corpus mainly consists of dyadic
or multi-party conversations. Even narrative and myth tellings are pervasively dia-
logical, and indeed, conversational, as Nantis expect the recipients of narratives to
ask frequent questions and introduce relevant information of their own. I quickly
learned that attempting to acquire ‘clean’ narrative texts, by eliciting a narrative
and subsequently keeping my contributions to a minimum, did little more than make
the narrator uncomfortable and bring the narrative to a swift end.
Without a doubt, I would have found elicitation a useful tool at many points.
For example, lthough I frequently attempted to obtain well-formedness judgements
from Nantis, my efforts were largely unsuccessful. I believe the source of my dif-
ficulties were two-fold. First, Nantis normally treat utterances as embedded in
trajectories of social action, and as such, they found it hard to provide acceptability
judgements of any sort for isolated utterances. Even when I sought clarification
regarding transcribed utterances from interactions, my consultant’s first response
was always to inquire about the participant framework and the social context in
which the utterance occurred. Second, Nantis have very little experience with meta-
linguistic commentary – that is, explicit commentary on linguistic form. Nantis were
generally enthusiastic about discussing the social importance of an utterance, but
I had grave difficulties in communicating that I was interested in the form, rather
than the content, of utterances. As a consequence, when I asked Nantis to comment
on whether a given utterance was acceptable or not, their overwhelming tendency
was to evaluate its social or interactional appropriateness. Nantis were generally
happy even with utterances that I knew to be grossly ungrammatical, as long as
they could interpret them in light of the interactional context that I supplied.
As a result of these challenges, basic linguistic tasks such as eliciting paradigms
or grammatical structures proved quite arduous. One technique I employed with
some success was to steer conversations in particular ways, in the hope that my
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interlocutors would spontaneously employ the form or construction I was interested
in during the course of the interaction. Another useful technique in this context was
to attend closely to the ways in which my interlocutors would rephrase utterances I
produced, which provided important clues about well-formedness.
Most Nantis also had difficulties with providing paraphrases or glosses, even
when they were interested in helping me to understand a lexeme that I did not
understand. A small number of Nanti men who had travelled to Matsigenka com-
munities – and consequently had had significant exposure to a different, if closely
related, language – were able to gloss words and provide well-formedness judgements
to a small degree. However, they did not seem to enjoy this activity at all, and so I
generally made judicious use of their abilities.
All the merit of my corpus, then, accrues to the extensive and intensive time
that I and my Nanti interlocutors have invested over the years in the project of
making me a competent speaker of Nanti.
1.4.2 A note on personal names and place names
1.4.2.1 Personal names
All the personal names I use for the Nantis mentioned in this study are Nanti
adaptations of Spanish names they received from Matsigenkas or mestizos.31 Prior
to being given Spanish names in the early 1990s, personal names were apparently
very rare among Nantis. Most of the individual Nanti names that I have recorded
belonged to men who played infamous roles in the violent incidents of the 1960s (see
§1.2.2.2), including Guŕıguri, Koshanti, and Kapohari. As far as I am aware, only
one of the eventual residents of Montetoni had a personal name prior to contact
31The majority of the Spanish names that Nantis have received were given to them by the Mat-
sigenka schoolteacher Silverio Araña, who lived with the Nantis between 1992 and 1998. Between
1998 and 2001, the Matsigenka evangelical pastor Ángel Dı́az also named some children. The
majority of new Spanish names given to Nantis since 1998 have come from mestizo doctors who
periodically visit the upper Camisea.
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with the Matsigenkas, Yonka,32 who was given the Spanish name Yonatan by the
Matsigenka schoolteacher Silverio Araña. I have only ever recorded a single Nanti
name for a woman, Tayo,33 a former resident of Inkonene.
As surprising as the rarity of personal names may be cross-culturally, all the
Nantis with whom I have spoken about this topic are insistent that very few individ-
uals had personal names. These findings are also consistent with the ethnographic
data on the closely-related Matsigenkas (Johnson, 2003, pp. 9-10). Based on my
discussions with Nantis and observations of current referential practice, it appears
that individuals were formerly referred to by basic kin terms (e.g. pishobanirite ‘your
brother-in-law’), by complex kin term expressions (e.g. pishari ikoritiri ‘your grand-
son’s wife’), and by nonce indexical expressions. Given that Nantis formerly lived in
small settlements of 10 to 30 individuals, all of whom were usually related through
kinship ties, the rarity of personal names is somewhat explicable.
The use of personal names remains rare among many Nanti adults, who retain
the habit of referring to individuals via kins terms, and who frequently exhibit great
difficulty in remembering the recently-given personal names of close kin such as
children, siblings, and parents. Unsurprisingly, Nanti adults make the most use
of personal names for socially prominent individuals to whom they cannot trace a
kinship relation. Young Nantis, however, have embraced personal names and use
them regularly, especially in reference to one another.
Borrowed names strongly reflect adaptations to Nanti phonology and phono-
tactics, as evident in the examples of men’s names given in (1.2), and women’s
names given in (1.3).
(1.2) a. Áheri < Ángel
b. Bikotoro < Victor
32Yonka is the Nanti name for the Military Macaw, Ara militaris.
33Tayo is the Nanti name a species of scaled bottom-feeding fish.
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c. Bisárota < Lizardo
d. Erehón < Gideón
e. Hosukaro < Oscar
f. Ihonira < Leonidas
g. Irabi < David
h. Gónaro < Donaldo
i. Migero < Miguel
j. Terohite < Teodor
(1.3) a. Aborora < Aurora
b. Éroba < Elva
c. Isabera < Isabel
d. Hororinta < Florinda
e. Horoteha < Dorotea
f. Márota < Marta
g. Nánkuse < Nancy
h. Óroma < Norma
i. Peranke < Francisca (and Francisco)
j. Rakera < Raquel
Since 1997, Nantis have developed additional forms for some names, so that
they presently have both a historically prior Nanti form and a more recent form
that more closely approximates Matsigenka or Spanish pronunciations of the name,
as in (1.4).
(1.4) a. José > Hóshi > Hosé
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b. Delf́ın > Teherina > Rerṕın
c. Ezekiel > Esekera > Esekira
Some other names, however, have developed forms that better accomodate
Nanti phonotactics and are less like their associated Spanish forms, as in (1.5).
(1.5) Job > Hoke > Hókuse
1.4.2.2 Place names
Rivers serve as the basic orienting geographic feature for Nantis when they discuss
the locations of persons, areas, and things. River names also serve as the basis for
naming communities and settlements, meaning that rivers and nearby communities
normally share names. Such is the case for the Nanti community of Marankehari,
for example, which takes its name from the small river that joins the Camisea some
200 meters downriver from that community.
An important exception to this general principle is the community of Mon-
tetoni itself, which takes its name from the river gorge of Montetoni, some five
kilometers further up the Camisea. The name ‘Montetoni’ illustrates another im-
portant fact about Nanti settlement names: they may refer to multiple settlements
in roughly the same area. Thus, the name ‘Montetoni’ has applied to three suc-
cessive settlements, formed by relocating the entire settlement every few years to a
better location.
For the most part, I choose to employ Nanti place names for locations and
geographic features within Nanti territory, even if Matsigenka or Spanish alternatives
exist. I make two exceptions though, for the Timṕıa and Camisea Rivers, which
are well-known rivers that extend far outside Nanti territory. Nantis previously
referred to the former as the Ogorokaate, but in recent years have largely adopted
the Matsigenka name, Tinṕıa. Similarly, when the Nantis first migrated to the
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Camisea basin in the mid-1980s, they referred to the Camisea River as the Shinkebe
([SiNkseBe]). However, when they learned that the Matsigenkas already referred to
the river as the Camisea, the Nantis adopted this name and modified it to Nanti
pronunciation as Kamisuha [kamis
>
Wija]. Nantis have retained the name Shinkebe
for the portion of the Camisea upriver of the small Pirihasanteni tributary, and I do
likewise.
In some cases, more than one form of a name is attested in Nanti disourse:
a Matsigenka place name, plus one or more versions which showing the influence of
Nanti phonology and morphology. Such is the case with the name of the commu-
nity that I refer to as Marankehari [malanksejari] (lit. ‘Snake Creek’), which derives
from the Matsigenka name, Marankeato. The suffix -ato – reconstructible in Proto-
Kampa as a means of deriving names for small rivers and creeks from other nouns –
is no longer productive in Nanti, and Nantis appear to have re-derived the name of
the creek as Marannkehari, using the derivational suffix -hari, which serves the same
function.34 These two names exist in a diglossic relationship, in which the Matsi-
genka name is frequently employed when speaking with Matsigenkas. Similarly, the
tributary of the Manu river most commonly referred to as Serehari or Sereha by
Nantis is also sometimes referred to by its Matsigenka name Seraato.35
1.5 Orthographic conventions, transcript symbols, and
morpheme codes
The orthography is phonemic and largely self-explanatory; n represents a nasal
unspecified for place of articulation.36 In the first line of any interlinearized Nanti
text, sans-serif t and a represent epenthetic segments; they are not segmented or
34Nantis also do this with place names far outside Nanti territory. The Matsigenka community
of Segakiato, for example, is frequently referred to as Segakihari by Nantis.
35On most maps this river is marked as the Rı́o Manu Chico.
36See Chapter 6, §6.2, for a detailed discussion of Nanti phonology.
56
glossed in other lines. In certain contexts a morphophonemic process neutralizes the
surface contrast between the realis suffix -i and the irrealis suffix -e. The contrast
is maintained in the morphemic segmentation.
Transcriptions consist of four lines. The first line is a broad transcription
of the recording, in which the following transcription conventions are employed: ‘–’
indicates that the speaker has cut off the production of a word with a sharp glottal
closure; ‘[’ indicates the point at which overlap begins between the line bearing the
bracket and the line immediately above it; ‘=’ at the beginning of a line indicates
latching with the previous line; ‘[...]’ indicates elided material. Nanti text preceded
by a carat (^) in the first line is inaudible material, but material that is recoverable
due to allophony that the inaudible material induces in the audible material, or
because of morphological co-occurrence relations. The remaining lines are typical
interlinearization, consisting of morphological segmentation (line 2), morpheme-by-
morpheme gloss (line 3), and free translation (line 4). Note that in lines 2 and 3,
‘=’ is employed to indicate clitics, and not latching.
Table 1.1: Morpheme codes
morpheme code morpheme gloss
1S no= 1st person subject
1O =na 1st person object
2S pi= 2nd person subject
2O =npi 2nd person object
3mS i= 3rd person masculine subject
3mO =ri 3rd person masculine object
3nmS o= 3rd person non-masculine subject
3mO =ro 3rd person non-masculine object
1P no- 1st person possessor
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2P pi- 2nd person possessor
3mP i- 3rd person masculine possessor





alien.poss -ne ∼ -re ∼ -te alienable possesion
anim -n- animate
appl:indr -ako indirective applicative
appl:inst -ant instrumental applicative
appl:pres -imo presencial applicative
appl:sep -apitsa separative applicative
augm -sano augmentative
caus:agnt ogi- agentive causative
caus:dstr otin- causative of destruction
caus:infl -akag influential causative
caus:mal omin- malefactive causative




cngnt =ta congruent stance





coll -page collective plural
coord -ntiri coordinator
deont =me deontic
derank.rel.impf -tsi deranked relativizer, imperfective
derank.rel.perf -ankicha deranked relativizer, perfective





exist.anim ainyo animate existential
exist.inan aityo inanimate existential
ext.neg matsi external negation
foc.pro (various) contrastive focus pronouns
frus -be frustrative
hab -apini habitual




irreal.a -enpa irrealis, a-class verb
irreal.i -e irrealis, i-class verb
loc -ku locative
mal.rep -na malefactive repetitive
ncngt =npa non-congruent stance
neg.irreal ha irrealis negation
neg.exist mameri negative existential
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neg.real te realis negation
nomz -rira nominalizer
nposs -tsi non-possessed
pass.irreal -enkani irrealis passive
pass.real -agani realis passive
pat/thm -ni ∼ -ne patient/theme argument
perf -ak perfective
pl -hig verbal plural
pred.foc onti predicate focus
purp -ashi purposive
quot ka quotative
real.a -a realis, a-class verb








top.pro (various) topic pronoun
trnloc.impf -aa imperfective translocative







The purpose of this chapter is to provide conceptual tools and define terminology
that I use in my description and analysis of specific aspects of Nanti evidential
practice in Chapters 3 and 4. I begin in §2.2 by discussing the competing defini-
tions of evidentiality found in the literature, and then evaluating their strengths and
weaknesses from both conceptual and empirical standpoints. In §2.3, I provide the-
oretical background for the concept of evidential practice, describing the concepts of
social practice and communicative practice, and then clarifying the role of grammar
in communicative practice. With this background, I turn in §2.4 to a discussion
of the concept of evidential practice, and argue that a comprehensive account of
evidentiality as a linguistic phenomenon requires recourse to this concept. Finally,
in §2.5, I provide a summary of the Nanti evidential system and discuss its recent
grammaticalization.
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2.2 Evidentiality: definitions and debates
The grammatical study of evidentiality dates from Boasian linguists’ engagement
with North American indigenous languages in the early 20th century (e.g. Boas,
1911, 1938). However, significant theoretical and empirical attention to the phe-
nomenon is much more recent, dating only to the 1980s (e.g. Chafe and Nichols,
1986; Barnes, 1984; Givón, 1982; Willett, 1988). The study of evidentiality as a
discursive phenomenon is younger still. Chafe (1986) was the first to broach some
of the pragmatic aspects of evidentiality, but only relatively recently has evidential-
ity attracted much attention as a discourse phenomenon (Atkinson, 1999; Hill and
Irvine, 1993b; Fox, 2001; Mushin, 2001; Ifantidou, 2001; Sakita, 2002).
In this section, I discuss the different ways in which evidentiality has been
understood in the linguistic and discourse-analytic literatures and I clarify how the
term ‘evidentiality’ is used in the present work. In doing so, I will provide an
overview of the scholarship on evidentiality, and draw a number of terminological
and conceptual distinctions that I employ in subsequent sections, including the
distinctions among ‘grammatical evidentiality’, ‘evidential strategy’, and ‘evidential
resources’.
2.2.1 Grammatical perspective on evidentiality
In prototypical instances of evidentiality, source of information1 meanings are obli-
gatorily marked by a tidy paradigm of bound morphemes, as in the Wanka Quechua
(Quechuan, Peru) examples given in (2.1). This language marks a three-way evi-
dential distinction among direct experience (-m(i), dir), inference (-chr(a), conj),
and report (-sh(i), rep).
1In Chapter 3, I argue that the notional definition of evidentiality as expressing source of infor-
mation is misleading, and that it is more accurate to characterize evidentiality as expressing the
mode of sensory access to an event. For the present discussion, however, I work with the common
definition.
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‘(I was told) Shanti borrowed it.’
While there is widespread agreement among linguists that systems like that
of Wanka Quechua are examples of evidentiality, there is disagreement over what
extensions from such prototypical cases constitute legitimate cases of evidentiality.
There are two main ways in which scholars have sought to broaden the concept
of evidentiality beyond cases like that of the notionally and paradigmatically tidy
example presented by Wanka Quechua. First, some have notionally conflated source-
of-information meanings and epistemic modality, or grouped them together under
a grammatical super-category. Second, some have relaxed structural criteria of
obligatoriness and paradigmatic regularity.
The result of such moves, as Aikhenvald (2004, p.16) has remarked, is that
an increasingly broad set of phenomena has been included under the analytical
category of ‘evidentiality’ in recent years. In response, some scholars have sought
to narrow the scope of the term, in order to render it more technically precise and
useful for grammatical typology (e.g. Aikhenvald, 2003a, 2004; De Haan, 1996, 2001).
For expositional purposes, I will review this debate by focusing on Aikhenvald’s
sustained arguments for a narrow definition of evidentiality, and the ways in which
63
alternative definitions extend the concept of evidentiality from Aikhenvald’s narrow
definition.
Aikhenvald argues that evidentiality is a distinct grammatical category2 from
epistemic modality, and that it is desirable to distinguish evidentiality as a gram-
matical category from periphrastic source-of-information meanings.
To argue for a distinct typological grammatical category from a functional-
typological perspective, it is necessary to distinguish the category notionally from
other categories (Plungian, 2001, p.350), and provide evidence that the category is
at least sometimes realized as a distinct paradigm in particular languages. Both
of these steps are easily achieved in the case of evidentiality. Notionally, eviden-
tiality can be defined as expressing the ‘source of information’ for a proposition
(Aikhenvald, 2003a; De Haan, 1999, 2005a,b). This clearly distinguishes evidential-
ity from epistemic modality, the category with which evidentially is most frequently
conflated. Basic notional definitions of epistemic modality, on the other hand, char-
acterize it as expressing the “the degree of certainty the speaker has that what s/he
is saying is true” (De Haan, 2005b). (Nuyts, 2001) provides the following, more
expansive, definition:
Epistemic modality is defined here as (the linguistic expression of) an
evaluation of the chances that a certain hypothetical state of affairs
under consideration (or some aspect of it) will occur, is occurring, or has
occurred in a possible world which serves as the universe of interpretation
for the evaluation process, and which, in the default case, is the real
2The term ‘grammatical category’ is potentially ambiguous, as it is used in two senses by func-
tional typologists: viz. a typological grammatical category and a language-specific grammatical
category. A typological grammatical category is a semantically/notionally defined category that
may be realized as a language-specific grammatical category in a given language (Palmer, 2001,
p.18-21). A language-specific category is a structurally well-behaved set of morphemes in a partic-
ular language that realize a typological category. There is some disagreement on what constitutes
structural well-behavedness, as the following discussion shows. Nevertheless, it is clear that what
Aikhenvald calls a (language-specific) grammatical category is what many would call an inflectional
category (Stump, 2001).
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world... (Nuyts 2001: p.21)
Having argued for the categorial distinctness of evidentiality, Aikhenvald
proposes that the use of the term ‘evidentiality’ be restricted to cases in which
evidentiality forms a language-specific grammatical category. Languages which do
not exhibit grammatical evidentiality express the presumably universal human ca-
pacity to express source-of-information meanings through ‘evidential strategies’ or
by ‘lexical’ means. For Aikhenvald, a language can be said to exhibit grammat-
ical evidentiality if it possesses a set of morphemes that obey the following two
requirements:
Semantic primacy: Evidential meanings are the ‘core’ meanings of the
set of morphemes in question (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004, p.3).
Obligatoriness: The relevant constituent (normally a clause) must be
marked by at least one evidential morpheme in any grammatical context
that the constituent is capable of being so marked (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004,
p.10).
Aikhenvald’s conception of a language-specific grammatical category is thus
essentially that of an inflectional category (cf. Stump, 2001). Two other criteria
related to grammatical evidentiality also surface in Aikhenvald’s discussion in a
qualified manner, which we discuss below:
Paradigmatic unilocality: Evidential morphemes form a paradigm
with a single syntagmatic locus (cf. Aikhenvald, 2004, p.9).
Paradigmatic uniformity: All the morphemes in the paradigm have
evidential meanings as their core meanings (cf. Aikhenvald, 2003a, p.11).
All scholars engaged in the study of evidentiality would, I think, consider any
set of evidential morphemes that fulfills all four criteria to be a prototypical instance
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of grammaticalized evidentiality (as in the Wanka Quechua example, above). Not
all, however, consider each of these criteria to be necessary ones for ‘evidentiality’.
In fact, by relaxing one or more of these requirements, we arrive at the various
alternate conceptions of evidentiality found in the literature.
I now consider each of these criteria, as well as the varied conceptions of evi-
dentiality obtained by relaxing each of them. In the course of this discussion, I will
also develop the definition of grammatical evidentiality that I employ throughout
the present work. Tipping my hand, the position I will defend is that the seman-
tic primacy condition is a necessary one for grammatical evidentiality, but that
the paradigmatic unilocality and paradigmatic uniformity conditions are not. To be
sure, evidential systems which additionally obey the latter two conditions constitute
especially tidy evidential systems, and are consequently a natural focus for typo-
logical studies of evidentiality, for reasons of analytical convenience. Nonetheless,
though such systems may provide the best examples of evidential systems, they do
not constitute the only such systems.
I will also argue that the obligatoriness criterion is a sufficient but not a neces-
sary condition for grammaticalized evidentiality. I maintain that the obligatory/non-
obligatory dichotomy, which the obligatoriness condition appears to endorse, fails to
adequately take into account the fact that evidential systems are found on a cline of
grammaticalization, and many evidential systems exhibit highly grammaticalized,
but not entirely obligatory, evidential systems. To treat such systems as of a piece
with ‘evidentiality’ in languages such as English (cf. Fox, 2001) fails to acknowledge
the fact that evidential meanings are often pervasive in languages with highly gram-
maticalized but facultative evidential systems, in a way they are not pervasive in
languages that lack grammaticalized evidential systems.
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2.2.1.1 Semantic primacy
Relaxing the semantic primacy condition yields the most common alternatives to
the narrow definition of evidentiality. These alternatives generally involve the no-
tional broadening of ‘evidentiality’ to include both source-of-information meanings
and epistemic modality, or subsuming the two as subcategories of a broader no-
tional category. Proponents of broader conceptualizations of evidentiality ground
their proposals in one or more of following observations: 1) source-of-information
and epistemic modal meanings share significant notional similarities, and 2) eviden-
tial morphemes frequently induce inferences regarding epistemic modality. I shall
consider each of these observations in turn.
2.2.1.1.1 Notional similarity We can take Palmer (2001) to exemplify the po-
sition that evidentiality and epistemic modality are sufficiently notionally similar to
consider evidentiality a kind of modality, on par with epistemic modality, subsuming
both under a more general type of modality:
...[E]pistemic modality and evidential modality are concerned with the
speaker’s attitude to the truth-value or factual status of the proposition
and may be thus be described as ‘propositional modality’. (Palmer, 2001,
p.24)
This supposed notional similarity of evidentiality and epistemic modality is
questionable, however. The source of information does not entail anything about the
truth-value or factual status of a proposition, as Aikhenvald (2003a) and De Haan
(1996) forcefully argue (see also Faller, 2002, p.9). To be sure, general Gricean
cooperative principles lead to routinized inferences regarding speaker commitment
to the truthfulness of their utterances (Levinson, 1983), but this is not special to
evidentials. It is also true, of course, that a language may possess portmanteau
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morphs that express both evidential and epistemic modal meanings.3 Such morphs
encode information about both source of information and factual status. However,
as Floyd (1999, p.21-7) has argued at some length, the tendency for certain eviden-
tial meanings to associate with grammaticalized epistemic modal meanings is not
evidence against their conceptual distinctness.
Taking a slightly different approach to the notional similarity of evidentiality
and epistemic modality, Chafe and Nichols (1986, p.vii) characterize evidentiality as
an “attitude towards knowledge,” which permits epistemic modality to fall under a
broad interpretation of evidentiality (Chafe 1986, p.262). Epistemic modality gram-
maticalizes judgements regarding the epistemic reliability of a proposition, which
clearly counts as an ‘attitude towards knowledge’.4 However, it is much more diffi-
cult to see source-of-information marking as an ‘attitude,’ since it does not involve
any kind of overt evaluation of the knowledge expressed in a proposition.
All this is not to deny that evidentiality and epistemic modality exhibit
similarities. For example, both evidential and epistemic modal marking index a
knowing subject (see Chapter 3 for an extended discussion of this issue). This cer-
tainly suggests a greater conceptual similarity than that which obtains between, say,
grammatical number and person. However, it is highly unclear if similarities of this
sort are sufficient for positing a grammatical super-category into which evidentiality
and epistemic modality fit, or for conflating the two categories. For the purposes
of the present work, I conclude that there is no strong notional basis for conflating
evidentiality with epistemic modality, or for subsuming the two under a broader
grammatical category.
3Faller (2002), for example, provides a detailed semantic analysis of three morphemes in Cuzco
Quechua, showing that two of them encode only evidential meanings, but that the third encodes
both evidential and epistemic modal meanings.
4See also Kockelman (2004) for a discussion of epistemic modality as ‘stance’ taking.
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2.2.1.1.2 Inferential Relationships Another argument for the conflation of
evidentiality and epistemic modality is that evidential morphology is ‘associated’
with epistemic modal meanings. Willett articulates this widely held view:
There is little doubt that evidentiality as a semantic domain is primar-
ily modal. It participates in the expression of the speaker’s attitude
towards the situation his/her utterance describes, rather than strictly
orientational information about the temporal setting of the situation, as
do tense and aspect... (Willett, 1988, p.53)
Palmer expresses a similar view regarding evidentials:
. . . their whole purpose is to provide an indication of the degree of com-
mitment of the speaker: he offers a piece of information, but qualifies its
validity for him in terms of the type of evidence he has . . . they indicate
the status of the proposition in terms of the speaker’s commitment to
it. (Palmer, 1986, p.54)
These authors take the noted associations between evidentiality and epis-
temic modality to motivate the subsumption of evidentiality under modality. How-
ever, a close reading of Willett’s and Palmer’s remarks make it clear that they
are not arguing that evidentials encode epistemic modal meanings,5 but that these
meanings arise pragmatically. This is especially obvious in Palmer’s invocation of
communicative “purpose”. Bybee, who shares Palmer’s and Willett’s basic position,
alludes to the pragmatic nature of these epistemic modal meanings more directly:
Certain evidential senses . . . relate to epistemic modality. In particular,
an indirect evidential . . . implies that the speaker is not totally commit-
5Of course, portmanteau evidential-epistemical modal morphemes exist, but that is a different
issue.
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ted to the truth of [a] proposition and thus implies an epistemic value.
(Bybee et al., 1994, emphasis added; p.180)
Of course, even if the pragmatic claims that these authors make are cross-
linguistic-ally valid (which they are not, see below), the fact that one typological
grammatical category may induce inferences regarding another one is not evidence
that they are the same category, or that they are subcategories of a higher-level
category. If we take the secondary epistemic modal meanings of evidentials as
grounds for grouping the two grammatical categories together, or for conflating
them, then it follows that we should do the same with epistemic modality and
aspect, or epistemic modality and tense.6 Indeed, it is easy to see that this mode
of reasoning would lead to the collapse of most typological grammatical category
distinctions, clearly a reductio ad absurdum.
Moreover, it is clear that in so far as evidentiality and epistemic modality are
related in specific languages, be it by inference or otherwise, this relationship is a
contingent one. As such, no intrinsic relationship can be posited between evidential-
ity and epistemic modality as typological grammatical categories. The contingent
nature of the relationship between the two categories is made especially clear by
languages that express the two categories in distinct inflectional paradigms. This is
the case in Andoke (isolate, Colombia), in which four epistemic modal morphemes
realized in one paradigm can combine freely with three evidential markers (including
a null direct experience marker) that form a distinct paradigm (Landaburu, 2005,
p.1-4). Other languages known to exhibit the same basic behavior include Paez
(Landaburu, 2005, p.4-8), Uwa (Landaburu, 2005, p.8-9), and Tsafiki (Dickinson,
2000).
Further evidence for the contingent pragmatic relationship between eviden-
tiality and epistemic modality is provided by languages which essentially present us
6It is relatively common, for example, for the perfect to develop indirect evidential overtones
(Comrie, 1986, p.110).
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with the opposite of the Andoke case, in which all evidentials are associated with a
single epistemic modal value. Such is the case in Kashaya, in which all propositions
marked by evidentials are taken to be certain and true (Oswalt, 1986, p.43).
Before closing this section, I think it is helpful to consider Floyd’s comments
on the relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality, since he has de-
veloped one of the most detailed accounts of ‘secondary’ epistemic modal meanings
associated with evidentials that I have encountered thus far. Floyd remarks that:
A fairly straightforward relationship between information source and
validation [a modal category proposed by Floyd that includes epistemic
modality] typically obtains. According to Givón, certainty judgements
are an inferential by-product of the evidentiary, experiential aspect of
knowledge (1982:25). (Floyd, 1999, p.25)
However, this relationship does not lead him to conflate the two typolog-
ical grammatical categories, despite the fact that languages may grammaticalize
epistemic modal meanings, together with evidential ones:
In principle, of course, validation and evidence are independent of each
other. It is certainly possible, for instance, for someone to see something,
but not believe it or accept it strictly on the basis of its appearance. But
the prototypical associations – direct evidence with strong commitment
and indirect evidence with weak commitment – are what become encoded
grammatically in languages. ... Validation notions bear strong and ob-
vious connections to source of information notions but are conceptually
independent. (Floyd, 1999, p.26-7).
And since typological grammatical categories are defined “conceptually”,




Another argument adduced for grouping evidentiality and epistemic modality to-
gether is the existence of paradigms in specific languages that include both mor-
phemes with primary evidential meanings and ones with primarily epistemic modal
meanings.
Stenzel (2004), for example, in her grammar of Wanano (Tucanoan, Brazil),
uses paradigm-structure arguments to justify treating evidentiality as a type of
modality. Arguing against Aikhenvald’s categorical distinction between evidentiality
and (epistemic) modality, Stenzel remarks:
Furthermore, Aikhenvald also observes that in some languages, ‘eviden-
tiality markers occur in the mood and modality slot in a verbal word, and
are thus mutually exclusive with conditional, imperative, interrogative
markers and so on’ (Aikhenvald 2003a:15). In other words, evidentials
in some languages can be analyzed as one of the categories of modality
because of their behavior within the overall paradigm. (Stenzel, 2004,
p.339)
Note that Stenzel is making an argument about language-specific grammat-
ical categories, suggesting that an evidential can be considered a modal in a given
language, by virtue of its occupying a paradigm shared by modal morphemes. Specif-
ically, Stenzel is not making an argument about the relationship between evidential-
ity and modality as typological gramatical categories, but rather about the behavior
of language-specific modal or evidential systems. Indeed, Stenzel seems to evince
skepticism about the entire project of identifying typological grammatical categories:
Such observations suggest that perhaps we should not attempt to make
absolute cross-linguistic claims about the nature of evidential systems
and the semantics they code. Though we can observe cross-linguistic
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tendencies and use them as suggested frameworks, there are so many
possible areas of semantic overlap that the only kinds of categorical state-
ments possible are those which refer to the organization of the system
in a single language. (Stenzel, 2004, p.339)
While Stenzel’s remarks about paradigm structure are cogent, I think that
she misconstues the nature of the “cross-linguistic claims” being made about the
distinctness of evidentiality and (epistemic) modality. Moreover, I believe that there
is a subtle incoherence in her overall position, stemming from the role of typologi-
cal grammatical categories in identifying the semantics of particular morphemes in
language-specific inflectional paradigms.
We can begin by observing that typological (i.e. cross-linguistic) grammatical
categories are defined notionally, and never structurally (see above). Such categories
may be realized by morphemes in a single paradigm, or scattered across multiple
paradigms. In either case, the paradigm(s) in question may include morphemes
expressing quite different grammatical categories (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1998). In
short, language-specific morphosyntactic paradigms do not systematically corre-
spond to typological grammatical categories, or vice versa. Consequently, language-
specific notional heterogeneity at the paradigmatic level carries no consequences for
the typological grammatical category membership of the paradigm’s morphemes. To
return to Stenzel’s point, the fact that evidentials may occupy the same paradigm
as modal morphemes entails nothing, one way or the other, about whether eviden-
tials are a category of modals, conceived as exponents of a typological grammatical
category. Even in the case of a particular language, all we can conclude is that
evidentials and modals form a paradigm.
The argument I am making here may be clearer if we consider paradigms in
which evidentials share a position with morphemes other than epistemic modal ones.
Consider, for example, the case of Mỹky (Isolate, Brazil), in which two evidential
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morphemes and negation form a paradigm (Monserrat and Dixon, 2003). The fact
that negation and evidentials share a paradigm in Mỹky does not permit us to
conclude that negation is a ‘category of evidentiality’, or that evidentiality is a
‘category of negation’. Returning to Stenzel’s claim above, by analogous reasoning,
the presence of evidentials in a paradigm containing modal markers does not permit
us to conclude that evidentials can be analyzed as a modal category.
A defense of Stenzel’s position might be that her claims pertain to evidential
and modal systems in specific languages, and not to evidential and modal cate-
gories, in the typological sense. In this light, we could understand Stenzel’s basic
point to be that, from language to language, evidential systems vary in their se-
mantics, and as such, linguists cannot make categorical statements regarding what
evidential systems encode. In some languages, evidential meanings may be realized
in portmanteau morphemes with epistemic modality, or tense, or any number of
other categories, whereas in others, morphemes may carry only evidential mean-
ings. In some languages, evidentials form dedicated paradigms; whereas in others,
evidentials are found with other kinds of morphemes. As such, Stenzel argues,
“absolute cross-linguistics claims” – and it seems that Stenzel has Aikhenvald’s cat-
egorical distinction between evidentiality and epistemic modality in mind here – are
untenable.
But I believe that Stenzel’s argument misses the mark, as she and Aikhenvald
are concerned with different issues. Aikhenvald is concerned with the existence
of a typological grammatical category, whereas Stenzel’s point concerns particular
evidential systems. And crucially, Aihkenvald’s categorial claim has nothing directly
to do with the semantic organization of particular evidential systems. In particular
evidential systems, the semantics of evidentiality and epistemic modality may be
complexly intertwined at both the morphemic and paradigmatic levels. But this
does not, in itself, vitiate the claim that each are distinct typological grammatical
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categories.
The final twist in defending Stenzel’s position would be to argue against the
existence of typological grammatical categories themselves – an issue she seems to
broach when she asserts that categorical statements are only possible in reference to
the organization of language-specific systems.7 But it is here, I submit, that Sten-
zel’s position is undermined by inconsistencies. In particular, without the notional
grounding given by typological grammatical categories, it would not even be possi-
ble to define the category of any given morpheme in a paradigm. This would render
moot any argument about how the notional composition of a paradigm structure
may, in a language-specific manner, ‘re-categorize’ morphemes which would other-
wise be classified as belonging to other categories. In the Wanano case that Stenzel
discusses, for example, evidentials are argued to be modals by virtue of their sharing
a paradigm with modals. To even begin this argument, however, Stenzel needs to
identify particular morphemes as modals, a step that relies on the cross-linguistic
category of ‘modal’. In short, Stenzel’s argument, which seeks to undercut absolute
cross-linguistic claims, rests crucially upon such claims, in the form of the notional
definitions of categories necessary to categorize individual morphemes.
There seems little reason, therefore, to take the existence of mixed paradigms
as compelling evidence for conflating evidentiality and epistemic modality. For the
purposes of the present work, then, evidentiality and epistemic modality, as typo-
logical grammatical categories, will be considered sufficiently distinct.
2.2.1.3 Obligatoriness
Evidential meanings can be expressed in a variety of ways: as morphemes in an
inflectional paradigm, as facultative morphology, or periphrastically. Indeed, it is
commonly claimed – and there seems no reason to doubt this – that it is possible to
7Such a stance would resemble that of Radical Construction Grammar (Croft, 2001).
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express evidential meanings in any human language by some means or another (cf.
Aikhenvald, 2004, p.10). Most linguists, however, are interested in distinguishing
evidential systems which exhibit significant structural regularity from those which
do not. Those which exhibit the greatest degree of structural regularity are referred
to as grammatical evidential systems.
On Aikhenvald’s view, the crucial feature that distinguishes grammatical evi-
dentiality is its obligatoriness. Although obligatory evidential systems are exemplary
instances of evidentiality, Aikhenvald’s stark delimitation of grammatical evidential-
ity is open to criticism from grammaticalization-theoretic perspectives, which reject
simple dichotomies between obligatoriness and non-obligatoriness, in favor of a gra-
dient conception of obligatoriness, or more felicitously, frequency. On this view,
obligatoriness is simply an extremum of the frequency continuum. Similarly, on
this view, the sharp dichotomy between grammar and pragmatics is replaced with
the concept of a grammaticalization cline, in which phonological simplification and
dependence, semantic generalization, and frequency are criterial in determining the
degree to which an element is ‘grammaticalized’ (Hopper and Traugott, 2003).8
This divergence of viewpoints regarding the delimitation of grammar leads to
different judgements on whether particular evidential systems are instances of gram-
matical evidentiality or not. For example, researchers influenced by grammaticaliza-
tion theory seem much more likely to characterize facultative evidential systems as
instances of ‘grammatical evidentiality’ (see, for example, Epps’s (2005) discussion
of Hup evidentiality), than those who consider obligatoriness to be criterial in gram-
mar. The reasoning behind the former judgement is that facultative morphology
exhibits a greater degree of ‘grammaticalization’, measured by the above-mentioned
criteria, than do periphrastic expressions of grammatical meaning. As such, facul-
8In §2.3.3 I articulate a position that, instead of blurring the notion of ‘grammar’, delimits
grammar sharply, and proposes that the regularity exhibited by ‘partially grammaticalized’ elements
can be accounted for as a component of communicative habitus within a theory of communicative
practice.
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tative evidential morphology is an instance of a (partially) grammatical expression
of evidentiality. For those who rely on the obligatoriness condition as an index of
formal grammaticality, of course, facultative evidential morphology and periphrastic
expressions of evidential meanings are equally motivated by pragmatics, and not by
principles of grammatical well-formedness.
However, under Aikhenvald’s proposal, only languages which realize eviden-
tiality as an inflectional category may be said to exhibit ‘evidentiality’.9 It is clear
that Aikhenvald’s proposal is motivated by a desire to exclude from consideration
systems that only express evidential meanings periphrastically (Aikhenvald, 2004,
p.10). While acknowledging the important difference between grammatical eviden-
tiality and other forms of structural realization of evidential meanings, I do not
adopt Aikhenvald’s proposal. My principal reason for this that there are evidential
systems which are certainly not inflectional, yet which exhibit considerably greater
regularization than, say, the periphrastic system of English – such as the Hup system
discussed below, and crucially, the Nanti system.
We now turn to two criteria that surface in Aikhenvald’s discussion and
definition of evidentiality in ambiguous ways: the paradigmatic unilocality criterion
and the paradigmatic uniformity criterion. Satisfaction of these criteria, I will argue,
is not a necessary condition for grammatical evidential systems, although they are
characteristic of highly regular inflectional evidential systems.
2.2.1.4 Paradigmatic unilocality
The paradigmatic unilocality criterion is satified when a typological grammatical
category is realized by a set of morphemes in complementary distribution in a single
syntagmatic position. Evidential systems that do not obey the paradigmatic unilo-
9It should be noted that despite the strong theoretical stance Aikhenvald (2004) takes in de-
limiting grammatical evidentiality, a perusal of the evidential systems she discusses show that in
practice, she also treats facultative evidential systems as instances of grammatical evidentiality.
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cality condition form what Aikhenvald calls ‘scattered’ evidential systems, in which
evidential morphemes appear in multiple syntagmatic positions. Such systems are
found in languages such as Hup (Nadahup, Brasil, Epps, 2005), Western Apache
(Athabascan, USA, De Reuse, 2003), and Nanti.
Consider the evidential system of Hup. Hup makes five evidential distinc-
tions: nonvisual =hÕ, reportative =mah, two inferred distinctions, =cud and -ni,
and visual, which is zero-marked. The non-visual =hÕ and the inferred =cud pat-
tern together, appearing either as enclitics on predicates or as a verbal ‘inner suffix’.
The reportative =mah, on the other hand, may cliticize to any focused element in
the clause, and may appear more than once in a clause, unlike the previous two
evidentials. The reportative may also appear as an inner suffix, but unlike either
the visual =hÕ or the inferred =cud, cannot receive primary stress in this position.
The second inferred evidential -ni, has yet another distribution, appearing only on
clause-final predicates in inner suffix position.
It does not appear to be the case that scattered evidential systems are neces-
sarily non-obligatory ones (as is Hup’s). The evidential system of Makah (Wakashan,
USA) (Jacobsen, 1986) is apparently both scattered and obligatory.
The literature on evidentiality exhibits mixed views regarding the grammat-
ical status of scattered evidential systems. Aikhenvald (2003a, p.10), for example,
characterizes the scattered evidential system of Japanese (Aoki, 1986) as failing
to form a “unitary grammatical category,” and concludes that scattered evidential
systems are “only marginally relevant to the study of evidentiality” (Aikhenvald,
2003a, p.11). Fortescue’s (2003) discussion of evidentiality in Western Greenlandic
Eskimo appears to align with this view also.
Aikhenvald (2004), however, seems to take a more liberal position, charac-
terizing scattered evidential systems in the following terms:
The expression of evidentiality may itself be obligatory – but different
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evidentiality specifications ‘scattered’ throughout the verbal system by
no means make up a unitary category. They still, however, qualify as
grammatical evidentials, but their status is different from the systems
[that obey the paradigmatic unilocality condition]. (Aikhenvald, 2004,
p.80)
The stronger position taken in Aikhenvald (2003a) has been argued against
by Joseph (2003), who suggests that a grammatical category may be ‘cognitively
unitary’ or ‘cognitively systematic’ without being syntagmatically so. He argues that
scattered evidential systems may be examples of morphological ‘constellations’: sets
of elements related by rules of co-occurrence and exclusion across, rather than within,
syntagmatic positions. Joseph goes on to mention Sanskrit reduplication (Janda and
Joseph, 1986), the Modern Greek negator µη(ν) (Janda and Joseph, 1999), Arapesh
plural marking (Dobrin, 2001), and Hindi postpositional -ko (Vasishth and Joseph,
2002) as other examples of other ‘scattered’ categories. In any event, regardless
of the theoretical mechanism invoked to account for scattered categories, the ex-
istence of scattered inflectional categories is actually quite uncontroversial among
morphologists (Carstairs-McCarthy, 1998, p.326-7).
At this point, then, there seems to be little support for the paradigmatic
uniformity condition as a necessary feature of grammatical evidential systems. Con-
sequently, I exclude it from the definition of grammatical evidentiality.
In concluding the present section, however, I want to acknowledge what I be-
lieve to be the methodological point behind Aikhenvald’s attitude towards scattered
evidentiality – namely, that evidential systems that obey the unilocality criterion
are particularly amenable to analysis. In the first place, it is much easier to evaluate
the obligatoriness of evidential systems that obey the unilocality criterion. When
evidentiality is scattered, the question of whether pervasive evidential marking is
motivated by pragmatic reasons or by structural ones becomes more challenging to
79
resolve. In the second place, Aikhenvald suggests that the semantics of scattered
evidential systems is more complicated:
Languages with ‘scattered’ evidentiality may employ semantic param-
eters which diverge somewhat from those recurrent in languages with
evidentiality as a single tightly knit and coherent category. (Aikhenvald,
2004, p.9)
In light of these points, I think that Aikhenvald’s position on scattered evi-
dentiality, even the stronger (2003) position, should be seen primarily as an effort to
focus attention on the tidier evidential systems, rather than as an effort to exclude
scattered evidential systems from the realm of grammatical evidentiality.
2.2.1.5 Paradigmatic uniformity
The paradigmatic uniformity condition is not explicitly discussed by Aikhenvald
(2004), but emerges from her discussion of factors that “complicate” the grammati-
cal status of evidential systems (Aikhenvald, 2003a, p.11). Explicitly formulated, the
paradigmatic uniformity condition would stipulate that in grammatical evidential
systems, paradigms containing evidential morphemes may not include morphemes
with non-evidential core meanings.
The analytical relevance of the paradigmatic uniformity condition stems
from the implications that mixed paradigm structures have for obligatoriness. If a
paradigm includes both evidential and non-evidential morphemes, it not possible for
evidentiality to be obligatorily marked, as the choice of non-evidential morphemes
in the paradigm automatically excludes evidential morphemes.
The case of Mỹky, discussed above, in which two evidential morphemes share
a paradigm with a negation marker illustrates the issue nicely. If we relax the
paradigmatic uniformity condition, we let into the fold of grammatical evidentiality
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those systems, like that of Mỹky, which mix evidential and non-evidential mor-
phemes in a single paradigm. Under a strict interpretation of the paradigmatic
uniformity criterion, the Mỹky evidential system would not count as a grammat-
ical evidentiality system. But Aikhenvald does not explicitly commit to such an
interpretation, leaving the matter somewhat ambiguous:
An informed decision concerning the categorial status of evidentiality
and what exactly constitutes a grammatical category in these cases can
only be made on the basis of language-internal criteria. (Aikhenvald,
2003a, p.11)
Although not explicitly stated, I believe that Aikhenvald’s position on this
issue stems from the fact that it is not uncommon for the marking of evidentiality
to be restricted by mood- or tense-marking. It is cross-linguistically common, for
example, for evidentials to be omitted in imperatives, as in the Yukaghir languages
(Russia), (Maslova, 2003, p.228), and in clauses marked for future tense, as in
Tariana (Arawak, Brazil) (Aikhenvald, 2003b, p.287-9).
From this perspective, it is possible to see the Mỹky case in another light –
namely, that the mixed paradigmatic structure is simply an artifact of restrictions
in evidential marking due to clause polarity, and consequently, in no way affects the
obligatory, or more precisely, inflectional, status of evidentiality in the language.
For this reason I do not consider the paradigmatic uniformity criterion, in
itself, to be necessary criterial for grammatical evidentiality, which leads me to
include systems like the Mỹky one under the rubric of grammatical evidentiality.
2.2.1.6 Concluding remarks on grammatical perspectives
Taking Aikhenvald’s restrictive definition of evidentiality as a starting point, I have
explored and evaluated other definitions of evidentiality, which can be obtained by
relaxing one or several of the conditions Aikhenvald specifies or alludes to. In light of
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this discussion, I define grammatical evidentiality as a highly-grammaticalized, but
not necessarily obligatory, category with primary source-of-information meanings.
Grammatical evidential systems which in addition obey the paradigmatic unilocal-
ity and paradigmatic uniformity conditions are, in my view, especially structurally
well-behaved cases of grammatical evidentiality, and may form privileged objects of
study for grammaticalized evidentiality for methodological and analytical reasons.
However, they do not exhaust the range of grammatical evidential systems.
2.2.2 Discourse-analytical perspectives on evidentiality
Having examined how ‘evidentiality’ is understood as a grammatical phenomenon,
I now turn to how the term has been understood by discourse analysts.10 In addi-
tion, I will introduce terminology that I employ throughout the remainder of this
work and, hopefully, sort out some of the ambiguity created by overlapping, but
distinct, terminological usages adopted by scholars approaching evidentiality from
grammatical and discourse analytic perspectives.
Scholars who study evidentiality as a discourse phenomenon generally under-
stand it differently than those who study it from a grammatical perspective. The
most significant of these differences are: 1) their deemphasis on grammaticalization
as a relevant criterion in the evaluation of evidential systems, and 2) their tendency
to conflate source-of-information meanings and epistemic modality in the definition
of evidentiality.
The following definition of evidentiality, given by Paul Atkinson, who spe-
cializes in analysis of medical discourse, is typical of discourse analysts’ delimitation
of evidentiality:
Evidentiality refers to the diverse ways in which the relative credibility of
10In this section, I am using the term ‘discourse analyst’ in a broad sense, to refer to scholars
who examine discourse from the perspective of a number of affine disciplines including linguistic
anthropology, linguistic discourse analysis, conversational analysis, and pragmatics.
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reported events, acts or statements is conveyed in language. (Atkinson,
1999, p.98)
In the remainder of this section, I discuss the differences between grammatical
and discourse-analytical approaches to evidentiality, as illustrated by Atkinson’s
definition, and then seek to develop terminology that allows us to take full advantage
of the contributions of each tradition.
2.2.2.1 Evidential strategies and grammatical evidentiality
Scholars who study ‘evidentiality’ in discourse almost uniformly disregard issues of
grammaticalization with respect to elements with evidential meanings, considering
both grammatically obligatory morphology and entirely optional affixes, clitics, and
lexical elements as evidentials (see, for example, Atkinson, 1999; Fox, 2001; Ifanti-
dou, 2001; Mushin, 2001). In so far as delimiting evidentiality is concerned, these
scholars are concerned only with notional content, and are neutral with respect to
the structural characteristics of how this notional content is realized in discourse.
I am generally sympathetic with this analytical strategy, if not with the ter-
minological laxness embodied by this approach. In Nanti evidential practice, gram-
maticalized evidentials and periphrastic means for expressing source-of-information
meanings (typically, verbs of perception) tend to be used in conjunction with each
other, supporting each other in expressing sensory modes of access to events. As
such, both highly-grammaticalized and weakly-grammaticalized elements which com-
municate source-of-information meanings are relevant to Nanti evidential practice.
Consequently, I share the interest of discourse analysts in the general expression of
source-of-information meanings, regardless of the manner of their structural realiza-
tion. Unlike discourse analysts, however, I feel that it is important to distinguish the
character of their realization, and particularly, to attend to questions of the struc-
tural regularity and discursive pervasiveness of their realization. To this end, I adopt
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the term evidential strategy for non-obligatory, non-grammaticalized expressions of
evidential meanings. Evidential strategies thus contrast with grammaticalized evi-
dentiality, discussed in the previous section. I employ the term evidential resource
in a structurally neutral manner to refer to notionally evidential affixes, clitics, or
free lexical items, be they obligatory or facultative, grammaticalized or not.
By distinguishing evidential strategies from grammatical evidentiality, I hope
to avoid the kind of ambiguity criticized by Aikhenvald, who, commenting on Fox’s
(2001) work on evidentiality in English, for example, remarks: “Saying that En-
glish has ‘evidentiality’ ... is misleading: this implies a confusion between what is
grammaticalized and what is lexical in a language.”11
Before continuing, I want to comment on the relationship of the terminology
I have introduced here to extant terminology in the literature. This comment con-
cerns Aikhenvald’s sense of the term ‘evidential strategy’, which partially overlaps
with my own, but is crucially different. Aikhenvald (2004, p.105) uses the term
to refer to notionally evidential ‘secondary meanings’ of (primarily) non-evidential
grammatical categories and forms. Aikhenvald appears to use the terms ‘non-core’
meaning and ‘secondary’ meaning to refer both to pragmatic meanings, i.e. mean-
ings derived via inference, and properly semantic meanings which are subordinate
to some other semantic meaning associated with a given morpheme. As such, her
use of the term ‘evidential strategy’ makes an important empirical distinction. How-
ever, I argue that the term itself is infelicitous in two ways. First, in some cases, an
‘evidential strategy’ may cover highly automatic, non-defeasible secondary mean-
ings which are hardly ‘strategic’ at all, in a practice-theoretic sense (see §2.3.2).
This is the case, for example, with secondary evidential meanings of certain verbal
inflectional categories in Macedonian and Albanian described by Friedman (2003,
11In fairness to Fox, I think that what her use of the term ‘evidentiality’ indicates is not confusion
about the grammatical/lexical distinction, but rather an indifference to that distinction, stemming
from her interest in discourse analysis, rather than grammar.
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p.212), where the secondary meanings are so closely tied to the primary tense, as-
pectual, and modal meanings that he characterizes evidentiality in these languages
as a ‘grammaticalized strategy’. Second, Aikhenvald’s sense of ‘evidential strategy’
does not cover periphrastic or ‘lexical’ means for expressing evidential meanings,
which surely are ‘strategies’, as the term is understood by discourse analysts, for
expressing evidential meanings. In this present work, I reserve the use of ‘eviden-
tial strategy’ for the use of any optional evidential marking or defeasible linguistic
meaning to indicate source of information.
2.2.2.2 Evidentiality and epistemic modality in discourse
The second way in which discourse analysts diverge in their use of the term ‘eviden-
tiality’ from those who study evidentiality as a grammatical phenomenon is in their
widespread adoption of the term to cover both source of information and epistemic
modality (Atkinson, 1999; Ifantidou, 2001; Fox, 2001; Sakita, 2002). This difference
plausibly stems from the fact that source-of-information meanings and epistemic
modal meanings frequently induce pragmatic inferences about the other category
(Floyd, 1999). This tendency, as remarked on above, leads even scholars who study
evidentiality as a grammatical category to conflate source of information and epis-
temic modality, or subsume them under a broader category. Given that discourse
analysts tend to be less concerned with the distinction between grammatical and
pragmatic meanings, it is not surprising that they are even more likely to conflate
the two categories. Regardless of tradition, however, the motivation for doing so
seems to be the same, viz. the perception that evidentials induce strong pragmatic
inferences regarding ‘speaker commitment’ and propositional ‘reliability’.
Moreover, despite the fact that the discourse-analytic literature has paid
considerable attention the epistemic modal inferences induced by evidentiality, it
would be an error to assume that these are the only inferences induced by evidentials.
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As Philips (1993, p.255-6) has remarked, there are good reasons to believe that
the deployment of evidentiality for purposes related to the reliability of knowledge
(i.e. for epistemic modal reasons) is linked to culture-specific language ideologies.
Philips cites Athabascan ideals of avoiding reference to others’ internal states, and
Tongan ideologies linking wisdom to particular hierarchical social positions, as other
factors influencing the discursive deployment of evidentials. As I show in Chapters
3 and 4, in Nanti evidential practice, evidentials are discursively significant due to
inferences that have little to do with epistemic modality, such as event responsibility
and utterance responsiblity. For these reasons, the relationship between evidentiality
and epistemic modality, even at the level of discourse, in which the analyst may
choose to collapse the distinction between grammatical and pragmatic meanings,
should be treated as contingent, and requiring empirical investigation (cf. Philips,
1993, p.256).
In concluding this section, I wish to remark that it would be remiss of me to
imply that all scholars studying evidentiality as a discourse phenomenon are insen-
sitive to the contingent relationship between evidentiality and epistemic modality.
Mushin (2001, p.23-26), for example, provides a cogent discussion of both the issues
involved in distinguishing evidentiality and epistemic modality semantically, and the
difficulties in distinguishing the two in discourse.
2.3 Grammar and communicative practice
My central concern in the present work is how Nantis indicate their sources of
knowledge in talk, and how they employ these evidential resources in linguistically-
mediated social action. This particular entanglement of language and social action,
which I call ‘evidential practice’, is a facet of what linguistic anthropologists and
others call ‘communicative practice’. In this section, my goal is to provide an in-
troduction to the concept of communicative practice, and to discuss the place of
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grammar in communicative practice, in preparation for my discussion of evidential
practice in §2.4.2.1.
The concept of communicative practice that I describe here springs from
two distinct sources.12 The first source is the more general concept of ‘social prac-
tice’ as developed within practice theory. Practice theory, most closely identified
with the names of Pierre Bourdieu and Anthony Giddens, is an effort to capture
the patterning and regularities of social life, while at the same time acknowledg-
ing the agency of social subjects; the contingent, strategic nature of social action;
and the historicity of social life.13 The second source on which my articulation of
communicative practice is based is the discourse-centered approach to culture, an
approach to the relation between language and culture that seeks explore the role of
discourse (understood as communicative interaction) as a site for the repoduction
and transformation of culture and society.
2.3.1 Practice theory
I begin with a summary of practice theory, and introduce basic concepts developed
within practice theory to talk about regularity, improvisation, and agency in social
action. The first aspect of practice theory we consider is habitus, and its role in
accounting for the regularity displayed by human social activity, without reducing
it to mechanical rule-following.
We can set up Bourdieu’s account of habitus with two observations: first,
social activity consists in great part of highly routinized activities, in which indi-
viduals repeatedly engage in actions in very similar ways. At the same, although
12My discussion of communicative practice is heavily influenced by Hanks’s (1996) and Erickson’s
(2004) articulations of the concept. Although with different emphases, both scholars seek to wed
practice theory to North American approaches to language-in-interaction – the ethnography of
communication and conversation analysis among them.
13Historically, practice theory emerged as an effort to avoid problems besetting structuralist social
theory, principally, atemporality, ahistoricity, and the erasure of agency, while not succumbing to
its antithesis, voluntaristic subjectivism.
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people’s actions display significant routinization, individuals also innovate and alter
their behavior in accord with evolving personal projects and changes in the phys-
ical and social environment. The regularity of routinized behavior thus cannot be
reduced to the following of social ‘rules’, since the actions of individuals always
demonstrate elements of strategic maneuvering against a background of repetition
and routinization.
The second relevant observation is that much of what we do on a day-to-day
basis rests on knowledge to which we have limited conscious access. That is, we
can perform actions fluidly, and negiotiate our way through our social and physical
worlds, without being able to describe precisely how we do so. Thus, our ability to
function socially is not based on articulable, propositional knowledge, but rather on
a practical mastery that results from embodied and situated interactions with the
world.
Bourdieu argues that in order to account for these characteristics of social
action, we cannot rely on anything like ‘social rules’ or ‘social structure’, but instead
on what he calls habitus, which consists of:
. . . systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures
predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as principles
of the generation and structuring of practices and representations which
can be objectively “regulated” and “regular” without in any way being
the product of obedience to rules ... (Bourdieu, 1977, p.72)
As to the functional and cognitive status of the principles of habitus, Bourdieu
remarks that they are:
...objectively adapted to their goals, without presupposing a conscious
aiming at ends or an express mastery of the operations necessary to
attain them and, being all this, collectively orchestrated without being
the product of the orchestrating action of a conductor. (ibid. p.72)
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Even when they appear as the realization of the explicit, and explicitly
stated, purposes of a project or plan, the practices produced by the
habitus, as the strategy-generating principle enabling agents to cope with
unforeseen and ever-changing situations, are only apparently determined
by the future. (ibid. p.72)
Under this view, social regularities emerge as the regularity of practices,
which are rooted in the habitus of the socially and physically situated individual.
The regularity of practice is not mechanical reproduction, but the outcome of in-
terested, strategic action which, in the social contexts in which the habitus was
acquired, tends to reproduce the conditions of that social context.
There is considerable similarity between Bourdieu’s concept of habitus and
what Anthony Giddens calls “practical consciousness”. Like Bourdieu, Giddens re-
acts against the determinism of structuralism, and the “derogation of the lay actor”
inherent in functionalism, by which the goals of social agents, and these agents’
understandings of the consequences of their actions, are dismissed in favor of the
‘goals’ of society identified by the analyst (Giddens, 1979, p.71). Giddens takes as a
starting point for social theory the observation that people are knowledgeable agents
(Giddens, 1984, p.281). Their knowledge consists both of ‘discursive consciousness’,
that is, articulable propositional knowledge; and ‘practical consciousness,’ which
consists of:
tacit knowledge that is skillfully applied in the enactment of courses
of conduct, but which the actor is not able to formulate discursively.
(Giddens, 1979, p.57)
Practical consciousness includes the knowledge of rules and resources that
actors draw on in the course of social conduct, which Giddens takes care to charac-
terize as continuously reflexively-monitored and motivated. Significantly, Giddens’
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conception of ‘rules’ is consonant with the “regulated improvisation” (Bourdieu
1977: p86) of habitus, and is quite distinct from the notion of ‘mechanistic’ social
rules:
[r]ules imply methodological procedures of social interaction, as Garfinkel
in particular has made clear. Rules typically intersect with practices in
the contextuality of situated encounters: the range of ‘ad hoc’ consider-
ations which he identifies are chronically involved with the instantiation
of rules and are fundamental to the form of those rules. (Giddens 1984,
p.18)
We see in both Bourdieu’s and Giddens’ work, then, the elaboration of con-
cepts that allow us to discuss social action as simultaneously routinized and strategic,
structured and improvised, conscious and unconscious.14 Synthesizing the concepts
of habitus and practical knowledge, on the one hand, and strategic action and the
knowledgeable agent, on the other, we arrive at a particular vision of the social actor
and social activity.
To begin with, it is clear that many of social actors’ actions are guided by
schematic and open-ended knowledge of techniques and methods for conducting
themselves in the social and physical world. This generative knowledge enables
them to act fluidly in most contexts, improvising on a shifting interactional ground,
without requiring a great deal of conscious effort. Indeed, much of this knowledge
is only limitedly accessible to consciouss awareness. I will refer to this generative,
improvisation-enabling, schematic knowledge as habitus, adopting Bourdieu’s term.
To be clear, though, the concept denoted by my use of this term owes as much to
14It is worth commenting that remarkably similar ideas about practical knowledge and action have
been developed by cognitive scientists seeking to understand the situated and embodied nature of
cognition (Agre, 1997; Clark, 1997). Since both Bourdieu and Giddens make claims with significant
cognitive and psychological ramifications, it is comforting that cognitive scientists, working with
different data and analytical frameworks, have converged on similar conclusions.
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Giddens’ articulation of the concept of practical knowledge as it does to Bourdieu’s
conception of habitus.
Significantly, the social actor who deploys his or her habitus in concrete
interactional settings is a socially-situated and interested agent. By saying that the
social actor is situated, I mean that he or she stands in particular relations with
respect to other actors and social institutions, and their habitus is significantly tuned
to this position. Habitus is not, therefore, simply a rebranding of the holistic culture
concept. To be sure, certain aspects of habitus may be widely distributed among the
members of social groups, but others will be restricted to particular social roles, and
even to particular individuals. The habitus of Nanti women, for example, differs in
important ways from that of Nanti men, and the habitus of Migero, the community
leader, is unique in important ways from that of everyone else, consonant with his
inhabiting a unique social role in the community.
By saying that the social actor is an interested agent, I am emphasizing two
related things. First, social actors are motivated, that is, their actions need to be
understood as forming parts of personal or group projects of a variety of scales.
Second, I am emphasizing that social actors strategize and maneuver in their social
interactions, using resources such as social relationships and the patterns of language
as means for achieving goals. As such, the social actor is neither the structuralist
automaton guided by the algebraic logic of culture; nor the unwitting social ant of
functionalism; nor even the social golem ‘articulated’ by ‘discourses’, as envisioned
by anti-humanist postmodernism.
2.3.2 Communicative practice
Having described the social agent and habitus in general terms as components of
social activity, I now narrow my attention to communicative activity. Those as-
pects of social habitus in which the deployment of communicative structures or
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resources is involved, I refer to as communicative habitus. No comprehensive theory
of communicative habitus has been developed, although Hanks (1996) and Erickson
(2004) elaborate aspects of such an account in their work on communicative prac-
tice. However, it is possible to make some observations, relating work in a number
of language-centered disciplines to the concept of communicative habitus.
Given that habitus accommodates, and indeed, serves as the basis for strate-
gic and improvisational action, we expect to find the same basic accommodation
of strategy and improvization in the communicative habitus. One does not have
to look far to find aspects of language that fit this characterization. The context-
sensitive and defeasible principles of pragmatics, for example, broached by Grice’s
introduction of the notion of communicative maxims, and since considerably refined
and elaborated by a large number of scholars (Levinson, 1983; Mey, 1993), are obvi-
ously components of communicative habitus. The principles governing conversation,
studied within the tradition of conversation analysis, which permit individuals to
improvisationally, yet with great precision, organize their contributions to talk in
groups, also shares these features. The quasi-rule-like nature of turn-taking princi-
ples which, in the context of concrete interactions between individuals, allow people
to negotiate the distribution of access to the conversational floor in a strategic,
improvisational, but normally fluid manner, is a clear exemplification of the phe-
nomenological character of habitus. The schematic nature of habitus is also evident
in the Goffmanian concept of frames, and scaling up from there, is also found in
the concepts of discourse genres and speech events, as decribed in the ethnography
of communication tradition and approaches influenced by it (Bauman and Sherzer,
1974; Hanks, 1987).
The second aspect of practice theory that is relevant for my discussion of
communicative practice is its theorization of social reproduction and change, in
particular, Giddens’ theory of structuration. Giddens’ theory of structuration is an
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intrinsically dynamic conception of social structure, which emphasizes that social
forms exist only through their recursive actualization in concrete social conduct.
Central to Giddens’ theory is the concept of ‘duality of structure’, by which:
... rules and resources are drawn upon by actors in the production of
interaction, but are thereby also reconsituted through such interaction.
(Giddens 1979, p.71).
The significance of Gidden’s account of structuration for communicative prac-
tice is two-fold. First, it makes concrete instances of interaction the locus of the
perpetuation and transformation of social forms. Second, by acknowledging the
role of agency in interaction, Giddens opens up an analytical space for the socially
transformational dimension of discourse.
This view of the role of interaction converges with the independent tradition
represented by the discourse-centered approach to culture15 (DCAC) (Sherzer, 1987;
Urban, 1991; Farnell and Graham, 1998). Crucially, DCAC brings a specific focus
on language that is lacking in the sociological orientation of practice theory.
The central idea of DCAC is that culture should not be conceived of as an
abstract network of binary conceptual oppositions and transformations on them, as
structuralists do; nor should it be understood in terms of reified notions of social
structure, as functionalists do; nor even in terms of delocalized ‘discourses’, as post-
structuralists do. Rather, culture should be understood as “localized in concrete,
publically accessible signs, the most important of which are actually occurring in-
stance of discourse” (Urban, 1991, p.1). On this view, to study the production,
reproduction, and circulation of discourse is to study culture. The transformational
dimension of discourse is made clear by Sherzer, who remarks that “...language use
15Anthony Woodbury has commented that Anthony Giddens was friends with John Gumperz,
who, with Dell Hymes, launched the ethnography of communication tradition, of which the
discourse-centered approach to culture is a direct descendant. It may be, then, that the convergence
I describe here is not merely fortuitous.
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does not reflect culture but ... language use in discourse creates, recreates, and
modifies culture.” (Sherzer, 1987, p.300).
DCAC contributes, through its disciplinary heritage, a substantial empirical
and theoretical engagement with concrete instances of communicative interaction.
Despite Bourdieu’s and Giddens’ insistence on the importance of practice and con-
crete interaction, both ultimately shy away from any serious empirical engagement
with them. DCAC, on the other hand, has its roots in the empirically-oriented
ethnography of communication, and beyond, to the Boasian approach to language
and culture (Sherzer, 1987, pp.296-7). Work in the DCAC framework has sought to
understand, for example, how discourse structure, genre, speech play and verbal art,
and participant structures are implicated in the perpetuation and transformation of
cultural forms.
I now wish to draw together the threads I have laid out and articulate the
notion of communicative practice that will underpin my account of Nanti eviden-
tial practice. In the genesis of communicative action, several kinds of generative
structures and resources come together in the context of concrete interaction. These
include the communicative habitus, articulable knowledge and ideologies, and gram-
mar. The interplay of these elements in the course of efforts to realize individual
and group social projects in interaction with other social actors in specific social
and physical setting yields communicative practice.
2.3.3 Communicative practice and the irreducibility of grammar
The concept of communicative practice that I have outlined above provides a means
for talking about certain regularities in communicative interaction. An obvious
question that arises is where the limits of communicative practice lie, and how the
concept of communicative practice shares its analytical and explanatory role with
concepts such as grammar and pragmatics. It is the relationship between com-
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municative practice and grammar that I now address. This relationship will prove
especially relevant in making use of the scholarship on grammaticalized evidentiality
in theorizing evidential practice (see §??ect:evidepistprac).
In this work I maintain that grammar is ontologically distinct from commu-
nicative habitus, and that communicative practice arises in part from the instru-
mental use of grammar by the communicative habitus. Neither grammar nor com-
municative habitus alone can account fully for the way in which concrete instances
of discourse are patterned with respect to the signifying resources of language and
the social contexts of which discourse forms a part.
In as much as grammar is an analytically useful concept, I contend, it denotes
a dimension of the organization of linguistic resources that is independent of social or
communicative instrumentality. An early formulation of this conception of grammar
is given by Bloomfield (1926, p.154):
A needy stranger at the door says I’m hungry. A child who has eaten
and merely wants to put off going to bed says I’m hungry. Linguistics
considers only those vocal features which are alike in the two utterances,
and only those stimulus-reaction features which are alike in the two
utterances.
The grammar of a language is the sum total of distributional statements re-
garding the organization of linguistic tokens into types, based on their paradigmatic
and syntagmatic distribution with respect to other linguistic tokens, themselves
organized into types. On this view, we can speak of a property or function be-
ing ‘grammatical’ precisely by virtue of it being definable exclusively in terms of
relations of syntagmatic and paradigmatic co-occurrence or exclusion between lin-
guistic token types (grammatical function1, in the formulation of Silverstein (1987)).
In Hanks’s (1996) apt formulation, grammar is formally irreducible. Grammar, as
I have characterized it, is thus different from communicative habitus in a crucial
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way: grammar leaves no place for strategy or improvisation; grammar is a set of
structural relationships removed from human agency, motivations, and reasons.
In order to avoid a possible misinterpretation of my analytical intentions,
I wish to make clear that my interest in being precise about the distinction be-
tween grammar and communicative habitus is not motivated by a desire to justify
discarding the latter in order to focus on the formal study of grammar. Distinc-
tions that have sought to demarcate a domain of formal objects and properties of
language, such as the Saussurean langue/parole distinction and Chomskyan com-
petence/performance distinction, have indeed been invoked as a justification for
focusing on grammar at the expense of discourse. These are reflexes of what Bau-
man and Briggs (2003) have analyzed as the tendency in the Western intellectual
tradition to attempt to sever language from its social roots in order to ‘purify’ it,
and render it suitable as a medium of, and object for, rational inquiry. My purpose
here is quite different. My interest in distinguishing grammar from communicative
habitus in the context of evidential practice stems from a sense of the pervasive-
ness of social and strategic considerations in evidential practice, and the relatively
modest role played by grammar. In short, I am interested in demonstrating the
thoroughly social nature of evidential practice. At the same time, however, it is cru-
cial not to engage in social reductionism when grammatical properties play a role
in communicative practice. Only by recognizing that grammar and communicative
habitus have different properties, and different roles in communicative practice, can
we hope to understand the social dimensions communicative practice, and evidential
practice in particular.
2.4 Evidentiality and evidential practice
Following a tradition going back at least as far as Givón (1982), I consider eviden-
tiality to form that part of communicative practice concerned with our practical
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epistemology (Sidnell, 2005), or our everyday relationship to knowledge. I refer to
this aspect of communicative practice as evidential practice.16 Note that we should
expect evidential practice, given the open-ended nature of communicative practice
more generally, to be heterogeneous and difficult to delimit precisely. Thus, in fo-
cusing on how Nantis employ evidentials to negotiate responsibility in the present
work, I am presenting only slice of a Nanti evidential practice, albeit an important
one.
The idea that a satisfactory account of evidentiality requires looking beyond
the solely grammatical dimensions of their distribution is not new. The earliest effort
of which I am aware to situate evidentiality in a broader communicative framework
is Givón’s (1982) discussion of evidentiality in the context of a comprehensive “epis-
temic space”. Under this account, encoded and inferred meanings stemming from
evidentials and epistemic modal marking are distributed in discourse with respect
to an exhaustive “epistemic continuum” of “subjective certainty” that a speaker has
about a given proposition. According to this account, propositions with very low
certainty cannot be evidentially marked, whereas highly certain propositions do not
require evidential marking. This latter grouping includes “deictically obvious” and
presupposed propositions, among others. Propositions in the intermediate range of
the epistemic continuum are the typical locus of evidentiality.17
Mushin (2001) introduces the first comprehensive framework for analyzing
evidentiality in pragmatic terms – which all subsequent ones, including my own, re-
semble in many respects. Mushin’s account, which is heavily influenced by cognitive
16Scholars have referred to partially similar concepts as epistemic stances (e.g. Agha, 2002;
Kärkkäinen, 2003) or epistemological stances or practices (e.g. Chafe, 1993; Mushin, 2001)
17It should be noted that although Givón relates the use of evidentials to what is, in essence, a
parameterization of epistemic modality, he does not conflate evidentiality and epistemic modality
notionally or categorially. Rather, he seeks to account for the distribution of evidential resources
in discourse with respect to speakers’ epistemic evaluations of knowledge. That said, Givón’s
generalizations appear to be contradicted by subsequent scholarship on highly grammaticalized
evidential systems which exhibit the use of evidentials in the utterances that express forms of
knowledge at the extrema of his proposed epistemic space, where Givón predicts evidentials to be
absent.
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linguistics, centers on the notion of epistemological stances, which are universally-
available values for the universal cognitive category of ‘evidentiality’ (essentially a
cognitive framing of the typological grammatical category of evidentiality). Accord-
ing to Mushin there is, for example, an inferential stance available to speakers of
all languages, which is expressed in any particular language with the grammatical
and pragmatic resources available to that language. In Mushin’s model, a speaker’s
choice of epistemological stance results from the intersection of his or her assess-
ment regarding the source of information; his or her assessment of the ongoing
interaction; and cultural conventions regarding epistemological stances. Once this
choice is made, the linguistics resources available for expressing that epistemological
stance are deployed, which may be dedicated morphemes, periphrastic expressions,
or inferences stemming from other grammatical or lexical resources.
Agha (2002) presents a discussion of ‘epistemic stance’ that is broadly similar
to Mushin’s discussion of ‘epistemological stance’, although he frames his discussion
in terms of semiotics and interactional frameworks. Agha gives greater weight than
Mushin does to the significant range of “social/interpersonal effects” that evidentials
may have, including “affect, interpersonal alignment (challenge, dispute; sympathy,
empathy toward another), politness and ethical consequences (responsibility, cul-
pability)” and to the contextually determined nature of meanings associated with
evidentials.
2.4.1 Motivating an evidential practice approach
In this section, I argue that the comprehensive study of evidentiality as a linguistic
phenomenon is not possible without attention to how it is enmeshed in communica-
tive practice. I am not merely arguing that evidentiality may be studied from the
perspective of communicative practice – we can presumably do so with any gram-
matical category – but rather that evidentiality is unlike many other well-known
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grammatical categories in that failure to understand its role in communicative prac-
tice leads to pervasive misunderstandings regarding the phenomenon.
First I argue that for many, if not most, languages which exhibit grammati-
calized evidentiality, the distribution of evidentials is significantly underdetermined
by grammar, and that a robust account of evidentials in these languages requires
attention to the strategic use of evidentials in interaction – in other words, eviden-
tial practice. A purely grammatical approach simply leaves unanswered important
questions about the distribution of evidentials. Second, I argue that the suitability
of a practice-oriented approach to evidentiality is supported by the fact that eviden-
tiality, unlike most other grammatical categories, tends to be the object of language
ideologies that link the use of these grammatical resources to local understandings
of the relationships between language use and morality.
2.4.2 Evidential practice, obligatoriness, and pervasiveness
I argue that the notion of evidential practice is essential to providing a thorough
account of the distribution of evidentials in languages in which evidentials are not
structurally obligatory.
As discussed in §2.2.1.3, the issue of structural obligatoriness – or its ab-
sence – with respect to evidentials has been highlighted in recent scholarship by
Aikhenvald’s (2004) insistence that source-of-information marking must constitute
an obligatory language-specific grammatical category for it to count as ‘evidential-
ity’. This stipulation is Aikhenvald’s reaction to some scholars’ extension of the
term ‘evidentiality’ to cover any expression of source of information (see §2.2.1), on
the grounds that the optional periphrastic expression of a meaning associated with a
given grammatical category has different consequences for linguistic well-formedness
than does the gramaticalization of those meanings into a language-specific gram-
matical category. As Aikhenvald remarks, the fact that lexical items for ‘male’ and
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‘female’ exist in a given language, and may be used optionally in any given sentence,
has quite different morphosyntactic consequences than does the existence of gram-
matical gender in that language. It is therefore problematic to equate the lexical or
periphrastic expression of biological sex (or social gender) with grammatical gender.
Equating any expression of source-of-information with ‘evidentiality’ poses similar
problems.
In this section I show that Aikhenvald’s stipulation regarding what con-
stitutes an evidential system contains an important insight, but that the simple
obligatory/non-obligatory dichotomy it sets up is too crude to usefully characterize
the regularity of many evidential systems. In particular, a large number of evidential
systems display ‘pervasive’ evidentiality, although the category is not structurally
obligatory. In order to account for such systems, I argue that an approach based on
communicative practice, and not solely on grammar, is required.
I begin by showing that in several prominent cases, the ‘obligatoriness’ dis-
played by highly-grammaticalized evidential systems is not grammatical obligatori-
ness, but instead a kind of communicative obligatoriness that stems from interac-
tional maxims concerning the need to specify the source of information for a given
utterance clear to interlocutors.
At this point, some orienting comments on grammatical obligatoriness will
be helpful. To say that a grammatical category is ‘grammatically obligatory’ in a
given language is to specify that in any construction type in which a grammatical
category can be expressed, it must be expressed, in order for the construction to
be grammatically well-formed. Note that this definition does not indicate that a
category must be expressed in all construction types for it to be considered oblig-
atory. In many evidential languages, for example, evidentiality is never marked in
future-tense clauses.
The importance Aikhenvald gives to obligatoriness as a characteristic of
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grammatical evidentiality is clear:
In languages with grammatical evidentiality, marking how one knows
something is a must. [...] This is very much unlike languages where say-
ing explicitly how you know things is a matter of choice for the speaker.
(Aikhenvald, 2004, p.6)
However, when we closely examine particular systems of grammatical eviden-
tiality, we begin to see that the issue of obligatoriness in not as straightforward a
grammatical matter as it may at first seem. Consider the case of Tariana (Arawak;
Brazil), a language that exhibits highly grammaticalized evidentiality. Speaking
of this language, Aikhenvald (2004, p.2) remarks that “[o]mitting an evidential re-
sults in an ungrammatical and highly unnatural sentence,” suggesting that tense-
evidential marking is grammatical obligatory in Tariana. However, in her detailed
grammar of Tariana, Aikhenvald (2003b, p.289) also remarks that:
Tense-evidentiality specification is obligatory in most clauses. It can,
however, be omitted under some circumstances, for instance, if the spec-
ification has already been established and/or is clear from context. (em-
phasis mine)
Aikhenvald (2003b, p.309-10) later expands on the conditions under which
tense-evidential marking may be omitted:
For each clause a listener must be able to infer its tense and evidentiality
status. [...] The tense-evidentiality enclitics can be omitted if the time-
and-evidence frame is set in the previous or in the following clause, or
is clear from the context, as in repetition. [...] The tense-evidentiality
specification can be omitted in short answers where the specification is
recoverable from the context.
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These more detailed comments indicate that evidentiality is not grammati-
cally obligatory in Tariana, since evidential marking is not required for morphosyn-
tactic well-formedness per se. This is clear from the fact that evidentials may be
omitted if they can be inferred from context. The correct generalization regarding
the distribution of evidentials in Tariana is therefore a generalization about com-
municative practice, and not about grammatical form: the tense-evidential status
of a proposition must be clear to interactants. This may be achieved either by overt
marking or by inference from context.
Evidentiality appears to behave similarly in another language with highly-
grammaticalized evidentiality, Shipibo-Konibo (Panoan; Peru):
Evidentials in SK [Shipibo-Konibo] are clitics that do not take part in the
obligatory verb inflection. While inference and speculation are marked
overtly, direct and reported information need only be coded in the first
of a string of clauses, with zero-marking an option in subsequent clauses.
Nevertheless, I argue that evidentiality is “obligatory” in the sense that
the evidential value of the information has always been grammatically
marked in the forgoing discourse and is clear to native speakers. (Valen-
zuela, 2003, p.57-8)
In the Shipibo-Konibo case too, then, evidential marking is not required
for reasons of morphosyntactic well-formedness, but rather, because the evidential
status of a proposition must be clear to interactants. As in the Tariana case, this
may be achieved either via overt marking or via inference. I will refer to languages
like Tariana and Shipibo-Konibo, in which this maxim is very strong, as displaying
communicatively obligatory evidentiality.
These comments make clear that the ‘obligatoriness’ of Tariana and Shipibo-
Konibo evidentiality is best understood not as consequence of requirements on mor-
phosyntactic form, but rather of maxims governing ideal communicative interaction.
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Specifically, in both languages it appears that the distribution of evidentials is gov-
erned by a communicative maxim requiring that the source of information on which
a proposition is based be clear to the interactants. In short, the ‘obligatoriness’
in question is not a consequence of grammar, but a consequence of understandings
regarding proper communication between individuals. As such, the distribution of
evidentials in these languages is best analyzed as being governed by communicative
habitus, and not solely by grammar.
The behavior of evidentiality in Tariana and in Shipibo-Konibo illuminates
two important issues. First, evidentiality may be highly grammaticalized in a lan-
guage without being grammatically obligatory. And second, the distribution of
evidentiality in such languages is ultimately governed by aspects of communicative
habitus.
The notion that the behavior of Tariana and Shipibo-Konibo is not anoma-
lous, and may indeed be typical for languages with grammaticalized evidentiality, is
supported by looking at other Amazonian languages with well-described evidential
systems.
The evidential system of Hup (Nadahup; Brazil), for example, presents a case
in which evidentiality may be omitted either because of recoverablity from context,
or simply because it is not deemed particularly relevant by interactants:
. . . the expression of evidentiality in Hup is to some degree optional, and
it is guided more by Gricean-type pragmatic principles of informative-
ness rather than by any grammatical rule. Thus evidential markers are
sometimes left off in situations where the information source is already
made obvious by the discourse context or is otherwise seen as relatively
non-salient. (Epps, 2005, p.779, emphasis mine)
Evidentiality in Hup is thus not grammatically obligatory, or even commu-
nicatively obligatory. However, Hup speakers employ evidentials with much greater
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frequency than English speakers employ the ‘evidential’ system of English, as de-
scribed by Fox (2001).
Similarly, the omission of evidential particles in Kamaiurá (Tuṕı-Guarańı) is
described as leading to sentences that are in certain respects discursively odd, but
crucially, not ungrammatical or ill-formed:
De fato, en dados elicitados, é comum que o falante omita part́ıculas,
limitando-se a incluir aquelas imprescind́ıveis para que o enunciado seja
gramaticalmente e, em parte, semanticamente correcto na situação su-
postamente neutra do enunciado isolado. Despido das part́ıculas, os
enunciados soam como algo artifical, esterelizado, destitúıdo de col-
orido.18 (Seki, 2000, p.347)
One suspects that discourse context plays a major role in the assessment
of the oddness or naturalness of evidential-free sentences, and a perusal of Seki’s
grammar appears to confirm this: sentences lacking evidentials are legion (Seki,
2000, p.435-451 passim). Evidential particles are dense when a narrative or a scene
begins, but once the evidential basis for a topic or scene has been established,
evidentials become scarce.19
These scattered observations suggest that there is a cline in the strength of
the relevant maxims and interactional principles governing the use of evidentials
in interaction. This cline reaches from languages like Tariana and Shipibo-Konibo,
which exhibit communicatively obligatory evidentiality, to ones in which norms re-
garding source-of-information clarity motivate much less frequent use of evidentials.
18“In fact, in elicited data, it is common for the speaker to omit particles, limiting themselves to
including only those necessary for the utterance to be grammatically and, in part, semantically cor-
rect in the supposedly neutral situation of the isolated utterance. Bereft of particles, the utterances
sound like something artificial, sterile, and drained of color.” (my translation)
19This discursive distributional fact probably accounts for the awkwardness of the isolated sen-
tences mentioned by Seki. As isolated sentences, they are, in a certain sense, the opening sentence
of a narrative, and thus should bear evidential particles.
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Hup, for example, presents a case in which evidentiality may be omitted either be-
cause of recoverablity from context, or simply because it is not deemed particularly
relevant by interactants. Further along the cline we find Western Apache. De Reuse
(2003) observes that evidentiality is more pervasive in Western Apache (Athabaskan,
USA) discourse than in English, though apparently far less so than in the cases of
the languages discussed so far in this section:
Even though evidentiality is by no means an obligatory category in WA
[Western Apache], WA speakers mark source of information more often
and more precisely than European language speakers do. (De Reuse,
2003, p.95-6)
The preceding discussion of systems of grammaticalized evidentiality sug-
gests that descriptive characterizations of evidential systems that solely distinguish
whether evidentials are morphosyntactically obligatory or not fail to capture an im-
portant dimension of their use: their pervasiveness and regularity in discourse. We
have seen, for example, how evidentials are pervasive in Tariana, Shipibo-Konibo,
Hup, Kamaiurá, and Western Apache, without being grammatically obligatory.
Dickinson et al. (2006) similarly argue that evidentiality in Tsafiki is “discursively
obligatory” even though it is not an inflectional category, suggesting a pervasiveness
of evidential marking more like that of Tariana. For these languages, the distribu-
tion of evidentials is grammatically constrained by, but is not reducible to formal
rules. Rather, as Epps indicates for Hup, the occurrence of evidentials depends on
communicative factors such as the relevance or salience of evidential information to
the interactants in concrete contexts of communicative interaction.
If the distribution of evidentials is not a purely grammatical phenomenon
even in most languages that exhibit grammaticalized evidentials, then we are left
with a significant gap in our description of evidentiality between true morphosyn-
tactic obligatoriness and entirely optional use of source-of-information resources. In
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the next section, I discuss a proposal for filling this gap in our description of the
systematicity of use of evidentials: evidential practice.
2.4.2.1 Evidentiality, language ideology, and evidential practice
One indication that a full understanding of evidentiality requires a practice-based
approach is the fact that the use and misuse of evidentials is heavily ideologically
freighted. Recall that communicative practice, as I discussed in §2.3.2 and following
Hanks (1996) and Erickson (2004), consists of predispositions in the real-time de-
ployment and interpretation of formal linguistic resources in the course of strategic
social action (or better, interaction), as informed by ideologies that imbue these
resources and the actions themselves with social meanings (Hanks, 1996, p.229-47).
The ideological significance of evidentiality is manifest in the work of a number of
different scholars.
Consider for example, the ideological framing that Hardman gives for the
misuse of evidentials in the Jaqi languages:20
Those who ... state as personal knowledge [instead of using reportives]
... that which they know only through language (e.g. things that they
have read in books) are immediately categorized as cads, as people who
behave more like animals than humans. . . (Hardman, 1986, p.133)
The omission of evidentials in Jaqi is apparently not considered a grammat-
ical error or a speech error, on par with the omission of morphology or incorrect
word order. Rather, it is considered a moral or interpersonal failing: “[evidential]
accuracy is a crucial element in the public reputation of individuals; misuse of data
source . . . is insulting to the listener” (ibid., p.114). Thus, the omission of eviden-
tials is considered socially improper, but apparently results in perfectly intelligible,
20The Jaqi family, more frequently referred to as Aymaran family, consists of Aymara, spoken in
Peru and Bolivia, Jaqaru, and Kawki, considered by some to be a dialect of Jaqaru, both of which
are spoken in Peru.
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and so one assumes, grammatically well-formed, utterances. In short, the omission
of evidentials flouts Jaqi language ideologies, not constraints on grammatical form.
The ideological nature of evidential use is reasonably cast by some linguists
as a ‘cultural’ dimension of language that is reflective of a broader social orienta-
tion towards knowledge. Hardman (1986, p.136) characterizes Jaqi evidentiality as
“pervasive and uncompromising, an integral part of the Jaqi world view,” and We-
ber (1989, p.420), speaking of Huallaga Quechua (Quechuan; Peru) society suggests
that evidentials are instrumental in fulfulling the following set of cultural principles
(cf. Nuckolls, 1993):
1. (Only) one’s own experience is reliable.
2. Avoid unnecessary risk, as by assuming responsibility for informa-
tion of which one is not absolutely certain.
3. Don’t be gullible. (Witness the many Quechua folktales in which
the villain is foiled because of his gullibility.)
4. Assume responsibility only if it is safe to do so. (The successful
assumption of responsibility builds stature in the community.)
McClendon (2003) makes similar remarks on the role of evidentiality in sup-
porting cultural ideals regarding appropriate language use in traditional Eastern
Pomo (Pomoan; USA) society.
These observations strongly suggest that the misuse of evidentials is more
similar to violations of ideologies of politeness than to violations of grammatical
form arising from, say, misuse of tense or aspect inflections. Indeed, in the case of
Japanese society, a number of scholars have argued that the use of evidentials is
intimately tied to local ideologies of politeness (Aoki, 1986; Ide, 1989; Kamio, 1994;
Trent, 1997).
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De Reuse, speaking of Western Apache evidentials (mentioned in §2.4.2),
provides an explanation of their use in terms of an ideology of personal autonomy:21
[Western Apache use of evidentials] might be due to Athabaskan atti-
tudes about the autonomy of the person . . . resulting in a reluctance to
speak for another person, or impute feelings to another person. (De Reuse,
2003, p.96)
The highly-socially salient nature of evidentials is also apparent in the fact
that in some societies, the misuse of evidentials makes one a target for terms of abuse.
Dickinson indicates that using a direct evidential to talk about an event that one did
not witness, instead of the appropriate hearsay or indirect evidential, may lead one
to be “. . . accused of being a nene pun ‘liar’, or at the very least presumptuous. . . ”
(Dickinson, 2000, p.409). Significantly, vulnerability to this designation depends in
part on one’s social relations to the participants in the event in question. Speaking
of the departure of a man to a nearby city, Dickinson continues “[t]he wife can use
the direct form because she is a participant in the event in a way the neighbor
is not.” In short, Tsafiki evidential practice is shaped by ideologies that license
greater evidential freedom when speaker and referent are socially close than when
they are socially distant. This is not a fact about grammar, but rather about the
intersection of grammatical resources, interaction, and ideology – communicative
practice, in short.
2.5 Evidentiality in Nanti
The specification of modes of sensory access is a pervasive aspect of everyday Nanti
communicative interactions. As with the Western Apache speakers mentioned by de
21Rushforth (1992) makes similar ethnographic observations about Bearlake Athapaskan
(Canada) society, and provides extensive citations that echo these observations for other Athabaskan
peoples.
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Reuse, providing mode of access information is not obligatory for Nantis, but it is a
significantly more pervasive aspect of communicative interaction for Nanti speakers
than for speakers of English. Significantly, Nanti presently appears to be in the
process of independently grammaticalizing evidentiality. This is important in part
because it is consistent with my impressionistic claim regarding the pervasiveness of
specifications of modes of access in Nanti discourse. As observed by Bybee (2003),
among others, frequency is the primary contributor to grammaticalization. Thus,
the ongoing grammaticalization of evidentials in Nanti is congruent with the high
frequency of mode of sensory access meanings in Nanti discourse. The fact that
Nanti evidentiality is an independent innovation, rather than one arising through
language contact, is also important because it suggests that the high frequency
of mode of access meanings in Nanti is driven by the active communicative needs
of Nanti individuals. That is, the ideological and interactional aspects of Nanti
communicative practice are driving the grammaticalization of evidentiality, rather
than, say, the adoption of communicative or linguistic norms of a more prestigious
language community in the context of language contact.
Since evidentials are not obligatory in Nanti, in the sense discussed in §2.2.1.3,
a cogent treatment of Nanti evidentiality is thus inseparable from a treatment of
Nanti evidential practice. We begin with a treatment of Nanti grammaticalized evi-
dentials and the evidence for their recent independent grammaticalization. We then
turn to a discussion of Nanti evidential practice, focusing on the discursive contexts
for evidential marking, and the related role of inference in visual mode of access
meanings.
Nanti exhibits three morphologized evidentials: a quotative clausal proclitic
ka, exemplified in (2.2), a reportive clausal proclitic ke, exemplified in (2.3), and
an inferential second-position clausal clitic ka, exemplified in (2.4). Under certain
circumstances, unmarked declarative clauses are understood to be based on visual
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access to the event in question, but this evidential meaning arises from inference,
and will be treated separately.



















‘He said, “No, I will live there.”’

































‘He is presumably there sleeping.’ (Inference based on knowing the referent
is at home, but there being no sign of activity.)
The quotative ka and reportive ke are transparently related to the verbs roots
kant ‘say’ and kem ‘hear’, respectively. These evidentials were diachronically formed
by taking the first bisyllabic foot of the corresponding inflected verbs.22 Like their
corresponding verb roots, these evidentials bear person markers,23 and the quotative
may bear the irrealis prefix n-, which otherwise only appears on verbs.24
22The development of quotatives from ‘say’ verbs is well-established cross-linguistically (Aikhen-
vald, 2004, p.271-2)). The development of reportives from ‘hear’ verbs is apparently not as common,
but is attested in Shibacha Lisu (Sino-Tibetan; China; Aikhenvald, 2004, p.274)
23This is relatively unusual for evidentials. The presence of person markers in the Nanti case may
be understood at least in part as a consequence prosodic requirements: Nanti words are minimally
bisyllabic (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005), and the person markers guarantee that these evidentials
are bisyllabic.
24Lest a skeptic argue that these evidentials are nothing but inflected verbs which have had their
final syllables clipped in fast speech, it should be noted that these bisyllabic evidentials uniformly
bear stress on their initial syllable (e.g. ı́ka). This is characteristic of bisyllabic words in Nanti
(Crowhurst and Michael, 2005), but not of clipped words, which retain the stress pattern of the
full word. In the case of the inflected verbs corresponding to the evidentials in question, clipping
would result in stress on the final syllable of the evidential (e.g. *iká).
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The quotative ka seems to be the furthest along the trajectory of grammat-
icalization, as evidenced by the fact that it can serve as a complementizer to verbs
of communication and cognition, as in (2.5), (2.6),25 and (2.7).























‘I told a story of my arriving in Shanpinkihari.’



































‘He would say: I will not go and visit my son.’























‘She decided to come back.’
The inferential =ka is reconstructible in proto-Kampa. Cognates of this mor-
pheme are found in several other Kampan languages. These include Ashéninka -ka,
which functions as an interrogative marker (Wise, 1986, p.603), and which also sur-
faces in indefinite and interrogative pronouns such as tshika ‘where/wherever/what’
25Note that the matrix verb kant may be interpreted either as a verb of communication, ‘say’, or
as a verb of cognition, ‘think’.
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and ninka ‘who/whoever’ (Wise, 1986, p.573); Kakinte -ka, an indefinite marker26,27
(Swift, 1988, p.45-6); and Asháninka -kea, an interrogative marker (Wise, 1986,
p.614). For Matsigenka, the language most closely related to Nanti, Snell (1998,
p.63) mentions several modal suffixes which are likely cognate with Nanti =ka, in-
cluding =rika ‘indefinite’, =raka ‘possibility’, =roka ‘probability’, and =rorokari
‘probability’. It appears, then, that the Nanti inferential is an innovation in the
Kampa family.
There is no evidence that the ongoing grammaticalization of Nanti eviden-
tiality is due to language contact. Of the other language families found in the area
of the Amazon Basin where Nanti is spoken, the Panoan and Southern Arawak lan-
guages are reported to exhibit evidentiality (Aikhenvald and Dixon, 1998). Of the
Panoan languages, Shipibo-Conibo (Valenzuela, 2003), Amahuaca (Sparing-Chavez,
2001, cited in Sparing-Chavez (2003)), and Sharanahua (Deleague, 2006) are known
to exhibit evidentiality, but they are located away from territories known to have
been inhabited by Nantis (Michael and Beier, 2004), and there is no evidence of
contact between Nantis and members of these Panoan groups. Moreover, other
Kampan groups which live in closer proximity to these Panoan groups, especially
the Ashéninka, exhibit no signs of having developed evidentiality as a consequence
of language contact (Garcia Salazar, 1997). The sole Southern Arawak language
spoken in the rough vicinity of Nanti is Yine (Piro), which is reported to exhibit
evidentiality (Aikhenvald and Dixon, 1998, p.245). There is no known history of
social contact between Yines and Nantis, however, and in any event, Matsigenka,
which has had considerable contact with Yine, shows no signs of contact-induced
evidentiality.
26(Wise, 1986, p.603) glosses this as an interrogative marker, but Swift (1988) gives no indication
that this morpheme functions as an interrogative, and an examination of Swift’s texts appears to
confirm that -ka does not function as an interrogative marker in Kakinte. In addition, Swift (1988,
p.34) mentions a relativizer -ka, which may or may not be related to the indefinite marker.
27Nanti indefinite pronouns reflect the prior role of =ka as an indefinite marker. e.g. tyanika
‘someone’, cf. tyani ‘who (interrogative)’.
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The nearby Quechuan languages, of course, are well known for their eviden-
tial systems (see, e.g. Faller, 2002; Floyd, 1999; Weber, 1989), and the presence of
Quechua loanwords in the Kampan languages is indicative of contact between the
two language families. Contact with Quechua does not appear to be a viable ex-
planation for the emergence of evidentiality in Nanti, however. First, the location
of Nanti territory makes it unlikely that there was ever any direct contact between
Nantis and Quechuas. Second, even if there were, at one point, contact between the
ancestors of present-day Nanti speakers and Quechua speakers, it would likely have
been several centuries in the past, probably before Matsigenka and Nanti diverged
into different varieties. Consequently, if Nanti evidentiality arose through contact
with Quechua, we would expect to see signs of a similar system in Matsigenka, which
we do not.
Although Nanti exhibits grammaticalized evidentials, they are not morphosyn-
tactically obligatory. Rather, the pervasiveness of evidentiality and of periphrastic
mode of access information in Nanti discourse arises from the high salience of sources
of information in Nanti communicative practice. There are numerous factors that
influence the expression of mode of access information in Nanti utterances, but one
in particular can be considered basic. Since it plays an important role in the infer-
ence of visual mode of access, I will briefly discuss it now. This factor in question
is one already discussed in §2.4.2 in relation to other languages, namely, the com-
municative maxim that the mode of access to the event or state of affairs to which
a given proposition refers should be clear to the participants. Such clarity may be
achieved by overt specification, using evidentials or periphrastic expressions, or by
inferences from discursive context. Conversely, such specifications may be omitted
because the information imparted by the utterance is common knowledge (Michael,
2001b).
Since this particular motivation for mode of access specification is the estab-
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lishment of mode of access to an event, rather than the formally-motivated marking
of particular constituents, the turns of talk that introduce a body of information
related to the event are particularly relevant sites for the specification of mode-of-
access information. In short, mode-of-access specification tends to cluster in the
early turns of talk related to a topic of event. In this particular phase of interaction,
speakers tend to infer that utterances that do not overtly specify mode-of-access
information lead are based on the visual mode of access. In other words, in this
context, Nanti has pragmatically-based, formally unmarked, visual evidentiality. It
is not the case, however, that all clauses that do not specify mode of access are





responsibility in Nanti society
3.1 Chapter overview
Previous work on the relationship between evidentiality and responsibility has fo-
cused on the role of source-of-information meanings in reducing speakers’ responsi-
bility for the factuality of utterances. In this chapter, I argue that evidentiality can
also serve to mitigate responsibility for events. The close analysis of interactions
between speakers of Nanti shows that these speakers deploy evidentials and pe-
riphrastic source-of-information meanings to negotiate event responsibility. Source-
of-information specifications denote the nature of sensory access that indexed know-
ing subjects have to indexed events. Via conventionalized understandings regarding
the prototypical circumstances under which particular evidentials are used, eviden-
tial meanings lead to inferences regarding the spatial and sensory relationship of
the speaker to the event in question. Interactants are then able to infer the nature
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of the speaker’s involvement and causal responsibility for the event. On this basis,
combined with cultural understandings about causal and moral responsibility, inter-
actants reach conclusions regarding the moral responsibility of the speaker for the
event in question.
3.2 Introduction
On March 5th 2005, I was sitting working in my house in the Nanti community of
Montetoni when Hirero, my neighbor, called me out to inform me of an unfortu-
nate incident: the community boombox had stopped working. I walked over to the
community leader’s house with Hirero, where the boombox had been in use during
a communal manioc beer feast. A group of concerned-looking young men stood
around the silent boombox. In an effort to determine the problem, I asked the as-
sembled group what had happened. Within moments, everyone was talking. Several
young men who were frequent operators of the boombox offered the most animated
replies, each explaining that he hadn’t seen what happened to it. Among these was
Terohite, the community leader’s son, who vehemently declared, using quotative
and reportive evidentials, that he had learned of the demise of the boombox from
others. Several bystanders contradicted Terohite, however, saying that he had seen
what happened. But Terohite remained adamant: he had heard about the event
from someone else. This dispute continued for several minutes without resolution.
Eventually we determined that the problem was a loose wire, which I was able to
fix. After several bowls of manioc beer, I returned to my house, intrigued by how
my inquiry had led to a quickly-escalating evidential dispute. This chapter is an
effort to understand why disputes like this arise in Nanti society, and to explicate
their significance for our understanding of the social functions of evidentiality.
Evidentiality1 has captured the attention of many socially-oriented students
1Following De Haan (1999) and Aikhenvald (2004), I take evidentiality to be the grammaticalized
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of language because of its obvious importance in the interactional construction of
authority, responsibility, and entitlement (Atkinson, 1999, 2004; Fox, 2001; Hill and
Irvine, 1993b; Sidnell, 2005). Most work on the relationship between evidential-
ity, a linguistic category, and responsibility, a social one, has focused on the use
of evidentiality to construct responsibility for attributes of discourse, such as its
factuality or its appropriateness relative to local norms of politeness. There has
been much less work carried out on the use of evidentiality to construct respon-
sibility for events and situations, such as mishaps or successes. My goal in this
chapter is to clearly distinguish these two forms of responsibility, which I refer to as
utterance responsibility and event responsibility, and to examine how evidentiality
is employed in Nanti interactions to negotiate the latter. I argue that evidentials
and related source-of-information specifications index relationships between know-
ing subjects and events, and that in Nanti society at least, these relationships can be
deployed as metaphors for the subject’s involvement in that situation. Involvement,
in turn, serves as a basis for Nanti judgements of moral responsibility. The result
is a pragmatic metaphor (Silverstein, 1976), through which evidential specification
can come to stand for moral responsibility for the situations referred to by those
evidentially-marked propositions.
If this argument is correct, then the social significance of the evidential dispu-
tation in the opening vignette with Terohite and the boombox, and the motivations
of the interactants, become clearer. The question of the sensory access Terohite had
to the event of the boombox’s breakdown is immediately relevant to the interactional
construction of responsibility for the unfortunate event.
In this chapter, I demonstrate one of the principal social-interactional func-
tions of evidentiality in Nanti society by examining its use to construct responsibil-
expression of the source of information for a given proposition, thereby distinguishing evidential-
ity from epistemic modality and non-grammaticalized expressions of source-of-information. The
denotational and indexical components of evidentiality are discussed in detail in §3.7.
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ity for situations and eventualities among speakers of Nanti. I see this chapter as
a bridge between typological-grammatical approaches to evidentiality and socially-
oriented pragmatic approaches to knowledge-in-interaction. My goal is to draw on
the complementary strengths of these approaches in order to develop a better un-
derstanding of the social and interactional functions of evidentiality, while clarifying
the position of evidentiality in grammatically-oriented approaches to language. On
the one hand, functional-typological approaches benefit from greater attention to
the pragmatic and social aspects of language; on the other hand, pragmatically-
and socially-oriented approaches benefit from the greater linguistic breadth of typo-
logical approaches, which make clearer the grammatical distinctions that we must
attend to in language. In this chapter, then, I explore both the characteristics of
evidentials as a category in the Nanti language and the affordances of evidentiality
as a strategy for negotiating individual responsibility in Nanti society.
This chapter is organized as follows: section 3.3 reviews the previous scholar-
ship on the relationship between evidentiality and responsibility. Section 3.4 presents
a discussion of general philosophical and anthropological approaches to responsibil-
ity, while section 3.5 discusses responsibility in Nanti society. Section 3.6 presents
an overview of Nanti evidentiality and evidential practice, including a discussion
of how Nanti appears to be in the process of independently innovating evidential
marking. Section 3.8 is the empirical heart of the chapter, providing an extended
examination of the use of evidential resources and their relation to the interactional
negotiation of event responsibility in a particular interaction. Section 3.7 provides
a theoretical account of how evidentials come to be resources for the negotiation of
event responsibility.
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3.3 Evidentiality and responsibility: an overview
The fact that evidentiality is implicated in the interactional negotiation of responsi-
bility is well established (Fox, 2001; Hill and Irvine, 1993b). What is not so clearly
distinguished in discussions of evidentiality and responsibility is that there are at
least two markedly different kinds of responsibility salient to the interactional role
of evidentiality: responsibility for utterances, and responsibility for events. In this
section, I define and distinguish these two forms of responsibility, and review the
scholarship on the role of evidentiality and evidential practice in the interactional
construction of responsibility, showing that both forms of responsibility are relevant
to our understanding of the social functions of evidentiality.
Utterance responsibility refers to the accountability of speakers for particu-
lar attributes of discourse that are singled out as salient by interactants and local
language ideologies. Under this construal of ‘responsibility’, interactants are evalu-
ated as praiseworthy or culpable for how their discourse displays or fails to display
qualities deemed relevant by participants in interactions. The discourse attributes
that have received the most attention with respect to the social-interactional func-
tions of evidentiality are factuality and politeness. Evidentiality is relevant to the
negotiation of this form of responsibility as a means for mitigating or underscoring
the responsibility of interactants for these discourse attributes.
Linguistic anthropologists and others have explored in some detail the use of
quotative and reportive strategies for negotiating utterance responsibility.2 We find
that Hill and Irvine (1993b), Fox (2001), and Atkinson (1999), for example, comment
that quotative and reportive evidentials serve to mitigate a speaker’s responsibility
for the factuality of an utterance. This result is a consequence of the differentiation
of principal and animator participant roles effected by quotatives and reportives.
The mitigating effect stems from the fact that animators are typically shielded from
2Utterance responsibility is simply referred to as ‘responsibility’ in these works.
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responsibility for the discourse attributes of the utterances they animate (Goffman,
1979).3 This burden is instead that of the principal, which role the reportive or
quotative typically distinguishes from the speaker.
These same evidentials can also shield speakers from the disapproval risked
by violating local norms regarding appropriate evaluative statements of others’ be-
havior. For example, Irvine (1993), for Wolof society (Niger-Congo; West Africa),
and Besnier (1993), for Nukulaelae society (Austronesian; Tuvalu), have shown how
reported speech can insulate speakers from negative evaluations to which they may
otherwise open themselves by making insulting or critical comments of others.
Although quotatives and reportives are most commonly discussed as means
for mitigating (utterance) responsibility, it is also clear that they may be used in
self-reports to increase a speaker’s responsibility for an utterance. In such cases a
fusion of animator and principal is achieved, rather than a fission of these roles.
Responsibility enhancement of this sort has been reported by Bendix (1993, p.238)
for Newari (Tibeto-Burman; Nepal and India), Haviland (2004, p.54) for Tzotzil
(Mayan; Mexico), and Michael (2001a, p.104) for Nanti, and is discussed in detail
in Chapter 4.
While linguistic anthropologists have tended to focus on quotatives and re-
portives, descriptive and typological linguists concerned with grammaticalized evi-
dential systems have observed that other forms of evidentiality are also implicated in
speaker responsibility and commitment to factuality. In the case of Wanka Quechua
(Quechuan; Peru), for example, Floyd (1999) has argued that the use of direct ev-
identials, especially visual evidentials, indicates strong speaker commitment to the
truthfulness of utterances, and that the use of weak evidentials, such as reportatives
or inferentials, is linked to weak speaker commitment. Chafe (1986), Willett (1988,
3As Shuman (1993) and Hill and Irvine (1993a, p.13) observe, reportive and quotative strate-
gies are not foolproof, and may ultimately fail to achieve the sought-after fission of principal and
animator, leading to the inability of participants to escape responsibility for the utterances they
animate.
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p.85-8), and many others have made similar observations. De Haan (1996, cited
in Stenzel (2004)) characterizes the relationship between evidentials and utterance
responsibility in the following terms:
As far as the degree of confidence in the truth of the statement is con-
cerned, by using evidentials, a speaker will not commit him or herself
to any degree of confidence but will transfer any responsibility to the
hearer.
The second type of responsibility I consider in relation to evidentiality and
evidential practice, and the main focus of this chapter, concerns praiseworthiness or
blameworthiness for events and states of affairs. I refer to this form of evidential-
ity as event responsibility. Under this form of responsibility, interactants are held
accountable for certain situations or eventualities having arisen, rather than being
held accountable solely for the attributes of discourse.
The role of evidentiality and evidential practice in the interactional construc-
tion of event responsibility has not attracted much attention from either linguistic
anthropologists or linguists. This is no doubt in part because what I here distinguish
as utterance responsibility and event responsibility are not clearly distinguished in
the literature. Nevertheless, we do find sufficient mention of the relationship between
evidentiality and event responsibility to infer both that the distinction between ut-
terance responsibility and event responsibility is salient for speakers of genetically
and areally disparate languages, and that evidentiality plays a role in the interac-
tional construction of the latter.
Hill and Zepeda (1993), for example, discuss the use of discursive strate-
gies to “distribute responsibility” in English-Tohono O’odham (Uto-Aztecan; USA
and Mexico) bilingual interactions. A careful reading of their discussion makes it
clear that their use of the term ‘responsibility’ covers both event and discourse at-
tribute senses of the term. Their analysis shows that reported speech both mitigates
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utterance responsibility via the animator/principal split discussed above (Hill and
Zepeda, 1993, p.198), and diminishes event responsibility for the “troubles” that are
the topic of the interactions. In the latter case, reported speech serves to iconically
represent an interactant’s belated acquaintance with certain crucial facts (Hill and
Zepeda, 1993, p.208), through which “she represents herself as being unable to di-
rectly influence the course of events . . . because she lacks the necessary knowledge at
crucial junctures.” (Hill and Zepeda, 1993, p.198). As we shall see below, this echoes
certain strategies employed by Nanti speakers to mitigate event responsibility.
Bendix (1993, p.241-2) briefly describes some strategic uses of Newari evi-
dential morphology to mitigate event responsibility via implicatures regarding in-
tentionality and volitionality. His discussion concerns an ‘internal’ evidential (int),
which indicates direct knowledge of the intention to perform a given action, and
an ‘external’ evidential (ext), which indicates knowledge obtained through having
observed incontrovertible evidence for it. Bendix remarks that “with ext . . . I dis-
tance myself from involvement in the event, and thereby from responsibility for it.”
As we shall see, a similar evidential distancing function plays an important role in
Nantis’ negotiation of event responsibility.
Dwyer (2000, p.51-2), speculates briefly on how speakers of Salar (Turkic;
China) may use nonfirsthand evidentials to distance themselves morally from sit-
uations they deem shameful. Chirikba (2003, p.246) comments that speakers of
Abkhaz (Abkhazo-Adyghean; Georgia, Turkey, and Ukraine) can use inferentials to
indicate non-participation in an event as well as to reduce utterance responsibility
for the factuality of an utterance. He makes similar observations about the reportive,
noting that it can serve both to reduce responsibility for an utterance as well as to
‘distance’ the speaker from the source of information (ibid., p.261, 264). Similarly,
Dixon (2003, p.169-170) remarks on an instance in which a Jarawara (Arawá; Brazil)
narrator employs a recent past non-eyewitness evidential, by which he “dissociates
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himself from responsibility for” a boat getting lost.
Event responsibility is in principle both positive, leading to praiseworthiness,
and negative, leading to blameworthiness. However, to the extent that the literature
discusses the relationship between evidentiality and event responsibility, the focus is
on the role of evidentiality in mitigating blameworthiness. This asymmetry is also
manifest in Nanti interactional data, where we find evidential resources being used
to mitigate blameworthiness, but rarely, if ever, employed to construct praisewor-
thiness. This asymmetry may stem from the fact that evidentiality easily serves as
a means for speakers to distance themselves from events, which readily lends itself
as a strategy for reducing responsibility, but less so for increasing it.
Before closing this overview, I wish to briefly mention two types of language-
related responsibility discussed in the literature that I will not be examining in this
chapter: responsibility for communicative competence and responsibility for mean-
ing. The assumption of responsibility for communicative competence is invoked in
performance theory as the basic characteristic that distinguishes performance from
non-performance (Bauman, 1977). On this view, performance is characterized by the
assumption of responsibility to produce utterances (or potentially, any semiotically-
freighted material) that display certain characteristics. Consequently, performance
is grounded in a prospective form of utterance responsibility (see §3.4 for a discussion
of prospective (ex ante) and retrospective (ex post) responsibility). There has been
little work on the role of evidentiality in the negotiation of responsibility for com-
municative competence, but Bauman’s (1993) discussion of how reportive frames
can be used as performance disclaimers suggests that this may be a fruitful area in
which to further explore the interactional functions of evidentiality.
The concept of responsibility for meaning stems from the observation that
the interactionally-relevant ‘meaning’ of an utterance is co-constructed among par-
ticipants with regard to local language ideologies (Duranti, 1993). Consequently,
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establishing who is considered to be responsible for the meaning of an utterance
is an interactional, culturally-situated achievement. An ethnographic example of
this concept at work is provided by Besnier’s examination of interactions in Nuku-
laelae society in which one person is criticizing another. He found that speakers
who produced the majority of critical talk in a given interaction employed strate-
gies that involved other participants in the creation of critical utterances, thereby
sharing the (utterance) responsibility for the critical meanings. Strategies included
the production of vague statements which either prompt requests for clarification
or require inferencing. In the former case, the recipient is regarded as having ini-
tiated the specificity of the criticism, who thereby becomes co-responsible for the
critical meaning (Besnier, 1989), while in the latter case, the typically negative, af-
fective meaning “is thus covert and indirect, and places the speaker in a position of
diminished responsibility for meaning” (Besnier, 1993, p.172). Both strategies are
non-evidential ones for diminishing utterance responsibility. Since responsibility for
meaning does not appear to be directly implicated in the interactional construction
of event responsibility, I will not discuss it further in this chapter.
In closing this section, I wish to make clear that the distinction between
utterance responsibility and event responsibility does not simply reduce to ‘respon-
sibility for talk’ and ‘responsibility for actions’, respectively. This tidy correspon-
dence breaks down because utterances may be performative, making talk an act that
brings about an event or a state of affairs. Event responsibility may thus in principle
include responsibility for the social consequences of discourse (e.g. discord). This is
one of the points made by Duranti (1993), who discusses how Samoan orators may
be held blameworthy for the consequences of their talk. In cases such as this, the
two forms of responsibility may overlap significantly, since blameworthy attributes
of discourse can be seen as the causes of undesirable events.
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3.4 Responsibility: philosophical and anthropological
perspectives
In order to sharpen our analysis of evidentiality and event responsibility, it will be
helpful to draw on philosophical and anthropological approaches to responsibility
more generally. In general, these approaches treat the concept of ‘responsibility’
broadly, including, but not restricted to, constructions or representations of respon-
sibility through discourse. Ethical philosophers typically distinguish three basic
types of responsibility, which, following Birnbacher (2001), I will refer to as ex post
responsibility, ex ante responsibility, and causal responsibility. Ex post responsi-
bility corresponds to forms of retrospective responsibility that we associate with
praiseworthiness or blameworthiness for acts or omissions:
Ex post responsibility is the kind of responsibility one incurs by being
held ‘answerable’ for some act of one’s own, done by commission or by
omission in the past. (ibid.: 9)
Both utterance responsibility and event responsibility are forms of ex post responsi-
bility.
Ex ante responsibility is a prospective form of responsibility associated with
undertaking to perform certain actions:
Ex ante responsibility is normally ascribed to an agent (individual or
collective) for the production of a certain state of affairs, with the acts
realizing this state of affairs lying in the future. (ibid.: 10)
Finally, causal responsibility is a non-moral form of responsibility, arising
solely from substantive participation in a causal chain leading to some outcome:
Causal responsibility is not related to responsibility in the one or the
other of its core meanings [i.e. ex post or ex ante responsibility]. . . The
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fact that the event E1 is causally responsible for event E2 does not
imply anything about ex post or ex ante responsibility in the case. It
only means that E1 is the cause or one of the more important causal
conditions of E2. . . (ibid.: p.11)
Although causal responsibility is not in itself a form of moral responsibility,
we shall see that it does play an important role in the assignment of moral, specif-
ically ex post, responsibility. This will be clearer if review the basic conditions of
ex post responsibility. According to Birnbacher (2001, p.12-14, passim), a person is
said to be ex post responsible if the following conditions are met:
1. The person held responsible is identical with the individual who performed
the act for which responsibility is ascribed.
2. The person in question was free to act otherwise.
3. The person in question was under an obligation not to do, or not allow, the
harm for which he or she is held responsible.
4. There exists a causal relation between the person’s actions and the event for
which he or she is being held responsible. That is the person is (partially or
wholly) causally responsible for the event in question.
Clearly, causal responsibility is only one of the conditions necessary for ex
post responsibility, and does not lead to ex post responsibility by strict deduction.
Nevertheless, looking forward to our empirical discussion in §3.7, it is helpful to
note that there is an important practical relationship between causal and ex post
responsibility. The following is one way to understand this practical relationship: in
specific interactional contexts, interactants frequently agree that ex post responsibil-
ity conditions 2 and 3 hold, based on shared world knowledge, cultural assumptions,
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and moral principles. Under these circumstances, the determination of causal re-
sponsibility becomes the locus of negotiation over ex post responsibility, with the
affirmation of causal responsibility leading to the deduction of ex post responsibility.
In this way, ex post responsibility may come to turn on the contingent facts of causal
responsibility. As we shall see in §3.7, the role of causal responsibility in the deter-
mination of moral (event) responsibility is central to the efficacy of evidentiality in
negotiating event responsibility in Nanti interactions.
Since I seek to apply the philosophical distinctions outlined above to a non-
Western society, it is important to consider them in light of the anthropological
literature on responsibility, recalling that linguistic anthropologists commonly ap-
proach the culturally-decontextualized claims of philosophers with some skepticism.4
Within anthropology, the earliest work on responsibility was carried out mainly by
legal anthropologists. More recently, responsibility, and especially utterance respon-
sibility, has come to interest linguistic anthropologists also. Both subdisciplines
appear to take for granted the basic philosophical distinctions sketched above, in
effect understanding cross-cultural variations in ideologies of responsibility in terms
of culture-specific variants of the four basic conditions of ex post responsibility.5
Documented areas of cross-cultural variation in ideologies of responsibility include
local understandings of what constitutes an offense (condition 3), local theories of
morally-relevant forms of causation6 (condition 4), and the salience of intentionality
as a factor in the assignment of responsibility (condition 2). The first of these areas
of variation is an ethnographic commonplace: moral values are known to vary from
4Consider, for example, Rosaldo (1982)’s criticism of speech act theory, which was an early salvo
in a broad critique of personalist theories of meanings (Du Bois, 1993; Duranti, 1993).
5Attention to ex ante responsibility is unusual among anthropologists; Kuipers’s (1993) dis-
cussion of Weyewa (Austronesian; Indonesia) “responsibility to the word” is a rare discussion of
responsibility framed as prospective (discourse attribute) responsibility.
6An intriguing variant is reported for Dou Donngo society, in the form of a significantly weakened
condition on causal responsibility (Just, 1990). In certain cases in this society, liability is established
solely on the grounds of it having been causally possible that the accused committed the harm in
question.
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society to society. Variation in morally-relevant forms of causation is evident in work
on classical topics in cultural anthropology, such as witchcraft (e.g. Evans-Pritchard,
1937) and taboos (e.g. Frazer, 1936).
Linguistic anthropologists’ engagement with the concept of responsibility is
motivated by a broader re-examination of ‘personalist’ theories of meaning (Duranti,
1993; Du Bois, 1993). Personalist theories seek to explain meaning in terms of the
individual speaker’s communicative intentions – a flawed approach for analysts who
see meaning as negotiated through interaction. Sociocentric approaches, in contrast,
seek to understand meaning as the outcome of interaction among multiple partici-
pants. The relevance of sociocentric approaches to meaning for understandings of
responsibility is exemplified by Duranti’s (1993) discussion of Samoan orators’ re-
sponsibility for their utterances in political meetings (fono). Duranti observes that
the socially-accepted meaning of an utterance is the consequence of the combined
contextualizing and re-contextualizing contributions of multiple orators, especially
higher-ranking ones. Accordingly, the meaning for which the original orator is held
responsible may be quite divergent from the one he intended.
Consequently, for linguistic anthropologists, differences in the role of inten-
tionality in the assignment of responsibility is frequently the most interesting pa-
rameter of variation. In terms of the conditions of ex post responsibility enumerated
above, intentionality enters as a factor affecting the second condition, namely, that
the agent to whom responsibility is to be attributed was in the position to act oth-
erwise than he or she did. If the agent did not act intentionally, the reasoning goes,
the agent was not in a position to choose not to bring about the event for which he
or she would be held responsible. In early work, the significance of intentionality
was framed in evolutionist terms, whereby its exclusion in determining responsibility
(i.e. strict liability) was seen as a characteristic of “tribal” societies, and its inclu-
sion a characteristic of “modern” legal systems (e.g. Gluckman, 1965). Moore (1972)
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argued that this contrast is overdrawn, since ‘modern’ legal systems also include no-
tions of strict liability (e.g. in tort law), and the close study of nominally strict
liability systems shows that there is space in them for the consideration of intention
(Just, 1990; McLaren, 1975). Some of the many societies that have been described as
exhibiting strict liability include Barotse (Lozi, Bantu; southwestern Africa Gluck-
man, 1965), Yurok (Algic; USA; Kroeber, 1925), Jalé (Trans-New Guinea; Irian
Jaya; Koch, 1978), Dou Donggo (Bimanese, Austronesian; Indonesia; Just, 1990),
Nukulaelae (South Tuvaluan; Tuvalu; Besnier, 1993, p.166), and to a significant
degree, Samoa (Duranti, 1993; Shore, 1982).
Given that the work of legal and linguistic anthropologists essentially pre-
supposes the basic philosophical framework for responsibility developed by ethical
philosophers, it seems reasonable to assume that this framework is viable for cross-
cultural work on responsibility. It is clear that the various criteria are weighted
differently in different societies – leading, for example, to the greater prominence of
‘strict liability’ in some societies than others. Similarly, culture-specific theories of
morally-relevant causation may vary considerably. It will therefore be prudent to
be sensitive to Nanti-specific weighings of these parameters.
3.5 Event responsibility in Nanti society
The discursive construction of event responsibility is a major theme in Nanti in-
teractions. In my experience, few mishaps that come to the knowledge of others
are permitted to pass by without discussion of who bears responsibility for the un-
fortunate event. Determining the whos, hows, whats, and wherefores of mishaps
is something into which Nantis frequently invest considerable interactional work –
and on some occasions at least, appear to delight in. Although I have witnessed
interactions in which the assignment of culpability may ultimately be abandoned,
as when culpability appears to be gravitating towards socially prominent men, I
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have rarely heard Nantis articulate the view that something ‘just happened’ or that
an event was the consequence of chance, if people were involved in the event. The
conclusion that there is no moral responsibility for an event or state of affairs is for
the most part only reached in Nanti interactions if the participants do not identify
any human causal responsibility in the event.
At the same time that event responsibility is a major interactional concern
for Nantis, the assignment of responsibility frequently entails little or no further
overt social sanction. Over the course of some 20 months in the community over a
space of nine years, I have only witnessed a handful of cases in which an adult was
explicitly reprimanded by others for their actions, and the majority of these cases
involved rare instances of physical violence. More typically, the party who emerges
as responsible for an event reacts by becoming interactionally withdrawn and quiet
for a time, and the other interactants drop the matter. In most cases, then, it
appears that it is a sufficient resolution to the issue for Nantis to interactionally
enact their acceptance of the assignment of responsibility.
There is a distinct tendency for event responsibility to trickle down to the
young and to women, following the tendency observed by Hill and Irvine (1993a,
p.21) for less powerful members of a given society to be disproportionately saddled
with culpability. Conversely, intentions, which generally do not play a major role in
discussions about responsibility among Nantis, are much more frequently cited as a
mitigating factor for socially prominent adult men than for anyone else.
The following incident exhibits the characteristically low importance placed
on intentions in Nanti interactions involving responsibility. On October 11th 2004,
I accompanied a group of some ten members of my residence group on a trip to a
nearby stream to fish with kogi (barbasco), a plant whose roots can be pulped to
release a milky fluid, which, diffused into water, stuns fish. We had been following
the cloud of kogi fluid downstream for about half an hour when almost everyone in
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the group froze: a samani (Cuniculus paca, a large nocturnal rodent valued for its
meat) was emerging sleepily from its burrow in the creek bank only a few meters
away. One young woman, Nora, had her back turned to the hole, however. As Hirero
and Shanebo limbered their bows to fire at the samani, Nora turned to see what
everyone else was intently gazing at, and was so surprised by the nearby agouti that
she cried out: Samani! In the blink of an eye, the startled samani shot off into the
undergrowth. The adults’ faces fell, and the men rounded on Nora to criticize her
for scaring off the animal. Even the children of the group got involved, mimicking
Nora’s cry of Samani! in mocking tones. Nora was very embarrassed and silently
endured the criticisms and mockery. At no point in this interaction did the fact that
her actions were unintentional surface as a relevant factor in her culpability for the
events that had transpired.
When a mishap is revealed in the course of an interaction and the respon-
sible party is not obvious, it is not unusual for vulnerable parties to scramble to
protect themselves. Culpability is circling, and it must land somewhere. In fact,
socialization into this view of responsibility is, to me, a striking aspect of Nanti
childhood. Very young Nanti children are very rarely criticized for their actions or
for the consequences of their actions. Indeed, they seem immune to blame and are
sometimes even encouraged by adults, in the context of ‘play’, to display behaviors –
such as expressing anger or greed, or demonstrating physical aggression – which are
otherwise severely censured in Nanti society. However, this state of affairs changes
radically at around four years of age, when children go from being virtually blame-
less to being magnets for culpability. Suddenly their actions become the objects
of intense parental discursive scrutiny and assessments of culpability. Behaviors
which are generally socially disapproved are, of course, objects of criticism and the
assignment of culpability, but even minor unintentional mishaps may occasion ex-
tensive criticism and negative evaluation. When an infrequent theft occurs, or when
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there is damage to property, children are almost always the first suspects, and they
are overwhelmingly ultimately designated as guilty parties. Indeed, a child’s mere
proximity to some mishap may lead parents to hold them responsible.
Consider the following events: on March 30th 2005, I went to visit the house-
hold of Ihonishi and Behatrisa, in a neighboring residence group. On the way to
their house, I noticed that their neighbor’s, Horasa’s, house had collapsed. Horasa
rarely slept in his own house, preferring to stay in another residence group, and
he did not maintain it. I asked Behatrisa about the house, and in a scolding voice
(Beier, 2005) she responded, Iryo tinteronkanake ‘He knocked it down,’ indicating
her seven-year old son Bisako, who stood sheepishly at her side. She repeated this
several times, scowling at her son. When I mentioned this in a later conversation
with Horasa, he laughed, remarking, Chichata oteronkanake ‘It fell down by itself,’
and pointed out that the houseposts were completely rotten. Clearly Horasa did not
entertain the idea that Bisako was even involved in the collapse of his house, and I,
personally, could not see how this small child could have knocked down the house
either. Nonetheless, Behatrisa took the opportunity to hold Bisako responsible for
the collapse of the house, even though it seems very unlikely that Bisako had any
direct hand in the matter.
In this way, children quickly learn not only that every mishap is someone’s
fault, but also that they themselves are particularly vulnerable to accusations. Not
surprisingly, after a few years of such experiences, children begin to acquire discur-
sive competence in deflecting the culpability that gravitates towards them. One of
the central arguments of this chapter is that the strategic use of evidential resources
is one way that they and adults do so. Nevertheless, sensitivity to blame, and the
strong desire to avoid it, persists far into adulthood for most Nantis, especially for
women.
One final comment is in order here: it would be an exaggeration to suggest
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that intention is entirely irrelevant to Nantis in the assignment of responsibility, as
has been suggested (incorrectly, I believe) for some societies (see §3.4). Consider
the following incident, which began at a communal manioc beer feast in Montetoni.
At one point during the evening’s chanting and dancing, Bisarota, a young man
trained as a health worker,7 knocked down his father’s brother’s wife, Serina. Over
the next few days, a public discursive consensus emerged that the event was an
accident.8 However, on the evening of the accident, Horasa, a young man unrelated
to either Bisarota or Serina, had declared that he was offended by Bisarota’s action
and, as a consequence, would refuse to accept medical treatment from Bisarota
in the future. Troubled by this, Bisarota mentioned the incident to me the next
morning. Subsequently, when the community leader, Migero, learned that I had
heard about this altercation, he came to me to express his concern that Horasa’s
declaration would lead to a suspension of medical aid to the community. Crucial
to Migero’s framing of the incident to me was the fact that Bisarota had knocked
down Serina unintentionally, and therefore, his action should not yield any negative
consequences, either for Bisarota himself or for the community at large.
3.6 Nanti evidentiality and evidential practice
The specification of sources of information, or modes of sensory access (see §3.7),
is a pervasive aspect of everyday Nanti communicative interactions. Although the
deployment of grammaticalized evidentials is not obligatory in Nanti discourse, they
are a significantly more pervasive aspect of communicative interaction for Nanti
speakers than for speakers of English.
In this respect, the use of grammaticalized evidentials in Nanti discourse
7At the request of the community, my partner Christine Beier and I, in cooperation with the
Peruvian ministry of health, trained Bisarota in the use of basic antibiotics to treat introduced
illnesses; see Chapter 1 for more information.
8This is very plausible, since on dark evenings accidental collisions between chanters in the
energetic dance-lines is a common event.
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is more reminiscent of their use by speakers of languages such as Hup (Nadahup;
Brazil; Epps, 2005) and Western Apache (Athabaskan; USA; De Reuse, 2003), than
by those of Tuyuca (Tucanoan; Brazil; Barnes, 1984), a language known for its
obligatory evidentiality. Describing Hup evidentiality, Epps remarks:
. . . the expression of evidentiality in Hup is to some degree optional, and
it is guided more by Gricean-type pragmatic principles of informative-
ness rather than by any grammatical rule. Thus evidential markers are
sometimes left off in situations where the information source is already
made obvious by the discourse context or is otherwise seen as relatively
non-salient. (Epps, 2005, p.779, emphasis mine)
Similarly, de Reuse describes the use of evidentials in Western Apache in the
following terms:
Even though evidentiality is by no means an obligatory category in WA
[Western Apache], WA speakers mark source of information more often
and more precisely than European language speakers do. (De Reuse,
2003, p.95-6)
Significantly, Nanti presently appears to be in the process of independently
grammaticalizing evidentiality (see below). This is important in part because it is
consistent with my impressionistic claim regarding the pervasiveness of specifications
of modes of access in Nanti discourse. As observed by Bybee (2003), among others,
frequency is the primary contributor to grammaticalization. Thus, the ongoing
grammaticalization of evidentials in Nanti is congruent with high frequency of mode-
of-sensory-access meanings in Nanti discourse. The fact that Nanti evidentiality is
an independent innovation, rather than one arising through language contact, is
also important because it suggests that the high frequency of source-of-information
meanings in Nanti is driven by the active communicative needs of Nanti individuals.
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That is, the ideological and interactional aspects of Nanti communicative practice
are driving the grammaticalization of evidentiality, rather than, say, the adoption
of communicative or linguistic norms of a more prestigious language community in
the context of language contact.
Since evidentials are not grammatically obligatory in Nanti, a cogent treat-
ment of Nanti evidentiality is inseparable from a treatment of Nanti evidential prac-
tice (discussed in detail in Chapter 2.) By this latter term I refer to the real-
time strategic deployment in interaction of both grammaticalized resources such as
evidentials and epistemic modal morphemes, and periphrastic expressions in the
communication of meanings associated with speakers’ relations to their knowledge.
Although evidentiality and epistemic modality are clearly distinct conceptual and
grammatical categories, they both participate in humans’ everyday practical episte-
mology. I refer to the intersection of communicative activity with this epistemology
as evidential practice.
3.7 Evidentiality and event responsibility
In order to understand how evidentiality is implicated in the discursive construc-
tion of event responsibility in Nanti society, it is helpful to consider the indexical
components of evidentiality and their relation to its denotational component. I take
the position that evidentials denote the mode of sensory access that the knowing
subject indexed by the evidential has to an indexed event or state of affairs.
Since as early as Jakobson’s (1990) [1956] work on Bulgarian evidentiality, it
has been recognized that evidentials have a triune structure. In Jakobson’s original
formulation, evidentials take into account three events: the narrated event (En),
i.e. the event described by the propositon over which the evidential has scope; the
speech event (Es), i.e. the interactional circumstance in which the proposition is
uttered; and the narrated speech event (Ens), the “alleged source of the narrated
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event”. Jakobson’s insight is echoed in more recent work that seeks to characterize
evidentiality as an indexical category.
Jakobson’s description of evidentiality is clearly oriented towards quotatives
and reportives. If we generalize away from this orientation, we see that the ‘nar-
rated speech event’ corresponds to evidentials’ source of information, or source event
(Kockelman, 2004). Similarly, ‘speech event’ generalizes to a more generic notion
of event. Mushin (2001) further refines this model by recharacterizing the indexical
component Es (speech event) as a component that indexes “some conceptualizer’s
subjective viewpoint” (ibid: p.35). Agha (2002) makes a similar move when he char-
acterizes evidentials as forming a “semiotic chain” that links speaker to perceiver to
source, as does De Haan (2005a) when he speaks of evidentials as “encoding speaker
perspective.”9 I will refer to the entity indexed by this component as the knowing
subject. In these terms, then, evidentials denote the sensory/cognitive mediation be-
tween the indexed knowing subject and the indexed event. De Haan (2005a) reaches
a similar conclusion when he characterizes evidentiality as a form of propositional
deixis that “mark[s] the relationship between the speaker and the action s/he is
describing.”
I now wish to focus on the characterization of the mediation between the
knowing subject and event denoted by the evidential. As indicated above, it is
typical to speak of this mediation as the source10 for the knowledge encoded by the
proposition within the scope of the evidential. Strictly speaking, however, this is
misleading. The source of the knowledge in question is always the event. Consider
an event: the death of a tapir. A knowing subject may acquire knowledge of the
tapir’s death by seeing the animal collapse with an arrow in its side, by hearing the
9Nuyts (2001) also associates evidentiality with subjectivity. Kockelman (2004) is critical of the
notion of subjectivity in the analysis of epistemic modality and evidentiality, preferring to speak of
degrees of overlap between ‘commitment events’ and ‘narrated events’.
10This characterization is most apt for reported speech, where it is natural to speak of a narrated
speech event as the ‘source’ of our knowledge.
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animal’s death rattle, by inference upon noting slabs of tapir meat smoking over the
fire, or via a hunter’s narrative of the event. In each of these cases, the speaker’s
knowledge stems from some sensory input, whose ultimate source, in some direct or
ramified casual chain, is always the event in question. It is more accurate to say that
evidentials denote the nature of a speaker’s sensory/cognitive access to the event in
question, not the source of information.11 Recasting the denotational component of
evidentiality in these terms will be helpful in understanding the role of evidentiality
in event responsibility, without running afoul of previous work based on the ‘source
of information’ definition. Figure 3.1 illustrates the set of relationships discussed
thus far.
Figure 3.1: Evidentials: their denotational and indexical features
We now examine how the denotational and indexical relationships illustrated
in Figure 1 form the basis for a chain of inference that relates evidentiality to event
11I believe Floyd (1999, p.161) takes a similar position when he speaks of evidentials expressing
“how directly or immediately the speaker ‘contacts’ the designated scenario.”
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responsibility. We begin by considering the implications of two simple observations.
First, as much as a given speaker is a knowing subject, he or she is also an embodied,
physical subject. This fact places significant constraints on the kinds of circum-
stances in which particular sensory/cognitive modes of access are available to any
given subject. The visual mode of access, for example, typically requires physical
proximity and the absence of intervening obstructions.
Second, there is a cross-linguistic pragmatic preference for speakers to use
the strongest licensed evidential in a given circumstance. It was an early result in
pragmatics that the use of an evidentially weak utterance implies that the use of a
stronger one is not justified (see discussion in Horn (2004, p.15)). Recent work on
the use of evidentiality strongly supports this observation as a cross-cultural trend,
as argued by Aikhenvald (2004, p.307-9), De Haan (2001, p.197), Faller (2002),
and Palmer (2001, p.51). Thus, the use of an auditory evidential implies that a
visual evidential is not licensed, and the use of a quotative, reportive, or inferential
evidential implies that no direct evidential is licensed.
Given the use of a particular evidential, these two considerations imply that
the embodied subject was in a particular physical relation to the event in question
– no closer and no more distant.12 Evidentials are thus associated with prototypical
physical circumstances that permit the sensory/cognitive access denoted by the
evidential (Floyd, 1999, p.184-5). In short, the denotative content of an evidential
leads to inferences regarding the physical relationship between the indexed embodied
subject and the event.
Physical proximity to an event alone, of course, carries no moral entailments
regarding that event. However, physical proximity makes it possible for a person
12De Haan (2001) appears to go so far as to argue that presence/non-presence is part of the basic
semantics of at least some evidentials. I think caution is advisable in this regard, however, since
the relationship between evidentiality and physical presence is in general defeasible. Consider, for
example, the fact that Shipibo-Konibo speakers use visual evidentials for events seen on television
(Valenzuela, 2003, p.52).
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to be causally responsible for that event. Physical proximity is relevant to causal
responsibility in two ways. First, physical proximity to an event affects the efficacy
of any efforts to alter the course of the event in question: if one is insufficiently
close to an event, one cannot affect it. Second, proximity to an event affects one’s
knowledge of the event: if one is ignorant of an event, one cannot act to alter it.
Conversely, sufficient proximity makes possible the potential efficacy and knowledge
required to alter the course of an event. Taking efficacy and knowledge to be different
facets of involvement in an event, we can summarize by saying that an individual’s
physical proximity to an event allows us to infer their involvement in that event.
The plausibility of the inference from physical proximity to involvement, and the
role of evidentiality in that inference is supported, I believe, by de Haan’s remark
that:
[e]videntiality is a notional category which directly reflects the degree
of the speaker’s involvement (or the lack thereof) in the action he/she
describes. (De Haan, 2001, p.216)
The perceived relationship between evidentiality and involvement is also
manifest in Bendix’s comment, cited in §3.3, that Newari evidentials can diminish
responsibility by distancing the speaker from involvement in the event in question.
If we take as given that evidentials permit inferences regarding involvement,
and hence causal responsibility, the step to event responsibility is a short one. As
discussed in §3.4, if causal responsibility is given, deduction based on world knowl-
edge and shared moral principles allows one to arrive at the assignment of ex post
responsibility, of which event responsibility is a type.
The complete chain of inferences, illustrated in Figure 3.2, is the following:
evidential mode-of-access marking leads to inferences regarding physical proximity,
which in turn lead to inferences regarding involvement and causal responsibility.
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Assumptions regarding causal responsibility then lead to assignment of event re-
sponsibility, a form of moral responsibility.
I wish to be clear that the chain of implicatures that relates the mode of
access denoted by the evidential and moral responsibility rests on culturally-based,
if perhaps common, ideas regarding involvement and moral responsibility. The
culturally-mediated nature of the relationship between evidentiality, involvement,
and moral responsibility is clear when one compares Nanti evidential practice with
Dickinson’s (2000) description of Tsafiki (Barbacoan; Ecuador) evidentiality. Appar-
ently, Tsafikis also employ evidentials to construct representations of involvement
in events, with the inferential evidential serving to indicate reduced involvement.
For Tsafikis, however, this distantiation serves to indicate moral condemnation of
the events in question, rather than mitigating personal responsibility for them, as
in the Nanti case. Although the Tsafiki case provides another example of eviden-
tiality serving to indicate involvement, it also shows how the relationships between
evidentiality, involvement, and moral responsibility are culturally-grounded.
3.8 Evidential practice and event responsibility in Nanti
discourse: an example
We now turn to an extended example of how evidential strategies are deployed in
Nanti interaction to deflect culpability. The interaction involves six adults and sev-
eral children. The principal participants are two women, Mecha (M) and Chabera
(C); Pasotoro (P), Mecha’s husband; Aherika (A), Pasotoro’s sister-in-law; and
Tomashi (T), Mecha and Pasotoro’s son. The interaction takes place around noon
in Mecha’s cooking hut on September 27th, 2004.
The interaction we examine revolves around a burn that Mecha’s daughter
Rosa suffered the previous day. A few days beforehand, several men had cleared
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the tall grass in an open area near Mecha’s family’s cooking and sleeping huts. The
grass was left to dry, to be burned a few days hence in order to slow the growth of
new grass. Before the adults could do so, however, a group of children gathered the
grass into piles and set it alight – a common turn of events, but one nevertheless
disapproved of by adults. In the ensuing fun, Rosa inadvertently stepped into a pile
of burning grass, receiving a large burn on her foot and ankle. Rosa did not tell her
parents about the burn at the time, however, and even slept in the family’s chicken
coop that night to evade detection. Only the next day did Mecha finally learn of
the mishap from Rosa’s younger brother, Tomashi. She then tracked Rosa down
and severely chastised Rosa both for burning her foot and for concealing the fact.
I was apprised of these events when I was passing by Mecha and Pasotoro’s
cooking hut and was invited in to drink manioc beer. After several minutes of
appropriate visiting talk, Pasotoro told me of and showed me Rosa’s burn, and asked
if I could treat it. I left to obtain some topical antibiotics and returned with my
research partner, Christine Beier. Not long after I had returned to treat Rosa’s burn,
Chabera, a good friend of ours and mother-in-law to Pasotoro’s brother Tomashi,
arrived and was given manioc beer by Mecha. She then pointed to Rosa’s burn,
and asked how it occurred. Note that in the transcript that follows I indicate at the
right margin of each line the type of mode-of-access information contained in the
line (e.g. visual, inference, quotative, etc.), and the corresponding evidential
or periphrastic expression is underlined.
3.8.1 Interaction 1: Chabera asks about Rosa’s burn
















‘Where/how13 did this happen?’ (indicating Rosa’s burn)









‘Over there, yesterday, in the grass.’



















‘I saw (it) just now, (when I was making) yuca beer.’















‘I saw (it) just now.’











‘When she was making oburoki, in the late afternoon.’













‘I said, what got you?’
7. C: [Tya iro?
13Because of the indicated polysemy of tya, this utterance is ambiguous. Mecha’s response






‘Where did it happen?’























‘That (grass) which was burning, she presumably stepped on it.’











‘She– she– she was horsing around.’















‘I saw (the burn) just a little earlier.’













‘I said, what got you?’















‘She said, this is (due to) fire.’
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‘So that is why that (i.e. Rosa’s skin) is scorched.’
14. (pause)















‘All that, uh, is burned?’













‘All over here, here, see this.’





















‘You didn’t hear it at the time?’

























‘No. This one, he-, just recently he said now,’















































‘She- she just now she said, I stirred up the fire. She said the fire burned
(me).’















‘She said, the fire burned (me).’
[. . . ]



















‘Really, you didn’t hear her cry?’









‘She didn’t cry at all.’
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Some ethnographic contextualization of this interaction will be helpful in
understanding the significance of the participants’ strategic moves. First, Nanti
mothers are generally considered responsible for the safety of their young children
in Nanti society. This responsibility is not absolute, however, and the older a child
becomes, the more the child herself is held responsible for her own safety. Rosa,
who is approximately nine years old, is at a transitional age, when both she and her
mother share responsibility for her safety. In the context of this interaction, then,
both Rosa and Mecha are the candidates for culpability for the accident. Second,
Chabera is generally inclined to be more openly critical of others’ behavior than
most Nanti women are, and she is also more socially mobile than most women,
visiting distant households and conversing openly with both men and women in
those households, in a manner more reminiscent of male than female inter-household
visiting behavior. Mecha has ample reason to anticipate, therefore, that Chabera
is likely to cast a critical eye on the events in question, and that Chabera will not
hesitate to criticize Mecha’s behavior to others if she believes Mecha to have been
negligent. I have frequently heard Chabera’s criticisms of others, and have at least
once been subject to her criticisms myself.
As soon as Chabera starts inquiring into the events surrounding Rosa’s burn,
Mecha adopts intonational contours common among Nanti speakers who are de-
fending themselves from criticism or accusations.14 This behavior indicates that
14In brief, Mecha uses a slight creakiness and nasalization throughout her speech; simultaneously,
she deploys the upper extremes of her pitch range, beginning her breath groups at a high pitch and
then lowering her pitch step-wise across the syllables of the breath groups. The interpretability of
intonational contours is an important aspect of Nanti communicative practice, but not one that
can be addressed in detail in the present context. The reader is referred to Beier (2005) and Beier
(in prep.) for further information.
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Mecha interprets Chabera’s questions as relevant to the assignment of culpability
for the events under discussion. This assessment is supported by Mecha’s reaction
to Chabera’s questioning. Note, for example, that in responding to Chabera’s initial
question regarding where/how the burn occurred, Mecha moves immediately from a
brief response to Chabera’s explicit question to an extended discussion that distances
her from the event in question. Most of Mecha’s contributions to the conversation are
protestations of her protracted ignorance of Rosa’s burn and evidentially-qualified
descriptions of the event. In fact, in this interactional strip, the focus is much less on
how Rosa suffered the burn, and much more on who knew about it, when and how.
This is particularly clear in Chabera’s repeated efforts to clarify if either Mecha or
Pasotoro have failed to mention earlier knowledge of the burn than they initially
admit, in lines 17 and 22.
It is informative to contrast Mecha’s reaction to Chabera’s questioning with
the interaction that took place some twenty minutes earlier, when Pasotoro first
requested treatment from me for his daughter’s burned foot. Reho (R) is the author.
3.8.2 Interaction 2: Pasotoro tells Reho about Rosa’s burn

















‘Lev, fire burned this.’ [Indicating Rosa’s foot and ankle]


















‘(Did this happen) yester– many days ago?’

































‘That is due to (boiling) water? No?’














































‘Fire, like that (grass) they were burning, that burned (her).’






















‘Uhuh, uhuh. (pause) Hey, wait a sec, I’ll be back quickly.’















‘Wait a sec, I’m going to bring some medicine.’ [R finishes his bowl of











‘Here you go.’ [Hands R a new bowl of manioc beer; R quickly drains the
bowl and leaves to get medicine]
Although this interaction also touches on the circumstances of Rosa’s burn,
it proceeds very differently from Interaction 1. Note that Pasotoro makes no use of
evidential resources in describing the events surrounding Rosa’s burn, and displays
no concern regarding the assignment of responsibility. Significantly, the discussion of
the circumstances of Rosa’s burn involved Pasotoro and myself,15 rather than Mecha
and another Nanti woman. As Rosa’s father, Pasotoro is in relatively little danger
of being held responsible for Rosa’s burn, by Nanti standards. In addition, I have
endeavored to maintain a helpful and non-judgemental persona in the community,
which probably made Pasotoro even less worried about being held responsible by
me than by other Nantis. It is reasonable, therefore, to infer that Pasotoro does
not feel vulnerable to being held culpable for Rosa’s burn in this interaction, and
that the significant difference in the way Pasotoro and Mecha react in the two
interactions stems from the different risks the two face with respect to the assignment
of responsibility for Rosa’s burn by their respective interlocutors. As a result, we see
that Mecha invests significant interactional effort in unequivocally establishing the
nature of her relationship to Rosa’s burn, while Pasotoro makes no such investment.
Pasotoro’s discussion of Rosa’s burn makes clear another important aspect
of Mecha’s and Pasotoro’s shared epistemic orientation to the events in question:
they appear to have no doubt in their minds regarding what happened to Rosa.
Rosa herself admitted that she burned herself in the grass fire (see line 12, Interac-
tion 1) and her little brother gleefully confirmed the account which Rosa sheepishly
gave of her actions (see line 18, Interaction 1, which is an oblique mention of the
15In inter-household visits like this one, men tend to address other men, and women tend to
address other women, especially in the early stages of the visit.
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little brother’s testimony). Given this testimony and the circumstances of the grass
burning, no one had any reason to doubt Rosa burned her foot in the grass, as she
admitted. The certainty that the participants have regarding the events of Rosa’s
burn is evident in Pasotoro’s unqualified description of what happened (lines 1 and
9, Interaction 2) when speaking only to me. Consequently, we cannot understand
Mecha’s use of sensory access specifications in Interaction 1 as deriving from her
uncertainty regarding what happened, or from her concern about avoiding utter-
ance responsibility for the factuality of her utterances regarding the events of the
burn. Rather, she and the other participants are attending to a different kind of
responsibility: event responsibility.
Bearing in mind the heightened salience of event responsibility in the in-
teraction between Mecha and Chabera, let us now take a closer look at Mecha’s
deployment of mode-of-access information in that interaction. Mecha’s contribu-
tions mainly serve to distance herself epistemically from Rosa’s accident, principally
via the use of inferentials and reported speech. Even when Mecha speaks of seeing
Rosa’s burn (line 3: Otya maika . . . nonehanake ‘I saw just now’; see also line 10),
this visual mode-of-access specification is deployed to temporally and spatially dis-
tance her visual access to the burn from the event of the burn itself (line 2: kara
chapi shinpenashi ‘Over there, yesterday in the grass’). Interestingly, Mecha’s use of
nonehanake ‘I saw’ involves a subtle morphological feature that further emphasizes
her prior ignorance: the use of the ablative suffix -an. When used with non-motion
verbs, this suffix indicates change of state.16 Mecha’s use of the ablative therefore
indexes a change of epistemic state: her having come to see, and know about, Rosa’s
burn.17
Mecha employs quotative evidentials several times, either quoting herself
asking for information about the burn (lines 6 and 11) or quoting others informing
16Payne (1982) describes a similar meaning for the cognate morpheme in Ashéninka.
17I thank Christine Beier for pointing out the salience of this morpheme to the present analysis.
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her about the burn (lines 12, 18, and 21). These uses of quotatives allow Mecha
to present question-answer pairs that index for Chabera, via the presupposition of
ignorance underlying the use of interrogatives, Mecha’s ignorance about the events
surrounding the burn at the time that she first saw it (lines 6 and 11). Moreover,
Mecha’s use of quotatives to evidentially mark her own questions can hardly be seen
as an effort to diminish her utterance responsibility, since she is reporting her own
speech. Rather, she is indexing her epistemic relationship to the event of the burn.
By depicting herself as ignorant about the event of the burn at the time that it
occurred, she effectively characterizes herself as having been at a sufficient physical
remove to be incapable of doing anything either to prevent Rosa’s burn or to attend
to it at the time. In other words, Mecha’s use of the quotative leads to an inference
of her lack of causal, and hence moral, responsibility for the accident.
Of course, the quotative-marked question-answer pairs also allow Mecha to
report Rosa’s utterances, which are effectively admissions of Rosa’s own responsibil-
ity for the burn, since Rosa doesn’t blame anyone else for the accident. Interestingly,
it would have been perfectly acceptable, in the context of Nanti speech reporting
practices, for Mecha to have reported only Rosa’s speech. This is what Aherika does
in line 20 of Interaction 1, when she employs a quotative to report Rosa’s expla-
nation that she received her burn in the course of stirring up the fire. However, if
Mecha had simply reported Rosa’s speech, this would not have so clearly indexed
Mecha’s ignorance of the accident. The fact that Mecha did report her own question
– twice in fact – underscores the importance of the distancing effect of the evidential.
The epistemic distancing that Mecha introduces in line 6 with the use of the
quotative is expanded upon by her use of an inferential. When in line 7 Chabera asks
for information about how the accident occurred, Mecha responds in line 8 using
an inferential, Iroka agapokihiro, ‘she presumably stepped in it’. Mecha thereby
characterizes her mode of access to the key event in the accident as indirect, again
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leading others to infer that she was not causally responsible for the event.
Significantly, Mecha explicitly indexes the issue of responsibility in next line
(line 9) by remarking otsararaha ‘she was horsing around’.18 Note that this clause
is not evidentially marked in any way, even though Mecha’s access to the events
immediately preceding the burn were presumably the same as her access at the
precise moment of the burn. Thus, when Mecha shifts from distancing herself from
the accident to pinning the blame on Rosa, she drops all evidential marking. This is
another indication that Mecha’s use of evidentials is related to her efforts to mitigate
her own event responsibility.
In line 17, we see an interesting interactional move on Chabera’s part, when
she asks if Mecha heard the event, even if she didn’t see it. Chabera appears intent
on clarifying Mecha’s access to the event, and specifically, when she learned of it.
In line 17, Mecha denies that she heard anything, and begins to indicate that her
son told her about the burn, at which point almost everyone in the hut makes a
bid for the conversational floor. In line 22, Chabera presses the issue even further,
inquiring if Mecha didn’t perhaps hear Rosa crying subsequent to the burn. Mecha
responds that she didn’t (recall that Rosa hid out in the family chicken coop to
avoid detection), and her husband Pasotoro once again supports her.
We see in this interaction a great deal of work by the participants to clarify
Mecha’s mode of access to the events of the burn. Mecha takes great care to char-
acterize her access using inferentials and quotatives, thereby situating herself at a
great remove from the events in question. She uses the periphrastic visual evidential
only in reference to the recent event of belatedly seeing Rosa’s burn, some 24 hours
after it occurred. Her husband Pasotoro twice supports her representation of her
access to events of the burn. Chabera, on the other hand, appears to be working
to eliminate all possibility that Mecha is understating her epistemological access to
18The verb tsararah denotes reckless running around and hollering, typical behavior when children
are chasing each other.
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the events of Rosa’s burn, by inquiring if Mecha might have heard the event, or at
least heard Rosa’s subsequent crying.19 In both cases, however, Mecha and Chabera
are working toward the same goal: clarifying Mecha’s knowledge of, access to, and
therefore, responsibility for, the event of Rosa’s burn.
3.9 Conclusion
Most previous work on the relationship between evidentiality, evidential practice,
and responsibility has focused on the role of evidentiality and periphrastic source-
of-information meanings in reducing speakers’ responsibility for the factuality of
utterances. In this chapter, I have argued that evidentiality also serves to mitigate
responsibility for events. This proposal makes use of a distinction that has not been
clearly drawn to this point: the difference between responsibility for the socially-
salient attributes of utterances and responsibility for events or states of affairs.
The analysis of interactions between Nantis shows that Nanti evidential prac-
tice includes the deployment of both evidentials and periphrastic mode-of-access
meanings to negotiate individuals’ responsibility for events. Mode-of-access specifi-
cations denote the nature of sensory access that indexed knowing subjects have to
indexed events. Via participants’ understandings regarding the prototypical circum-
stances under which the use of particular evidentials would be appropriate, these
mode-of-access meanings lead to inferences regarding the spatial and sensory rela-
tionships between the speaker and the event in question. On this basis, interactants
are able to infer the nature of the speakers’ involvement and causal responsibility
for the event in question. From this inference, and additional understandings about
the nature of moral responsibility, interactants can reach conclusions regarding the
moral responsibility of the speaker.
19There may also be another issue at stake here, although none of the participants mention it:
even if Mecha is blameless for the burn itself, it could certainly be seen by Nantis that a lapse of
almost 24 hours before Rosa is treated for the burn is a sign of negligence on her parents’ part.
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This work makes three contributions to our understandings of responsibility
and evidentiality. First, it clarifies the analytical distinction between utterance re-
sponsibility and event responsibility, a distinction implicit in previous work. Second,
it shows that evidentiality is not crucially tied to responsibility for factuality, and
hence, to epistemic modality, even in its pragmatic role. This is significant to the
ongoing disciplinary debate regarding the status of evidentiality as a grammatical
category distinct from epistemic modality. And third, this chapter provides a model
of the inferences by which evidentials and periphrastic mode-of-access meanings
come to serve as a pragmatic metaphor for moral responsibility for events.
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In the previous chapter, I distinguished event responsibility from utterance respon-
sibility, and described the role that evidential resources play in Nanti discourse in
constructing representations of responsibility for events. In this chapter, I turn to
the phenomenon of utterance responsibility, and examine the role of quotative re-
sources (i.e. quotatives and verbs of saying) in modulating representations of this
form of responsibility.
My main goal in this chapter is to show that the common understanding of
the relationship between quotative resources and utterance responsibility — namely
that quotative resources serve to mitigate responsibility for the factuality of utter-
ances — is an incomplete understanding, and that the actual relationship differs in
two important ways. First, I show that the basic communicative function of quota-
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tive resources is to individuate stances, and that stance individuation is associated
with the expression of commitment to, or heightened responsibility for, a stance. I
argue that mitigation of utterance responsibility is in fact a secondary effect that
results from inferences regarding the commitment of speakers with respect to third
party quotations. Second, I show that epistemic stances — that is to say, degrees
of commitment to the factuality of quoted utterances — are but one type of stance
that quotative resources can be employed to express, and that quotative resources
can also be employed to express a variety of moral evaluative stances. The strong
pragmatic relationship to epistemic modality that many scholars attribute to quo-
tative resources is thus, I argue, a special case of the more general use of quotatives
to express evaluative stances.
The common view of quotative resources as means for diminishing responsi-
bility is clearly articulated by numerous authors. Drawing principally from work in
pragmatics and ordinary language philosophy, Clark and Gerrig (1990, p.792), for
example, express the following view regarding the relationship between quotation
and utterance responsibility:
[W]hen [speakers] quote, they take responsibility only for presenting the
quoted matter — and then only for the aspects they choose to depict.
The responsibility for the depicted aspects themselves belongs to the
source speaker. So with quotations speakers can partly or wholly detach
themselves from what they depict. That makes quotations useful for
several purposes, including ... dissociation of responsibility...
Similarly, Fox (2001, p.174), whose work is more closely aligned with the
linguistic anthropological tradition, remarks that:
by doing a message as “animator” [i.e. by quoting] ... a participant
can be seen to distribute responsibility to other (perhaps noncopresent)
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participants and thereby minimize the potentially negative consequences
of their actions.
Examples representing this consensus view are abundant. Likewise, many
scholars have drawn a strong connection between utterance responsibility and epis-
temic modality (e.g. Hill and Irvine, 1993a; Palmer, 1986). Even among those schol-
ars who do not discuss the communicative functions of reported speech in terms of
responsibility as such, at least since Chafe (1986, pp.268-9), reported speech has
been widely understood to be intimately related to epistemic modality — as in-
deed, have evidential strategies more generally. Recently, for example, Sakita (2002,
p.207) has remarked that as a form of evidentiality, reported speech is an indication
of the “source and reliability of a speaker’s knowledge (emphasis mine).”
As I shall show, the common wisdom regarding the relationship between quo-
tative resources, utterance responsibility1 and epistemic modality expressed above
is basically sound, but it only applies to a restricted set of uses of quotative re-
sources. This partial empirical coverage leads, I argue, to subtle misunderstandings
regarding the ways in which quotative resources modulate utterance responsibility
and the relationship between quotative resources and epistemic modality.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: In §4.1.1 I define utter-
ance responsibility and contrast it with event responsibility, to which the previous
chapter was devoted. Then in §4.2, I take an extended look at concurrent quo-
tative framing, a form of Nanti speech act participant quotation. I show that, as
part of using this special form of quotation, quotative resources serve to individuate
stances, and that stance individuation is intimately linked to the emphasis, rather
than the mitigation, of responsibility. In §4.3, I show that epistemic stance is but
one kind of stance modulated by quotative resources, which are best understood as
1The cited authors do not distinguish event responsibility from utterance responsibility, but in
their discussions of the relationships of quotation and reported speech to the broader phenomenon
of responsibility, it is clear that they mainly have utterance responsibility in mind.
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modulating evaluative stances more generally. In §4.3.2 I provide an account of the
widely-recognized responsibility-mitigating functions of quotative resources, showing
that these are second order pragmatic effects stemming from the combination of the
responsibility-emphasizing functions of quotative resources and inferences guided by
maxims regarding the articulation of commitments to stances. Finally, in §4.3.3 I
compare the Nanti-specific phenomena discussed in the preceding sections to simi-
lar phenomena discussed in the literature, including self-quotation and first-person
evidentiality.
4.1.1 Defining utterance responsibility
A speaker can be said to be ‘responsible’ for his or her utterance in so far as he
or she can be evaluated as praiseworthy or blameworthy for some attribute of that
utterance, such as its factuality or its politeness. Thus, when an individual is held
culpable for lying or for being rude, his or her utterance responsibility is invoked.
In distinguishing utterance responsibility from event responsibility, it is im-
portant to note that every utterance is, in a certain sense, an event, and as such,
speakers may be assessed as displaying both utterance and event responsibility. The
distinction between the two forms of responsibility lies in the fact that event respon-
sibility focuses on the consequences of actions (which may include utterances), while
utterance responsibility focuses on the attributes of utterances, without regard to
the consequences of the utterance. To distinguish these two forms of responsibility,
consider the utterance of a vulgarity. In such a case, responsibility can attach to
the utterer in two ways: first, the utterer can be held blameworthy for violating
local language ideologies regarding appropriate forms of expression in particular
interactional contexts; second, the person can be held blameworthy for having of-
fended a co-present party. The former type of culpability is an instance of utterance
responsibility, while the latter type is an instance of event responsibility.
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Note that these two kinds of responsibility are in principle independent of
one another. Returning to the hypothetical example, a participant may judge the
vulgarity to be inappropriate for the given context, even though he or she was not
personally offended. Thus, a speaker may be held responsible either for the qualities
of the utterance as such, or for the consequences of the utterance, or both. Making
use of terminology from speech act theory, we can say that responsibility attaches
to an utterance at both the illocutionary and perlocutionary levels.
4.2 Concurrent quotative framing and utterance respon-
sibility in Nanti discourse
Although quotative evidentials and reported speech are broadly implicated in aug-
menting or emphasizing utterance responsibility in Nanti discourse, this effect is
clearest in a particular form of Nanti quotation that I call concurrent quotative
framing (CQF). This discursive strategy is characterized by the use of quotative
resources — either a quotative evidential or the verb kant ‘say’ — to explicitly at-
tribute an utterance from the unfolding interaction to a local speech act participant
(i.e. a first or second person participant). CQF thus attributes an utterance to a
speech event participant at the very time of utterance, rather than reporting an
utterance from a prior interaction.
Consider the following example of CQF, drawn from the interaction concern-
ing Rosa’s burn, which I examined in the previous chapter. At one point in this
interaction, prior to Chabera’s arrival, Mecha was discussing the circumstances of
Rosa’s burn with Aherika, her classificatory sister-in-law. In line 1, Aherika asks
if Rosa was horsing around when she was injured, and Mecha responds that she
was. In line 3, Mecha reaffirms that Rosa was horsing around, this time employing
a quotative evidential to frame her assertion regarding Rosa’s actions. Note that
161
Mecha is not quoting her own utterance from a previous interaction, but instead is
explicitly attributing to herself an utterance from the ongoing interaction.








‘Was she horsing around?’





















‘I say, “She was horsing around.”’
The virtue of CQF for clarifying the relationship between quotation and
utterance responsibility in Nanti society lies in the fact that CQF utterances are
not construed as reports of past utterances,2 and are frequently instances of self-
quotation. These characteristics confer the analytical benefit of largely removing
2A long-standing debate revolves around the appropriateness of terms like report and reported
speech, stemming from disagreement over whether or not reported speech should be considered a
replication of past utterances. As a number of scholars have shown, there are clearly cases in which
it is inaccurate to characterize ‘reported speech’ as a replication of past utterances (e.g. Clark and
Gerrig, 1990; Koven, 2001; Mayes, 1990; Tannen, 1989), leading some to reject the term reported
speech in favor of terms like constructed dialogue (Tannen, 1989) or reporting discourse (Sakita,
2002). Nevertheless, it is equally clear that in many interactional contexts, across many societies,
reported speech is construed by interactants as being faithful, in some locally-relevant sense, to past
utterances (e.g. Clark and Gerrig, 1990; Besnier, 1993). It is in this particular language-ideological
sense that I speak of utterances as being construed as ‘reports’ of past utterances.
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a significant confounding factor in the analysis of the communicative and social
functions of quotative resources — namely, that quotation is also used extensively
by Nantis in talking about past social interactions. Past interactions are typically
narrated through extensive quotation of the involved parties, rather than by summa-
rizing the contents of participants’ contributions. Nantis also tend to avoid directly
attributing subjective states — such as particular desires, intentions, emotions, and
thoughts — to individuals, preferring to index such states through the quotation of
relevant utterances. The resulting polyfunctionality of Nanti quotative resources in
discussing past events can make it difficult to tease out effects particularly tied to
utterance responsibility. However, the deployment of CQF in interactions cannot be
understood as motivated by the need to report utterances from other interactions or
individuals, which, as we shall see, brings into relief issues of utterance responsibility.
4.2.2 CQF and stance individuation
The basic claim I advance in this section is that CQF serves to individuate evaluative
stances by explicitly attributing them to a participant in the unfolding interaction.
The main piece of evidence I present for this claim is the distribution of CQF with
respect to the type of stance-taking activity that interactions exhibit. Specifically,
Nanti speakers mainly employ CQF in interactions in which they take conflicting
stances on the given topic of discussion, whereas CQF is generally absent in the
discussion of non-controversial topics and in interactions in which the participants
seek to present the stances they express as generally valid or accepted.
Interactions in which Nantis express conflicting evaluations of an individual’s
behavior tend to be rich in CQF, especially when the interlocutors are social equals. I
examine one such interaction now, which involved two socially prominent Nanti men,
Bikotoro and Anteres, and which concerned the details of a social conflict between
the residents of Montetoni and Marankehari. Also present for the interaction were
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Migero, the peresetente of Montetoni and Bikotoro’s younger brother; Hoha, elder
brother to Migero and Bikotoro and the de facto leader of Marankehari at the
time;3 Maryo, a young man from Marankehari; and myself. The conversation took
place in the early evening of March 4th, 2005, in Migero’s family’s cooking hut and
concerned negotiations between the four men over the place of residence of three
young women, Soira, Rerisuha, and Isabera, who had recently left Marankehari to
live in Montetoni.
4.2.2.1 Background to the interaction between Bikotoro and Anteres
To understand the personal and political stakes in these negotiations, it is helpful
to situate them in the political history of the Nanti communities of Montetoni and
Marankehari. As discussed in Chapter 1, Marankehari was founded in 1997 in
an effort by Araña, the Matsigenka schoolteacher, to relocate the Camisea Nantis
further downriver. The creation of Marankehari split the Camisea Nantis into two
groups: a larger one of some 180 people in Montetoni, and a smaller one of some 70
individuals in Marankehari.
Hoha assumed leadership in Marankehari after Araña’s flight in 1998, and
although he abandoned Araña’s coercive strategies, he continued efforts to convince
individual Nantis to relocate from Montetoni to Marankehari. Hoha’s motives were
partly similar to those of Araña: Hoha associated community size with political
legitimacy in dealing with outside entities, such as petrochemical companies, mis-
sionaries, Matsigenka communities, and government representatives. Consequently,
Hoha saw increasing the population of Marankehari as a means to build his own
political power and that of his community.4 Hoha initially was successful in con-
3It merits mention that Anteres is brother-in-law to these three men — Anteres’ wife Ines is
Bikotoro’s, Migero’s and Hoha’s sister — so resolving discord within this relationship is of great
importance to all of them.
4Events since 1997 have shown that Hoha, and Araña before him, were essentially correct in
associating community size with political legitimacy with respect to outside institutions.
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vincing some residents of Montetoni to relocate to Marankehari, but dissatisfaction
with Hoha’s relatively authoritarian leadership style led them to return to Monte-
toni. Some long-term residents of Marankehari also joined them. Shortly afterwards,
Hoha was forced from from the titular position of peresetente by the community,
although he continued to act as the community’s de facto leader in many respects.
The new peresetente was Berenarto, a young man who was held in high esteem by
Angel Dı́az, the Matsigenka evangelical pastor who had considerable influence in
Marankehari at that time.
After a series of events in 2002 and 2003 which seriously undermined Hoha’s
social position in the community (Michael and Beier, 2004), he and several of his
closest male allies left Marankehari for a six month visit to the Matsigenka com-
munity of Segakiato, between approximately May and November 2003. During this
time, several women, some of whom had been left behind in Marankehari when their
husbands departed with Hoha, relocated to Montetoni to live with their relatives
there.
When Hoha returned from Segakiato, he succeeded in convincing most of
those who had moved to Montetoni to return to Marankehari; but within months,
young women began to trickle back to Montetoni, sometimes with their young hus-
bands trailing behind.5 In early 2004, this trickle became a flood when, in the space
of two weeks, Soira, Rerisuha, Isabera, and one young man, Behani, relocated to
Montetoni from Marankehari.
In the following weeks, the young women’s husbands and these men’s families
made a number of visits to Montetoni, during which they unsuccessfully sought to
convince and/or force the young women to return to Marankehari. Hoha partici-
5Three main factors motivated these women to return to Montetoni. First, several of these young
women had recently had their first children, and returned to Montetoni to live with their mothers
and sisters to obtain help raising their infants, a common Nanti practice. Second, there was a
manioc shortage in Marankehari, resulting from the fact that the men who had gone to Segakiato
had not prepared new gardens to replace the older ones, which were being exhausted. And third,
some young women were unsatisfied with their partners, who had been arranged for them by Hoha.
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pated in these visits and played a major role in motivating the Marankehari group to
visit Montetoni in order to recover the young women. With Hoha’s encouragment,
some of the visitors even attempted to physically coerce some of the young women
to return with them — behavior which shocked the residents of Montetoni, and led
them to criticize the visitors’ actions in strong terms. Some of the Marankehari visi-
tors, in turn, blamed their difficulties in returning the young women to Marankehari
on the young women’s kin in Montetoni. Not surprisingly, relations between the two
communities grew strained.
As this acrimonious state of affairs dragged on, a small group of men from
Marankehari, led by Hoha and Anteres, made another trip to Montetoni to negotiate
a solution. This time they were successful, and an agreement was reached: Isabera
(Anteres’ young second wife) would remain in Montetoni, but Soira and Rerisuha
would return to Marankehari. The fate of Behani was left unresolved. The conver-
sation we now examine took place towards the end of this visit, and was one of the
major steps towards the resolution of the situation.
Bikotoro’s and Anteres’ conversation concerned a number of issues surround-
ing the arrival in Montetoni of Bikotoro’s daughter, Soira, and her possible return
to Marankehari. To better understand the data segment we consider next, it is
helpful to be aware of two aspects of Bikotoro’s involvement in Soira’s situation.
First, Soira’s return to Montetoni, and the subsequent demands that she return to
Marankehari, put Bikotoro in a difficult interpersonal position. Bikotoro appeared
quite happy to have his daughter living with him again, and Soira’s mother Oroma
was especially pleased and wanted Soira to stay. However, Bikotoro’s brother Hoha
was intent on seeing Soira return to Marankehari. Having observed Bikotoro’s rela-
tionships with his two politically powerful brothers, Migero and Hoha, over almost
ten years, I have noted that Bikotoro generally accommodates their desires. It
seemed to me that in this particular case he was inclined to do the same, and that
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he was uncomfortable with opposing Hoha. This placed Bikotoro in a dilemma: he
either risked angering his brother, if he supported Soira staying in Montetoni; or he
risked angering his wife Oroma, if he supported Soira’s return to Marankehari.
In the segment we consider, Bikotoro navigates the conflicting interests with
which he is faced by choosing a third discursive position: he entirely recontextualizes
Soira’s arrival in Montetoni as an impulsive, temporary visit to her mother, and not
as a permanent move at all. This discursive framing allows Bikotoro to sidestep the
issue of whether he supports or opposes Soira’s move to Montetoni by rejecting the
presupposition that any such move took place.
The second matter relevant to understanding the following segment is that
the visiting group from Marankehari, which had sought to return Soira to Maranke-
hari, had accused Bikotoro of encouraging his daughter to return to Montetoni, and
of subsequently supporting her resistance to return to Marankehari. The first accu-
sation was, as far as I was able to determine, false (there had been no communication
between father and daughter for many months), but it was true that Bikotoro had
in no way aided the visitors in their efforts to return Soira to Marankehari. Re-
gardless of the validity of their accusations, however, it was clear that Bikotoro was
personally stung by them.
Thus, another discursive concern for Bikotoro in this segment is to present
his actions, and those of his daughter, as reasonable and morally defensible. To this
end, Bikotoro argues that Soira’s return to her mother’s home was an unpremed-
itated but appropriate response to being offended by the behavior of certain men
in Marankehari during a manioc beer feast immediately prior to her departure, and
that he himself had had no part in the matter. He characterizes Soira’s actions as
reasonable under the circumstances, but not indicative of any decision to perma-
nently relocate to Montetoni.
In the interaction we examine, then, Bikotoro is working to present particu-
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lar framings and interpretations of his own and Soira’s actions, which in at least two
important ways contradict other understandings of the same events that were cir-
culating at that time in the Nanti discursive sphere. Moreover, it is very likely that
his interlocutor Anteres held the very views that were contradicted by Bikotoro’s
reframing, since Anteres was one of the aggrieved parties visiting from Marankehari.
As we shall see, Bikotoro’s interactional contributions are dense with CQF, as he
indicates his personal commitment to the contested stances he takes.
4.2.2.2 Interaction 2: Bikotoro and Anteres



















‘You see what happened there, I, there,’





















‘I said, “It’s because of that, because you (the participants in the
Marankehari manioc beer feast) were intoxicated.”’6










6Bikotoro is referring here to an interaction at Bikotoro’s home which occurred during a previous
visit by the residents of Marankehari.
7The expression kantira and related ones such as kantira aryo are employed as continuers (Sche-
gloff, 1982).
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‘Because of that, she subsequently decided to return (to Montetoni).’













‘Yeah, that’s what I say.’

























‘That (Soira’s return to Montetoni) happened for no reason (i.e. without
forethought).’











































‘Its not as if she decided, that she said, “I’m going back there (to Montetoni
to live)” and came back here.’
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‘What could I have said?’ (i.e. there was nothing I could/should say, because
Soira’s actions were reasonable)





















‘What happened was due to the manioc beer (i.e. the events at the manioc
beer feast).’





























‘It was appropriate for her to say, “I’m going back there to my mother’s (to
Montetoni).”’













‘Yeah, that’s what I say.’




















‘Yeah, that’s what I say.’















‘Indeed I said earlier, did you hear?’
16. (pause)













‘That, that one (thing) I say.’
This segment exhibits a high density of verbs of saying (eight instances)
that are deployed for purposes of CQF, and not for reporting speech from other
interactions. Examining the instances of CQF in this segment of interaction, we
find that they are uniformly associated with the articulation of contested stances.
Bikotoro’s first use of CQF in the segment is found in line 5, where it follows on
his claims in lines 1-3 that Soira came to Montetoni because of her disagreeable
experiences at the Marankehari manioc beer feast.8 In lines 1-3 Bikotoro presents
an account of the reason for Soira’s arrival in Montetoni, and of his own role in these
8The verb of saying in line 5 cannot be construed as a report of past speech for two reasons. First,
reported speech complements typically follow the verb of saying in reported speech constructions,
as part of the same sentence (see Chapter 6), and we see no such complement in line 5. Secondly,
the immediately preceding clause (line 4), which might be construable as related to the verb of
saying via the pronoun iro in line 5, is a descriptive observation, and not a segment of reported
speech.
171
events, that differs starkly from the account given by the Marankehari visitors. In
contrast to the position that Soira premeditatedly moved to Montetoni in order to
live there, Bikotoro claims that the supposed move was an impulsive reaction to the
events of the aforementioned feast. Bikotoro’s use of CQF here is thus associated
with the expression a contested epistemic stance.
Bikotoro’s next use of CQF is found in line 12, following his argument in
lines 7-11, in which he reprises his assertion that Soira’s return to Montetoni was
unpremeditated, and adds the evaluation that her return to her mother’s home
was an appropriate and reasonable action under the circumstances. Bikotoro’s use
of CQF in this instance is thus associated with the expression of both contested
epistemic and moral stances.
The contested nature of the evaluations under discussion is signalled by An-
teres’ response in line 15. In this line, Anteres responds to Bikotoro’s articulation
of his position, and perhaps specifically to the final point in the segment concern-
ing the appropriateness of Soira’s actions, with the utterance ari pinka inkahara
nokanti pikema? ‘Indeed I said earlier, did you hear?’. This utterance exhibits
two discourse particles associated with disagreement and incompatible evaluative
stances. The first of these, pinka ‘actually’,9 grammaticalized from the inflected
verb pinkante ‘you will say’, is employed when a speaker expresses a proposition
that either directly contradicts one expressed by their interlocutor, or contradicts a
supposition or presupposition held by their interlocutor, as in (4.1).













‘Who owns this (part of the) forest?’
9I have found it difficult to find a clear counterpart to pinka in English, although ‘actually’ is
used in similar ways in certain interactional contexts. In free translations I sometimes omit any
overt translation of this discourse particle when no natural means exists in English to express it.
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‘Noboy yet, actually, nobody yet.
The second discourse particle, pikema ‘you hear’ is grammaticalized from
the inflected verb pikemake ‘you heard’, and serves as a sentence-final tag to project
an affirmative continuer response to the assertion to which it is appended. It is
especially common in interactions in which recipients exhibit skepticism about a
speaker’s assertions, or resistance to his or her demands.
Returning to the utterance in line 15, I am unable to determine with certainty
to which previous utterance Anteres is referring to when he says inkahara nokanti
‘I said earlier’, but it is likely a reference to his assertion a few minutes earlier that
Soira was not insulted or mistreated at the manioc beer feast in question, and that
Soira’s departure from Marankehari was unjustified. In any event, it is relevant that
Bikotoro’s articulation of his stance, and his use of CQF in lines 12 and 14, motivates
Anteres to index his own stance, which is framed through the use of the discourse
particles pinka and pikema as contesting Bikotoro’s. In these uses of CQF, Bikotoro
and Anteres each clearly individuate and distinguish their stances and acknowledge
their contested nature.
4.2.2.3 Interaction 3: Bikotoro and Anteres
We now consider a later segment of Bikotoro’s and Anteres’ conversation, which
transpired approximately three minutes after the segment just discussed. After the
coda of the previous interaction, Bikotoro and Anteres lapsed into silence for about
a minute, while Migero and Hoha talked. When Bikotoro and Anteres resumed
talking, the theme of the interaction concerned what should be done to resolve the
social crisis in which they were enmeshed. Bikotoro asserted that Berenarto, the
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titular peresetente of Markankehari (and Anteres’ son) should come to Montetoni
himself and tell Soira that she should return to Marankehari. Effectively, Bikotoro is
making the case that the responsibility of convincing Soira to return to Marankehari
does not lie with him, but instead lies with Berenarto, the absent peresetente.
We consider this segment for two reasons. First, it illustrates the role of CQF
in advocating for a future course of action, which shows how CQF can be associated
with deontic illocutionary force; and second, the segment exhibits a particularly
elaborate coda, in which Anteres and Bikotoro collaborate to unambiguously link
Bikotoro’s expressed evaluative stance to Bikotoro alone.





























































10Used in this manner, the expression aryome indicates disapproval of an action or state of affairs,
which could translated as ‘things are not as they should be.’ I use the briefer ‘no way’ to capture
this.
174
‘He says, he will say to you,’












































‘He should say tomorrow morning, unintelligible , “I will-, I will-, I have












‘He should say (that).’













‘Indeed, indeed I say.’























‘He should say (that) now.’






























‘What would I say?’ (i.e. I would not oppose him)
12. A: (unintelligible)











































‘That’s all I say.’









‘That’s all you say.’
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‘That’s all I say.’
In line 1 Bikotoro expresses a stance with deontic illocutionary force, namely,
that Berenarto should intervene personally and come to tell Soira that her relocation
to Montetoni is unacceptable. In line 2 he expresses an epistemic stance, predicting
that Soira would listen to Berenarto and return to Marankehari, thereby resolving
the crisis. He expands on this position in lines 6 and 7, then employs CQF in line
8: aryo pinka aryo nokanti ‘Indeed, actually, indeed I say.’ The course of action
he advocates stands in stark contrast to how the social crisis has been dealt with
thus far, and moreover, it is based on a very different assessment of where the
responsibility for resolving the situation lies. Rather than placing responsibility in
the hands of the residents of Montetoni, and specifically himself, Bikotoro effectively
asserts that the situation is Berenarto’s to resolve.
After Anteres responds with a continuer in line 8, Bikotoro reiterates his
deontic stance, and adds in line 15 that he would acquiesce to Soira’s departure.
Moreover, the manner in which he articulates the latter point, Tyanpa nonkante?
‘What would I say?’, is generally strategically employed by Nantis to express non-
involvement in situations which are framed as being none of the speaker’s business.
Bikotoro is thus seeking to make clear that the issue of Soira’s place of residence is
simply not his responsibility.
Having done this, Bikotoro then deploys CQF again in line 11, triggering an
interleaved set of utterances in which both he and Anteres deploy CQF to unam-
biguously attribute the stance that Bikotoro has expressed to Bikotoro and Bikotoro
alone. The coda to this topic is thus a collaborative effort on the part of both par-
ticipants to individuate Bikotoro’s stance in this segment of the interaction.
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The two interactions we have examined in this section show that Bikotoro
uses CQF to articulate contested stances, and that both he and Anteres employ
CQF to unambiguously link these stances to Bikotoro alone. In doing so, Bikotoro
and Anteres overtly co-construct the individuation of these stances and discard the
possibility that the stances that Bikotoro expresses are widely held, or that they are
considered generally valid by the broader discursive community of which they are a
part.
4.2.3 CQF and stance collectivization
In the previous section, I argued that CQF is a resource for attributing a given utter-
ance to a particular speaker, and in doing so, for individuating the stance expressed
by that utterance. In this section, I seek to reinforce this argument by showing that,
in contrast, CQF is absent or rare in interactions in which speakers seek to collec-
tivize or universalize evaluative stances, rather than individuate them. While this
phenomenon is widespread in Nanti discourse, it is perhaps most strikingly present
in the oratory of peresetentes, a genre in which these community leaders often seek
to present particular evaluative stances as broadly valid, and not simply as their
own individual evaluative positions. We consider one such interaction now, which
illustrates how stances that are presented as universally valid or collectively held
are not expressed with CQF.
4.2.3.1 Background information for interaction 4 between Migero and
Ariponso
The segment we examine is part of an interaction between Migero and Ariponso, a
Nanti visitor to Montetoni, which took place during a manioc beer party on March
3rd, 2004. The interaction took place in the cooking hut of Peranke and Beti,
to which the village’s adults had been invited to drink. Ariponso had arrived in
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Montetoni a few days earlier with his wife Sara, from his home at Pirihasanteni
(half-a-day’s walk upriver from Montetoni), and had previously expressed that one
of his major goals in visiting the community was to obtain some items of manu-
factured clothing. Migero initiated the following interaction by closely questioning
Ariponso about his motives for visiting; and, having determined Ariponso’s desire
to acquire clothing, Migero carefully laid out the conditions under which Ariponso
could acquire clothing, as well as the standards of behavior to which Ariponso was
expected to hold in doing so.
Migero’s goals in this interaction were no doubt shaped in part by Ariponso’s
dubious reputation among the Montetoni Nantis. Ariponso was an associate of the
men responsible for the violence on the Timṕıa in the 1960s, and was a participant
in one incident that some of the then-residents of Marihentari (and now residents
of Montetoni) have described as the vanguard of an abortive attack on Marihentari
(see Chapter 1). Probably even worse, from Migero’s perspective, Ariponso was
briefly a resident of Montetoni in 1994–1995, but had returned without warning to
Marihentari, absconding with an axe and a machete. Ariponso’s removal of valued
metal goods from the community was considered theft by many Nantis in Montetoni,
since he had been given them on the basis of his commitment to membership in the
new community, a commitment on which he subsequently reneged.
To Migero, then, Ariponso was at this point an individual of dubious trust-
worthiness,11 and Migero evidently felt it was necessary to determine what Ariponso’s
motives and plans were, and to lay down the conditions under which Ariponso would
be permitted to visit the community and benefit materially from doing so.
As we shall see, in setting down these general community-wide norms, Migero
articulated numerous evaluative stances. However, Migero’s goal in this interaction
11At the urging of Ariponso’s wife Sara, their family settled in Montetoni later in the same year,
living with Sara’s sister Chabera, her spouse Erehon, and their family. Ariponso was in fact an
exemplary community member, until his death in 2006, at approximately 60 years of age.
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was not to express his personal evaluation or opinion, but rather, speaking as pere-
setente, to express the stance of Montetoni, as a collectivity, to their visitor. The
segment of the interaction that we now consider focuses on Migero’s discussion of
proper behavior with respect to acquiring manufactured goods from me.12
Migero’s choice of time and place to have this first interaction with Ariponso
is also significant in understanding how to interpret Migero’s stance-taking. Ariponso
had already been in the village for several days, and although Migero had eagerly lis-
tened to news about Ariponso that people brought to him, he had carefully avoided
going near Chabera and Erehon’s home, where the visitors were staying. Instead,
he chose to have his first conversation with Ariponso during the early hours of a
feast day, when and where most of the village’s socially prominent men were gath-
ered together as ratified overhearers. This kind of maneuvering of forseeable dyadic
interactions into feasts is a strategy frequently employed by Migero to express the
articulation of stances that he wishes to be received as community-wide policy. In
an important sense, then, Migero’s conversation with Ariponso served both as a way
of expressing to Ariponso the conditions on his interaction with the community of
Montetoni, and as a way to express a stance meant to be taken by the community
as a whole as its stance towards Ariponso.
4.2.3.2 Interaction 4: Migero and Ariponso
In the segment we examine, Migero seeks to make clear several principles underlying
Ariponso’s acquisition of manufactured clothing. First, Migero expresses that I,
Reho, am allowed to give clothes to Ariponso, and that Ariponso can ask for clothes
12As compensation to the community, I provide manufactured goods requested by the commu-
nity. Upon arriving in the community I turn over the majority of the goods to Migero, which
he immediately distributes in a single public session, which serves to make transparent the equal
distribution of goods to all adults in the community. I typically retain a small store of goods for
visitors from other settlements, like Ariponso. In distributing these additional goods I am still
bound by community standards regarding the appropriate age, gender, and place of residence of
recipients, a point to which Migero alludes in his comments to Ariponso.
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from me. Note that the clothes to which Migero refers are ones that I am holding
for use by the community; and consequently, their distribution is under the control
of the community, and of Migero in particular. Second, Migero wishes to make clear
that there is a distinction between goods that I bring for the community, which
are intended for distribution, and my personal possessions, which are not, and that
Aripons should neither ask for nor steal the latter.







































‘It was appropriate for him to give (them) to you.’























‘He did not say, “I will not give you (anything), there aren’t any.”’13



















‘It is appropriate that he gives, “Here you go.”’
13Responding mameri ‘there isn’t any’ is a relatively polite, if not always literally true, means to
refuse a request.
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“‘Here you go, here you go, what- what you wanted, a blanket, clothes.”’











‘There are no shorts, they’ve run out.’14













‘The shorts ran out recently.’















‘Those on the other hand (unintelligible), like those you put on15 (i.e. shirts),
there are (some).’

















‘Those on the hand (unintelligible), there are some, but those are his.’
14The term sapirontsi may refer to clothes in general, or specifically to shorts, the prototypical
member of this category.
15The root ogagu refers specifically to the action of putting on a garment with a neck hole, like
the traditional magatsi.
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‘I don’t-, I don’t take them away, I don’t say, “Give me that of yours, your
own.”’
...































‘Don’t say that, “Give me what you wear.”’







































‘I will not say, “Give me what you wear.”’
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‘But those, on the other hand with which he helps (us),’























‘those are ours, our community’s, ours here.’





































‘I do not take (his clothes) and say, “Take his clothes away from him, here
you go.”’
...









































‘Those who do not yet, those who do not yet have clothes, it would be
appropriate for him to give them a little...’
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In this segment, Migero expresses evaluations of proper and improper be-
havior at several points, and presents potentially contentious framings of facts. In
sharp contrast with Interactions 2 and 3, however, there is not a single instance of
CQF in this segment — or, indeed, in the entire 27 minute long interaction between
Migero and Ariponso. If, as I proposed in the previous section, CQF serves to in-
dividuate stances, then the absence of CQF in this interaction is to be expected.
Migero, after all, seeks to communicate to Ariponso the general community-wide
principles and evaluations relevant to Ariponso’s participation in the community
economy, and Migero has no reason to frame these evaluations as being particularly
his own. On the contrary, individuating these evaluative stances would only serve to
weaken Migero’s efforts to impress on Ariponso that these evaluations and directives
regarding Ariponso’s acquisition of manufactured goods are of general validity, and
are held by the community as a whole. And indeed, I have, on numerous occasions,
heard other socially prominent Nantis articulate stances similar to those expressed
by Migero here.
In terms of the use of CQF, Migero’s expressions of evaluative stances in this
interaction pattern with the expression of uncontested evaluative stances in Nanti
discourse. For example, in lines 2, 4, and 17, Migero expresses the evaluation that
it is appropriate for me to provide clothes to Ariponso, or individuals like him (line
17: tetyarira ontime isapiro ‘those who do not yet have clothes’). This stance is
presented without CQF, although it is clearly an evaluative stance. By articulating
it without CQF, however, Migero presents it as an uncontested, and thus a widely-
held or collective, stance. The fact that Migero is speaking for the community,
and not simply for himself as an individual, is particularly clear in line 15, where
he remarks, regarding the manufactured goods I brought to the community, onti
nashihegi komoniraro, nashihegi aka ‘they are our community’s, ours here.’ Here
Migero articulates the collective ownership of the goods in question, and names the
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novel collectivity, the komoniraro,16 of which he is the head and spokesperson.
We also see that Migero does not employ CQF when he seeks to impress
on Ariponso the distinction between clothes in my personal possession and clothes
which I have brought for distribution in the community, in lines 9 and 12. This
is especially striking because the notion on which this distinction rests — between
personal property and property held by one individual for others — is a novel one in
Nanti society, and is a potentially contestable one. However, instead of employing
CQF, which would emphasize his personal commitment to this position, Migero
presents this stance as an uncontested one.
4.2.4 CQF, participant roles, and utterance responsibility
In the previous sections, I showed that Nanti speakers employ CQF to individuate
evaluative stances. In this section, I argue that because this means of individuating
stances relies on quotative resources, stance individuation also entails that the indi-
vidual to whom the stance is attributed is morally accountable for that stance. My
argument is that the close relationship between stance individuation and utterance
responsibility derives from the fact that both stance individuation and the assign-
ment of utterance responsibility depend on the capacity of quotative resources to
identify the sources of utterances.
I begin by noting that the capacity of CQF to individuate stances lies in its
capacity to single out a particular social subject, out of a world of possible subjects,
as the source of an utterance. By attributing the utterance to a particular individ-
ual, quotative resources distinguish the stance expressed by the utterance from a
generally held truth, or from a stance held by multiple individuals. Significantly,
16The term komoniraro ‘community’ is a loan from Matsigenka, and ultimately originates from
the Spanish comunidad. Nantis have adopted this term to refer to the novel settlement pattern,
exemplified by Montetoni, which involves multiple family groups living in a single location. Nantis in
Montetoni have also explicitly ideologized membership in the komoniraro by implicating individuals
in collective labor obligations and in rights to share in collective subsistence activities.
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quotative resources are also central to identifying the participant roles associated
with a given utterance. Crucially, participant roles are differentiated precisely in
terms of type of utterance responsibility that inhere in them. We consider this
point now.
It has long been recognized that the notion of ‘speaker’ is insufficiently precise
to distinguish the kinds of socially accountable persons associated with any given
utterance (Goffman, 1986; Levinson, 1988). Goffman was the first to decompose the
speaker into a larger set of accountable persons, which he called ‘participant roles’.
Two such roles are especially important in understanding the role of quotatives
in constructing utterance responsibility: principal and animator. The principal
is the socially-acknowledged source of the utterance, who is held responsible for
its attributes; while the animator is the individual who articulates an utterance,
and is responsible, at most, for the faithful reproduction of another’s utterances.17
Quotative resources are a discursively routinized, and in the case of Nanti quotative
evidentials, a grammaticalized means for distinguishing principals from animators.
Both stance individuation and the attribution of utterance responsibility,
then, turn on the question of utterance source. The use of quotative resources to
individuate an utterance, by identifying a unique source for that utterance, thereby
simultaneously identifies a principal for that utterance. CQF in particular renders
explicit a speaker’s responsibility for an utterance by explicitly identifying them as
the source of the utterance.
17The preceding account glosses over, of course, some of the complexities that may arise in in-
teraction. For example, empirical work shows that the boundary between animator and principal
can be porous with respect to issues of utterance responsibility (Hill and Irvine, 1993a; Shuman,
1993). Similarly, the assignment of the participant roles of animator and principal is ultimately
interactionally negotiated, and is not always a simple matter of reading off roles from quotative
constructions. Levinson (1988) and Irvine (1996) have found that Goffman’s typology of participant
roles is incomplete, and others have since expanded the typology to account for additional partic-
ipants such as speech writers, who originate an utterance but neither animate it nor are socially
responsible for its attributes. Despite these caveats, however, the animator/principal distinction
remains central in the efforts of students of language to understand how social actors come to be
held responsible for their utterances.
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4.2.4.1 CQF and types of utterance responsibility
Having argued that CQF renders explicit a speaker’s responsibility for an utter-
ance, I now discuss the types of utterance responsibility that Nantis employ CQF
to indicate. My reason for doing so is to show that utterance responsibility has a
wider scope than the scholarship on evidentiality and reported speech would have
us believe. In particular, Nantis’ uses of CQF show us that utterance responsibility
in Nanti society extends far beyond epistemic modality to encompass responsibility
for the moral aspects of utterances.
Utterance responsibility, as I have explained above, consists of praiseworthi-
ness or blameworthiness for some attribute of an utterance. The bulk of attention
in the literature on discouse and responsibility has focused on speakers’ responsi-
bility for the truthfulness of utterances — that is, epistemic stance-taking — and
the role of evidential resources, and quotative resources in particular, to mitigate
that responsibility. It is in this context that writers identify a strong link between
evidential resources and epistemic modality.
The interactional effects of CQF in Nanti discourse certainly include the
modulation of responsibility for epistemic stances, as can be seen in the interaction
between Aherika and Mecha, as well in the one between Bikotoro and Anteres. In
the former case, for example, Mecha employs CQF in asserting her commitment to
the fact that her daughter was horsing around when she suffered her burn (§4.2.1 In-
teraction 1, line 3). Similarly, we see that Bikotoro employs CQF when he expresses
his commitment to the fact that his daughter Soira left Marankehari for her mother’s
home in Montetoni due to her unpleasant experiences at the Marankehari manioc
beer feast (§4.2.2.2 Interaction 2, lines 1-5). However, the interaction between Biko-
toro and Anteres also shows us that CQF is employed to indicate commitment to
moral evaluative judgements. Consider, for example, lines 11 and 12 in Interaction
2, repeated here for convenience, in which Bikotoro defends Soira’s decision to return
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to Montetoni after the events of the manioc beer feast in Marankehari.





























‘It was appropriate for her to say, “I’m going back there (to Montetoni) to
my mother’s.”’













‘Yeah, that’s what I say.’
The utterance within the scope of the CQF expresses an evaluative judge-
ment, namely, that Soira’s decision was reasonable under the stated circumstances.
Recall that in the context of the interaction in question, one of the major points
of contention was whether Soira’s decision to relocate to Montetoni was reasonable
and justified, which would support Soira’s expressed wish to remain in Montetoni;
or whether it was unjustified, which would support the argument made by the vis-
itors from Marankehari that she should return with them. By his use of CQF at
this point in the conversation, Bikotoro is expressing his commitment to the for-
mer position, in the face of strong opposition. His commitment, however, is not to
an epistemic stance regarding the fact of Soira’s relocation — about which every-
one is in agreement — but rather to the contested evaluative stance regarding that
relocation.
Another instance of the use of CQF to take a non-epistemic stance is found
in Interaction 3 (§4.2.2.3), when Bikotoro advocates a course of action to resolve
the stalemate regarding Soira’s place of residence. In lines 5-7, repeated here for
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convenience, he expresses that Berenarto should come to Montetoni and take Soira
in hand.












































He should say tomorrow morning, (unintelligible), “I will-, I will-, I have












‘He should say (that).’













‘Indeed, indeed I say.’
Bikotoro’s use of CQF in line 7 clearly does not indicate a commitment to the
factual status of some state of affairs, since the utterances in the scope of the CQF
are both conceptually and morphologically irrealis. Rather, Bikotoro is expressing
his commitment to his evaluation that the course of action he has suggested is a
desirable one, and is likely to meet with success.
In both of these examples, CQF is instrumental in expressing commitment
to non-epistemic stances, and although occasional examples of the use of CQF to
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express commitment to epistemic stances are to be found in my corpus of Nanti
interaction, as in the case of Mecha’s utterance in line 3 of Interaction 1, the former
use of CQF is considerably more common. This fact suggests that CQF is best
analyzed as a general means for expressing commitments to evaluative stances, and
not only to epistemic ones.
4.3 Third person speech reports and utterance respon-
sibility
In the previous section, I described Nantis’ use of concurrent quotative framing
(CQF) to individuate stances, and argued that CQF serves to indicate a local speech
act participant’s commitment to the stances expressed by his or her utterances. In
this way, CQF serves to render explicit this participant’s responsibility for the ut-
terances in question. In this section, I turn to the use of quotative resources to
report the speech of third persons and show that third person quotation (TPQ) can
behave in a very similar manner, individuating stances and emphasizing responsi-
bility for those stances. I conclude by observing that these very functions of TPQ
can be employed by speakers to disavow their commitment to or responsibility for
those stances, producing the familiar responsibility-mitigating effect of quotation. I
argue, however, that this effect is ultimately a second order effect that depends on
the primary responsibility-emphasizing effect of quotation evident in CQF.
4.3.1 TPQ, third party stance individuation, and responsibility em-
phasis in Nanti discourse
My empirical focus in this section is on a segment drawn from a brief conversation
between myself and Migero regarding a garden maintained by Barentin, a socially
prominent Nanti man and resident of Montetoni. As I explain below, the location
191
of this garden is a source of significant concern for Migero, and he had attempted to
convince Barentin not to clear and plant it. Despite strong pressure from Migero,
however, Barentin cleared the garden. In the segment we examine here, Migero
makes clear to me that he and Barentin took opposing stances regarding the creation
of the garden, and that Barentin cleared the garden against Migero’s express wishes.
As with the instances of CQF we considered in the previous sections, then, the use
of quotative resources in this example is associated with stance-taking with respect
to a contested issue.
The dispute to which Migero refers in this conversation has its roots in a visit
made to Montetoni in early 2003 by official representatives of the Manu National
Park, whose border lies some three kilometers to the east of Montetoni. During
this visit — the first ever made by park officials to Montetoni — the officials told
the Nantis that they were not permitted to farm within the borders of the national
park, and could only hunt or fish there under restricted conditions. The residents
of Montetoni subsequently ignored this injunction, as roughly half of their hunt-
ing and fishing territory lies within the boundaries of the park, and moreover, the
prohibition made little sense to them.18 As the community’s leader and principal
intermediary with outsiders, however, Migero was deeply troubled by the potential
conflict between the national park authorities and the residents of Montetoni. At
first, he attempted to convince community members to cease hunting, fishing, and
farming in the park, but he soon gave up his unsuccessful efforts in regards to hunt-
ing and fishing. It was simply impractical for the residents of Montetoni to give up
such a large part of their hunting and fishing territory, and in the face of minimal
monitoring, continued hunting and fishing within the park boundaries posed few
18Nantis had been using the territory in question since the mid-1980s without any concern being
expressed by the national park authorities. The sudden concern of the park officials was quite
inexplicable to the residents of Montetoni, all the more so because it was quite clear that nobody
else was using the indicated territory. Nantis recognize exclusive claims on territory based on the
use of territory for hunting, fishing, gathering, or farming, but ownership of land per se remains an
alien notion for most Nantis.
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risks.
However, while hunting and fishing activities are fairly easy to conceal, farms
are easy to detect in the course of superficial and infrequent inspections. Concerned
that the park officials would carry out such inspections, Migero made a much more
serious effort to convince those who had gardens in the national park to aban-
don them, and to prevent new ones from being cleared. Of all the Nanti gardens,
Barentin’s was located the furthest into the park, and moreover, Barentin made
intensive use of this garden to support hunting and fishing even further into the
park. For Migero, then, Barentin’s garden became the rhetorical focus of his efforts
to convince the residents of Montetoni to cease farming in this region. Despite all
his efforts, Migero remained unsuccessful in curtailing farming within the national
park, a result that left him clearly frustrated. He also expressed his concern to me
that the situation would result in conflict between the community and the national
park authorities, which he, as the community spokesperson, would need to handle.
The segment we now consider followed a brief exchange between Migero
and myself regarding Barentin’s recent departure from Montetoni to the garden in
question for an extended fishing trip. In line 1, I mention the visit of the park
officials and their injunction against Nantis farming in the national park, which
leads Migero to discuss at length his efforts to prevent Barentin from farming in the
park, and to present his and Barentin’s contrasting stances on this sensitive issue.
4.3.1.1 Interaction 5: Migero and Barentin’s garden





















































‘I remember that some time ago, those park officials came briefly and said,
“You will not farm that (land).”’























‘Yes, I paid attention (to the park officials), (but) he (Barentin) did not pay
attention.’































‘He (and not anyone else) farmed it.’



















‘Contrary to what one might expect, I did not say to him, “Farm
downriver!”’
19Nantis employ pronominal forms like irironpatyo, which bear the suffixes clitics =npa and =tyo,
to explicitly disassociate themselves from the words or actions of the referent, and to convey that
person’s responsibility for the consequences of those doings, for good or for ill.
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‘On his own he thought of farming, he said, “I will fish downriver.”’

































‘That’s why he farmed there, in order to fish for kobiri, mamori, and
sankena, that’s all.’
...




















































‘Yes, indeed he said, he said, “I will not listen to the park officials, I will
farm this (land) here, I will not listen to the park officials.”’
9. Hehe irota, aka nantabagete aka, kameti onta.
20Note thatintagati has scope over the verb ıntsagate only; in other words, Barentin has cleared
























‘Yes, that’s right, “I will farm here, (because) it (the land) is good.”’































“‘I’m not farming for no good reason, but rather because I will fish (here).”’
In this segment of interaction, Migero contrasts his own and Barentin’s
stances regarding the validity of the park officials’ injunctions against farming in
the park, and the justifiability of Barentin’s garden in particular. In line 2, Migero
sets up in simple terms the basic contrast he subsequently explicates in greater de-
tail: Hee, naro nokemake, te inkeme. ‘Yes, I paid attention (to the park officials),
(but) he did not.’ Migero then strives to make clear that he himself does not support
Barentin’s decision, and certainly did not encourage him to clear his garden within
the park boundaries. An important part of Migero’s rhetorical strategy in this re-
gard is to portray Barentin’s stance towards the park officials’ injunction and the
desirability of farming within the boundaries of the park. To portray these stances,
Migero makes extensive use of TPQ.
Migero represents Barentin’s basic stance in line 8, where he quotes Barentin
as saying, Hara nokemi pariki. ‘I will not listen to the park officials.’, putting in
Barentin’s mouth the stance he attributed to him in line 2. Significantly, Nantis’
use of the root kem ‘hear’ to express the acceptance or the rejection of an injunc-
tion carries with it an evaluation of the injunction in question as valid or invalid.
Thus, when Migero quotes Barentin, Migero communicates not only that Barentin
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intends to to disregard the injunction, but that Barentin evaluates the injunction
as unjustified, unreasonable, and invalid.
Barentin’s evaluation of his own planned course of action as justified and
reasonable is the theme of the following two lines of TPQ. In line 9, Migero quotes
Barentin as justifying his action because of the quality of the land: kameti onta,
‘it’s good’, and dismissing the park officials’ objections on the grounds of the benefit
that Barentin will derive from the garden. Note that this stance in effect rejects the
authority of the park officials to constrain his own subsistence activities, and by ex-
tension, those of any Nantis. In the following line, Migero quotes Barentin as he ex-
plicitly raises the issue of justification, remarking, Tera onti kogapage nontsamaite,
‘I’m not farming there for no good reason,’ and justifying his plan to clear the garden
by his intention to use it to support his fishing trips, a crucial subsistence activity.
Migero’s uses of TPQ thus serve to represent Barentin’s stance regarding
the unjustifiability of the park officials’ injunction against farming in the park, and
the reasonableness and justifiability of Barentin’s actions in contravention of that
injunction. At the same time, Migero’s use of TPQ serves to clearly individuate
Barentin’s stance and distinguish it from Migero’s own stance regarding farming
within the boundaries of the park. We consider this issue in the following section.
In concluding my discussion of the use of TPQ to attribute stances and ut-
terance responsibility to third parties, I wish to point out that although it is clear
that Migero’s use of TPQ is associated with his representations of the stances to
which Barentin is committed, a major confounding factor looms in this analysis
that was not present in the preceding analysis of CQF and utterance responsibility.
Specifically, the direct attribution of subjective states to others is generally avoided
in Nanti interaction. Instead, Nantis typically make use of reported speech to dis-
cuss the opinions, desires, and decisions of others. Consequently, in interactions
like the one we just examined, it is difficult to tease apart whether TPQ is being
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employed to indicate the strong commitment of third parties to the epistemic and
moral stances expressed in reported speech, or whether TPQ is simply being em-
ployed as the default means for discussing others’ subjective states. It is likely that
in many instances of TPQ, speakers both mean to attribute a subjective state to a
third party and explicitly indicate that party’s commitment to the stance expressed
by an utterance, but it is very difficult to determine precisely what is being com-
municated by the use of TPQ. It is for this reason that CQF is methodologically so
important in understanding the relationship between quotative resources and utter-
ance responsibility, since CQF is used in cases in which speakers need not employ
quotative resources to talk about subjective states — namely, when referring to their
own subjective states. In regard to TPQ, then, we restrict ourselves to observing
that its distribution overlaps with that of CQF in terms of the types of interactions
in which it is found — namely, those in which contested stances are expressed or con-
trasted; and that the use of TPQ is consistent with the relationship between the use
of quotative resources and representations of utterance responsibility encountered
in CQF.
4.3.2 TPQ and first party utterance responsibility mitigation
In the preceding sections, I have demonstrated that Nantis employ quotative re-
sources to individuate utterances and to indicate commitment to their evaluative
stances. These uses of quotative resources run contrary to the common wisdom
regarding the interactional function of quotative resources — namely, to mitigate
utterance responsibility. In this section, then, I reconcile these two seemingly op-
posed points of view by clarifying the pragmatic mechanism by which third party
quotation comes to mitigate first party responsibility. I argue that this particular
responsibility-mitigating function is a consequence of inferences about first party
commitment, based on understandings of the third party commitments indicated by
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TPQ. As such, the responsibility-mitigating functions of quotative resources are a
second order effect that ultimately relies on the more basic interactional function of
these resources to indicate a speaker’s commitment to particular epistemic, moral,
and affective stances.
Migero’s use of TPQ in the preceding conversation shows us that the attri-
bution of utterances to third parties is capable of the same stance-individuating and
utterance responsibility-emphasizing functions as CQF. At the same time, however,
we see in this interaction that Migero is clearly employing TPQ to disavow his own
support of Barentin’s stances and to mitigate his responsibility for Barentin’s ac-
tions. In this case, then, TPQ does display the responsibility-mitigating functions
that we are led to expect by the literature on evidentiality, reported speech, and
responsibility.
The argument I advance is that the responsibility-mitigating effect of TPQ
with respect to first party stance-taking is the result of the inference of low first-
party commitment on the basis of the expression of strong third party commitment.
The basis of this inferential process is the evaluation of a given TPQ utterance with
respect to the Maxim of Quantity21 in light of a ‘commitment hierarchy’ (Dascal,
2003). Focusing briefly on the commitment hierarchy, we note that since TPQ
does not indicate first party commitment to the quotatively framed stance, a TPQ
utterance is necessarily lower on the commitment hierarchy than an utterance in
which the speaker directly articulates that stance. At this point, the Maxim of
Quantity becomes relevant: if a speaker employs TPQ to attribute a stance to a
third party, the Maxim of Quantity leads us to infer that the speaker’s commitment
is less than that which would be indicated by the speaker’s own direct articulation
of that stance.22 The result is that the speaker’s commitment to the stance is
21The Maxim of Quantity stipulates: i) Make your contribution as informative as is required for
the current purposes of the exchange; and ii) Do not make your contribution more informative than
is required.
22This effect is easily illustrated in English with verbs of cognition, which are the primary means
199
mitigated.23 Note, however, that this mitigation ultimately depends on the fact
that TPQ indicates the commitment of the third party to the stance in question;
and that the mitigation of the first party’s responsibility arises as an inference but
is in no way directly expressed by the use of TPQ.
4.3.3 Quotative resources and utterance responsibility in compar-
ative perspective
The purpose of this section is to compare the role in Nanti society of quotative
resources in individuating stances and modulating utterance responsibility with the
role ascribed to similar quotative practices in other languages. I have already sum-
marized the scholarly consensus on the relationship between quotative resources and
utterance responsibility in the introduction to this chapter; in this section I wish to
shed a comparative light on two phenomena closely related to CQF that I have not
yet discussed — self-quotation and first person evidentiality. Finally, I compare the
Nanti uses of quotative resources to the uses of ‘locutives’ in Weyewa society (Aus-
tronesia, Sumba, Indonesia), which display several several striking commonalities.
4.3.3.1 Self-quotation
CQF is in many cases a form of self-quotation, a topic that has received some at-
tention in the scholarship on reported speech.24 Although most scholarship that
of attributing in English. Consider the following hypothetical interchange: A: Is manioc beer tasty?
B: Well, Lev thinks so. The inference in this circumstance is that B’s commitment to the tastiness
of manioc beer is not particularly strong.
23Note that in some language communities, such as Tewa (Kiowa-Tanoan, USA), Usan (Trans-
New Guinea, Papua New Guinea), and Tauya (Trans-New Guinea, Papua New Guinea), the use
of direct quotation of third parties is associated with skepticism or disbelief on the part of the
speaker regarding the quoted proposition (Aikhenvald, 2004, pp.139-140). These represent more
extreme cases of commitment mitigation than the Nanti one, but seem to operate on the same basic
pragmatic principles.
24Golato (2002) has remarked that self-quotation is largely a neglected topic. Self-quotation
received little attention during the 1980s boom of scholarship on reported speech, although it is
mentioned as a possible form of quotation by Sternberg (1982) and is exemplified by Tannen (1989)
in her criticism of naive accounts of reported speech as faithful utterance replication. Another early
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addresses self-quotation mainly focuses on self-quotation of utterances that are con-
strued as having been uttered in previous interactional contexts, there are a number
of points of empirical and analytic overlap between my discussion of CQF and the
scholarship on self-quotation that I wish to mention.
Maynard (1996)’s work on Japanese conversation was the first to examine
self-quotation in detail. Maynard analyzed Japanese self-quotation principally in
terms of Bakhtinian notions of ‘polyphony’ or ‘multivoicedness’, arguing that self-
quotation is a means for combining multiple “semiotic contexts” via the different
“voices” expressed by self-quotation, and that this mechanism allows a speaker to
simultaneously occupy multiple “subject positions” in the unfolding interaction. A
similar conclusion is reached by Koven (2001) in her work on the use of reported
speech by Luso-French bilinguals, where she remarks that self-reporting (and re-
ported speech more generally) creates “icons of credible utterances from culturally
specific types of personas” (p.514). Both Maynard and Koven thus see self-reporting
as a means for speakers to represent themselves as persons with certain moral and
social attributes, sometimes laminating such personas for subtle interactional effect.
It should be noted that for both authors, the phenomenon in question largely in-
volves self-quotation of utterances that are construed by participants as originating
in prior interactions.
I see Maynard’s and Koven’s analyses of the interactional consequences of
self-quotation as congruent with my analysis of CQF. In particular, I agree that self-
quotation (including CQF) enables speakers to index particular subject positions or
social personas. However, I suggest that this effect is not achieved directly by self-
quotation, but is instead mediated by stance-taking. As I have argued in the case of
Nanti CQF, self-quotation is a means for expressing commitment to stances, and it
is through this mediating mechanism that self-quotation serves to indicate subject
work on reported speech, Macaulay (1987, p.22) remarks in passing that self-quotation serves a
means for a speaker to represent him or herself as an “actor in a scene.”
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positions and social personas.
Maynard also makes a number of empirical claims regarding the interactional
effects of self-quotation which merit some attention. The specific interactional ef-
fects that Maynard attributes to Japanese self-quotation include ‘distancing’ and
‘dramatization’,25 the creation of ‘intimacy’, and speech act ‘emphasis’. Of these
interactional effects, Maynard’s discussions of ‘intimacy’ (p.215) and ‘emphasis’
(pp.222-223) are exemplified with instances of CQF.26 Inspection of these exam-
ples strongly suggests that CQF in Japanese serves to indicate commitment to a
stance, much as it does in Nanti.
A quite different analysis of self-quotation in interaction is provided by Golato
(2002), who examines the phenomenon in the context of troubles-tellings (focusing
on German, but incorporating English and Greek data as well). Golato argues that
in the interactions she examined, self-reporting serves as a strategy to demonstrate
for the listener (rather than simply describe) the process by which decisions and
evaluations were reached, thereby allowing or guiding the listener to reach the con-
clusion that the decision or evaluation was one that “‘had to be made’ by any fair
and responsible person” (ibid. p.67). Golato argues that this form of demonstration
(cf. Clark and Gerrig, 1990) is instrumental in cooperative theory-building (Ochs
et al., 1992) and allows participants to co-construct an evaluation of the troubles
and their resolution. In a significant sense, however, little in Golato’s discussion
of self-quotation depends on the fact that the quotation in question is first person
rather than third person, and as such, provides little insight into self-quotation as
25Maynard also claims that self-quotation allows the speaker to dramatize and animate his or her
own speech, which she argues “encourages a sense of closeness [between participants] while creating
a distancing effect [between the speaker and the quoted utterance]”(p.216). This first part of this
claim is much along the lines of Tannen’s (1989) account of the ‘involvement’-creating effects of
reported speech in general.
26Maynard’s claim that self-quotation induces feelings of closeness and solidarity is based on the
notion that self-quotation is a form of self-revelation that gives interlocutors access to otherwise
private “inner conversation”. Maynard provides no evidence, however, for her claims regarding the
capacity of self-quotation to create intimacy, and I remain skeptical of them.
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such.
4.3.3.2 First person evidentiality
The Nanti first person quotative noka is a form of ‘first person evidentiality’. This
is a topic that has received attention in recent years because of the unusual prag-
matic behavior of evidential constructions involving first persons (Aikhenvald, 2004;
Curnow, 2002a,b). In this section I review this scholarship, and consider how the
behavior of Nanti quotatives fits into the broader picture of first person evidentiality.
As Curnow (2002a,b) and Aikhenvald (2004, p.217-239 passim) have ob-
served, evidentials that occur in clauses in which the first person plays a promi-
nent role are frequently interpreted differently than those in clauses in which the
participants are third person. First person evidential constructions with indirect
evidentials frequently yield meanings of non-volitionality or unintentionality, while
those with direct evidentials frequently yield meanings of deliberateness and control.
Non-first person evidential constructions are normally neutral with respect to issues
of volitionality and control. Nanti first person quotatives, however, do not yield
interpretations of non-volitionality or unintentionality, despite the fact that quota-
tives are normally treated as a type of indirect evidential. Quite to the contrary,
Nanti first person quotatives are employed to indicate commitment to an evaluative
stance, which aligns more closely with notions of volitionality and intentionality
than their opposites.
In this respect, the Nanti quotatives behave much more like visual evidentials
than like indirect evidentials such as reportives or inferentials. Although first person
visual evidentials may also yield interpretations of accidental or uncontrolled actions,
as in Qiang (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.229), it is considerably more common for them
to yield interpretations of deliberateness, control, and volition-ality, as in Tucano
and Yukaghir (Aikhenvald, 2004, p.238). Aikhenvald notes that this behavior is
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consistent with the tendency for visual evidentials also to exhibit semantic extensions
of an epistemic nature that convey meanings of certainty or commitment to the truth
of a statement (ibid. p.192).
Reportives, which we might naively suppose to be the evidential type most
closely related to quotatives, frequently yield senses of unintentionality, non-volitionality,
or uncontrolledness and surprise when they have scope over propositions that feature
first persons, as in Lithuanian (ibid. pp.225-6). In other cases, constructions of this
type yield interpretations of denial or scepticism regarding the evidentially marked
proposition, as in Nganasan (ibid. p.226). Whether or not first person reportive
constructions yield such interpretations appears to vary from language to language.
Curnow (2002a, pp.3-4) notes, for example, that the Wintu hearsay evidential and
Tucano reportive receive normal interpretations with first person subjects. Signifi-
cantly, neither Curnow nor Aikhenvald discuss first-person effects for quotatives.27
The fact that Nanti first person quotatives yield interpretations more typical
of first person direct evidential constructions than of first person indirect evidential
constructions stems from the fact that the protypical circumstances under which
quotatives are employed in Nanti society do not match the conditions which al-
low first person evidential constructions to yield meanings of non-volitionality and
lack of control. Specifically, meanings of reduced volitionality and control arise in
circumstances in which evidentials indicate greater sensory distantiation from the
events in question than would be expected of a first person participant. However,
the use of the first person quotative does not imply sensory distantiation in Nanti,
but in fact the opposite. Typically, the use of a quotative in Nanti implies that:
i) the speaker was present in the circumstances in which the quoted utterance was
uttered;28 and ii) that the quoted individual had direct sensory access to the events
27Curnow (p.2) cites Rood’s (1976, p.92) mention of a “quotative” in Witchita that yields an
unintentional action interpretation in the first person, but remarks that inspection of the data
suggests that the evidential in question is not a quotative, but rather a “non-witnessed” evidential.
28When this condition does not hold, Nanti speakers either employ a reportive in conjunction
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expressed by the quoted utterance, unless otherwise specified.29 A first person quo-
tative, therefore, yields the inference that the speaker, by virtue of being the quoted
individual, had direct sensory access to the events in question. As such, a first per-
son quotative is, in effect, a direct evidential. As such, it is unsurprising that the
Nanti first person quotative does not yield the interpretations of non-volitionality
and lack of control associated with first person indirect evidential constructions.
4.3.3.3 Weyewa locutives
In this section, I discuss the use of ‘locutives’ by speakers of Weyewa (a.k.a. Wejewa),
an Austronesian language spoken on the Indonesian island of Sumba (Kuipers, 1993).
My reason for doing so is the striking similarities these elements display to the form
and interactional function of Nanti quotatives, which suggests that the behavior of
Nanti quotative resources that I have described in this chapter may not be atypical
of quotative resources more generally.30
Weyewa locutives are quotatives31 that inflect for person, in a manner very
similar to Nanti quotatives. Like Nanti quotatives, they can be employed for CQF,
the interactional effect of which Kuipers characterizes as “claiming responsibility for
the [quotatively framed] speech” (ibid. p.93). Similarly, Kuipers characterizes the
with the quotative, or employ multiple quotatives in order to clarify the chain of transmission
between the speaker and the quoted utterance.
29This follows from the fact that evidentially-unmarked utterances are defeasibly interpreted as
having a visual evidential basis (see Chapter 3).
30Quotative evidentials are relatively rare among languages that exhibit grammaticalized eviden-
tiality, and there is much less discussion of the pragmatic properties of quotatives than of other
types of evidentials.
31Kuipers rejects the term ‘quotative’ because they can inflect for the person and gender of the
source and recipient of the utterance, which distinguishes them from the uninflectable “quotative”
particles described by Whorf (1956, p.119) for Hopi. However, linguists would now characterize the
latter particles as ‘reportives’ and not ‘quotatives’, removing the basis for Kuipers’ terminological
qualms. Kuipers also argues that ‘locutives’ cannot be considered ‘evidentials’ because they do
not indicate the ultimate source of information of the locutive-marked utterance — be it hearsay,
visual, or otherwise. This latter point seems to stem from a misunderstanding of evidentiality, since
quotatives do specify the source of information (a verbal report from a specific individual), albeit
not the ultimate one, for an utterance.
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interactional effect of locutives in terms very similar to those I have employed for
Nanti quotative resources:
Rather than collectivizing discourse the way many Amerindian verba
dicendi do, the import of Weyewa locutives in ritual speech contexts is
to particularize and individuate it. This particularizing has the effect of
heightening the connotation of personal responsibility for discourse.
We see, then, that on Kuipers’ analysis, Weyewa locutives share the indi-
viduating function of Nanti quotatives, and that Kuiper attributes a responsibility-
heightening effect to them. This remarkable coincidence in communicative function
is paralleled by structural similarities — particularly the existence of CQF construc-
tions and the person marking of the source of the quoted utterance on the locutive.
The fact that similar structural characteristics are associated with similar commu-
nicative functional characteristics in each language suggests that the account I have
provided in this chapter of the relationship between the structural-semiotic features




In the preceding pages, I provided an analysis of Nanti evidential practice, focusing
on the use of evidential resources to modulate representations of responsibility in
discourse. This analysis was based on a detailed understanding of Nanti grammar
(a description of which I provide in Chapter 6), and the close analysis of ethno-
graphically contextualized transcripts of Nanti interactions.
At the outset of my examination of the instrumental role of evidentiality
in modulating representations of responsibility, I drew an analytical distinction be-
tween two quite different forms of responsibility: event responsibility and utterance
responsibility. This distinction has not been previously recognized in the scholar-
ship on discourse and responsibility, but I show that the ways in which evidential
resources modulate these two types of evidentiality are quite different. Event re-
sponsibility rests on the nature of a social subject’s participation in a causal chain
that brings about an event. Utterance responsibility, in contrast, rests on a subject’s
production of an utterance that interactants evaluate as having certain praiseworthy
or blameworthy attributes, such as being ‘vulgar’ or ‘true’, regardless of the events
that the utterance brings about.
In Chapter 3, I focused on the role played by evidential resources in Nan-
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tis’ efforts to modulate event responsibility. I showed that Nantis employ indirect
evidentials, such as inferentials and quotatives, to mitigate their own responsibility
for unfortunate events. I also provided a theoretical account for the efficacy of indi-
rect evidentials in mitigating event responsibility, the central idea of which is that
in Nanti evidential practice there exists a pragmatic metaphor relating the sensory
mode of access to an event encoded by evidentials to moral responsibility for that
event. I argued that this pragmatic metaphor is based on a chain of inferences that
links modes of access to prototypical physical circumstances that allow the use of
particular evidentials, which in turn yield inferences regarding causal responsibility,
which in turn form the basis of judgements of moral responsibility. Inferentials and
quotatives denote indirect modes of access that invoke prototypical circumstances of
(physical) distance from events, yielding inferences of minimal causal responsibility
for the event in question, and hence minimal moral responsibility for it.
As part of my analysis of the pragmatic metaphor by which Nantis mitigate
event responsibility, I also argued that it is helpful to treat evidentiality as a mixed
indexical-denotational category that indexes knowing subjects and events, and de-
notes a mode of sensory access that the former have to the latter. This way of
articulating the semiotic content of evidentials brings into relief the fact that ev-
identials denote a relationship between the knowing subject and the event, which
is the aspect of the evidential that is most salient to the chain of inferences that
results in the mitigation of event responsibility.
In Chapter 4, I turned to the role of evidential resources, and in particular,
quotative resources, in modulating utterance responsibility in Nanti discourse. I
argued that quotative resources serve to individuate utterances by attributing them
to a particular individual. In general, I showed, this use of quotative resources
is associated with efforts to indicate an individual’s commitment to the evaluative
stance expressed by the quotative utterance, thereby rendering explicit that person’s
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responsibility for that stance. In order to avoid confounding effects due to the
interdiscursive functions of quotative resources, I developed these arguments on the
basis of data exhibiting concurrent quotative framing (CQF), a discourse strategy
by which utterances from the ongoing interaction are placed under the scope of
quotative resources. I subsequently showed that similar individuating, commitment-
indicating effects are shown by third party quotations (TPQ.)
In concluding my discussion of utterance responsibility, I provided an account
of how third party quotation comes to have (utterance) responsibility-mitigating
effects, which is the interactional function typically attributed to quotatives in the
scholarship on discourse and responsibility. I argued that this effect is a consequence
of the application of the Maxim of Quantity to utterances, as evaluated against a
scale of degrees of commitment. Attribution of a stance to a third party leads to
inferences, via the Maxim of Quantity, that this is the strongest commitment that
the speaker is willing to express, leading in turn to the inference that the speaker is
not strongly committed to the stance expressed by the TPQ utterance.
This dissertation contributes to the disciplinary debate concerning the rela-
tionship between evidentiality and epistemic modality. In particular, we see that in
Nanti society, epistemic modal meanings arise as inferences based on encoded mode-
of-sensory-access meanings, and even then, only under restricted circumstances.
Nantis’ use of evidential resources to negotiate event responsibility, for example, is
predicated on interactants’ concerns regarding causal responsibility that are orthog-
onal to questions of epistemic reliability. As I showed in Chapter 3, interactants
may not express any doubts about a given event, yet still make use of evidential
resources to distance themselves causally and morally from that event.
Epistemic modality does surface as a salient issue in the realm of utterance
responsibility, as one form of stance commitment modulated by quotative resources.
As we saw in Chapter 4, however, epistemic stances are but one kind of evaluative
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stance to which Nantis might express commitment in using quotative resources.
In fact, in the interactions we examined, Nantis were principally concerned with
expressing commitment to moral evaluative stances.
The fact that epistemic modality appears to play a minor role even in the
pragmatics of evidential resources in Nanti further weakens arguments that there is
an intrinsic link between mode-of-sensory-access meanings and assessments of epis-
temic reliability, either conceptually, or at the level of communicative instrumental-
ity in interaction. Rather, it appears that semantic and pragmatic links between
evidentiality and epistemic modality arise in particular languages and speech com-
munities in locally idiosyncractic ways, on the basis of local understandings of the
relation between knowledge and the senses.
This dissertation also makes a case for the utility of studying evidentiality as
a component of communicative practice. As I argued in Chapter 2, the distribution
of evidentials, even in languages which exhibit highly grammaticalized evidential-
ity, is frequently underdetermined by grammatical considerations alone, as truly
structurally obligatory evidentiality is relatively rare. Consequently, in most lan-
guages that exhibit grammaticalized evidentiality, the distribution of evidentials
in naturally-occurring discourse is at least in part determined by the interactional
goals of speakers in specific interactional settings. As such, a purely grammatically-
oriented approach to evidentiality is incapable of accounting fully for their distribu-
tion and their communicative function. I argued that the tendency for evidentiality
to play a prominent role in local language ideologies argues for a practice-based
approach, as ideology is integral to communicative-theoretic approaches. In addi-
tion, I showed that Nanti speakers deploy grammaticalized evidentials and evidential
strategies (such as verbs of perception) in conjunction with one another, making an
approach that attends to both grammaticalized and non-grammaticalized evidential
resources essential to understanding the communicative instrumentality of mode of
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Nanti is a language of the Kampan1 family, a group of closely-related Arawak2 lan-
guages spoken in the Andean foothills region of southeastern Peru and the adjacent
1Note that some scholars (e.g. Cysouw, 2007; Wise, 1986) refer to this family as the ‘Pre-Andine’
family. I avoid this term because of its confusing history. The term was originally coined by Rivet
and Tastevin (1919-20) for a proposed grouping of Arawak languages that encompassed what are
now commonly known as the Kampan and the Purús branches. The best known languages of
the latter branch are Yine (Piro) and Apurinã (Ipurina). Later, Yaneshá (Amuesha) (e.g. Wise,
1976) and the Harakmbet family were added, and each subsequently removed (Wise, 1999). As
Payne (1991) showed, however, there is little evidence to support even the grouping together of the
Kampan and Purús languages. All recent classifications treat the Purús branch as coordinate with
the Kampan branch within Southern Arawak (Aikhenvald, 1999; Campbell, 1997; Kaufman, 1994).
Similarly, Yaneshá was removed from Pre-Andine, and is now sometimes grouped with Chamicuro
(Payne, 1991). Those who retained the term ‘Pre-Andine’ employed it for this successively dwin-
dling group, until only the Kampan languages remained, rendering ‘Pre-Andine’ coextensive with
‘Kampan’.
2Terminology varies somewhat. The core established group of historically-related languages is
called ‘Arawak’ by some (e.g. Aikhenvald, 1999; Facundes, 2002; Ramirez, 2001) and ‘Maipurean’
(also, ‘Maipuran’) by others (e.g. Campbell, 1997; Payne, 1991). Some prefer the term ‘Arawakan’
for this group (e.g. Wise, 2005), but the recent tendency is to reserve ‘Arawakan’ for a higher-level
speculative grouping that subsumes the Arawak/Maipurean languages, the Arawán languages (cf.
Dixon, 2004), the Harakmbet languages (cf. Wise, 1999), and Puquina (Campbell, 1997; Facundes,
2002; Payne, 1991).
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lowland regions of Peru and Brazil. In this section I review the scholarship on Kam-
pan genetic classification, and then consider the place of the Kampan family within
Arawak more generally.
Apart from Nanti, there are six commonly-recognized major varieties within
this family: Asháninka, Ashéninka, Kakinte, Matsigenka, Nomatsigenga, and Pa-
jonal Ashéninka (a.k.a. Pajonal Campa). There is substantial disagreement among
linguists in distinguishing dialects from languages among these varieties, which leads
to disparate internal classifications for the Kampan family. We now examine this
issue. It should be noted that there has been no application of the comparative
method3 to the varieties of the Kampan family, meaning that none of the classifica-
tions, with their implicit groupings through merging varieties under single language
names, can be considered entirely reliable. It is not clear that even lexicostatistical
methods have been applied.
Kaufman (1994) and Campbell (1997) present the most conservative classi-
fications, distinguishing only three languages.4 Kaufman considers the three lan-
guages to be ‘emergent languages’, a term he adopts to characterize a level of dif-
ferentiation between that which exists between clearly distinct languages and that
which exists between dialects of a single language:
1. Ashéninga (dialects: Ucayali, Upper Perené, Pichis, Apurucayali, and Atsiri
(Pajonal))
2. Asháninga
3. Matsigenga (dialects: Kakinte, Nomatsigenga, Machigenga [sic]).
3That is, we have no classifications that are based on the reconstruction of the proto-Kampa
phonological inventory and morphology and the subsequent deduction of subgroupings based on
shared phonological and morphological innovations.
4In the following discussion, I use the language names employed by the cited scholars; this
accounts for the orthographic inconsistencies in the remainder of this section.
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Campbell’s (1997:181) classification is essentially the same, although he enu-
merates fewer dialects: Ashéninga (dialects: Ucayali, Upper Perené, Pichis, Apuru-
cayali), Asháninga, and Machiguenga (dialects: Caquinte and Machiguenga).
Soĺıs Fonseca (2003) supresses mention of dialects in his classification, but
splits Kaufman’s and Campbell’s Matsigenga/Machiguenga, differentiating Nomat-
sigenga from Matsigenka and yielding four languages for the family:
1. Asháninka (= “Campa” Asháninca)
2. Ashéninka (= “Campa” del Gran Pajonal)
3. Nomatsiguenga
4. Machiguenga
I find the decision to distinguish Nomatsigenga as a distinct language to
be well-motivated, as Nomatsigenga underwent a number of sound changes not
experienced by the other Kampan languages. Nomatsigenga is also apparently the
only Kampan language to display contrastive tone (Shaver, 1996).
Aikhenvald (1999) further splits the Matsigenka branch of the family, recog-
nizing Kakinte as a distinct language; she also splits the Ashéninka branch, recog-






6. Pajonal Campa (possible dialects: Perene, Pichis, and Ucayali)
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Given the fineness of most classifications of the Kampan family, distinguish-
ing Kakinte from Matsigenka is well-warranted on phonological and morphological
grounds. Kakinte is also very lexically divergent from Matsigenka. Given the dearth
of published material on Pajonal Kampa, however, I find it difficult to comment on
the choice of considering it a distinct language within the Kampan family.
Aikhenvald’s classification is similar to Payne’s (1981) classification of the
Kampan family, which also distinguishes six languages:
1. Ashaninca





Gordon (2005) clearly owes much to Payne’s (1981) classification and dis-
cussion of dialects, and appears to give the largest number of languages for the
family, eleven. Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that Gordon is diffi-
dent about differentiating between languages and dialects in the Kampan family.
Although the varieties listed below are given at the level in Gordon’s (2005) Ethno-
logue classifications that is normally reserved for distinct languages, one encounters
numerous comments that undermine the inference that the listed varieties are all
distinct languages. His remarks suggest that the listed varieties are sub-varieties of
encompassing varieties, indicated by capital letters in the following list:5
5Note that the letters are my addition, based on my interpretation of Gordon’s (2005) comments,
and are not explicit in Gordon’s classification. However, the resulting internal classification is quite













Several comments are warranted by this set of classifications. First, it is
clear that within the Kampan family, we are dealing with a set of varieties whose
degree of differentiation lies in that ambiguous area between language and dialect.
In the absence of established disciplinary criteria for distinguishing languages from
dialects, the degree of differentiation found in the Kampan languages leads indi-
vidual linguists to varying classificatory judgments. This problem is compounded
by the fact that no comprehensive descriptive grammar yet exists for any of the
Kampan varieties,6 rendering impossible any systematic comparison of morphology
and morphosyntax across the entire family.
It is not clear that any substantive linguistic issues are at stake in where the
line is drawn between language and dialect in the case of the Kampan languages. As
long as the varieties are properly identified, and their genetic and areal relationships
6The most detailed works are Payne’s (1981) description of Apurucayali Ashéninka (a.k.a. Ax-
ininca) phonology and morphology, and Swift’s (1988) description of Kakinte phonology and mor-
phology, which is modelled on Payne (1981).
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understood, the question of which varieties are considered distinct ‘languages’ is of
no empirical or theoretical linguistic import. However, what varieties are called
‘languages’ or are considered ‘dialects’ is of great political and social significance,
both in terms of relations with the state and with powerful para-governmental actors,
such as missionary organizations and petrochemical companies; and in terms of
political and social relations between groups of indigenous individuals. In large part,
the importance of ‘languages’, so called, lies in their use by both indigenous and non-
indigenous entities and individuals as proxies for identifying salient politico-cultural
groupings (‘tribes’, ‘indigenous groups’, ‘peoples’, etc.). The recursive equating of
linguistic difference with politico-cultural difference and autonomy leads both to
exaggeration of linguistic difference and its to effacement, in a manner that parallels
strategic positions taken towards politico-cultural solidarity with, or independence
from, other groupings.7
Second, we note that the only classification that mentions Nanti, either as
a dialect or as a language, is Gordon (2005). This reflects the fact that Nanti
has only come to the awareness of linguists in the last few years (see also Payne
(2001)). Given the varying degrees of fineness of the different classifications given
above, I venture to predict that Nanti would be considered a dialect of Matsigenka
by Kaufman and Campbell, and a distinct language by Aikhenvald.
Turning to the classification of Nanti, we can observe that of the Kampan
varieties, Nanti exhibits the greatest similarity to Matsigenka, and specifically, to
the Manu dialect of Matsigenka.8 This is not entirely surprising, since various
ethnohistorical facts suggest that the ancestors of the Nantis migrated from the
Manu region to the upper Timṕıa region before or during the 19th century. In fact,
conversations I have had with Matsigenka individuals who have visited the Nanti
7I touch on some of these issues in the Nanti case in Chapter 1.
8Three major dialects of Matsigenka are commonly recognized by linguists and anthropolo-
gists working with Matsigenkas, and by Matsigenkas themselves: the Upper Urubamba, Lower
Urubamba, and Manu dialects.
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communities, as well as my own field observations, suggest that the relationship
between Nanti and the Matsigenka dialects is best analyzed as a dialect chain, where
adjacency in the following list indicates greater similarity: Upper Urubamba – Lower
Urubamba – Manu – Nanti. My observations indicate that speakers of the Upper
Urubamba dialect of Matsigenka experience the greatest difficulty communicating
with Nantis, and that speakers of the Manu dialect experience the least.
Within the Kampan family, Nanti and Matsigenka obviously form a sub-
group. This subgroup, in turn, probably forms a higher level grouping with Nomat-
sigenga, given the similarities in their morphological systems and what are proba-
bly some shared phonological innovations (see below). If this hypothesis is correct,
then these three languages form a Southern Kampan (SK) branch, while Ashéninka,
Asháninka, and Kakinte form a Northern Kampan (NK) branch. These observations
yield the classification given in (6.1).9 Note that I have suppressed details of the
internal classification of Northern Kampan, since my principal concern at this point








Clearly, a definitive internal classification of the Kampan family must await
the reconstruction of Proto-Kampa (PK) and the construction of a model of the di-
versification of the daughter languages. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify some
9The internal classification I propose is similar, in its overall form, to that given by Wise (1986).
The principal difference is that Wise groups Kakinte and Asháninka together as a subgroup. Payne
(1981, p.4), however, notes no genetic affinity between Kakinte and Asháninka, and in fact proposes
that they are relatively distantly related.
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likely shared innovations that support the internal classification given in (6.1). For
example, the basic division between NK and SK is supported by the widespread
loss or lenition of PK /g/ in NK, but its retention in SK. Within NK, evidence for
grouping Ashéninka and Asháninka together is provided by these languages’ shared
loss of PK /h/, which Kakinte does not exhibit. Within SK, the proposed classifica-
tion is supported by a number of shared innovations in Nanti and Matsigenka, which
include the palatalized segments /tj/ and /rj/, that are not present in Nomatsigenga.
All recent classifications of Arawak place the Kampan family in Southern
Arawak (Payne, 1991; Kaufman, 1994; Campbell, 1997; Aikhenvald, 1999), except
for Ramirez (2001), who rejects the Northern and Southern Arawak subgroupings for
Eastern and Western ones. For most Arawak specialists, Southern Arawak consists
of all Arawak languages south of the Amazon river,10 except possibly for Yaneshá
(Amuesha) and Chamicuro, both of which have proved difficult to classify in rela-
tion to other Arawak languages.11 Since there is no clear agreement among schol-
ars on mid-level groupings within Southern Arawak, it is difficult to say a great
deal about the relationship of the Kampan family to other low-level groupings in
Southern Arawak, except that there is a strong tendency to view the Kampan and
Purús families (Aikhenvald, 1999; Ramirez, 2001), and in some cases, Bolivia-Parana
Arawak12 families (Payne, 1991, p.489) as forming a single group at some level (see
also comments by Wise (1986, p.568)).
10Payne (1991) and Kaufman (1994) propose a slightly smaller Southern branch by placing Parećı
and Waurá in a separate Central branch.
11Aikhenvald (1999) places Chamicuro and Amuesha with the Kampan and Purús families in a
South-Western branch, as does Campbell (1997), while Payne (1991), Kaufman (1994), and Ramirez
(2001) do not.
12Following Payne (1991), I employ the term Bolivia-Parana Arawak for a grouping that in-
cludes all the living Arawak languages in Bolivia, and Terena, which is spoken in southern Brazil.




The Nanti phonemic inventory is typical for a Kampan language,13 although Nanti
exhibits several allophonic processes that are unique within the family. Similarly,
the Nanti inventory shows much similarity to the common Arawak phonological
profile described by Aikhenvald (1999, p.75-8), although, as discussed below, the
Kampan languages as a whole diverge from this profile at a number of points.
The Nanti consonant and vowel inventories are given in Table 6.1 and Table
6.2, respectively. Allophones are given in square brackets next to the phoneme, and
graphemes used in this text for phonemic representations are given in parentheses,
if they are different from the standard IPA symbol.
6.2.1.1 Consonant inventory
From a typological perspective, the most notable feature of the Nanti consonant in-
ventory is the lack of symmetry between the voiceless and voiced stop series. Specif-
ically, although /b/ and /g/ are found as the voiced counterparts to the voiceless
stops /p/ and /k/, there is no voiced counterpart in the Nanti consonant inventory
to the voiceless alveolar stop /t/.
This particular gap in the series of voiced stops is typical of the Kampan
languages. Certain varieties, such as the Upper Urubamba dialect of Matsigenka,
exhibit allophonic post-nasal voicing, which results in surface [nd] clusters, but in
no Kampan language does one find a contrast between voiceless and voiced alveolar
stops.
Gaps in the phonemic inventory of voiced stops are actually fairly common
13In the subsequent discussion, Kampan comparative comments are based on phonological de-
scriptions available in Kindberg (1980) for Asháninka, Payne (1981) for Ashéninka, Swift (1988)


















































































































































































































among Arawak languages more generally, although the missing segments are typi-
cally /b/ or /g/, rather than /d/ (Aikhenvald, 1999, p.76). In fact, in her survey of
Arawak phonological systems, Aikhenvald finds only two languages with a /k/-/g/
contrast, Reśıgaro and Garifuna (ibid.). Minimal pairs showing the contrast between
voiceless and voiced velar stops in Nanti are given in (6.2). Note that although
Nanti exhibits phonemic /B// and /g/, they are subject to the morphophonemic
restriction that neither can appear in either verb root-inital or nominal root-initial
position. Furthermore, /g/ is more generally forbidden in word-initial position,
and /B/ is extremely rare in word-initial position, being restricted to pronominal
elements that maintain their Proto-Kampan form (e.g. the second person pronoun
biro) and certain bird species names such as buburo, that are probably onomatopoeic
in origin. However, certain morphophonological process that strip verb stem-initial
vowels occasionally result in surface forms that exhibit word-initial /B/ and /g/ (see
§6.2.3).
(6.2) /k/ vs. /g/
a. irakake ‘It ripened.’
b. iragaka ‘He/she cried.’
c. okotakero ‘She cooked it.’
d. ogotakero ‘She knew it.’
Nanti exhibits a full series of contrastive palatalized segments corresponding
to the series of alveolar stops and the alveolar flap. Similar series of palatalized
segments are found in the other Kampan languages14 but otherwise appear to be
rare among Arawak languages, as evidenced by the fact that Aikhenvald (1999,
14In the orthographies of some of these languages, palatalized segments are represented as Ci.
However, all evidence indicates that in these cases, the languages in question exhibit palatalized
consonants, and not consonant-vowel sequences.
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p.75-8) does not mention them at all in her discussion of the Arawak phonological
profile.
Like all the other Kampan languages, Nanti exhibits a nasal unspecified for
place of articulation in addition to the bilabial and alveolar nasal stops. Following
Payne (1981), I indicate this segment by n. This underspecified nasal acquires its
place of articulation features from the following voiceless stop or affricate, if present,
as illustrated in (6.3). In these examples I use the irrealis prefix n- to illustrate the
place assimiliation of this segment.




































There are two main reasons for positing the existence of this underspecified
segment in the phonological inventory, instead of simply assuming that the segment
in question is either the bilabial or the alveolar nasal stop displaying place of ar-
ticulation assimilation. First, in cases in which the underspecified nasal and the
voiceless stop are heteromorphemic (as in (6.3)), we find that there is simply no
basis for preferring one nasal over another as an underlying form, since the under-
specified nasal always place-assimilates to the following voiceless stop. Moreover,
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if a voiceless stop is unavailable to provide place features, the underspecified nasal
simply deletes (see §6.3.1.1.1 for further discussion). Although one might be able
to explain the deletion of the nasal before a voiced stop as a result of a constraint
on consonant clusters in Nanti, the deletion of the nasal in question before vowels
largely rules out the possibility that the nasal in question has an underlying bil-
abial or alveolar place of articulation, since /n/ and /m/ are perfectly permissible
in intervocalic position.
The second argument for positing an underspecified nasal in Nanti comes
from monomorphemic forms. For forms in which the nasal and following voiceless
consonant are tautomorphemic (e.g. punto [p
>
Winto] ‘frog sp.’), it may seem ap-
pealing, on grounds of representational transparency, to assert that the underlying
segments in question are simply identical to their surface form. However, this analy-
sis would force us to posit a velar nasal phoneme /N/ to account for monomorphemic
forms in which the underspecified nasal precedes a voiceless velar stop (e.g. ankiro
[aN
>
kSiRo] ‘rabbit’). However, since we otherwise have no evidence for this phoneme,
this analysis is unsatisfactory.
Payne (1981, p. 62, 164-5) makes similar arguments for the corresponding
segment in Apurucayali Ashéninka, and adduces additional psycholinguistic ones,
based on evidence from Ashéninkas’ shifting use of either grapheme, ‘n’ or ‘m’, in
representing the underspecified nasal.
6.2.1.2 Vowel inventory
Nanti exhibits five contrastive vowel qualities, as indicated in Table 6.2; vowel length
is contrastive for all vowel qualities except the monomoraic diphthong, resulting in
a total inventory of nine vowels. The Nanti vowel inventory is typical for an Arawak
language, with the exception of the typologically unusual monomoraic diphthong
/
>
Wi/, represented by the grapheme u. The principal evidence for the lightness of this
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diphthong comes from the fact that it patterns with short vowels, and specifically
/o/ and /e/, for purposes of stress assignment (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005). Its
phonetic duration also corresponds to that of a short vowel, rather than a diphthong
or long vowel.
Table 6.2: Nanti vowel inventory
front central back
high i, i: (ii)
>
Wi (u)
mid e, e: (ee) o,o: (oo)
low a, a: (aa)
Vowel inventories show quite a degree of variation within the Kampan fam-
ily. However Nanti, Matsigenka, and Nomatsigenga form a group of varieties with
nearly identical nine-vowel inventories.15 Asháninka, certain dialects of Ashéninka,
and Kakinte each have eight-vowel inventories, lacking the light diphthong /
>
Wi/ or
its counterparts. Finally, certain Ashéninka dialects exhibit a six-vowel inventory,
further lacking the mid front vowels /e/ and /e:/.
Table 6.3 provides a quintuplet of verb roots demonstrating the contrastive
nature of the vowel qualities given in Table 6.2. Table 6.4 provides minimal pairs
illustrating the contrastive nature of vowel length in Nanti. Nanti permits the
following diphthongs: /ae/, /ai/, /ei/, /oi/, and /ui/.
Table 6.3: Nanti vowel quality contrasts
front central back
high tig ‘defecate’ tug ‘snuff tobacco snuff’
mid oteg ‘hand feed’ tog ‘fell tree’
low tag ‘burn’
15The minor variation between the vowel inventories of these languages involves the cognates
to Nanti u In Nomatsigenga and the Upper Urubamba dialect of Matsigenka, the corresponding
segment appears to be a simple high central vowel /1/.
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Table 6.4: Nanti vowel length contrasts
quality short vowel long vowel
a saro ‘grand-daughter (n. root)’ saaro ‘Datura sp. (plant)’
i ki ‘seed (classifier)’ kii ‘stick (classifier)’
e morek ‘give off light (v. root)’ poreek ‘burst into flames’ (v. root)
o og ‘put, place (v. root)’ oog ‘consume, eat (v. root)’
6.2.2 Phonological processes
The rich allophony of Nanti consonants, evident in Table 6.1, is in large part due
to three contrast processes: one that affects all stops and nasals (palatalization), a
second one which only affects velar stops (alveolarization), and a third one which
affects alveolar fricatives and affricates. I also describe a number of other important
phonological processes in Nanti including sibilant contrast, vowel nasalization, and
/h/-elision.
The distinction between lexical and postlexical phonology plays an important
role in understanding the differences among the various processes that alter sylla-
ble structure. Lexical phonological processes are characterized by the facts that
they can be conditioned by morphosyntactic environments, are structure preserving
(i.e. map phonemes to phonemes), may suffer lexically-specified exceptions, and are
not affected by speaking rate or style. Postlexical phonological processes are char-
acterized by the facts that they are not affected by morphosyntactic environments,
apply without lexical execeptions, are not necessarily structure preserving, and are
affected by speaking rate and style (Ito and Mester, 2003; Kiparsky, 1982).
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6.2.2.1 Palatalization
The process of palatalization affects all stops and nasals in Nanti, in the following
non-local environment:
(6.4) C → Cj / e(C)[+high]
The [+high] segment given in the rule in (6.4) may be any one of the following
segments: the high front vowel /i/, any palatalized consonant, or the alveo-palatal
affricate /
>
tS/. In the first case, a consonant must intervene between the /e/ and /i/
to satisfy constraints on syllable structure.
Example (6.5a) illustrates this palatalization process with the palatalization
of the voiceless bilabial stop when the [+high] segment is instantiated as the high
front vowel; while (6.5b) shows that the stop in question is not palatalized outside
of the environment specified by (6.4). An example of palatalization due to the
alveo-palatal affricate is given in (6.5c).
(6.5) a. peri [pjeRi] ‘give it to him (imperative)’
b. pena [pena] ‘give it to me (imperative)’
c. omechohitake [omje
>
tSoitakse] ‘it fruited (speaking of a plant)’
Since the palatalization process just described derives palatalized consonants
which can then trigger further palatalization, right-to-left palatal spreading occurs
under the right circumstances. One way to conceive of this process is to consider
/e/ to be transparent to palatalization, so that when a word contains adjacent /Ce/
sequences, as well as a palatalization-triggering [+ high] segment, palatalization
spreads from the [+high] segment, through the transparent intervening /e/s, to
consonants to its left. An example of such spreading is given in (6.6a). In this
example, /t/ palatalizes because of the following /eRi/ sequence, and then in turn,
/m/ palatalizes because of the following [etj] sequence. In (6.6c) we see an example
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of how replacing /e/ with /a/ blocks palatalization spread from [etj] to [m]. The
form exhibited in (6.6c), in which the final vowel of the word is not [+high], shows
no palatalization at all because there is no [+high] segment to trigger palatalization.
(6.6) a. ameteri [amjetjeRi] ‘She will get used to him.’
b. ametakeri [ametakjeRi] ‘She got used to him.’
c. ametena [ametena] ‘She will get used to me.’
Despite this widespread process of allophonic palatalization, there is nev-
ertheless a phonemic contrast between alveolar stops, the alveolar flap, and their
phonemic palatalized counterparts.16 Minimal pairs are hard to come by, however,
as the palatalized alveolar phonemes are relatively rare. Minimal or near-minimal
pairs are given in (6.7) through (6.9).
(6.7) /t/ vs. /ty/
a. teta ‘no, as I was saying’
b. tetya ‘not yet’
(6.8) /n/ vs. /ny/
a. okanomahiri ‘She is reproving him.’
b. okanyota ‘it is like (verb)’
(6.9) /r/ vs. /ry/
a. iryo ‘third person masculine pronoun’
b. iro ‘third person non-masculine pronoun’
16Certain Matsigenka dialects in addition exhibit a phonemic contrast between velar stops and
palatalized velar stops, but Nanti does not.
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6.2.2.2 Alveolarization
Velar stops undergo an additional height assimilation process, distinct from the
palatalization described in the previous section. I refer to this additional process as
alveolarization. In alveolarization, the blade of the tongue raises before the high and
mid front vowels in the articulation of velar stops, resulting in a secondary alveolar,
alveo-palatal, or palatal fricative articulation, upon release of the stop. The blade
raises towards the alveolar ridge before /e/, and varyingly, towards the alveo-palatal
or palatal regions before /i/. Examples of alveolarization of /k/ and /g/ are given
in (6.10b&c) and (6.11b&c), respectively. Examples of environments which do not
trigger alveolarization are given in (6.10a) and (6.11a) for comparative purposes.
The height to which the blade of the tongue is raised, and the resulting
frication with which the secondary articulation is realized, varies with speaking
style and rate, and between individuals, indicating that it is a postlexical process.
The process appears to be most regular and consistent with teens and children,
suggesting a diachronic process of regularization of this allophonic process.
(6.10) a. underlying form: /ipokahi/ ‘he came back’
surface form: [ipokãi]












b. underlying form: /pogiro/ ‘you are putting it down’
surface form: [po>gZiRo] ∼ [po>gýiRo]
c. underlying form: /pogero/ ‘you will put it down’
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surface form: [po>gzeRo]
It should be noted that this alveolarization process plays a significant role in
Matsigenka perceptions of linguistic difference between the Matsigenka and Nanti
languages. In particular, Matsigenkas perceive the [
>





kC] allophones of /k/ as /
>
tS/.17 As might be expected, Nantis face much
less difficulty in correctly distinguishing the corresponding segments in Matsigenka
speech (i.e. />ts/ vs. /k/ and /
>
tS/ vs. /k/), as doing so merely requires Nantis to
correctly perceive a subset of allophones already associated with these segments in
their own language. In fact, a number of young men who communicate with Matsi-
genkas on a relatively regular basis (principally via two-way radio), have developed
a Nanti-Matsigenka koine, which involves the suppression of much of the allophony
that differentiates Nanti from Matsigenka.
6.2.2.3 Sibilant contrast
A third contrast process neutralizes /s/ and /S/ before the high front vowel /i/, as
illustrated by the root final vowel in (6.12b). The non-gradient realization of this
process and its structure-preserving nature indicate that this is a lexical phonological
process.













17In at least one case, this allophonic process is probably responsible for the reanalysis of the
phonemic representation of a lexical item: the word /tserepato/ [
>
tseRepato] ‘kingfisher’ (common
to several Kampan languages), has been reanalyzed as /kerepa/[
>
kserepa] in Nanti, suggesting that
the affinity that Matsigenkas perceive between [ks] and /
>
ts/ is also perceived, to a lesser degree, by
Nantis.








‘He is passing by.’
Note that despite the contrast process just described, Nanti exhibits a con-
trast between /s/ and /S/, as illustrated in (6.13):
(6.13) /s/ vs. /S/
a. isori ‘his calf’
b. ishorita ‘his hips’
6.2.2.4 Vowel nasalization and /h/-elision
Intervocalic /h/ triggers nasalization on the preceding vowel, an example of rhinoglot-
tophilia (Matisoff, 1975). Nasalization is especially prominent on syllabic nuclei
bearing primary stress. The degree of nasalization varies significantly across in-
dividuals, and depends on speaking style, with nasalization being more intense in
emphatic utterances. Vowel nasalization is clearly a postlexical phonological process.
Intervocalic /h/ can delete, under circumstances described in §6.2.3, with the
result that the only surface expression of /h/ is vowel nasalization, as in (6.14b).




6.2.3.1 Stress, metrical feet, and clipping
Stress assignment in Nanti depends on word class, with verbs exhibiting one stress
pattern, and nouns exhibiting another. Adjectives derived from verbs tend to pat-
tern with verbs, while underived adjectives tend to pattern with nouns. Adverbs
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also pattern with nouns. We first examine verbal stress, and then consider nominal
stress.
6.2.3.1.1 Verbal stress Nanti verbs exhibit a complex stress system based on
the iterative left-to-right parsing of prosodic words by disyllabic iambic feet, as
in (6.15a). Final syllables are extrametrical (marked, where relevant, by angle
brackets) and certain clitics (e.g. object person markers and modal clitics) are ‘ex-
traprosodic’, meaning that they do not form part of the prosodic word and are thus
ignored for purposes of foot formation and stress assignment, as in (6.15b). The
boundary between prosodic and extraprosodic material is marked by a right square
bracket. Extraprosodic morphemes do form part of the phonological word, how-
ever, as evidenced by their participation in segmental phonological processes such
as palatalization, as illustrated in (6.6a&b). Degenerate feet are not permitted, as
illustrated in (6.16a), except when the creation of a degenerate foot would permit
the main stress of the word to fall on syllable with an /a/-nucleus, as in (6.16b).19
This latter phenomenon is part of a broader sensitivity of stress assignment to the
sonority of syllabic nuclei. All other conditions being equal, stress is preferentially
assigned to syllables with greater nuclear sonority, according to the scale a > e,o,u
> i, even at the cost of disrupting iambicity. We can see an example of this phe-
nomenon in the first foot of the forms given in (6.17). When both syllabic nuclei
are of the same sonority (in fact, the same vowel), as in the first foot in (6.17a), we
see the default iambic pattern. However, when the nucleus of the leftmost syllable
of the the foot is of higher sonority than the rightmost one, as in the first foot in
(6.17b), where /o/ outranks /i/ on the sonority scale, stress falls on the syllable
with the higher-sonority nucleus, forming a trochaic foot and breaking the default
iambic pattern.
19An empirically equivalent analysis, followed by Crowhurst and Michael (2005), is to assume
that in these cases the extrametricality of the final syllable is trumped, and a disyllabic foot is
formed.
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(6.15) a. (i­pi)(Ri"ni)<ti> ‘he is sitting’
b. (i­pi)(Ri"ni)<ti>]me.Ra ‘where he would be sitting’
(6.16) a. (i"ha)t
>






kse>]na ‘he lived with me’
b. (­oti)(mi­mo)("ta)<
>
kse>]na ‘she lived with me’
In addition to sonority-based prominence, Nanti exhibits a four-level syllabic
weight scale, in which syllabic weight depends on both the moraic quantity of syllabic
nuclei and the presence of syllabic codas: (C)VVN > (C)VV > CVN > CV. The
forms in (6.18a-c) exemplify the various pair-wise weight differences that make up
the hierarchy by showing iambic-to-trochaic stress shifts.
(6.18) a. (C)VN > (C)V
("om.po)<
>
kse> ‘she will come’
b. (C)VV > (C)VN
("oo.>gzeN)ka<ni> ‘it is eaten’
c. CVVN > CVV
(o­sa)("raan.tai)ga<
>
kse> ‘they (non-masc) tore it because’
The interaction of sonority-based prominence with the four-level syllabic
weight scale results in a 12-level prominence system for stress assignment. In the
assignment of primary and secondary stress, nuclear sonority interacts in a complex
manner with syllabic weight, presence of syllabic codas, avoidance of stress clash,
and the basic rightmost primary stress. The reader is referred to Crowhurst and
Michael (2005) for details.
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6.2.3.1.2 Nominal stress The nominal stress pattern in Nanti is considerably
simpler than the verbal one. With the exception of forms that exhibit lexicalized
stress, which I discuss below, Nanti nouns are parsed left-to-right by disyllabic
iambic feet, as evident in (6.19a-d). The final syllable of each noun is extrametrical,
and in contrast with verbs, no degenerate feet are permitted, as can be seen in
quadrisyllabic forms like (6.19c). Primary stress is rightmost, as evident in (6.19d).




c. (ak"a)pa<Ra> ‘bird sp.’
d. (pi­ja)(Ri"jen)<>tsi> ‘gourd sp.’
The major difference between nominal and verbal stress patterns is that
nominal stress is insensitive to vowel quality.20 The insensitivity of nominal stress
to vowel quality is illustrated by the forms in (6.20) and (6.21). These forms exhibit
feet in which the leftmost element is of a higher sonority class than the rightmost,
according to the sonority hierarchy relevant to verbal stress (a > e, o, u > i). While
in verbs this sonority class inequality triggers a shift to a trochaic foot type, it has
no effect on the nominal stress pattern.
(6.20) a. (pa"Ro)<to> ‘balsa tree’ (a 6> o)
b. (ka"Bje)<ti> ‘ant sp.’ (a 6> e)
c. (pa"ku)pa<ku> ‘crab sp.’ (a 6> u)
d. (a"ni)ga<
>
kSi> ‘heart’ (a 6> i)
(6.21) a. (
>
tSo"bi)bi<ni> ‘sandpiper sp.’ (o 6> i)
20Nominal stress may also be insensitive to vowel quantity and the presence of codas, but long
vowels and coda are sufficiently rare in nouns that it is not possible at this time to draw any









kSi<ti> ‘swallow sp.’ (u 6> i)
Nanti nouns also exhibit widespread lexical stress, which is at the very least
rare among verbs, if it exists at all. One of the major sources of lexical stress in
Nanti is the lexicalization of the Proto-Kampa nominal gender classification system
that is still partially productive in other Kampan languages (e.g. Nomatsigenga,
Shaver, 1996). The traces of this system in Nanti are two gender classfier suffixes, -
ri ‘masculine’ and -ro ‘non-masculine’, which are now lexicalized as part of the noun.
The considerable majority of Nanti animal species names, and many plant species
names, bear these no-longer-productive gender classifiers. Although the correlation
between grammatical gender and the presence of the appropriate gender classifier
is no longer perfect, it remains quite consistent, as can be seen in the examples
given in (6.22) and (6.23). Significantly, these Proto-Kampa gender classifiers are
homophonous with Nanti’s third person masculine and non-masculine object clitics,
and like them, behave as if they are extraprodic. Although these suffixes are now
lexicalized, the stress pattern of most nouns reflects the extraprosodicity of the these
suffixes. This behavior is most evident in trisyllabic forms, as in (6.22) and (6.23),
since the exametricality of the final non-extraprosodic syllable forces word-initial
stess. As one would expect, quadrisyllabic forms, as in (6.24), do not generally
exhibit word-initial stress, since a full disyllabic foot can be formed.
(6.22) a. ("
>
tSo)<Be>]Ro ‘large cockroach sp.’ (non-masc.)
b. ("mo)<>tso>]Ro ‘tadpole’ (non-masc.)
c. ("o)<se>]Ro ‘crab sp.’ (non-masc.)
(6.23) a. ("no)<Sa>]Ri ‘tayra (mammal sp.)’ (masc.)




Wi)<mj e>]Ri ‘small bird (general term)’ (masc.)
(6.24) a. (kje"Si)<ta>]Ro ‘beetle sp.’ (non-masc.)
b. (
>
kSi"pa)<go>]Ri ‘fish sp.’ (masc.)
c. (ma"na)<ta>]Ro ‘palm sp.’ (non-masc.)
6.2.3.1.3 Clipping For the purposes of the present work, the principal signifi-
cance of the Nanti prosodic system lies in the fact that in fast speech, and in certain
discourse genres, speakers frequently omit unfooted syllables, a process I refer to as
clipping. Consider, for example, the monomorphemic form tahena ‘come! (imper-
ative)’; in (6.25a) I provide the full underlying form, annotated with its metrical
structure. The underlying form may surface in one of two ways: as the ‘full’ surface
form given in (6.25b), or as the clipped form in (6.25c), where which the extramet-
rical, and hence unfooted, syllable na has been elided.
(6.25) a. ("ta.he)<na> ‘Come! (imperative)’
b. [tãena]
c. [tãhe]
In the transcripts of interactions that I present in this work, I indicate clip-
ping in the first line of the transcript by placing a caret at the point at which the
clipping takes place, as in (6.26a). If it is possible to reliably recover the clipped
and inaudible material, I place the material following the caret, as in (6.26b).
(6.26) a. tahe^ ‘Come!’
b. tahe^na ‘Come!’
In the particular case of the form given in (6.26a), which surfaces as [tãhe],
deduction of the clipped segments is straightforward. The only other form that
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could surface this way would be a clipped alternant of the imperative form of the
verb tah ‘punch’. In this case, discourse context easily distinguishes the correct full
form, allowing us to deduce the clipped segments.
In other cases, however, deducing clipped elements requires considerably
more careful work, based on knowledge of both Nanti phonology and Nanti dis-
course practices, as well as a fine understanding of the active topic of conversation.
Therefore, below I illustrate some of the issues involved in the more complicated
cases, using surface forms related to the labile verb root kamoso ‘check on, visit’ –
forms which are very frequently clipped in everyday Nanti discourse.
Let us begin by considering the surface form [noNkamoso], which one could
naively imagine being related to a large number of possible surface forms: nonkamosote
‘I will visit (imperfective)’, nonkamosotake ‘I will visit (perfective)’, nonkamosoteri
‘I will visit him (imperfective)’, nonkamosotakeri ‘I will visit him (perfective)’, etc.21
Even in this partial listing, however, we have winnowed the possibilities by using
our knowledge of Nanti morphology and phonology. For example, all the suggested
full forms exhibit the i-class irrealis suffix -e. We deduce the presence of this suffix
in the full form due to the presence of the irrealis prefix n- (see, for example 6.27b).
Similarly, none of the candidates include much additional morphology following the
root, such as derivational morphology or facultative inflectional morphology (e.g. di-
rectionals). We eliminate forms that contain such additional morphology from the
candidate list because their presence would lengthen the word sufficiently to guar-
antee the creation of an additional foot to the right of the root kamoso, thereby
preventing the clipping from reaching the right edge of the root.
It is possible to narrow down our list of candidates, enumerated in (6.27),22
even further. The surface form in question may be derived from a full form via
21Note that the choice of the object person marker in these candidate forms is arbitrary, and
=ricould be replaced by any other object person marker.
22Note that the choice of object person marker in (6.27d&e) is arbitrary.
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the omission of the extrametrical final syllable (marked by angle brackets), as in
(6.27a); or of the penultimate extrametrical syllable and the final extraprosodic
syllable (where the right square bracket marks the right edge of the prosodic, but
not phonological, word), as in (6.27e). However, we can eliminate the forms in
(6.27c&d) as candidates, because of the creation of a degenerate final foot because
of the the sonority of /a/. The footing of this syllable would block its deletion,






















































‘I will visit him.’
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Phonological and morphological analysis can take us no further in this case,
leaving both (6.27a&d) as possible full forms. In some cases it is possible to choose
either the transitive or the intransitive form over the other, on the basis of discourse
context, but not always.
A slightly different deductive process is illustrated by the surface form [noNkamosotakje],
which exhibits palatalization of the penultimate voiceless velar stop. Recall from
§6.2.2 that consonants palatalize before /eC[+high]/ sequences, which indicates that
the segments deleted from the form in question must be segments that supply the
necessary environment for the palatalization; that is, the deleted segments must
be /C[+high]/. In the position in question, the only morphologically possible se-
quences that satisfy the phonological requirement just deduced are /ri/, the third
person masculine object marker, or /npi/, the second person object marker. At
that point, knowledge about communicative context is normally sufficient to recon-
struct the underlying unclipped form as either nonkamosotakeri ‘I will visit him’ or
nonkamosotakenpi ‘I will visit you’.
6.2.3.2 Syllable structure, epenthesis, and deletion
Constraints on syllable structure play an important role in Nanti phonology by
triggering widespread epenthesis and deletion of segments, largely in order to avoid
illicit syllabic structures resulting from the concatenation of verbal morphology.23
An accurate description of permitted syllable types requires that we distin-
guish tautomorphemic syllables from heteromorphemic ones, and that we distinguish
the evaluation of syllable structure at the level of lexical phonology from its evalua-
tion at the level of postlexical phonology. The following structural constraints hold
for all syllable types, and at all levels of the phonology:
i) complex onsets are not permitted;
23The concatenation of nominal morphology, minimal to begin with, never produces illicit syllabic
structures.
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ii) onsetless syllables are permitted only in word-initial position;
iii) the only permitted coda is the underspecified nasal n, and then only when
followed by a voiceless stop in the onset of the next syllable (hence, no word-
final nasals);
iv) diphthongs cannot be of rising sonority; and
v) triphthongs are not permitted.
Table 6.5: Nanti syllable types
σ-type lexical phonology postlexical phonology
tautomorphemic (C)V(N), (C)V:N, (C)V1V2(N) (C)V(N/S), (C)V:N, (C)V1V2(N)
heteromorphemic (C)V(N), (C)V:N (C)V(N), (C)V:N, (C)V1V2(N)
At the level of lexical phonology, then, both heteromorphemic vowel clusters
and heteromorphemic consonant clusters (with the exception of NC
˚
sequences) are
forbidden. When these illicit sequences of vowels or consonants arise from morpho-
logical concatenation, either epenthesis or deletion occurs, depending on the location
of the illicit sequence with respect to the verb root. In the post-root environment,
illicit consonant clusters are typically resolved by epenthesizing the segment /a/
between the two consonants, as in (6.28), where epenthetic /a/ appears between
the root kent ‘pierce’ and the frustrative suffix -be. Illicit sequences of vowels are
resolved by epenthesizing the segment /t/ between the two vowels, shown in the
same example, where epenthetic /t/ appears between the frustative suffix and the
perfective -ak .24 Note that throughout the present work, epenthetic segments are
indicated in the first line of interlinearized examples with a sans serif font (a, t).
24The first analysis of epenthesis for a Kampan language is found in Payne’s (1981) work on















‘I failed to hit it with an arrow.’
In pre-root environments, where there is much less morphology, a different
situation obtains. Because of the particular forms of Nanti verb prefixes and procli-
tics, no heteromorphemic consonant clusters ever arise from morphological concate-
nation in pre-root environments, though illicit heteromorphemic vowel sequences do.
These instances of vowel hiatus are not resolved by epenthesis, however, but rather
by deletion of the the first vowel in the heteromorphemic sequence, as in (6.29). In
this example, there are two instances of vowel deletion: i) the deletion of the vowel













‘You will stand it up (e.g. a housepost) (polite imperative).’
As would be expected of a lexical phonological process, we find a small num-
ber of exceptions to the processes just described. In particular, we find irregularities
in pre-root vowel hiatus resolution and post root consonant cluster resolution. In the
former case, we find that pre-root vowel hiatus resolution behaves irregularly when
the first person masculine subject marker i=, or the first person plural inclusive
subject marker a=, are the first member of an illicit vowel sequence. In the former
case, the person marker becomes a glide, instead of deleting, as in (6.30); whereas
in the latter case, the second vowel of the illicit sequence deletes, rather than the
first, as in (6.31). Note that these irregularities with respect to rules of vowel hiatus
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resolution serve to preserve the surface contrast between third person masculine,






















‘Let’s drink manioc beer!’
Irregularities in post-root consonant cluster resolution principally involve
clusters resulting from the suffixation of consonant-initial classifiers and incorpo-
rated nouns to particular consonant-final verb roots. In these cases, the consonant
cluster is resolved by deleting the final consonant of the root instead of epenthesizing
an /a/ between the root and the classifier or incorporated noun.
In (6.32), for example, we see that the final consonant of the root orog ‘dry’
deletes when the classifier -bi ‘1D.rigid.hollow’ is suffixed to it, and in (6.33), we see
that the final consonant of the root tot ‘cut’ deletes when the incorporated noun shi



























































‘She cut my hair.’
6.2.3.3 Bare stem vowel deletion
Nanti generally does not permit the initial vowel of a verb stem to align with the left
edge of a phonological word. In circumstances in which this impermissible alignment
would occur, the vowel deletes. In (6.34), for example, the subject person clitic –
which typically occurs at the left edge of the phonological word that contains the
verbal grammatical word, as shown in (6.34) – has been stripped off by the process





















Other processes that strip off the subject person clitic and trigger bare stem
vowel deletion include NP extraction in interrogative constructions, as in (6.35) and
subject focus constructions, as in (6.36).
































Note that bare stem vowel deletion sometimes creates illicit syllable struc-
tures that trigger further deletion, as in (6.35), where the deletion of the initial
vowel /a/ creates an illicit /nt/ complex onset. The onset is subsequently simplified
by deletion of the the nasal. Note also that the vowel deleted in (6.36) pertains to
the causative prefix, showing that the constraint against phonological word-initial
vowels applies to the verb stem, and not simply to the verb root.
There are two indications that bare stem vowel deletion is a lexical phono-
logical process. First, this process does not apply to certain irregular verbs, such as
the existential verbs ainyo (animate) and aityo (inanimate). Second, there is clear
evidence of lexical phonological rule ordering. In particular, it is clear that bare stem
vowel deletion applies before vowel hiatus resolution, which I have argued to be a
lexical phonological process. Consider, for example, the forms given in (6.37a) and
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(6.37b). In (6.37a), we see that the bare verb stem has undergone vowel deletion,
as expected. In (6.37b), however, the verb stem has not undergone vowel deletion,
despite it lacking any surface manifestation of the deleted subject person clitic o=.
The simplest explanation is that bare stem vowel deletion applies prior to vowel
hiatus resolution. Under this hypothesis, bare stem vowel deletion does not apply
to (6.37b) because the person subject marker has yet to be lost, meaning that at
this point in the derivation, the stem-initial vowel is not yet aligned with the left




















The final process we consider is a postlexical one, that of intervocalic /h/-deletion.
Under this process, any intervocalic /h/ may delete, providing that the resulting
syllable obeys the constraint against syllabic nuclei of increasing sonority. The role
of this constraint in governing /h/-deletion can be seen by comparing (6.38) and
(6.39). In (6.38), the sole intervocalic /h/ can delete, because the resulting syllable
is a diphthong of decreasing sonority. In (6.39), however, we find a more complicated
situation, where two intervocalic /h/ are found in a sequence of the form /nehahi/.
In this case, only the second /h/ deletes, since deletion of the first would result in
a diphthong of increasing sonority.
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(6.38) underlying form: pishaninkahegi
surface form: [piSaniNkãegZi]
(6.39) underlying form: nonehahiri
surface form: [nonehãiRi]
Note that /h/-deletion is a counter-feeding process that produces hetero-
morphemic vowel hiatus which would be illicit at the level of lexical phonology, and
which would be resolved by /t/-epenthesis at that level. However, since /h/-deletion
is a postlexical process, /t/-epenthesis does not apply.
As one would expect of a postlexical phonological process, /h/-deletion is
significantly affected by speaking rate and style. Otherwise deleted intervocalic /h/
frequently surfaces in emphatic speech, especially scolding talk (Beier, 2005), and
in karintaa poetry (Beier, 2003; Michael, 2004a).
6.3 Word classes and morphology
Nanti exhibits clearly distinguished open classes of verbs and nouns, and closed
classes of adjectives, adverbs, demonstratives, pronouns and clausal clitics. Each
class is easily differentiated by its morphological characteristics; consequently I pro-
vide discussion of the criteria used to distinguish among them in the morphological
description of each class. Two morphological systems, noun incorporation and the
multiple classifier system, share certain features and cross-cut word classes in such
a way that it is most convenient to treat them in their own section, following the
word class based discussion of morphology. I distribute my discussion of exocen-
tric morphology among word classes, treating particular processes with the word
class they ultimately derive. I defer discussion of focus pronouns, demonstrative
and topic pronouns, and reflexive pronouns to §6.4, since the description of these
pronoun classes benefits from an understanding of their syntactic functions.
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Nanti is a head-marking, polysynthetic language. The vast majority of gram-
matical relations are marked by verbal morphology, rather than by case markers or
adpositions. Similarly, the vast majority of interclausal relations are marked by
morphology on verbs in the main clause rather than by clause-linking morphology
or syntactic elements located in the dependent clause. As a consequence, descrip-
tions of Nanti verbal morphology and of Nanti syntax overlap at many points. And
indeed, most morphology in the language is verbal morphology. In order to avoid
redundancy in this sketch, I have chosen to postpone discussion of the aspects of
morphology most closely tied to grammatical relations and interclausal relations to
the following Syntax section (§6.4), though for the sake of completeness I do mention
the relevant morphology in this section.
In this section, I largely follow the established modern terminology employed
by Kampanists (e.g. Snell, 1998; Payne, 1981; Swift, 1988) for the morphemes and
grammatical categories that I discuss. However, my terminology diverges from this
tradition when Kampanist terminology is at odds with more widely used descrip-
tivist terminology (for example, I employ the terms ‘perfective’ and ‘imperfective’
for the categories that Kampanists have called ‘completive’ and ‘incompletive’); or
when wider Kampanist terminology is misleading with respect to Nanti (for exam-
ple, the terms ‘reflexive’ and ‘irreflexive’ for verb classes, which I refer to as the
‘a-class’ and ‘i-class’ verb classes, see below).
6.3.1 Verbal morphology and morphophonology
We can distinguish two basic groups of Nanti verbs: i) an open class of lexical verbs
that can combine freely with derivational and inflectional morphology, and takes
regular person-marking morphology; and ii) a small closed group of existential verbs
and copulas that exhibit highly restricted combinatorial possibilities with respect to
inflectional, derivational, and person-marking morphology. We begin by considering
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the morphology and morphophonology of the former open class of verbs, and then
turn to the latter closed class.
For expositional purposes I follow the traditional distinction between inflec-
tional and derivational morphology (Beard, 2001; Stump, 2001). This distinction
is useful for the bulk of Nanti verbal morphology, but there are some morphemes,
such as the directionals and the trajectal -ah, which show a mixture of inflectional
and derivational characteristics. Such instances will be discussed on a case-by-case
basis.
The basic structure of the Nanti verb is given in (6.40). Derivational af-
fixes are located closest to the verb root, with inflectional affixes and then verbal
person-marking clitics forming the next morphological layers. The vast majority of
verbal derivational morphology is suffixal, except for a small set of causative pre-
fixes (see §6.3.1.3.3). Similarly, inflectional morphology is exclusively suffixal, with
the exception of an irrealis reality status prefix (see §6.3.1.1.1). Subject and object
person-marking clitics form the final layer, outside inflectional morphology.
(6.40) subject=irrealis-causative-ROOT-derivation-inflection=object
6.3.1.1 Inflectional morphology
Inflectional morphology is located in two regions in the Nanti verb: i) to the left
of the verb root and any causative prefixes, in the sole case of the irrealis reality
status prefix, and ii) to the right of the verb and any derivational suffixes, for the
remainder of inflectional morphology. Suffixal inflectional morphology falls into
two major groups: obligatory inflection, which consists of aspect and reality status
marking; and a set of optional suffixes that includes directionals, locatives, number-
marking associated with verbal referents, and several verbal quantificational and




























































































































































































































































6.3.1.1.1 Reality status In Nanti, a binary reality status25 distinction between
realis and irrealis is obligatorily marked on verbs. In this section, I focus on the
morphology and morphophonology of this category, and its semantics in simple
clauses. Reality status marking is also complexly enmeshed with negation, modality,
and clause-linking; I describe the semantics and morphosyntax of this category in
greater detail in my discussions of those phenomena.
Realis and irrealis morphemes exhibit allomorphy based on the membership
of verb roots to which they attach in one of two arbitrary classes,26 which I refer to as
a-class verbs and i-class verbs, respectively. As shown in Table 6.7, the allomorphs
of the realis morpheme are exclusively suffixes, but the allomorphs of the irrealis
morpheme are circumfixes. For expositional convenience, I refer to the two parts of
the circumfix as the irrealis prefix and irrealis suffix, respectively.
Table 6.7: Nanti reality status morphology
verb class realis irrealis
a-class -a n- -enpa
i-class -i n- -e
Verb stems generally maintain the verb class of their roots, but certain deriva-
tional and quasi-derivational suffixes alter the class of the stem, such as the frustra-
tive suffix -be. The verb-class altering behavior of the latter suffix is illustrated in
25The realis/irrealis distinction is variously treated as a modal distinction (e.g. Palmer, 2001)
or a ‘status’ distinction (e.g. Van Valin and LaPolla, 1997). I follow Elliott (2000) in referring to
this category as reality status. There is some debate over the typological validity of reality status
(under whatever name) as a grammatical category. Arguments against the typological validity of the
realis/irrealis distinction are made by Bybee et al. (1994) and Bybee (1998), while arguments in its
favor are made by Mithun (1995) and Givón (1995), among others. The utility of the realis/irrealis
distinction in describing Nanti morphology and morphosyntax (Michael, 2007) leads me to side
with the latter scholars.
26Following Payne (1981), Kampanists generally refer to these two classes of verbs as reflexive
verbs and irreflexive verbs. In Nanti, however, the correlation between reflexivity and the two
verb classes is synchronically so weak that I have abandoned this terminology. In Nanti, semantic
reflexivity is expressed through reflexive pronouns (§6.4.2.1.3).
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(6.41), where in (6.41a) we see that in the absence of the frustrative, the verb root
neh ‘see’ is an i-class verb, but when derived with the frustrative -be, as in (6.41b),
the stem takes a-class reality status marking. If a stem includes multiple verb-class


























‘I saw him (but without the expected result).’
A small set of intransitive verb roots exhibits ‘mixed’ verb class behavior,
taking -a for realis and -e for irrealis, such as the verb shig ‘run’, seen in (6.42); and









































‘She will lie down.’
Allophony, phonotactics, and morphophonology play an important role in
the surface realization of reality status marking; I discuss this now, considering first
the irrealis prefix, and then the realis and irrealis suffixes. The irrealis prefix consists
solely of a nasal unspecified for place of articulation. As already discussed in §6.2.1.1,
this segment place-assimilates to the following voiceless stop, as in (6.44a&b). In
the absence of an available voiceless stop, Nanti handles this phonotactic constraint
in two ways: i) if a voiceless stop is available to the nasal by the metathesis of a
single segment, as in (6.44b), the nasal is retained;27 otherwise, the nasal is deleted,
as in (6.44c). Note that the irrealis prefix has an allophone r-, which appears before












































‘I will sew it.’















‘It (masc.) will bite you.’
Reality status suffixes are affected by a morphophonological process of vowel
lowering that neutralizes the contrast between i-class realis and irrealis suffixes in
certain morphological contexts. Following the perfective -ak, the i-class suffixes -i













It should be noted that I have encountered some variation in the mor-
phophonological neutralization of the reality status suffixes. For example, in the
speech of some speakers, -i and -e do not always neutralize to -e when followed by
the third person masculine enclitic =ri. Thus, the same basic form may surface, for
example, as either nonehakeri or nonehakiri ‘I saw him’, though the former is cer-
tainly the most common variant. Another occasional neutralization is the that of -i
and -a to -a before the first person object clitic =na, as exemplified in (6.47). I have










‘He gave (something to) me.’
28Note that in the case of verbs where the irrealis prefix n- also deletes, the neutralization in
question results in verbs which are formally ambiguous with regard to reality status.
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Turning to the semantics of reality status in Nanti, we find that realis marking
is associated with positive polarity indicative of non-future temporal reference, as
in (6.48); while irrealis marking is associated with future temporal reference, as in





































‘I did not hear.’
Beyond this basic semantic core, the marking of reality status in Nanti be-
comes complicated, especially in contexts where multiple semantically irrealis fea-
tures, such as negation and future temporal reference, combine in a single clause.
These issues are discussed in §6.4.
Nanti exhibits two endocentric verbal derivations that affect the marking of
reality status: the passive and the focal relativizer. The passive retains the basic
realis/irrealis contrast but marks it with portmanteau passive-realis and passive-
irrealis morphemes, -agani and -enkani, respectively (see §6.3.1.3.2). The focal
relativizer ankicha neutralizes the reality status distinction (see §6.4.3).
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6.3.1.1.2 Aspect, trajectals, and translocatives Aspect is the other obliga-
tory grammatical category of the Nanti verb. Nanti exhibits a basic perfective/imperfective
contrast, which is marked either by dedicated aspectual morphemes, or by port-
manteau morphemes with additional spatial meanings. The dedicated aspectual
morphemes and the spatial-aspectual portmanteaus form a single morphological
paradigm, whose members occupy the position immediately to the left of the reality
status morpheme position. It should be noted that Nanti also exhibits a pair of op-
tional directional morphemes, discussed below, which belong to a separate paradigm
and exhibit aspectual extensions to their basic directional senses.
6.3.1.1.2.1 Perfective and imperfective The dedicated aspectual mor-
phemes consist of the perfective -ak and the zero-marked imperfective, exemplified





















In negated clauses, the perfective/imperfective contrast is neutralized (or
unmarked), as in (6.52). The contrast is also neutralized in the passive voice (see
§6.3.1.3.2.1).












‘He did not come’ (perfective reading)/‘He is not coming’ (imperfective
reading)
b. *Tera inpokake.
Nanti exhibits four portmanteau morphemes with spatial and aspectual mean-
ings: two trajectals, morphemes that indicate trajectories of motion; and two transloca-
tives, morphemes that indicate realization of the predicate at a distal point. Both
trajectals additionally encode perfective aspect, while the two translocatives encode
the same spatial meaning, but contrast in aspect.
6.3.1.1.2.2 Regressive When affixed to motion verbs, the regressive

















‘He went back to his house.’
When the regressive -ah is suffixed to most non-motion verbs, the sense of
repetition of the action (or return to the state) indicated by the verb obtains, as in
(6.54) and (6.55). A number of verb roots also exhibit lexicalization of the regressive,























‘She went back to sleep.’
The regressive also gives rise to an abilitive modal reading in cases in which
the spatial and repetition readings are unfavored, as in (6.56) and (6.57). The
utterance in (6.56), for example, was produced by someone who was not able to



























‘It (a species of caterpillar) is capable of stinging.’
Finally, we note that the regressive alters the verb class of the stem to which
it attaches, producing an i-class stem, as in (6.58b). In this respect, the regres-
sive exhibits a property characteristic of derivational morphology, despite forming a






















6.3.1.1.2.3 Returnative The returnative trajectal -ut indicates motion
from some initial point to a distal point, and subsequently back to the initial point,
without a significant lapse of time between the outbound trajectory to the distal
point and the return trajectory back to the initial point. This spatial sense of the
returnative obtains both with motion verbs and with non-state non-motion verbs.
With motion verbs, the returnative simply indicates a ‘there and back’ trajectory.
With non-state non-motion verbs, the returnative indicates that the action was






















‘He gave it to him (going to him, giving it to him, then returning).’
When affixed to state verbs, the returnative -ut indicates that the state held
for a brief period of time, as in (6.61). This interpretation is compatible with a
distal realization interpretation, but does not require it.
29The affixation of the regressive to the root pig ‘return’ may strike the reader as redundant. In
this case, however, it expresses repetition of the act of returning to a particular place, with the
resulting implication that the place in question is one that the subject frequently or habitually












6.3.1.1.2.4 Perfective and imperfective translocatives The two transloca-
tives, -aki and -aa, have identical spatial meanings, indicating that the action ex-
pressed by the verb is realized at a point distal to the deictic center. The two

























‘I saw him over there.’
6.3.1.1.3 Grammatical number While the person and gender of verbal argu-
ments can be marked by means of the subject proclitics and object enclitics (see
§6.3.1.2.1), or by free focus pronouns (see §6.4.1), the grammatical number of ver-
bal arguments is generally specified by verbal suffixes, as person markers mostly do
not carry number information.30 There are two distinct verbal suffixes that mark
grammatical number: the plural -hig and the distributive -ge.
30The sole exception is the first person plural inclusive subject person marker a=.
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6.3.1.1.3.1 Plural The plural suffix -hig indicates that at least one of the
verb’s arguments is plural. For intransitives, then, the plural suffix indicates that
the subject is plural; while for transitive verbs, it indicates that either the subject,
the object, or both, are plural, as illustrated in (6.63). Only discursive context and














‘They visited him./He visited them./They visited them.’
6.3.1.1.3.2 Distributive The distributive suffix -ge, in addition to mark-
ing plurality of verbal arguments, indicates that the multiple referents in question
are separated into groups (of possibly one referent each) which occupy distinct points
in space, as in (6.64), and/or time, as in (6.65). The distributive exhibits an ‘erga-
tive’ pattern, in that the distributive sense applies to the subjects of intransitives,
as in (6.64) and (6.65) and the objects of transitives, as in (6.66). The distributive














































‘You let various groups of your companions pass by.’
6.3.1.1.4 Directionals Nanti exhibits two directional suffixes: the ablative, -
an, and the adlative -apah, which indicate the direction of motion of the subject of
intransitives (6.67a,b) and the object of transitives (6.68a,b). The ablative indicates
motion away from the deictic center, while the adlative indicates motion towards
the deictic center. A third suffix, -ab ‘semantic transitivizer’, forms a paradigm with
the two directionals, and judging by its cognates in the other Kampan languages
(Snell, 1998; Swift, 1988; Payne et al., 1982), was historically a directional used with
transitives to indicate motion of the subject towards the object of the verb. In Nanti,
however, it appears that the directional sense is no longer operative (or is at least
very rare), and the non-directional sense, discussed below, obtains synchronically.






















































‘He pulled it towards (him).’
All members of the paradigm also have non-directional meanings when used
with non-motion verbs. An inceptive sense obtains for the ablative -an, as in (6.69),


























‘I saw him upon arriving.’
As mentioned above, the suffix -ab has apparently lost all directional meaning
in Nanti, and only the non-directional sense remains. The suffix -ab increases the
semantic transitivity of the verb, in the sense of Hopper and Thompson (1980), and
is affixed only to transitive verbs, indicating increased affectedness of the object




























‘He watched you intently.’
Directionals in Nanti share attributes of both inflection and derivation. They
are entirely productive, exhibit compositionality, do not alter the basic meaning of
the root, and with the exception of -apah, do not alter the word class of the root,
making them inflection-like. However, they are completely optional, a characteristic
of derivational morphology. Nevertheless, the preponderance of inflectional charac-
teristics leads me to treat directionals as part of the Nanti inflectional system.
6.3.1.1.5 Intensity and quantification Nanti exhibits several optional verbal
suffixes that qualify the intensity with which, or degree to which, the action or state
expressed by the verb stem is realized.
6.3.1.1.5.1 Undesirable extremal The undesirable extremal suffix -
uma indicates that the action or state expressed by the verb to which it is affixed is
realized to an extreme degree. This suffix is typically employed in contexts where
the realization of an action or state, or in the case of negative polarity sentences, its
lack of realization, is undesirable, unsatisfactory, or unpleasant.
This suffix interacts with sentence polarity in an interesting way. In positive
polarity sentences such as (6.72a), the suffix indicates a high degree of realization of
the action or state expressed by the verb. In negative polarity sentences, however,
the suffix indicates that there was absolutely no realization of the action or state
expressed by the verb, as in (6.72b). That is, the negative polarity sentence is not
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simply the negation of the corresponding positive polarity sentence (which would
permit, for example, readings of moderate-intensity realizations of the verb).













‘I am really afraid of jaguars.’

















‘He did not come at all yesterday.’
6.3.1.1.5.2 Desirable extremal The suffix -asano indicates that the
action or state expressed by the verb is realized to a very high degree. This suffix
typically carries the connotation that the high degree of realization is desirable or
laudable, as in (6.73). The suffix is also employed in contexts where a given action
is implicitly compared to a less exemplary realization of the same action. Consider
(6.74), in which someone described the actions of a woman who had left her spouse



















‘He really knows our language.’


















‘And then she left for good.’
6.3.1.1.5.3 Durative The durative suffix -bage indicates that the action
or state expressed by the verb endured over a long period of time, as in (6.75); or
in the case of motion verbs, that the motion took place over a long distance, as in
(6.76). The suffix has been lexicalized in the case of at least one verb root, antabaget


























‘He crawled a long way.’
6.3.1.1.5.4 Malefactive repetitive The malefactive repetitive suffix -
na indicates that the action of the verb is repeated multiple times by the subject of
the verb to the detriment of some party. This party is typically not overtly expressed
















‘He (a mouse) gnawed it (a bag) repeatedly into a mass (of fibers) (to your
detriment).’
31In Matsigenka, the root ant has a more general meaning, ‘do’, which is probably the historical
basis of the lexicalized form antabaget. Synchronically in Nanti, the corresponding verb is og ‘do’.
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6.3.1.1.6 Some rare morphemes Finally, I wish to mention a number of mor-
phemes that are extremely rare in Nanti – but which are frequently used and produc-
tive in other Kampa languages, and in Matsigenka in particular. These morphemes
appear to be either in the later stages of being lost from Nanti, or in the initial
stages of being borrowed from Matsigenka. They are used very infrequently, and as
far as I have been able to determine, only with particular verb roots. Moreover, I
have only heard them used by particular individuals.32 These morphemes include
-apini ‘habitual’, as in (6.78); agarant ‘partitive’, -unte ‘extreme durative’, -apanaa
‘in passing’, and -apanu ‘in passing (round-trip trajectory)’ .

















‘Only her mother gives her manioc (during her month-long menarch
seclusion).’
6.3.1.2 Verbal clitics
Nanti exhibits three verbal clitic paradigms: two paradigms of pronominal clitics
that either express, or agree with, verbal arguments; and a third paradigm of modal
clitics.
6.3.1.2.1 Person marking clitics Nanti person marking clitics are pronomi-
nal elements that either express verbal arguments, or agree with overt referential
NPs or free pronouns. In this section, I restrict my attention to the morphological
and morphophonological properties of these clitics. I refer the reader to §6.4.1 for
discussion of the morphosyntactic status of these clitics.
32This perception, however, may simply be an artifact of my tending to speak to some individuals
more than others. The individuals in question have more contact with Matsigenkas than the
majority of people in the community, lending some support to the notion that these morphemes
are being borrowed.
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Nanti exhibits a nominative-accusative system of morphosyntactic alignment
(see §6.4.1), and correspondingly, person markers fall into subject and object sets.
Subject person markers are verbal proclitics and object person markers are verbal
enclitics; the two sets are given in Table 6.8.
For the most part, Nanti verbs take at most a single non-subject marker.
Verbs that are ditransitive (or tritransitive), either intrinsically or through deriva-
tion, only mark a single non-subject argument on the verb, the other arguments
either being expressed as free NPs or free pronouns, or left unexpressed. As dis-
cussed in greater detail in §6.4.1, the single exception to this generalization involves
constructions in which a third person ‘pragmatic oblique’ is added to the argument
structure of a transitive verb. In this case, the verb’s third person theme/patient
argument is expressed by the theme/patient object clitic =ni, and the pragmatic














‘She dipped it out for him (i.e. She served manioc beer to him.).’
Table 6.8: Nanti person-marking clitics
subject proclitic object enclitic
1st person no= =na
2nd person pi= =npi
3rd person masc. i= =ri, =ni
3rd person non-masc. o= =ro,=ni
1st person pl. inclusive a=
Some comments are in order regarding the clitic paradigms given in Table
6.8. Nanti person markers distinguish first, second, and third persons, as well as
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distinguishing masculine and non-masculine genders in the third person. Most Nanti
person markers exhibit ‘generalized number’ (Corbett, 2000), meaning that they
can refer to either singular or plural referents, with overt specification of plurality
optionally marked by the verbal suffix -hig (see §6.3.1.1.3). The sole person marker
that encodes plurality is the first person plural inclusive subject marker a=.
The Nanti subject and object clitic paradigms are for the most part symmet-
ric. The first person plural inclusive is exceptional in this regard, as only a subject
clitic occurs; the pronominal expression of the corresponding object requires the free
pronominal form haro (see §6.4.1 for a description of the free pronoun paradigm).
The surface realization of subject person markers is affected by constraints
that restrict heteromorphemic vowel hiatus, as discussed in §6.2.3. In the pre-root
environment that subject person markers occupy, heteromorphemic vowel hiatus
is resolved by vowel deletion or glide formation. The first person marker no=, the
second person marker pi=, and the third person non-masculine marker o= all exhibit
the regular process of pre-root vowel-hiatus resolution, which involves the deletion
of the leftmost vowel in a pair of adjacent heteromorphemic vowels. This process is
illustrated in (6.80) with the vowel-initial root arateh ‘wade’. Note that in the case
of the third person non-masculine marker o=, exemplified in (6.80c), vowel hiatus






































Instances of vowel hiatus involving the third person masculine subject marker
i= are generally resolved in a different manner: by glide formation, as in (6.81). Note
that vowel hiatus resolution by glide formation, rather than deletion, preserves the
contrast between masculine and non-masculine person markers before vowel-initial













There is one vowel hiatus context, however, in which i= deletes, instead of
undergoing glide formation: before /i/-initial verb roots, as in (6.82a). In this envi-
ronment, then, the contrast between the two third person subject person markers is
neutralized, as can be seen by comparing (6.82a) and (6.82b). The risk of confusion
posed by this potential ambiguity is quite low, however, as the only /i/-initial Nanti






















Note that for the person markers no=, pi=, and o=, vowel hiatus resolution
is not affected by the vowel quality of the initial segment of the following verb stem.
In cases where the initial vowel of the verb stem is identical to that of the person
marker, the latter vowel is still deleted, as evidenced by the absence of a resulting
long vowel, as in (6.83a), (6.83b), and (6.83c).

































‘It is mature (speaking of manioc).’
A third pattern of vowel hiatus resolution is exhibited in cases involving the
first person plural inclusive subject marker a=: deletion of the initial vowel of the










6.3.1.2.2 Modal clitics Nanti exhibits two modal clitics: the counter-suppositional
and deontic verbal enclitic =me, and the epistemic modal verbal enclitic =rika. Both
clitics are probably historically related to homophonous second position clausal cl-
itics that are involved in clause-linking constructions, described in §6.4.3. In their
clause-linking functions, =me expresses counterfactual conditionality, while =rika
expresses non-counterfactual conditionality.
6.3.1.2.2.1 Counter-suppositional and deontic clitic The verbal en-
clitic =me exhibits two distinct functions: i) to mark the proposition expressed by
an utterance as counter-suppositional, and ii) to indicate deontic modality. In the
first case, the clitic indicates that the proposition which the clause expresses contra-
dicts a supposition held by an interlocutor or another relevant discourse participant,
as in (6.85). The supposition in question may have been explicitly stated in prior





















‘I did not watch him (contrary to what you say/believe/insinuate).’
In a related function, the same morpheme is employed in rhetorical questions
in which the supposed response is negative, as in (6.86).


















‘Who in the world would clear the weeds?’ (projected response: nobody)
There is one clear case of lexicalization of this morpheme, involving the
form aryome. This lexicalized form includes the positive polarity element aryo,
which frequently serves to indicate truth value focus. The lexicalized form aryome,
however, is a counter-presuppositional negation, as illustrated in (6.87).























‘I say: I did not bring back fishhooks (contrary to what you might expect).’
In its role as a marker of deontic modality, =me serves to indicate that the
sentence bearing the clitic expresses either: i) a retrospectively desirable course
of action that was not carried out, or ii) a course of action demanded by moral
obligations. Used to express deontic illocutionary force, the clitic may be used either
retrospectively or to express temporally indefinite moral obligations. An example of
the former usage is given in (6.88), uttered by a man discussing a hunting trip that
he had to cut short because he failed to bring enough food to make it an overnight
trip. The latter usage is exemplified in (6.89), in which the Nanti community leader
is reproving another man for not being fully open about his intentions regarding
















‘I should have carried (i.e. brought) yuca.’




























‘A long time ago you should have said: I am building a small [house].’
In negative deontic contexts, the free form hame, formed on the irrealis nega-


















‘You shouldn’t slurp it up.’













‘She should not come alone.’
Note that the presence of the verbal enclitic =me triggers irrealis marking
on the verb, while the presence of hame triggers realis marking.
6.3.1.2.3 Epistemic modality The epistemic modal verbal enclitic =rika in-
dicates uncertainty on the part of the speaker regarding the truth of the proposition
expressed by the clause in which the =rika-bearing verb appears, as in (6.92). Note
that the use of epistemic modal clitics in discourse is quite rare, as Nanti speakers
tend to avoid articulating speculations.
33Note this example of irregular post-root consonant cluster resolution, in which the root-final














‘He has probably returned.’
The epistemic modal clitic has also been lexicalized in the form aryorika
‘perhaps’.
6.3.1.3 Verbal derivational morphology
Nanti exhibits a rich array of verbal derivational processes, especially valence-
increasing ones. The following discussion is organized into two main parts: i) endo-
centric (word-class preserving) morphology, with subsections on valence-preserving,
valence-decreasing and valence-increasing morphology; and ii) exocentric (word-class
changing) derivation. All derivational processes described in this section are pro-
ductive, except where specified otherwise.
6.3.1.3.1 Endocentric valence-preserving morphology
6.3.1.3.1.1 Reversative The reversative suffix -reh derives a stem that
indicates the reversal or undoing of an action or state, as in (6.93) and (6.94). This
suffix is only attested to appear with achievement and accomplishment verbs.34















‘It became un-snagged (speaking of snagged fishing net).’
34Achievement verbs are non-durative telic verbs such as ‘realize’, while accomplishment verbs

















‘It will come back out of the ground (referring to an insect).’
6.3.1.3.1.2 Frustrative The frustrative suffix -be indicates that the ac-
tion or state indicated by the verb stem was in some respect unsuccessful or inter-
rupted, or that the expected sequel to the action failed to obtain. With non-state
verbs, the action indicated by the verb root is understood to be completely realized,
but that the expected sequel failed to obtain, as in (6.95). With state verbs, the
frustrative indicates that the state expressed by the verb held for some period of
time, but then ceased, as in (6.96). The frustrative derives an a-class verb stem, as
was seen in (6.41).

















‘He unsuccessfully exhorted him, “clear your garden here.”’

























‘He had a spouse (but she left him), then he left.’35
The frustrative exhibits a mix of derivational and inflectional properties. The
frustrative occupies the position of a derivational morpheme (to the left of the aspect
35Note that the presence of the temporal succession marker inpo shows this example to be an in-
stance of a temporal succession construction and not a contrast construction (see §refsect:contrast).
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and reality status inflectional paradigms), alters the verb class of its host, and does
not form part of an obligatory morphological paradigm – all characteristics that
align it with derivation. However, the frustrative is productive and exhibits largely
compositional semantics, which aligns it with inflection.
6.3.1.3.2 Valency-decreasing morphology Nanti exhibits a relatively small
number of valency-decreasing morphemes, consisting of the realis and irrealis pas-
sives, -agani and -enkani, respectively, the characteristic morpheme -ant, and the
reciprocal -abakag.
6.3.1.3.2.1 Passive Nanti exhibits a pair of passive morphemes: the re-
alis passive -agani, and the irrealis passive -enkani. These passive reality status port-
manteaus have the morphosyntactic distribution of realis and irrealis morphemes,
as illustrated in (6.97) and (6.98). In (6.97) -agani is found in a positive polarity
sentence with non-future temporal reference, the morphosyntactic context for realis-
marking. In (6.98) -enkani is found in a negative polarity sentence with non-future




















‘He was not given (anything).’
As can be seen by comparing the person marking in (6.99a) and (6.99b&c),
passivization reduces the valence of the verb and makes the object of the active
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verb the subject of the passivized verb. Note that there is no means in Nanti for
































‘It is not shot.’
6.3.1.3.2.2 Characteristic The characteristic suffix -ant indicates that
the action expressed by the verb stem is habitual, or characteristic of the subject of
the verb.36 This suffix reduces the valence of transitives, as in (6.100), but does not










‘It stings (speaking of a species of caterpillar).’
(6.101) Imatsekanti.
36The sense of this derivation is perhaps best captured by the following colloquial English ex-










‘It jumps (speaking of a species of marmoset).’
Note that the characteristic morpheme is homophonous with the instrumen-
tal applicative -ant (§6.3.1.3.3.6). However, the two morphemes are clearly distinct,
as they have very different effects on argument structure; also, the instrumental
derives an a-class stem, while the characteristic suffix does not alter the verb class
of the root to which it is suffixed.
6.3.1.3.2.3 Reciprocal The reciprocal suffix -abakag alters the argu-
ment structure of the verb, indicating that the object of the verb acts on its subject,
in addition to the expected action of subject on object, as in (6.102). If, in the cor-
responding non-reciprocal construction, the subject and object would be marked by
person clitics of the same grammatical person, the reciprocal derives an intransitive
a-class verb from transitive verb stem, as in (6.103). The resulting stem indicates
that the action of the verb is carried out reciprocally by the multiple referents indi-
cated by the grammatical subject. It should be noted that reciprocal-derived verbs
appear to be obligatorily plural-marked, which is generally not the case in Nanti
for verbs with multiple referents. Note also that Nanti exhibits a distinct reflexive




























‘They spoke to each other.’
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6.3.1.3.3 Valence-increasing morphology Nanti exhibits extensive valence-
increasing verbal morphology, encompassing several causative and applicative af-
fixes. The headmarking morphology described in this section serves most of the
argument structure modifying and clause-linking functions in the language, as Nanti
exhibits almost no adpositions and few dependent clause-situated clause-linking de-
vices. In this section, I focus on the morphological properties of these valence-
increasing morphemes; the syntactic properties of these morphemes are described
in greater detail in §6.4.
Nanti causatives include a set of four causative prefixes, ogi-, o[+voice]-, otin-
, and omin-, and one causative suffix, -akag. The causative affixes are distinguished
by how they select for characteristics of the causee or how they add information
about the caused action or the participants in the caused event. Causativization
demotes the former subject (the causee) to object status and introduces a new
subject (the causer). The precise morphosyntactic realization of the causee and, in
the case of originally transitive or ditransitive verbs, the original object(s), is an
involved question dependent on the syntax of objects in Nanti; therefore I defer the
discussion of this topic to §6.4.1.
There are four applicative suffixes in Nanti, including the instrumental -ant,
the separative -apitsa, the presencial -imo, and the indirective -ako. Applicatives
are typically defined as derivational morphemes that promote a peripheral argument
to object status (Dixon and Aikhenvald, 2000; Payne, 1997).37 The valence of the
derived verb may increase, if originally intransitive, or may remain unaltered, if
originally transitive. In the latter case, the semantic role of the object changes,
37A mild difficulty arises in applying this standard definition of applicatives to Nanti, due to
the paucity of morphosyntactic means that Nanti exhibits for expressing peripheral arguments.
Indeed, for most applicative constructions in Nanti, there exists no analytic counterpart in which
the applied object is expressed as a peripheral argument (but see the discussion of the presencial
applicative for one exception). In such cases, the only analytic alternative for expressing the applied
object is periphrasis. As such, it is inaccurate, strictly speaking, to speak of Nanti applicatives as
promoting a peripheral argument to object status. Otherwise, however, Nanti applicatives behave
as expected.
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with the original object being demoted to peripheral argument status or eliminated
entirely. In Nanti, most applicative suffixes also function as clause-linking devices.
6.3.1.3.3.1 Agent causative The agent causative selects for verb roots
whose subjects are volitional agents (generally, humans and animals), as in (6.104a).
In all attested cases, the causer is a volitional agent that acts deliberately, and due
to the selectional properties of the causative, the causee is typically a volitional
agent, as in (6.104b). The causative is compatible both with readings in which a
volitional causee is coerced, as in (6.105), and ones in which the causer enables or
facilitates an action desired by the causee, as in (6.104b). Only context determines
the appropriate reading. One also encounters a few cases of lexicalization of the
causative, such as ogiha ‘follow’ (cf. ha ‘go’).38 Since the subject of the selected












































‘He made him leave.’
38Note that this lexicalized form supports Payne’s (2001) proposal that the causative -ogi origi-
nally had a sociative function in Proto-Kampa.
280
Note that although the agent causative selects for verbs with a volitional
agent subject, the causee of the derived verb may, in certain cases, be non-volitional.
Non-volitional causees principally occur with causativized motion verbs, as in (6.106).
The intransitive verb root pig ‘return’ in this example requires a volitional agent as
a subject, but the causativized form of the verb permits a non-volitional causee –




















‘I returned your axe.’
6.3.1.3.3.2 Non-agent causative The non-agent causative, o[+voice],
selects for verb roots whose subjects are not volitional agents. The form of the
non-agent causative given in the morphological segmentation is a representational
compromise aimed at providing a concatenative representation of this partially non-
concatenative morphological process. More accurately, this morphological process
consists of the substitution of the first consonant of a verb root with its voiced
counterpart, if the phoneme exists in the Nanti phonological inventory, and the
prefixation of the segment /o/. Thus the voicing alternation manifests only for /p/-
and /k/-initial roots, respectively (recall that no Nanti verbs are voiced stop initial),
as in (6.107) and (6.108).
In all attested cases, the causer is a volitional agent, but need not act de-
liberately, as in (6.109), which exemplifies an expression of someone accidentally
dropping something (doing so deliberately requires the root apakuh.) Note that
(6.107) and (6.108) show the non-activity causative with accomplishment and state
















































As a consequence of the types of verbs to which the non-agent causative
attaches, the causee associated with this causative is typically inanimate, although
potentially volitional agents may be causees in rare cases, as in the case of the stative
verb in (6.110b). The cited example also illustrates that the non-causative derives

























‘He got me drunk.’
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6.3.1.3.3.3 Destructive causative The destructive causative, otin-, dif-
fers from the agent and non-agent causatives in that it qualifies the nature of the
caused action, rather than selecting for verbs with certain kinds of subjects. This
destructive causative indicates that the action expressed by the verb is a form of
caused breaking of, or damage to, an inanimate object. Consequently, only non-
volitional causees are attested, although both volitional and non-volitional causers
are attested, as in (6.111) and (6.112), respectively. As one would expect, given
the intrinsically non-static nature of acts of breaking and damaging, the destructive















































‘The wind knocked it down.’
The semantic effect of the destructive causative is evident if we compare the
form yotinpatuhakero in (6.111a), with the form yobatuhakero in (6.111b), which is
derived with the non-causative but shares the same verb root, patuh ‘bisect’. In
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the former case, the derived stem is understood to express an action of breaking the
object in two, while in the latter case, the derived stem indicates the careful dividing
of the object into two pieces, as by cutting or chopping.
6.3.1.3.3.4 Malefactive causative The malefactive causative, omin-,
requires that both the causer and causee be volitional agents, and indicates that
the causee is adversely affected by the caused action, as in (6.113). The malefactive
causative is the sole non-productive causative in Nanti, and I have found attestations
with only a small number of verb roots. It also exhibits a few cases of significant
















6.3.1.3.3.5 Influential causative Nanti exhibits a single causative suf-
fix, -akag, the influential causative, exemplfied in (6.114). This causative requires
that both the causer and causee be volitional agents, and it indicates that the causer
brought the causee to carry out the caused action by indirect or distinctly non-
coercive means. Examples of ‘influential causation’ include bringing about some-
one’s departure by accompanying them, or requesting someone to carry out an
action. This suffix has been lexicalized in some cases, such as kemakag ‘criticize,
reprove’ (cf. kem ‘hear’).

















‘It’s not as if anyone induced him to abandon (his spouse).’
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6.3.1.3.3.6 Instrumental applicative The instrumental applicative, -
ant, indicates that the applied object was employed in realizing the action expressed
by the verb. This may involve a straightforward instrumental reading, as in (6.115)
and (6.116), or a trajectal or locative reading, as in (6.117). Note that the instru-
mental applicative derives an a-class stem, as in (6.115); the i-class inflection in
(6.117) is a result of the directional -apah, which derives i-class stems and, because
it appears to the right of the instrumental, trumps it. Note that this applicative







































‘We came along it (a path) towards (here).’39
6.3.1.3.3.7 Presencial applicative The presencial applicative suffix -
imo indicates that the action of the verb is realized in the presence of the applied
object, as in (6.118). The resulting construction may have a comitative sense, as
39The verbal object in this example was expressed through a gesture indicating the path in
question. In Nanti, objects need not be formally marked if recoverable from the interactional
context.
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in (6.119), or a goal sense, as in (6.120). I have only encountered this applicative












































‘She arrived where I was.’ (lit. ‘She arrived in my presence.’)40
6.3.1.3.3.8 Separative applicative The separative applicative suffix -
apitsa indicates that the action of the verb involves either: i) the separation of the
subject from the applied object, in the case of an originally intransitive verb, as in
(6.121b); or ii) the separation of a theme argument (which is optionally expressed)
from the applied indirect object by the subject, in the case of an originally transitive
verb, as in (6.122b). In both cases, there is a malefactive sense that the separation
of the subject from the applied object, or of the theme argument from the applied
object, runs counter to the wishes of the applied object.
40There is a subtle difference between this sentence and the related analytic, non-applicative
construction Opokake naroku. ‘She arrived at my place.’ In the applicative construction, there is a
sense that the woman arrived coincidentally at the location of the applied object; whereas in the
locative construction, the woman is understood to have arrived deliberately at a place where the





















































‘He stole (a knife) from him.’
6.3.1.3.3.9 Indirective applicative The indirective41 applicative -ako
indicates that the action of the verb affects the applied object in an indirect manner.
When the root in question expresses some type of physical manipulation or alteration
of form, the indirective generally indicates that the action of the verb root makes
the applied object accessible or available to the subject, but that the action is not
carried out on the applied object itself, or if it is, only on a peripheral part. In
(6.123), for example, the hetsiki fruit itself is not sliced, but rather its stalk is,
41Following Payne (1981), Kampanists generally refer to the cognate morphemes in other Kampa
languages as a ‘dative’. The appropriateness of this term lies in the fact that applicatives frequently
promote peripheral arguments to indirect object status, and the fact that dative case is typically
associated with indirect objects. However, in languages such as Nanti with multiple applicatives,
the appropriateness of this name for any single applicative wanes.
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which allows the fruit to be harvested. Similarly, in (6.124), it is the soil around the






























‘I dug it up.’
When employed with verbs of perception, cognition, or emotion, the indirec-
tive indicates that the subject perceives, thinks or has feelings about the applied
object, but that the applied object is not the direct object of the perception, thought,
or feeling expressed by the verb root. The stem in (6.125), for example, indicates
that the subject had heard about the object through someone else’s report, but did
not directly hear utterances or sounds produced by the object. Similarly, the stem
in (6.126) expresses that the subject is angry about a woman or girl – for example,




























‘He is angry about her.’
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As we expect from Nanti applicatives, the indirective derives a transitive stem
from an intransitive one, but does not alter the valence of a transitive stem. The verb
stems in (6.123) and (6.125), for example, are transitive, as are the corresponding
underived verb stems, while the stems in (6.124) and (6.126) are transitives derived
from intransitive roots. The latter example also shows that the indirective derives
an i-class stem, as the root kis ‘be angry’, is an a-class stem.
Perhaps more than any other applicative, the indirective has undergone lex-
icalization in several instances, such as kogako ‘ask about’ (cf. kog ‘search for’) and
nehako ‘be familiar with’ (cf. neh ‘see, know’). The morpheme -ako also serves a
role in constructions with peripheral arguments (see §6.4.1).
6.3.1.4 Exocentric morphology
6.3.1.4.1 Denominal reversative The denominal reversative -reh derives an
intransitive verb stem from a classifier or an inalienable noun. The resulting stem
indicates either i) the loss of that part by the relevant whole, as in (6.127), or a
break or structural failure at the part, as in (6.128); or ii) the breaking of a referent
with the shape given by the classifier, as in (6.129), or the breaking of something


















42This transitive verb stem has additionally undergone derivation with a causative, a very com-








































‘It broke off in a plank shape.’
6.3.1.5 Irregular verbs
Apart from the open class of lexical verbs, Nanti exhibits a small set of irregular
verbs, consisting of a trio of existential verbs, ainyo, aityo and mameri, and a
positive polarity class membership copula nti.
The affirmative existential verbs ainyo, used with animate subjects, and
aityo, used with inanimate subjects, are highly morphologically defective, as they
never take person markers, and generally take no inflectional morphology (but see
below). The affirmative existential verbs are also unusual in that they agree with
the animacy of their argument, otherwise a property characteristic of adjectives (see
§6.3.2.1 and §6.3.4 for further discussion of animacy agreement). However, the fact
that these verbs can take the frustrative verbal derivational suffix -be (discussed
below) supports the categorization of these elements as verbs.
43That is, the point at which the roots come together to form a clump below the principal stalk
or stem of a plant. Note that when the root ponkiti is used in relation to animate referents, it is
interpreted as ‘foot’.
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Existential verbs typically take an NP complement, as in (6.131), in which
case they predicate the existence of the NP. They may also take a clausal comple-
ment, however, as in (6.132) and (6.133), in which case they predicate the presence




















‘She is there cooking.’











‘There is manioc piled up on the ground.’
Although this process is uncommon, the affirmative existential verbs may be
derived with the frustrative derivation suffix -be, which enables the resulting stem
to take inflectional morphology, as in (6.134). Even when these existential verbs












The third existential verb is the negative existential mameri, exemplified in
(6.135), which takes no verbal inflectional, person marking, or derivational mor-
phology at all, but has the syntactic distributional properties of a verb. Specifically,






‘There isn’t any fish.’
The positive polarity class membership copula nti takes person marking, but
no inflectional or derivational morphology, as exemplified in (6.136). The person
marking paradigm for this verb is irregular in the first person singular (nanti), first









The regular third person non-masculine form of the verb, onti, has also been
grammaticalized in a quite different role: as a marker of contrastive predicate focus,
as in (6.137).





















‘He had a spouse, but he left personal name.’
44Omitted for reasons of privacy.
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Although it is not an irregular verb, the verb n merits mention at this point.
This is the verb used to express class membership in negated clauses, as in (6.138);
it serves the attributive copular function, as in (6.139); and it also serves as the
basic locative verb in Nanti, as in (6.140).











‘She is not male.’





























‘It is in my house.’
6.3.2 Nouns and nominal morphology
Nouns can be distinguished by their distinctive, if restricted, morphology and by
their role as a target for animacy and gender agreement. Nanti nominal morphology
is limited to two plural suffixes, a set of possessive affixes, and a single locative
suffix. Nanti does not exhibit nominal compounding, with the marginal exception
of noun-classifier forms, discussed in §6.3.7. Nanti exhibits only a single productive
nominalization process; apparently a number of productive nominalizations found
in the other Kampan languages have been lost in Nanti.
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6.3.2.1 Noun classes and agreement
Nanti exhibits two noun class parameters: a binary animacy parameter (animate
vs. inanimate) and a binary gender parameter (masculine vs. non-masculine). How-
ever, instead of the four noun classes one would expect from this combination of
parameters, we find only three classes, since masculine nouns are obligatorily ani-
mate. Non-masculine nouns may be either animate or inanimate.
6.3.2.1.1 Animacy Animacy surfaces morphologically as agreement, although
the particular lexemes that exhibit animacy agreement are generally irregular mem-
bers of the word classes to which they pertain. In addition to nouns, some adjec-
tives, numerals, and quantifiers, and the existential verbs exhibit animacy. Animacy
agreement is marked via an alternation between /n/ (animate) and /t/ (inanimate),
and in one case via an alternation between /ny/ and /ty/; these alternations are
underlined in the examples in this section. Animacy agreement is found in numerals
(e.g. piteni ‘two (animate)’, piteti ‘two (inanimate)’), in a small set of adjectives
(e.g. omarane ‘big (animate)’, omarate ‘big (inanimate)’), in some indefinite quan-
tifiers (e.g. tobaheni ‘many (animate)’, tobaheti ‘many’ (inanimate)), and in the
existential verbs (ainyo ‘there is (animate)’ and aityo ‘there is (inanimate)’).
Generally speaking, nouns in the animate class denote individuable enti-
ties (hence, not mass nouns) that are capable of independent motion, including all
animals and celestial bodies, except for stars. A notable exception to this gener-
alization is the grammatically animatte kogi plant, which produces a potent fish
poison.45 Perhaps in analogy with kogi, a number of chemically potent introduced
substances are also treated as animate, such as soap and gasoline.
45Note that kogi is closely associated with men, being planted, harvested, and used only by men.
Consequently, the animacy of the plant name may be a consequence of its grammatical gender,
which is in turn due to the plant’s close association with men.
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6.3.2.1.2 Gender Gender principally surfaces morphologically as agreement on
verbal person markers and nominal possessive markers (see §6.3.1.2.1 and below).
Demonstratives also agree in gender with their referents (e.g. yoka ‘this (mascu-
line)’, oka ‘this (non-masculine)’), as do a small number of adjectives (imarane
‘large (masculine)’, omarane ‘large (non-masculine)’); igatsantsani ‘naked (mascu-
line)’, ogatsantsani ‘naked (feminine)’). In addition, gender is overtly marked in
a semantically transparent manner on a small set of nouns that denote humans
(e.g. antarini ‘adult male’, antaroni ‘adult female’; sari ‘grandson’, saro ‘grand-
daughter’; ichere ‘male child’, ochere ‘female child’).
Comparison of the preceding forms shows two systems of gender agreement
or marking: one diachronically related to the proclitic/prefix system of subject
marking and possessor marking of verbs and nouns, respectively (i=/o=, i-/o-);
and another diachronically related to the system of verbal object clitics (=ri/=ro).
There is strong evidence that in Proto-Kampa, the latter system was productive,
and that at least nouns denoting animate referents were marked with the gender
classifying suffixes -ri (masculine) or -ro (non-masculine).46 The remains of this
gender classification system in Nanti are found in the large number of animal and
plant names that end in the syllables -ri (e.g. kemari ‘Tapir’, kapaheriri ‘Common
Opposum’, tsugeri ‘Squirrel Monkey’, matsirari ‘Spider Monkey’) or -ro (e.g. masero
‘toad’, shinpero ‘stink bug’, tsiregiro ‘burr plant’). Significantly, there is a substan-
tial correlation between the actual grammatical gender of these nouns in Nanti and
their predicted gender, based on the Proto-Kampa gender classifer hypothesis. Syn-
chronically, neither the prefixal and suffixal forms of gender marking on nouns and
adjectives remains productive.
Inanimate nouns are a subset of the non-masculine class, while animate nouns
46This hypothesis is bolstered by the existence of obviously cognate nominal gender classifiers
in other Arawak languages such as Apurinã, which exhibits the classifiers -ru ‘masculine’ and -ro
‘feminine’ (Facundes, 2000, pp. 226-232).
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overlap with both the masculine and non-masculine noun classes. Note that any
given human or animal individual, regardless of species, may be treated as grammat-
ically masculine or non-masculine, in accord with their biological sex. Species as a
whole, however, are assigned grammatical gender in a semantically non-transparent
manner. Gender assignment to species does follow some broad patterns, although
there are unpredictable exceptions. Generally speaking, mammals, birds, fish, rep-
tiles, and social insects (e.g. ants and caterpillars) are grammatically masculine,
while non-social insects (e.g. spiders and millipedes), amphibians, and aquatic rep-
tiles are non-masculine.
It should be noted that the gender expressed by person markers associ-
ated with otherwise grammatically masculine agreement targets may be optionally
switched to non-masculine in order to avoid referential ambiguity. Thus far I have
observed this process applied only to grammatically masculine non-human refer-
ents, where the shift to non-masculine gender signals coreference with a non-human
agreement target, as in (6.141). In this example, the person marking on the verb
oog ‘consume’, which has as its target the grammatically masculine shintori ‘White-
lipped Pecarry’, has been switched from masculine to non-masculine. Were the per-
son marker in question to show masculine gender, either the hunter or the pecarry
would be permissible antecedents, possibly leading to the incorrect interpretation
that the hunter wounded the pecarry while the hunter, rather than the pecarry, was
eating pochariki. The shift from masculine to non-masculine gender guarantees that
the subject person marker of the verb oog is interpreted as coreferential with the
non-human antecedent.
























‘He wounded a peccary (while it was) eating pochariki.’
6.3.2.1.3 Plural suffixes Nanti exhibits two nominal plural suffixes: the regu-
lar plural -hegi, illustrated in (6.142), and the collective plural -page, illustrated in
(6.143). Both are optional for semantically plural referents, the plurality of which
may instead be indicated by a numeral or an indefinite quantifier, or may simply be




































‘We became familiar with blankets.’
Note that the plural forms of topic pronouns (see §6.4.1) exhibit the nominal
plural suffix (e.g. irirohegi ‘they, them’, cf. iriro ‘he, him’), as do the plural forms
of possessive pronouns (e.g. nashihegi ‘ours (exclusive)’, cf. nashi ‘mine’).
6.3.2.1.4 Possession and possessive affixes Like the other Kampan lan-
guages, Nanti exhibits a system of alienable/inalienable possessive marking, al-
though the Nanti system appears to be eroding and shifting towards a morpho-
logically simpler inherent/non-inherent possession system. Inalienable nouns must
always appear with a possessive prefix as in (6.144) and (6.145), whereas alienable
47In terms of Corbett’s (2000) typology, nominal referents that are not explicitly plural-marked
display generalized number.
48When commercially manufactured blankets were first introduced in Montetoni, the Matsigenka
term pashikarontsi was adopted along with them.
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nouns need not, as in (6.146a). Inalienably possessed nouns may also be incorpo-
rated into verbs and adjectives, in which case their (external) possession is indicated
by verbal person markers (see §6.3.1.2.1). Alienable nouns appearing in possessive
constructions take the same possessive prefix as inalienable nouns, but are addi-
tionally facultatively marked with an alienable possession suffix, as in (6.146b). In
addition to the inalienable and alienable noun classes, Nanti exhibits unpossess-

























49The root koriti is an eroded form of the considerably rarer koritiri, itself a nominalization of
the verb koriti ‘sleep with another person’.
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Nouns that take inalienable possessive morphology include the expected in-
alienable semantic domains of body parts and kin terms, and a small number of
manufactured objects (e.g. houses and bows). Possession is marked by the nominal
possessive prefixes given in Table 6.9. The reader will note that these are almost
identical in form to the verbal subject person marker clitics.
Table 6.9: Nanti possessive prefixes
person general plural
1st no-, (na-) a- (incl.)
2nd pi-, (bi-)
3rd masc. i-, iri-
3rd non-masc. o-
Some comments on the paradigm of possessive prefixes are warranted. First,
we find only one plural possessive prefix: the first person plural inclusive a=. The
remaining prefixes are neutral with respect to the grammatical number of the posses-
sor, with the default (but defeasible) interpretation being singular. Overt expression
of plural number for a possessor in a possessive construction requires the use of a
free plural possessive pronoun, discussed below.
Possessive prefixes undergo the same processes of vowel hiatus resolution
experienced by verbal subject person markers (see §6.2.3) with a single exception.
When prefixed to vowel-initial nominal roots, the third person masculine prefix i-,
instead of undergoing glide formation like its verbal counterpart, alternates with its
allomorph ir- (e.g. irishinto ‘his daughter’, cf. ishinto50 ‘daughter’; irotsitite ‘his
dog’, cf. otsiti ‘dog’).
The first and second person prefixes exhibit the irregular allomorphs na- and
bi-. These allomorphs are rare and are found only with particular lexically-specified
50This inalienable root is one of a number of forms that have retained a root-initial /i/ that has
been lost in other Kampan languages.
299
inalienable roots (for example, na-neni ‘the space at my side’, bi-neni ‘the space
at your side’). Internal reconstruction shows that these two allomorphs correspond
to the historically prior form of both person markers and possessive prefixes in
Pre-Proto-Kampa.
As indicated above, the marking of alienable possession differs morpholog-
ically from inalienable possession by the addition of a set of nominal suffixes to
the possessive prefixes already discussed. These alienable possession suffixes include
-ne, -te, and -re.51 Their distribution is largely determined by prosodic factors:
disyllabic nominal roots take -ne (e.g. igusine ‘his guan’, cf. kusi ‘guan (Pipile guia-
nensis)’) and trisyllabic or larger roots take -te (e.g. ochaberite ‘her chicken’, cf.
chaberi ‘chicken’). Note that no Nanti nominal roots are monosyllabic. The suffix
-re appears on a small number of forms denoting manufactured objects. Alienable
nouns that take -re often show other irregular features, suggesting that the possessed
forms have undergone lexicalization (e.g. ichagore ‘his arrow’, cf. chakopi ‘arrow,
arrow cane’, from the no longer productive nominal root chako, ‘arrow’).
It merits mention that the alienable possession suffixes are often omitted in
casual conversation between Nantis, which may reflect a broader transition from
an inalienable/alienable system to an inherent/non-inherent system. A piece of
evidence consistent with this hypothesis is the loss in Nanti of a pan-Kampan process
that derives alienable nouns from inalienable ones. In other Kampan languages, one
can derive an alienable noun from an inalienable one with the suffix -tsi.52 This
process is no longer productive in Nanti, although one does encounter instances
of frozen forms displaying this suffix (e.g. pankotsi ‘house (alienable)’, cf. banko
‘house (inalienable root)’). Instead of the non-possessed marker -tsi, Nanti speakers
employ the first person plural inclusive possessive marker a-, which functions in this
51Cognates of these suffixes are found in widely scattered Arawak languages, and probably re-
construct to Proto-Arawak.
52Cognates of this suffix are found in widely scattered Arawak languages (Aikhenvald, 1999,
p.82).
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context as an impersonal possessor, as in (6.147). Context serves to distinguish the





‘a head/our (incl.) head’
b. *gitotsi
In this area, then, Nanti has replaced a derivational process based on a
morphological alienable/inalienable distinction with an inflectional one based on an
inherent/non-inherent system.
Finally, it should be noted that both inalienable and alienable nominal roots
exhibit a morphophonological alternation conditioned by the presence of a possessive
prefix. Specifically, the voiceless stops /p/ and /k/, when appearing in nominal
root-initial position, alternate with their voiced counterparts /b/ and /g/ when
following possessive prefixes, as illustrated by the following pairs: pagiro ‘mother-
in-law (vocative)’, obagirote ‘her mother-in-law’; kapashi ‘palm thatch’, igapashite
‘his palm thatch’.53
6.3.2.1.5 Possessive pronouns In addition to the possessive prefixes already
discussed, Nanti exhibits a set of possessive pronouns, listed in Table 6.10. These
pronouns may be used demonstratively, as in (6.148), or in constructions that express
contrastive possessor focus. Contrastive focus on a demonstrative possessive pro-
noun is expressed by combining the possessive pronoun with a topic/demonstrative
pronoun, as in (6.149). Contrastive focus on a possessor is marked by combining a
possessive pronoun with a possessive prefix, as in (6.150).
(6.148) Onti irashi.
53Note that the same phonological alternation surfaces in relation to the non-causative derivation
and noun incorporation.
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Table 6.10: Possessive pronouns
singular plural
1st nashi nashihegi (excl.), hashi (incl.)
2nd pashi pashihegi
3rd masc. irashi irashihegi











































‘It would be inappropriate for him to say, “it (a hunting territory) is mine,
you can’t go (there to hunt).”’



















‘I do not know his (a Matsigenka man’s) language.’
6.3.2.1.6 Locative The nominal locative suffix -ku is the sole means in Nanti
of adding a peripheral argument to a verb. The suffix provides little information
about the spatial relation between figure and ground other than proximity. The
interpretation of the locative depends on the semantics of the verb with which the
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peripheral argument is associated, and on world knowledge about the activities
described in the clause. The locative in (6.151), for example, can be interpreted
as expressing any of a number of spatial relations compatible with the relationship
of bathing to rivers. Similarly, the locative in (6.152) yields a goal interpretation,
rather than one compatible with a static spatial relationship, because the verb with






























‘He went to the house.’
6.3.2.1.7 Nominalization Nanti exhibits only one productive nominalization,
the deverbal nominalizer -rira. A number of productive nominalizations common
in the other Kampan languages have been lost in Nanti. The Matsigenka deverbal
nominalization -agantsi, for example, which has cognates in all other Kampan lan-
guages, is no longer productive in Nanti, and survives only in a few lexicalized forms
that show semantic drift (e.g. nihagantsi ‘argument, dispute’; cf. nih ‘speak’).
When a verb undergoes nominalization with -rira, it loses all verbal inflection
and subject person marking, as in (6.153). The resulting nominal is typically an
agentive nominal, although verbal morphology can derive other types of nominals,
















The deverbal nominalizer -rira has the same form as the relativizer =rira
(see §6.4.3). Only their syntactic distribution distinguishes them: the nominalizer
is a verbal suffix, while the relativizer is a second position clausal clitic. Note
that since it is common for the verb to be either the first or only element in a
clause, distinguishing deverbal nominalizations from headless relative clauses can
be challenging.
Note that a number of Nanti nouns exhibit the Proto-Kampa nominalizer
-ri, which is no longer productive in Nanti. Consider, for example, the inalienably
possessed nominal root koritiri ‘spouse’, which is derived from the verb kori ‘sleep
beside, snuggle’.
6.3.3 Demonstratives and determiners
Nanti exhibits a set of six elements that function both as ostensive demonstratives
and determiners. Some of these elements also surface as hesitation particles.
Used ostensively, Nanti demonstratives encode a three-way distinction that
combines proximal and distal relationships between referents, speakers, and ad-
dressees, as shown in Table 6.11. Nanti demonstratives also distinguish the gram-
matical gender of their referent. In their ostensive function, Nanti demonstratives
are typically accompanied by gestures that indicate a referent of relevance to the
ongoing interaction. Lip pointing, chin thrusts, and eye gaze are more common
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than finger pointing for nearby referents, while finger pointing is more common for
distant referents.
Table 6.11: Nanti demonstratives
non-masculine masculine ostensive function
onta yonta speaker and addressee proximal
oka yoka speaker proximal
oga yoga speaker distal
In their ostensive function, demonstratives may be used alone, as in (6.155),
or as a verbal argument, as in (6.156).

























‘I will not clear this (indicating patch of land).’
Nanti demonstratives also exhibit a contrastive focus form, consisting of repe-
tition of the demonstrative, with the contrast clitic =ri attached to the first instance
of the demonstrative. The contrastive focus form of the demonstrative oga ‘that’,
for example, is ogari oga ‘that.foc’.
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As previously indicated, Nanti demonstratives also function as determiners.
Elements referred to as ‘determiners’ typically encode two semantically distinguish-
able features: ‘specificity’ and ‘givenness’ (Lyons, 1999; Gundel et al., 1993). All
Nanti determiners indicate specificity, and each determiner encodes a different level
of givenness. Generally, demonstratives that serve to indicate giveness appear as
NP modifiers, although they may also appear alone.
‘Givenness’ is an attribute of a particular discourse referent at a particular
point in a given stretch of discourse, corresponding to the salience or identifiablity
of a particular discourse referent prior to a specific mention (Gundel et al., 1993).
Three levels of givenness are relevant to the use of Nanti demonstratives; these are,
going from least given to most given: ‘uniquely identifiable’, ‘familiar’, and ‘active’.54
Determiners always precede the NPs they modify. ‘Uniquely identifiable’ referents
are specific referents which can be identified on the basis of the NP and its descriptive
content, but which do not require the addressee to be familiar with the referent. In
Nanti, uniquely identifiable referents are indicated by the demonstratives oka and
yoka, as in (6.157) and (6.158).











‘I am working the clearing.’





























‘I, in contrast, the past dry season, the dry season, I went for a short time.’
54In Nanti, the two extremes of the givenness hierarchy, ‘type identifiable’ and ‘in focus’, are
expressed through bare NPs and pronominal elements, respectively.
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‘Familiar’ referents are both uniquely identifiable and already (presumed to
be) part of the interlocutor’s world knowledge, but have yet to be introduced into
discourse (or were introduced and then not referred to again for a considerable pe-
riod). Familiar referents are indicated by the demonstratives oga and yoga. The use
of yoga to introduce a familiar discourse participant is exemplified in the utterance
given in (6.159), which is drawn from a conversation in which Migero, the leader of
Montetoni, is recounting a recent conversation. He mentions an important piece of
news his interlocutor brought up, and then commented that his interlocutor learned
this news from a man named Gunaro. This is the first mention of Gunaro in this
conversation, and we can see in the example that he is introduced as a discourse
participant by means of a topic NP (see §6.4.1), in which the demonstrative yoga
modifies the personal name Gunaro.


















Finally, ‘active’ referents are familiar referents that have previously been
introduced into the discourse and which have been recently referred to. Active ref-
erents are indicated by the demonstratives onta and yonta. The use of these deter-
miners to indicate active discourse referents is exemplified in the strip of interaction
given in (6.160). In this segment, Christine Beier (C) and I (L) are talking with
Bikotoro (B) about when he took his two spouses, Eroba and Oroma, as spouses.
In line (6.160b) I introduce Oroma as a discourse referent, and in (6.160c), then
in (6.160d), when Bikotoro refers to Oroma, a now active discourse referent, he
employs the NP onta Oroma.














‘I took Eroba (as my spouse).’









‘Then Oroma, then Oroma?’











‘Then Oroma, first Eroba?’

















‘I first took Oroma (as my spouse).’
In (6.161), drawn from a different conversation between myself and Bikotoro
about Nanti land use, Bikotoro uses onta alone to refer to an activated discourse
referent, a hypothetical piece of land we are discussing to clarify some of the political
dimensions of Nanti land use. This referent is introduced in (6.161a), referred to
again in (6.161d), and when Bikotoro refers to this active referent again in (6.161e),
he uses the lone determiner onta.



























‘He says, fine, good, you work the clearing. Yeah.’






















‘tha-, now, tha-, now, us.’







































‘Then I will tell, I will say, “Indeed I am going to work it when the
weather clears up.”’





















‘I will work, I will clear it.’
Finally, it should be noted that Nanti hesitation particles stem from the
demonstratives yoga and oga. The hesitation particles are distinguishable from the
corresponding demonstratives by the reduction and centralization of their vowels,
and by word-final glottalization, surfacing as [dZ@g@P] and [@g@P], respectively. These
hesitation particles are mainly used when a speaker is executing a word search for a
noun, and the choice of hesitation particle normally corresponds to the grammatical
gender of noun in question.
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6.3.4 Adjectives
In Nanti, members of the adjective class are easy to distinguish morphologically
from members of the verb and noun word classes. With the exception of adverbs,
adjectives are the most morphologically inert word class in Nanti. Adjectives cannot
take any verbal inflectional morphology, such as reality status or aspect suffixes,
nor can they take any nominal inflectional morphology, such as plural or possessive
affixes. Adjectives are also excluded from nominal and verbal derivational processes,
with one exception: most adjectives may participate in noun incorporation and
classifier affixation, the former process one that applies to verbs, and the latter
process one that applies to both verbs and nouns.
Nanti adjectives fall into two morphological classes: i) a large set of adjec-
tives that are either synchronically derived from verbs, or, judging by their form,
were so derived historically; and ii) a small set of adjectives which show no sign of
having been derived from verbs. We begin by considering deverbal adjectives, which
demonstrate the greatest morphological regularity.
6.3.4.1 Deverbal adjectives
Deverbal adjectives outnumber the underived adjectives by a large margin, num-
bering in the hundreds. The majority of deverbal adjectives are derived from verb
roots using the suffix -ri. Verb roots that undergo this derivation are mainly intran-
sitive state verbs expressing stable physical properties such as taste (e.g. kachori
‘sour (adj.)’, cf. kacho ‘be sour (v.)’), mechanical properties (amatsoganpiri ‘blunt
(adj.)’, cf. amatsoganpi ‘be blunt(v.)’), and ones expressing stable visual appearance
properties (e.g. shamehari ‘longitudinally stripey (adj.)’, cf. shameha ‘have longi-
tudinal stripes (v.)’), including color terms (e.g. kutari ‘white (adj.)’, cf. kuta ‘be
white (v.)’). Some non-property state verbs also undergo this derivation (e.g. katsi
‘hurt (v. intr.)’ > katsiri ‘painful (adj.)’). More rarely, non-state verbs undergo
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adjectival derivation, in which case the resulting sense is unpredictable, yielding
either resultant state or propensity senses. Consider, for example, the resultative
sense of kipari ‘cooked (by being wrapped in leaves and placed in coals)’ and the
corresponding intransitive verb akipa ‘cook by wrapping in leaves and placing in
coals’. Similarly, the propensity adjective pohamari ‘flammable (said of firewood)’
derives from the verb pohama ‘catch on fire’. A small set of deverbal adjectives
are derived with other suffixes, including -ni,55 as in taabani ‘painful’, shabogaheni
‘warm’, and the suffix -aga, as in anihaga ‘alive’.
Deverbal adjectives are highly regular in their morphosyntactic properties,
unlike underived adjectives. None exhibit either animacy or gender agreement, and
as far as I have been able to determine, all participate in noun incorporation and
classifier affixation.
6.3.4.2 Underived adjectives
There are approximately 25 underived adjectives in Nanti, mainly restricted to the
semantic classes of value, dimension, quantification, and number. Unlike their dever-
bal counterparts, underived adjectives exhibit considerable morphological irregular-
ities, including unpredictable manifestation of agreement, and participation in noun
incorporation and classifier affixation processes. For example, although some under-
ived dimension adjectives exhibit animacy agreement (e.g. omarane/omarate ‘large
(animate/inanimate)’ and otyomihani/otyomihati ‘small (animate/inanimate)’), most
do not (e.g. kurayu ‘tall’, shabiti ‘short’; sharotsantsa ‘long’, kakicho ‘short’). Quan-
tifiers and numerals, on the other hand, generally show animacy agreement (e.g. to-
baheni/tobaheti ‘many(animate/inanimate)’, maganiro/magatiro ‘all (animate/inanimate)’,
apiteni/apiteti ‘ the other (animate/inanimate)’), although we find some quantifiers
which never show animacy agreement (e.g. mahani ‘few’, pashini ‘another’). Nanti,
55The suffixes -ri and -ni do not appear to be either historically or synchronically related to each
other.
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like many Amazonian languages, exhibits a restricted numeral system, with only
two numeral terms. Nanti numerals agree with the animacy of the referent (overt or
not) that they quantify: paniro/patiro ‘one (animate/inanimate)’ and piteni/piteti
‘two (animate/inanimate)’. Another irregularity is manifested by a small number
of dimension adjectives that show gender agreement in addition to animacy agree-
ment (e.g. imarane/omarane ‘large (animate masculine/animate non-masculine)).
Gender agreement is otherwise very rare in Nanti adjectives.
Another domain of irregularity in underived Nanti adjectives is their partic-
ipation in noun incorporation and classifier affixation. Numerals as well as some
quantifiers and dimension adjectives participate in noun incorporation or classifier
affixation (e.g. kakichotsoha ‘short beaked’, cf. kakicho ‘short’ and tsoha ‘beak’),
but others simply cannot (e.g. kurayu ‘tall’). On the other hand, there are a small
number of adjectival roots which require a classifier (e.g. tsirepe ‘slender (adj. root)’,
tsirepetsa ‘slender (string-like)’; e.g. kara ‘broad (adj. root)’, karapokiri ‘wide (path)’
(see §6.3.7 for further discussion).
6.3.4.3 Patterns of adjective use
Implicit in the discussion of deverbal adjectives is the fact that many property
concepts may be expressed in Nanti either by verbs or by adjectives. Obviously,
morphosyntactic environments may force the choice of one construction type over
the other (for example, modification of an argument NP can only be achieved by
an adjective), but in simple attributional constructions, either construction type
is possible. For example, (6.162a) and (6.162b) are structurally distinct means of
expressing the same, or at least very similar, meanings.























Despite the truth-functional equivalence of these constructions, patterns emerge
in discourse that suggest that the two constructions serve different information struc-
tural functions. Positive polarity attributional sentences tend to employ the adjec-
tival construction, as in (6.163a), while negative polarity sentences tend to employ
the verbal construction, as in (6.163b). Nevertheless, this tendency is not absolute,
and one encounters examples like that in (6.163c).























‘It is not red.’











‘It is not red.’
Similarly, simple interrogatives in which a property concept is being ques-
tioned normally exhibit the adjectival form of the property concept. These facts
suggest that the adjective plus copula construction expresses contrastive focus on
the property concept, whereas the verbal expression of the same concept does not.
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6.3.5 Adverbs
Adverbs are distinctive among the Nanti word classes in showing no inflectional fea-
tures whatsoever, and in not participating in any productive inflectional or deriva-
tional processes (with the exception of one adverb, mentioned below). Adverbs also
form a small class of words in Nanti, since most adverbial concepts are expressed
either through verbal morphology or by semantically complex verbal roots.56
The majority of Nanti adverbs have temporal and/or spatial meanings, al-
though Nanti exhibits a number of other small semantic classes of adverbs, including
event quantification, degree and manner.
The basic set of temporal adverbs are as follows, including some lexicalized
collocations: ityasano pairani ‘a very long time ago’, pairani ‘a long time ago’,
karanki ‘a while ago’, chapi ‘ a few days ago’, maika chapi ‘yesterday’, inkahara
‘earlier in the same day’, maika inkahara ‘very recently earlier in the same day’,
maika ‘today, within a few hours, right now’, maikari maika ‘right now’, tahena
‘soon, within minutes or hours’, kamani onkuta ‘(early) tomorrow’, kamani ‘in the
next few days’.
Spatial adverbs include one set linked to the river-based system of spatial
orientation and another set linked to a radial system of orientation. The former set
includes intaati ‘opposite side of river’, pasotaatiro ‘same side of the river’, katonku
‘upriver’, kamatitya ‘downriver’. The radial system set includes choheni ‘near’,
chohesamachoheni ‘middlingly far’, and samani ‘far’. Nanti exhibits another pair
of spatial adverbs based on the concept of expected area or situationally relevant
area; the form ainyoni indicates a location within the relevant or expected area,
and typically can be interpreted as ‘very near’ the form parikoti indicates a location
outside the relevant or expected area, and typically can be interpreted as ‘very
56Compare, for example, the verb roots anu ‘walk’, shibanpiha ‘walk lengthwise along a narrow
surface’, shite ‘walk along a riverbank’, apeshi ‘walk in the rain’; or ha ‘go’, ken ‘go in a particular
direction’, tsa ‘go to a particular destination’, and onkuha ‘go on a particular trajectory, following
a major feature of the terrain’.
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far’. In both cases, however, these glosses are potentially misleading. In the case
of parikoti, for example, Nantis may use this term to refer to the land that I, the
author, come from, which accords with the sense of ‘very far’. However, Nantis also
use the term to refer to nearby locations, as when an eyedrop falls to the side of
the eye for which it was intended. The two uses share the sense of being outside a
relevant or expected area, the part of the world known to Nantis, in the first case,
and the eye in question, in the second.
Other spatial adverbs include sotsi ‘outside’, tsonpogi ‘inside’, and one asso-
ciated with trajectories of motion, okiro ‘directly, without stopping’.
Event quantification adverbs include aikiro ‘again’, and tobaheti ‘many times’.
The latter adverb also permits manner and degree interpretations depending on the
aspectual class of the verb; the event quantification interpretation obtains for telic
verbs.
Manner adverbs include shintsi ‘quickly’, chichanira ‘slowly, carefully’, and
tobaheti ‘frequently’; the manner interpretation of the latter verb is available for
telic verbs and activity verbs.
Degree adverbs include pairo ‘very, to a high degree’, tobaheti ‘frequently, a
lot’, choheni ‘slightly’ (note polysemy with choheni ‘near’), and pahentya ‘almost’;
the degree interpretation of tobaheti is available for state verbs only. The adverb














There are a very small number of adverbs that express adverbial qualities
related exclusively to humans; by far the two most common are chichata ‘of his/her
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own volition’, and kogapage ‘without expected/desirable attribute or outcome’. The
precise sense of the latter form depends crucially on the communicative context and
may yield senses as disparate as ‘thoughtlessly, without a good reason’ and ‘without
a spouse’.
6.3.6 Clausal clitics
Nanti exhibits two major sets of notionally-related clausal clitics, a set of discursive
stance clitics and a set of evidential clitics, and a lone temporal clitic =tya ‘yet,
still’.
6.3.6.1 Discursive stance clitics
Nanti exhibits a set of three second-position clausal clitics that serve to indicate the
stance of the speaker in relation to his or her own previous utterances, or in relation
to the utterances of his or her interlocutor. These clitics include =ta ‘congruent’,
=npa ‘incongruent’, and =ri ‘opposite’.
6.3.6.1.1 Congruent stance clitic The congruent stance clitic =ta indicates
that the proposition bearing the clitic is ‘congruent’ with a previous utterance. In
general, this means that the clause bearing the congruent stance clitic is construed
as being rhetorically supportive of a recent proposition.
In order to understand what ‘congruence’ means in this context, consider the
segment of interaction given in (6.165), in which Bikotoro and I are discussing the
collaborative labor involved in clearing his garden. In (6.165a), Bikotoro tells me
that all his friends and relatives helped clear his garden. I respond with a continuer in
(6.165b), and Bikotoro follows with the assertion in (6.165c) that ‘everyone’ worked
on the garden. This clause, which bears the congruent stance clitic, supports his
prior assertion in (6.165a).
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‘Yes. As I said, we all worked.’
The interactional sequence in (6.166) exemplifies a different type of rhetorical
congruence, in which the clause marked with the congruent stance clitic =ta is
construed as confirmatory evidence for, or a natural consequence of, a prior claim.
In this strip of interaction, the community leader, Migero, is commenting on a young
man who lived in a Matsigenka community for a few months before returning to a
Nanti community. In (6.166a) Migero asserts that the young man lost interest in
living there, and then follows this assertion with the =ta-marked clause in (6.166b),
in which he cites the young man’s departure as evidence of, or a natural sequel to,
his losing interest.

















‘Hei said, “Hej lost interest again.”’
































‘I assert, you see, that hej said, accordingly, “We are going to go back.”’
A related use of the congruent stance clitic is found in affirmative responses
to questions that seek to confirm a fact the questioner already believes to be true,
as in 6.167.































‘I did indeed give him (hetari).’
A third function of the congruent stance clitic is the explicit marking of inter-
utterance coreference, exemplified in (6.168). In (6.168a) the speaker establishes a
referent, and after his interlocutor responds with a continuer in (6.168b), he refers to
the same referent, using the focus pronoun iro. The congruent clitic =ta is attached
to the focus pronoun, indicating that there is an antecedent for the pronoun in the
previous utterance.
































‘Her, he took her (i.e. as his spouse).’
Apart from marking anaphoric relationships between NPs, the clitic =ta is
also frequently employed to emphasize an anaphoric relationship with an antecedent
proposition. This function is illustrated in the brief discourse segment in (6.169),
which consists of two adjacent sentences uttered by a single speaker, in which he
reports a previous conversation.























‘He said then, “He presumably gave him permission.”’



















‘He came because of that.’
In (6.169a), the speaker reports the utterance ipakerika peremiso ‘He pre-
sumably gave him permission’. In the next line (6.169b), the speaker continues the
speech report, saying Irota maika ipokantari aka ‘He came because of that’, where
the reason for the person’s coming is expressed by means of anaphoric reference
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to the immediately preceding proposition. This proposition anaphoric reference is
achieved by the element irota, which consists of the third person non-masculine
pronoun, to which the congruent stance clitic is suffixed.
6.3.6.1.2 Non-congruent stance clitic The non-congruent stance clitic =npa
indicates that the utterance bearing the clitic expresses a stance that either runs
counter to the desires or wishes expressed or presupposed by a preceding utterance,
or contradicts an argument being constructed in preceding discourse. In (6.170) we
see an example of the former function, where the non-congruent clitic is employed










‘You.’ (i.e. ‘You drink it, instead of handing it to me.’)
A similar use of the non-congruent clitic can be observed in (6.171), which
is drawn from a conversation between Migero, the leader of the community of Mon-
tetoni, and Ariponso, a man recently arrived from the a settlement on the Timṕıa
River. In this conversation Migero is counseling Ariponso on how he should behave,
were oil company personnel to visit the community and give him clothes to wear, and
specifically, that he should not reject them. Migero models what Ariponso should
not say, where the rejection of the offer of clothes is indicated by the non-congruent
clitic.
























‘Don’t say, “No, it is appropriate that I be naked.”
The strip of interaction given in (6.172) exemplifies the use of the non-
congruent clitic in marking a clause as expressing a rhetorical position opposed
to that of an interlocutor. In the example in question, a woman is trying to make
the case to Migero that when she left the downriver community of Marankehari to
visit Montetoni, she left in a socially appropriate manner, which involves appris-
ing socially prominent individuals of her intention to make an inter-village visit.
In (6.172a) the woman attempts to bolster her case by mentioning that Migero’s
mother saw her off. Migero, however, has many reasons to be suspicious about
this framing of her departure, and responds, in (6.172b), with a skeptical question
marked with the non-congruent clitic.

















‘Your mother watched me (go).’

















‘Hoha, did he watch you (go)?’
The word ironpa, formed on the third person non-masculine focus pronoun
iro, exhibits lexicalization of the non-congruent stance clitic. Ironpa is employed at
points in narratives in which a following action or event marks a sudden and stark
change in the narrative line, as in (6.173).
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‘If I were to clear land over there outside of our territory, I would quickly
return the next day.’
6.3.6.1.3 Polar contrast clitic The polar contrast clitic =ri indicates that the
utterance bearing the clitic should be construed as expressing a proposition that
includes a value for some relevant parameter that is the opposite of the value found
in some preceding expression. In this respect, it resembles the periphrastic English
expression on the other hand.



























‘You, on the other hand, ran away.’
The use of the polar contrast clitic for a parameter other than clausal polarity
is given in (6.175). The example is an excerpt from a conversation which I had with
two Nanti men, Bisarota and Tomashi, about a trip they made to the Pirihasanteni,
a small tributary of the Camisea. In (6.175a) I ask if the river was shallow at
the mouth, to which Bisarota responds in (6.175b) that it was not. Tomashi then
comments in (6.175c) that, on the other hand, the Pirihasanteni was shallow upriver,
employing the contrastive polarity clitic.
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Upriver, on the other hand (it was shallow).
6.3.6.2 Evidential clitics
Nanti exhibits three evidential clitics: the inferential second-position clitic ka, the
reportive proclitic ke, and the quotative proclitic ka. The reportive and quotative
can be considered to form a single paradigm, but the inferential does not occupy the
same position, which makes the Nanti evidential system an example of a scattered
evidential system (Aikhenvald, 2004).
6.3.6.2.1 Quotative The quotative ka is a clause-initial clitic, which is inflected
for the person of the utterer of the quotative-bearing clause, as in (6.176).



















‘He said, “No, I will live there.”’
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The quotative ka is transparently related to the verb root kant ‘say’,57 and
indeed, these evidentials were diachronically formed by taking the first disyllabic
foot of the corresponding inflected verbs.58
6.3.6.2.2 Reportive Like the quotative ka, the reportive ke is a clause-initial
clitic, inflected for person. In the case of the reportive, the person marking cor-
responds to the individual who heard the reportive-marked clause. The quotative
ke is transparently related to the verb root kem ‘hear’,59 and like the reportive,
was formed diachronically by taking the first disyllabic foot of the corresponding
inflected verbs.

















‘He wounded (that is, shot without killing) a tapir.’ (reportive)



















‘Yesterday hei said that hej has a brother.’ (reportive)
57The development of quotatives from ‘say’ verbs is well-established cross-linguistically (Aikhen-
vald, 2004, p.271-2)
58Lest a skeptic argue that these evidentials are nothing but inflected verbs which have had their
final syllables clipped in fast speech, it should be noted that these disyllabic evidentials uniformly
bear stress on their initial syllable (e.g. ı́ka). This is characteristic of disyllabic words in Nanti
(Crowhurst and Michael, 2005), but not of clipped words, which retain the stress pattern of the
full word. In the case of the inflected verbs corresponding to the evidentials in question, clipping
would result in stress on the final syllable of the evidential (e.g. *iká).
59The development of reportives from ‘hear’ verbs is apparently not as common as the develop-
ment of quotatives and reportives from ‘say’ verbs, but is attested in Shibacha Lisu (Sino-Tibetan;
China; Aikhenvald, 2004, p.274)
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6.3.6.2.3 Inferential The inferential =ka is a second-position clitic, as can be
seen by comparing the location of this element in (6.179) through (6.182). This his-
torical provenance of this morpheme is unclear. Several Kampan languages exhibit
a homophonous indefinite morpheme -ka, which also surfaces in Nanti indefinite
pronouns (§6.4.3.1.3). The indefinite -ka is likely cognate to the interrogative -ka,
attested in Ashéninka (Payne, 1981, p.28), as interrogatives are frequently derived
from indefinites (Haspelmath, 1997, pp 174-176).
The evidential literature does not, as far as I am aware, mention instances
of the development of inferentials from either interrogative or indefinite markers.
However, there are clear instances of evidentials developing from modal categories.
For example, Aikhenvald (2004, pp 278-279) discusses instances of declarative and
declarative-indicative mood markers in Shipibo and Tariana, respectively, devel-
oping into direct and visual evidentials. Similarly, Aikhenvald cites cases of the
development of non-direct evidentials from non-indicative modalities, as in the case
of the Estonian reportive, which has been analyzed as developing from a potential
mood marker (Metslang and Pajusalu, 2002, cited in Aikhenvald, 2004, p.277-278).
The notion that the Nanti inferential developed from a Proto-Kampan interroga-














‘He must live far away.’ (Inference based on interlocutor’s comment that he














‘He must be there sleeping.’ (Inference based on knowing the referent is at
home, but there being no sign of activity.)
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‘He must have gone to visit downriver.’
The following strip of interaction between the author and Teherina, during
a visit the latter made to my dwelling, renders relatively explicit the basis of the
inference expressed in the first line of the example.

































‘You hear them laughing.’
6.3.6.3 Temporal clitic
The temporal clitic =tya ‘yet, still’ is second position clitic, as is evident by com-






















‘It has not yet run out (re: manioc beer).’
6.3.7 Noun incorporation and classifier affixation
Nanti exhibits productive noun incorporation and classifier affixation. Noun incor-
poration and classifier affixation are clearly distinct morphosyntactic processes in
Nanti, but the two processes are interrelated and share several features, making a
combined discussion of the two phenomena economical. Because the two phenomena
cross-cut word classes, I have also separated the discussion of noun incorporation and
classifier affixation from the morphological descriptions of particular word classes.
6.3.7.1 Noun incorporation
In Nanti, nouns can incorporate into verbs, adjectives, and numerals, although the
processes differ somewhat among these classes. Only inalienably-possessed nominal
roots may incorporate, and moreover, the inalienably-possessed nouns that can in-
corporate are all part terms. By this I mean that the nouns in question are part
expressions in part-whole relationships – principally body part and plant part terms.
We do not find, for example, incorporation of inalienably-possessed manufactured
objects, such as bows.
6.3.7.1.1 Noun incorporation in verbs Nouns incorporate immediately fol-
lowing the verb root, prior to any derivational morphology, as in (6.185b). The
incorporation of an inalienable nominal root alters the argument structure of the
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verb through ‘possessor contrast’ (Perlmutter and Postal, 1983; Shibatani, 1994):
the notional possessor of the incorporated root comes to occupy the argument posi-
tion occupied by the possessum in the corresponding analytical expression.60 Thus,
the possessor of an inalienable noun filling the subject role in an analytical construc-
tion corresponds to the subject of the corresponding verb into which the alienable
nominal root has been incorporated. In such cases, the subject of the verb is in-
terpreted as the (external) possessor of the incorporated nominal root (Payne and
Barshi, 1999).
An example of the incorporation of a noun root negi ‘chest’ is given in
(6.185b), where the (external) possessor is indicated by the subject clitic no=. The
corresponding analytical construction is given in (6.185a).























‘My chest hurts (I am chest-hurting).’
Likewise, the possessor of an inalienable noun filling the object role in an
analytical expression corresponds to the object of the verb into which the posses-
sum has been incorporated. In such cases, the object of the latter construction is
interpreted as the (external) possessor of the incorporated nominal root.
(6.186) a. Nomapatakero igito.
60Part of the definition of productive noun incorporation requires that each instance of incorpo-
ration in a given language correspond to an equivalent analytic construction, in which the nominal






























‘I pulverized his head (I head-pulverized him).’
A systematic exception to the pattern of possessor contrast just described
occurs for transitive verbs which incorporate roots whose possessors are coreferential
with the subject of the verb. In this case, the verb becomes syntactically intransitive,
and no person marker appears in object position as the external possessor of the
incorporated root. Instead, the subject person marker indicates both the subject
of the verb and the external possessor of the the nominal root, as in (6.187a).
This behavior is consonant with the general behavior of reflexive and reciprocal
constructions in Nanti (see §§6.3.1.3.2.3 and 6.4.2.1.3). Note that referents are
necessarily disjunct in forms exhibiting possessor ascension with subject and object


























‘Hei crushed hisj hand.’
Noun incorporation in Nanti exhibits the ergative behavior typical of this
process: the subjects of intransitives and the objects of transitives incorporate;
oblique roots do not incorporate.
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Incorporated nouns exhibit a morphophonemic alternation conditioned by
the grammatical relation of their external possessor.61 The alternation in ques-
tion involves voiced and voiceless consonants in nominal root-initial position. This
alternation is restricted to nominal roots whose underlying forms are either /p/-
or /k/-initial, since these are the only two consonants with voiced counterparts.
Incorporated roots with external possessors in subject position exhibit voiceless ini-
tial consonants, as in (6.188a) and (6.189a), while incorporated roots with external




















































‘He took it (speaking of a tree trunk).’
61Alternatively, one could argue that the alternation is conditioned by the grammatical relation
of the inalienable noun, prior to incorporation.
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6.3.7.1.2 Noun incorporation in numerals and adjectives Inalienable nom-
inal roots may also incorporate into numerals, as in (6.190); other quantifiers, as in
(6.191); and adjectives, as in (6.192). In the cases of these word classes, the root

























‘yellow-elbowed’ (speaking of a species of crab)
The notional possessors of incorporated inalienable roots are not morphosyn-
tactically expressed; possessor ascension and external possessors are absent in these
cases of noun incorporation. Note that the phonological form of incorporated nouns
in numerals and adjectives corresponds to that of nouns incorporated into intransi-
tive verbs.
62It is plausible that noun incorporation previously involved suffixation, rather than infixation,
but that the previously productive morphology following the incorporated noun has been lexicalized.
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6.3.7.2 The multiple classifier system
Nanti exhibits a large set of classifiers which mainly classify referents in terms of
their shape and mechanical properties, such as rigidity and flexibility. These clas-
sifiers may affix to numeral, verbal, adjectival, and nominal stems, resulting in a
multiple classifier system (Aikhenvald, 2000). The affixation of the classifier ki∼gi
is illustrated with each of the possible stem types in (6.193).

































‘Job’s Tears (Coix lacryma-jobi) seed’
6.3.7.2.1 Verbal classifiers In most cases, classifiers categorize either the no-
tional subject of an intransitive verb, as in (6.194), or the notional object of a
transitive verb, as in (6.195), thereby displaying the same ergative behavior charac-

























‘I am throwing water on the fire.’
Unlike noun incorporation, however, classifier affixation extends to oblique
arguments, as in (6.196) and (6.197). In all such cases, the oblique argument in
question is of the morphologically unmarked ‘pragmatic oblique’ type described in
§6.4.1.



























‘He is beating the bat with an arrow.’
Verbal classifiers have a pragmatically mediated effect on the overt realization
of verbal arguments. A classifier may co-occur with the overt referential NP it
classifies, as well as with a coreferential person marker, as in (6.198). Similarly, a
classifier may co-occur with an overt referential NP, without a coreferential person
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marker, as in (6.196), or with only a person marker, as in (6.194). In other cases,
however, the classifier may be the only overt indication of a verbal argument, as in




































‘I tore (something flat and flexible).’
The omission of even a person marker (in object position) in (6.199) and
(6.200) is part of a broader pragmatic phenomenon in Nanti, in which speakers may
omit the overt realization of a referent, either as a referential NP or a pronominal
element, if they deem that their interlocutor is capable of recovering the referent
from either the discourse context or the broader interactional context. Classifiers are
one means by which information may be provided about a referent, permitting, in
some communicative contexts, the omission of either a corresponding person marker,
or a corresponding referential NP.
Classifiers are suffixed following any incorporated nouns, as in (6.201). It is
rare, however, for a verb to exhibit both noun incorporation and classifier suffixation,















‘I washed my hands with water.’
Affixed classifiers display a morphophonological alternation between unvoiced
classifier-initial stops and their voiced counterparts, much like the alternation de-
scribed for incorporated inalienable nouns (see above). Classifiers which categorize a
notional subject exhibit the unvoiced alternant, as in (6.202), while classifiers which



























‘I gathered it (a piece of arrow cane).’
6.3.7.2.2 Adjectival and numeral classifiers Classifiers appear infixed in
numerals, as in (6.204); other quantifiers, as in (6.205); and adjectives, as in (6.206)
and (6.207).
(6.204) pakiitiro
63Note the irregular post-root consonant cluster resolution, in which the root-final consonant /g/
































‘large (referring to a river in flood)’
In many instances in which classifiers are infixed in numerals or adjectives,
the referents which they classify are not overtly expressed, as in (6.208), although
they can be, as in (6.209).



























‘two hetari (fish species with very hard scales)’
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6.3.7.2.3 Nominal classifiers Classifiers also appear suffixed to alienable nouns,
as in (6.210). Like verbal, adjectival, and numeral classifier affixation, nominal clas-
sifier affixation is productive. Unlike the former types of classifier affixation, how-
ever, many nominal forms resulting from classifier affixation exhibit lexicalization.
Each of the forms given in (6.211) through (6.213), for example, are typically in-
terpreted as referring to the specific referent types given in the glosses, rather than
the referentially broader category predicted by the compositional semantics of the



























Classifiers generally attach to nouns that denote materials that can exhibit a
variety of forms, either through human manipulation, as in (6.214) and (6.215), or
natural differentiation, as in the case of plant parts. Note that the use of classifiers













6.3.7.2.4 Semantics and origins of Nanti classifiers From a semantic per-
spective, Nanti classifiers largely fall into two groups: a large group of classifiers that
categorize referents in terms of their geometrical and/or mechanical characteristics,
and smaller group which categorizes small sets of manufactured objects.
The former group distinguishes point-like (ki, 0D), stick-like (-kii, -tsa, 1D),
cylindrical (-pi, -tonki, -poha), sheet-like (-bant, 2D), circular (-pogu), spherical (-
hi), and amorphous geometries (-se), as well the following mechanical properties:
rigid solid (various), flexible solid (-tsa, -bant), powder (-pane), liquid (-ha), and
immaterial (-henka).
The classifiers of this group synchronically retain their semantic generality
and flexibility, as can be seen in their recent use to categorize electricity as a fluid,
as in (6.216), and in their use for discussing the operation of recording devices as

























‘It records your voice (lit. it immaterial-takes).’
Other Nanti classifiers are restricted to small sets of manufactured objects
and generally have not been extended to recently introduced objects. These clas-
sifiers include -poki/boki(h), which categorizes cooking fires and paths; -kita, which
categorizes woven mats and sieves; and pona/bona(h) which categorizes wrappers
made of leaves. The classifier meni, which categorizes blades, belongs to this group,
but unlike the others, has been extended to include some recently introduced metal
implements, such as spoons.
It appears that many classifiers, if not all, ultimately derive from the gram-
maticalization of inalienable nouns. Many Nanti classifiers are phonologically similar
– even identical – to inalienable nouns; this is especially the case with the geometri-
cal/mechanical classifiers. For example, -tonki, which categorizes slender but stubby
rigid cylindrical objects (like house nails) is identical to the inalienable root -tonki
‘bone’. Similarly, the classifier -kota, which categories rigid, flattish objects like
arrowheads, rock ledges, and wood planks, is identical to the inalienable root -kota
‘palm bark/wood’.
Other classifiers no longer have obvious synchronic counterparts among Nanti
inalienable nouns, but are clearly related to inalienable nouns in other Arawak lan-
guages, suggesting that these classifiers were formerly grammaticalized from inalien-
able nouns, which were subsequently replaced by new forms. One such example is
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the classifier -ki ‘0D.hard’, which reconstructs to Proto-Arawak *aki ‘seed’ (Payne,
1991, p.418).
It should also be noted that classifiers occupy the position in the verb im-
mediately following incorporated nouns, supporting the proposal of an intimate
relationship between classifiers and inalienable nouns.
6.4 Syntax
Headmarking languages such as Nanti present challenges to morphosyntactic de-
scription. Even issues as basic as what counts as a verbal argument (Jelinek, 1984;
Evans, 1999) and how to determine basic constituent order (Mithun, 2003) remain
issues of debate. In my description of Nanti syntax, I begin by addressing these two
issues, and then turn to a description of the syntax of simple sentences, followed by
a description of multi-clause constructions.
6.4.1 Argument realization, morphosyntactic alignment, and basic
constituent order
Verbal arguments can be realized in a variety of ways in Nanti, reflecting the effects
of both information structure and pragmatics. In this section, I describe the various
ways in which arguments can be expressed, the marking of grammatical relations
between verbs and their arguments, and issues of basic constituent order.
As I mentioned in the summary of Nanti verbal morphology, grammatical
relations between NPs and their associated verbs are overwhelmingly marked on the
verb, and not on the NPs themselves. In fact, overt dependent marking of grammat-
ical relations is limited to the NP suffix -ku, mentioned in §6.3.2.1.4, which appears
on oblique arguments and carries a very general locative meaning. Otherwise, where
grammatical relations between NPs and their associated verbs are not indicated by



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In everyday discourse, core verbal arguments are most commonly indicated by per-













Core arguments can also be expressed by free pronominal elements, which
are in contrastive distribution with person clitics. These free pronominal elements
include contrastive focus pronouns, exemplified in (6.219), ‘temporal’ pronouns










‘I (and not anyone else) own it.’
One of the verb’s core arguments may also be expressed by a referential NP,
such as the personal name in (6.220).













‘I saw Erobakin here.’
64Subscripts indicate grammatical relations and information structure status. Coreference be-
tween arguments and topics are indicated by indices. Square brackets are used where necessary to
delimit arguments.
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In addition to these options for expressing verbal arguments, a topic expres-
sion may optionally co-occur with any of them. This topic expression consists of a
topic pronoun, as in (6.221), or a referential NP, as in (6.222). Topic expressions are
located at clause peripheries, and either have discourse referent tracking functions,
or provide additional information about an argument in order to clarify reference.

















‘Him, we saw him.’



















‘He said, “They shot him, a person.”’
In the remainder of this section, I will clarify the communicative factors that
affect the morphosyntactic realization of core arguments and describe the principal
morphosyntactic properties of each of the main strategies by which core arguments
are expressed. For expositional purposes, it is useful to organize this discussion in
terms of the focus status of arguments.
6.4.1.1.1 Non-focused arguments: person clitics and referential NPs
Non-focused arguments can be expressed by either person clitics or referential NPs.
These elements typically exhibit nominative-accusative morphosyntactic alignment,
although Nanti exhibits traces of the fluid-S marking65 found in other Kampan lan-
65Fluid-S marking is a system by which the single argument of an intransitive verb may either be
marked like the subject of a transitive verb (SA) or the object of a transitive verb (SO), depending
on backgrounding and foregrounding needs in discourse.
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guages (Payne and Payne, 2005). In the case of person clitics, nominative-accusative
alignment is evident in the fact that the S of intransitive verbs and the A of transi-
tive verbs are both expressed by the same set of verbal proclitics, as can be seen by
comparing (6.223a) and (6.223b). The P of transitive verbs is marked by a distinct
paradigm of verbal enclitics, as evidenced by (6.223b). The full set of verbal subject























Fluid-S marking is rare in Nanti discourse, but the occasional instances of the
phenomenon typically appear in temporal succession clause-linking constructions,
and involve a small set of intransitive verbs (principally ha ‘go’, pok ‘come’, and
pig ‘return’) with first person arguments. In such constructions, the O-marked S
arguments are found on the main verb of the temporally posterior clause, as in
(6.224).

































‘If I were to clear land far away over there, I would promptly come back here
the following day.’
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Turning to non-focused referential NP arguments, we see that they occupy
either a preverbal position, in the case of referential NP subjects, as in (6.225); or a
postverbal position, in the case of referential NP objects, as in (6.226). Grammati-
cal relations are not morphologically marked on referential NP arguments, but the
position of these arguments – paralleling that of the person clitics – identifies their
grammatical relation to the verb. Referential NP arguments are in complementary
distribution with person clitics, and no free morphemes may intervene between a
























‘You will own the garden.’
Non-focused referential NP arguments are uncommon in everyday discourse,
and are principally used to introduce new discourse referents that are not projected
as being topical in subsequent utterances. The distribution of non-focused referential
NPs and person clitics suggests that Nanti basic constituent order is SVO. In the
corpus, however, there are no attested cases of transitive verbs where both arguments
are realized as phonologically free elements, i.e. referential NPs or focus pronouns.
When I have presented sentences to Nanti speakers with two phonologically free
arguments, they have had no difficulty interpreting them, but they do not produce
such sentences themselves.
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6.4.1.1.2 Focused arguments: focused pronouns and referential NPs
Nanti exhibits a preverbal focus position that may be filled by a focused pronoun,
such as the contrastive focus pronoun in (6.227b), or a referential NP, as in (6.228).
Focused elements can also be distinguished by the word-level stress they bear, in
addition to their position. As evident in (6.227b) and (6.228), focused elements
are in complementary distribution with person clitics, which are non-focused (see
above).66





































‘I am going to harvest your manioc.’
Unlike person clitics, focused pronouns do not morphologically distinguish
nominative and accusative forms, as can be appreciated by comparing the first per-
son subject focus pronoun in (6.227b) with its object counterpart in (6.229). Simi-
larly, the grammatical relations of focused referential NPs are not morphologically
marked. The grammatical relations of focused elements are instead indicated by a
‘gap strategy’: the person clitic whose grammatical relation corresponds to that of
66The gaps left by absent person markers are indicated with an underline.
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the focused element is omitted from the verbal complex. For example, in (6.229), we
can determine that the focus pronoun naro ‘I/me’ is an object because the transi-
tive verb nebi ‘make a request’ lacks an object person clitic. By the same argument,
in (6.228) we can identify that the focused referential NP piseka ‘your manioc’ is
an object. Similarly, we can determine that the focused pronoun in (6.227b) is a
subject by the corresponding absence of a subject person clitic on the verb.













‘She didn’t request (it) from me.’
Focused and non-focused referential NP subjects can be difficult to distin-
guish on the basis of surface syntactic criteria alone, as both argument types appear
between negation and the verb. However, the two argument types do differ syn-
tactically: free forms cannot intervene between a non-focused subject and the verb,
but they may intervene between a focused subject and the verb, as in (6.230). In
interaction, of course, prosodic cues serve to distinguish the two argument types,
and for the analyst, discourse context also aids in disambiguation.















‘He came here for her.’
6.4.1.2 Topic expressions
In this section, I describe the main communicative functions of topic expressions and
the morphosyntactic features that distinguish them from verbal arguments. Topic
expressions are pronominal or referential NP expressions that are not arguments
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themselves but instead provide additional information about a verbal argument that
aids in reference tracking, indicates ‘givenness’ (see §6.3.3), or clarifies reference.
Topic expressions are either referential NPs, as in (6.231); or topic pronouns, as in
(6.232). Topic pronouns form a distinct paradigm from focus pronouns, as can be
seen in Table 6.13.
Table 6.13: Nanti topic and focus pronouns
topic pronouns focus pronouns
person singular plural singular plural
1 naro narohegi naro
2 biro birohegi biro
3 masc. iriro irirohegi iryo
3 non-masc. iroro irorohegi iro
1 pl. incl. harohegi haro
Topic expressions are dislocated constituents found at either the left or the





























‘She, she put her in menarche seclusion.’ (lit. ‘She covered her over.’)
Topic expressions are employed in two main ways to aid in reference tracking.
The first is to indicate the givenness of a discourse referent, which normally involves
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the use of a determiner, as discussed in §6.3.3. In (6.233), the topic expression
yoga Losu Cabri is employed to introduce a new discourse referent, Losu Cabri, into
discourse.

















‘We visited him, that Losu Cabri.’
Topic pronouns also aid in reference by disambiguating pronominal reference.
In particular, the use of a topic pronoun indicates that the subject of a given clause
is the same as the topical subject of the preceding stretch of discourse. In (6.234),
for example, the topical subject is the third person masculine subject of the verb
kant ‘say’, in the first line. In that line, however, another third person masculine
referent, the subject of verb kent ‘shoot’ is mentioned. Consequently, the reference
of the third person masculine subject verb puga ‘respond in kind’, is ambiguous.
The use of the third person masculine topic pronoun iriro indicates that the subject
of this verb is coreferential with topical subject (i.e. the subject of the verb kant
‘say’ in the first line), rather than the subject of the immediately preceding verb,
kent ‘shoot’.

















‘Hei said, “Hej shoots (arrows).”’















‘Then hei, hei responded in kind to himj .’
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Referential NPs normally appear in topic expressions to clarify or narrow
reference. The use of topic expressions to clarify reference is clearest in instances
where both a topic expression and its associated coreferential verbal argument are
referential NPs, as in (6.235). In this example, the topic expression kapashi ‘palm
sp.’ clarifies the reference of the focused object oshi ‘leaf’, indicating that it is
specifically kapashi leaves that the subject of the sentence went to get.























‘He went to get leaves, kapashi (leaves).’
Topic expressions can be distinguished from verbal arguments because they
occupy a distinct syntactic position from verbal arguments, and because they are
optional, while verbal arguments are not. The distinct syntactic positions of topic
expressions and verbal arguments are clearest in clauses with (internal) negation.
Topic expressions occur to the left of negation, while arguments appear to the right,
as shown by (6.236a&b).















‘Migero didn’t shoot it.’













‘Migero didn’t shoot it.’
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The different syntactic distribution of topics and arguments is especially clear
when comparing sentences with third person topic and focus pronouns, which have
distinct forms. Comparing (6.237a) and (6.237b), for example, we see that the third
person masculine topic pronoun iriro appears to the left of negation, while the third
person masculine focus pronoun iryo appears to the right.















‘He didn’t shoot it.’













‘He didn’t shoot it.’
Note that it is perfectly permissible for a focus pronoun to exhibit a corefer-
ential topic, as in (6.238).













‘He shot it, Migero.’
The ungrammaticality of arguments to the left of negation and of topics to the
right of negation is demonstrated for referential NPs in (6.239a&b) and for pronouns
in (6.240a&b). Note also that sentences which lack an element in argument position
(focused or unfocused), are ungrammatical, as evident in (6.239a) and (6.240a).
(6.239) a. *MigeroS tera kentero.
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b. *Tera MigeroTOP inkentero.
(6.240) a. *IryoFOC,S tera kentero.
b. *Tera iriroTOP inkentero.
c. *IriroTOP tera kentero.
In summary, topic expressions are optional, whereas verbal arguments are
obligatory. Verbal arguments must either be expressed by person markers or unfo-
cused referential NPs, or by focused pronouns or referential NPs. Topic expressions
by themselves are insufficient to satisfy verbal argument structure, as evidenced by
the ungrammaticality of (6.239a) and (6.240c).
6.4.1.2.1 Identifying verbal arguments in Nanti In this section, I advance
the argument that person clitics, non-focused referential NPs, focused referential
NPs, and focused pronouns function as verbal arguments, but that topic expressions
do not.
When either referential NPs or free pronouns are the sole realizations of
morphological material associated with a given referent, as in (6.241a) and (6.241b),
it is uncontroversial to treat them as verbal arguments.

























The two analytically challenging cases are those in which: 1) a person clitic
is the sole morphosyntactic material associated with a referent, as in (6.242); or









































‘He, he shot it.’
In these cases, two analyses are possible: one in which the person clitic is
treated as a verbal argument, and the other in which it is treated as an ‘agreement’
marker that does not constitute an argument as such. On the latter analysis, it is
necessary to posit that the person clitic agrees with a non-overt or null argument in
order to account for cases in which no topic expression is present, as in (6.242).
The agreement analysis for person markers confronts two difficulties. First,
person markers need not agree in person with topic expressions. Consider (6.244),
for example, where the topic expression surari ‘man’ co-occurs with the first person
clitic no=. It is clear that in this example, the person clitic does not mark person
agreement with the topic; rather, the topic provides additional information about
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the argument expressed by the person clitic, which serves to clarify the reference of












‘Men, we can do agricultural work.’
Second, if we are willing to treat person clitics as agreement markers, we
are led, by the same reasoning, to the unpalatable conclusion that phonologically
free pronouns are agreement markers in constructions which exhibit a topic expres-
sion and a coreferential free pronominal element, as in (6.245). In this example,
the phonologically free subject focus pronoun iro is coreferential with the topic ex-
pression oga irento ‘her sister’. Free pronominal elements like iro are typically not
analyzed as agreement markers, but rather, as arguments. However, apart from it
being focused, iro is semantically indistinguishable from the person clitic o=, with
which it occurs in complementary distribution.



























‘Her sister, she, as I was saying, owns it, her manioc.’
A positive argument in favor of the argument status of Nanti person clitics
is that they form a paradigm with referential NPs, which are obviously verbal ar-
guments. The evidence for this claim is that person markers are in complementary
67Note that despite the absence of overt plural marking on the verb, it is clear from discursive
context that the speaker had plural referents in mind. Plural marking is optional in Nanti and is
only employed when necessary to disambiguate number (see §6.3.1.1.3).
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distribution with referential nouns, and that they occupy the same positions at the
margin of the verb, as shown in (6.246a&b).













‘I saw him here.’













‘I saw Erobakin here.’
In Michael (2004b), I argue that Nanti person markers should be treated as
phonological clitics, which form a phonological word with the verb due to minimum
word requirements. Nanti has a disyllabic minimum word requirement (Crowhurst
and Michael, 2005), while person markers are monosyllabic, and hence incapable
of being phonologically free. In order to meet the minimum word requirement,
person markers cliticize to the adjacent verb. Another property indicative of person
markers being clitics is that object markers do not form part of the prosodic word,
being ignored entirely in processes of foot formation (Crowhurst and Michael, 2005),
despite forming part of the phonological word, as evidenced by their participation
in triggering non-local palatalization (see §6.2.2).
6.4.1.3 Oblique and peripheral arguments
In Nanti, the addition of arguments to a clause is largely handled by applicative
derivational morphology, instead of by adpositions (see §6.3.1.3.3.6 for a description
of Nanti applicatives).68 The only oblique arguments in Nanti are ones marked with
68Nanti also exhibits a large number of transitive verb roots with very specific spatial meanings,
which obviates one of the major functions of adpositions in other languages – for example, anonkoreh
‘step over’, atakont ‘lay across’, shibanpiha ‘walk lengthwise along’.
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the locative suffix -ku (see §6.3.2), as exemplified in (6.247).















‘Long ago I lived in Marihentari.’
Apart from applicatives and the locative suffix, Nanti exhibits three construc-
tions through which a verb may acquire an additional argument: 1) the benefactive
alternation construction, 2) the bare peripheral construction, and 3) the bare loca-
tive construction. Each of these constructions is discussed in turn in the following
sections.
6.4.1.4 Benefactive alternation and indirective derivation
The benefactive alternation construction is characterized by an alternation in the
semantic role assigned to the non-subject argument (NSA) of a large number of
transitive verbs. Under the benefactive alternation, an NSA that is prototypically
interpreted as a theme or patient is instead interpreted as a beneficiary or recipient.
When the benefactive alternation takes place, the prototypical patient or theme
argument of the verb may optionally be overtly expressed as well, resulting in the
overall addition of an argument. Note that the benefactive alternation does not
involve any morphological alteration to the verb or any other formal alteration to
the clause.
The class of verbs which participate in the benefactive alternation construc-
tion is very large, and consists of transitive verbs whose NSA argument is proto-
typically inanimate. Some recent loans are included in this class, suggesting that
membership is productively determined by verbal semantics.
For verbs that undergo the benefactive alternation, the semantic role assigned
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to NSAs depends on its position in the speech act participant (SAP) hierarchy given
in (6.248).
(6.248) Nanti SAP hierarchy
first person, second person > third person
In the morphologically simplest realization of the benefactive alternation, the
NSA is interpreted as patient or theme if it is third person, as in (6.249a) and
(6.250a), but is interpreted as a beneficiary or recipient if it is either first or
second person, as in (6.249b) and (6.250b). Note that in the latter cases, the patient
or theme argument of the verb may be optionally expressed by either a referential
NP, as exemplified by the optional NP tsitsi ‘firewood’ in (6.249b), or by a focus
pronoun, as in (6.250b). It should be noted that the benefactive alternation may
be triggered by a phonologically free NSA, such as the form birohegi ‘you (pl.)’ in















































































‘He will bring (various items) to you.’
Patient NSAs typically alternate with beneficiaries, as in (6.249), and theme
NSAs typically alternate with recipients, as in (6.250); but there are cases where
the alternation does not fit this tendency, as in (6.252), in which a theme alternates
with a beneficiary, rather than the expected recipient.



















‘He hauled the boat for me.’ (Not: ‘He hauled the boat to me.’)
Thus far we have examined cases in which the two NSA referents straddle the
1,2 > 3 SAP divide. In these cases, only the beneficiary/recipient can be indicated
by a person clitic; if the patient or theme argument is to be overtly expressed, it
must be expressed by a referential NP, as in (6.249b) or (6.253), or a focus pronoun,
as in (6.250b).69
(6.253) Tsame pihokotagena mahenpa.
69Note that this is not surprising in Nanti: even when transitive verbs undergo valence-increasing
derivations, such as causativization or applicativization, only a single NSA can be expressed as a














‘Come on, please point out the mahenpa for me.’
If, however, both the beneficiary/recipient and the patient/theme arguments
in a benefactive alternation construction are third person, both may be marked by
person clitics. In this case, the patient/theme is expressed by the patient/theme
clitic =ni ∼ =ne, and the beneficiary/recipient is expressed by a person clitic from
the canonical paradigm, as in (6.254).













‘He carried it on his shoulder for him.’
Note that although it is typical for both the third person beneficiary/recipient
and the third person patient/theme to be overtly marked in benefactive alternation
constructions, they need not be. In (6.255), for example, the beneficiary is entirely
omitted, and is not realized as either a person clitic or a referential NP.





















‘Heri mother will cook heri manioc (for heri).’
Likewise, it is not obligatory that the patient/theme argument be realized
as person clitic; it may be realized solely as a referential NP, as in (6.256). The
patient/theme argument may even be entirely omitted, as in (6.257a) (compare
(6.257b)), although this is unusual.
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‘You brought him a knife.’











‘I will not give (it) to him.’











‘Give it to him!’
Note that even when a theme/patient argument is expressed with a person
clitic, a coreferential NP in the topic expression position may also appear, as in
(6.255).
Unfortunately, my corpus does not shed light on the benefactive alternation
in cases where a first or second person argument is a patient or theme and either a
first, second, or third person argument is the beneficiary.70
70It is not clear at this point if this empirical gap is incidental or systematic. It is plausible
that the gap is incidental, and arises due to the unusualness of this particular configuration of
person and semantic roles in discourse. However, it may be the case that the gap reflects SAP
hierarchy restrictions on the semantic roles of patient/theme and beneficiary/recipient in benefactive
alternation constructions. In interactional contexts in which one might expect utterances that would
fill this empirical gap, Nantis employ peripheral constructions to express the fact that an action
affecting a first/second person argument is being carried out on behalf of another party.
Examination of published material on the other Kampan languages shows that the descriptions
of the two other languages of the Southern branch, Matsigenka and Nomatsigenga, exhibit the same
gap in the description of the related construction in those languages – that is, the absence of first or
second person patients/themes with first, second, or third person beneficiaries (Snell, 1998; Shaver,
1996). However, these descriptions are both brief, and it is not clear whether the gap is incidental
or systematic in those languages either. Descriptions of languages of the Northern branch show
that both arguments are marked by person clitics in the benefactive alternation construction, and
that the assignment of semantic roles is always ambiguous (Payne, 1981; Swift, 1988). Thus, in
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The allomorphy of the patient/theme clitic is determined by the vowel quality
of the reality status clitic that immediately precedes it, with the =ni allomorph
following the -i realis suffix, as in (6.254), and the =ne allomorph following the -e
suffix, as in (6.257b).
All verbs that undergo the benefactive alternation are transitive verbs that
exhibit objects with either theme or patient semantic roles. I have not yet en-
countered any verbs of this type which cannot undergo the benefactive alternation,
suggesting that most, and perhaps all, verbs with the mentioned morphosyntactic
and semantic characteristics, participate in the benefactive alternation.
6.4.1.4.1 Benefactive alternations and the indirective voice The bene-
factive alternation results in the first and second person NSAs of a large number of
verbs being interpreted as beneficiaries or recipients. In order to force a patient or
theme interpretation for first and second person NSAs for this class of verbs, Nantis
employ the indirective derivational suffix -ako (see §6.3.1.3.3) to block the effect of















‘He carried me.’ Note: ‘He carried it for me.’
A summary of the patterns of morphosyntactic realization of NSAs for verbs
that participate in the benefactive alternation is given in Table 6.14.
these languages, if a given verb is marked with a first or second person NSA clitic and a third
person NSA clitic, either the first/second person argument or the third person argument may be
considered a patient/theme, with the remaining NSA treated as a beneficiary/recipient.
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Table 6.14: Morphosyntactic realization of non-subject arguments
beneficiary/recipient
patient/theme none 1,2 3
1,2 indirective voice ? ?
3 normal benefactive alt. -ne/ni -ri/ro
6.4.1.5 Bare instrumental constructions
The bare instrumental construction allows Nanti speakers to add an overt referential
instrumental NP argument to a large class of verbs, without requiring valency-
increasing morphology to license the presence of the NP. It should be noted that
otherwise, the instrumental applicative suffix -ant must be employed to add an












‘She cooked with it (a pot).’
The bare instrumental construction, however, permits the addition of a ref-



























‘I felled it (a tree) with an axe.’
The addition of a bare instrumental argument to a clause is restricted by two
factors. First, the prototypical event structure invoked by the verb must include an
instrument that the agent of the event employs in realizing the action denoted by
the verb. In (6.261), for example, the event of felling a tree protypically involves
some edged tool. Similarly, in (6.262), where the bare instrumental shibitsa ‘liana
species’ appears with the normally transitive verb oguso ‘tie up’, the act of tying
typically involves some cord-like object.















‘I tied it (a bundle of kapashi palm fronds) up with shibitsa.’
In most cases, verbs that permit bare instrumentals in Nanti are in accord
with expectations of speakers of Standard Average European languages regarding
events that require instruments. However, a small number of Nanti verbs treat
notionally locative arguments as instrumental arguments. The intransitive verb
pirini ‘sit’, for example, treats the object sat upon as an instrument, as evidenced
by the use of the instrumental applicative -ant in (6.263). Consequently, the verb














‘I sat on it (a chair).’
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‘I will not sit on the ground.’
The second restriction on the bare instrumental construction is that the
instrument argument must be readily recognizable as an instrument appropriate for
realizing the action denoted by the verb. In most instances this restriction requires
that the instrument argument be realized as a referential NP, as in (6.261), (6.262)
and (6.264). Note that this semantic restriction plays a crucial role in distinguishing
topics from bare instruments. If, for example, we replace the referential NP hacha
‘axe’ in (6.261) with enchato ‘tree’, as in (6.265), the interpretation of the NP














‘I felled it, a tree.’ (Not: ‘I felled it with a tree.’)
In general, then, bare instruments cannot be pronominal elements, as they
provide insufficient information regarding the argument to permit them to be inter-
preted as instruments. There are, however, two classes of exceptions to this general
principle. I discuss one class here; focus pronouns can serve as bare instrumentals if:
1) the focus pronoun bears the congruent clitic -ta, which serves to explicitly indicate
coreference with the argument of a previous clause, and 2) the antecedent is a ref-
erential NP that appears in the immediately preceding clause and is an appropriate
instrument; this is shown in (6.266).


































‘She will prepare the manioc beer mash with them.’
The second class of exceptions involves interrogative pronouns; I defer dis-
cussion of this topic to §6.4.2.2.
Finally, I wish to mention that verbal classifiers can be interpreted as cat-
egorizing non-overt instruments, effectively indexing an instrumental object in the
event structure associated with the verb. Classifiers are construed as categorizing
instruments when it is clear that the classifier does not categorize any of the verb’s














‘I washed my hands with water.’
Of course, classifiers may also categorize overt bare instruments, as in (6.268),
where the vessel classifier -ako categorizes the bare instrument kapirosanpi ‘bamboo
segment’.





















‘She cooked the hetari in a bamboo segment.’
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6.4.1.5.1 Bare locative constructions Nanti also exhibits a construction which
permits the addition of a locative argument to certain verbs, without requiring ver-
bal valence-increasing morphology or the use of the locative nominal suffix -ku.
The verbs that partipate in this construction are mainly verbs of motion, the most
common being ha ‘go’ and ken ‘head in a direction’. The bare locative NP must
be identifiable as denoting a location, with the result that most bare locatives are
proper place names, as in (6.269). NPs that do not clearly denote a location, such




























‘She went back to her father’s place.’
Note that in all attested cases, the bare locative indicates a goal or endpoint













‘He came from Kuriha.’
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6.4.1.5.2 Non-subject arguments of ditransitive verbs In the preceding
sections I have described the morphosyntax of argument realization for transitive
and intransitive verbs, and described certain constructions in which verbs may have
two non-subject non-oblique arguments. The purpose of this section is to focus on
verbs of the latter type and to clarify the morphosyntax of ditransitive verbs proper.
Properly delimiting the class of ditransitive verbs in Nanti is non-trivial, as
the language exhibits several classes of verbs which may express up to two non-
subject non-oblique arguments. These verbs include transitive verbs derived with
applicative or causative morphology (§6.3.1.3.3), verbs that participate in the bene-
factive alternation (see above), and transitive verbs that exhibit bare instrument
arguments (see above). For all of these verbs, only a single non-subject argument
(NSA) need be expressed; the expression of a second NSA is always optional.
Only some of these classes of verbs, however, display semantic and mor-
phosyntactic properties consistent with prototypically distransitive verbs. Consider,
for example, the basically transitive verbs that participate in the benefactive alter-
nation, and which by doing so, acquire a second NSA. I do not consider these to be
properly ditransitive verbs for two reasons: i) because the additional NSA (i.e. the
beneficiary or recipient) is extraneous to the basic event structure of the verb, and ii)
because the semantic role of the added argument is constrained by the grammatical
person of the argument.
I define a ditransitive Nanti verb to be one for which: i) a second NSA refer-
ent is always understood to be present, even when only a single NSA is expressed,
and ii) the semantic role of neither NSA argument is restricted by their grammat-
ical person. Defined in this way, Nanti distransitives include those transitive verbs
derived with applicatives and causatives and a small set of verbs that participate in
the benefactive alternation, such as p ‘give’ and anpina ‘borrow, lend’.
If we look at (6.272a), we can see that that if the verb p ‘give’ has only a
367
single overt NSA (the recipient), the presence of another NSA referent (the theme)
is assumed.71 We also see that the third person non-masculine NSA in (6.272b) is
interpreted as a recipient. This is significant because it shows that the verb is not
subject to the benefactive alternation, which would automatically assign a patient
























‘I gave (it) to her.’
If the recipient argument is either first or second person, the theme argument
must be expressed as either a free pronominal element or a referential NP, as in














‘He gave me a fishhook.’
If both the theme and recipient arguments are third person, the theme ar-
gument may be expressed by the patient/theme clitic =ni ∼ =ne, as in (6.274).
Of course, the argument may still be expressed by a free pronominal element or
referential NP. With third person themes we thus see a structural overlap between
the ditransitive and benefactive alternation constructions.
71One piece of evidence for this claim is that the question Tata?, ‘what?’ may be used in response















‘I gave it to him.’
6.4.1.6 Noun phrases
Thus far I have mainly considered arguments consisting of simple NPs; in this section
I describe the structure of complex NPs and NP coordination.
Nanti noun phrases are consistently right-headed. Modifiers found in Nanti
noun phrases include adjectives, as in (6.275); quantifiers, as in (6.276); and deter-
miners/demonstratives, as in (6.277).













‘I saw a big house.’







‘There are two pots.’

















Those punto (tree frog sp.), in contrast, are tasty.
When a modifier provides sufficient information about its associated noun
to enable recovery of the noun from context, overt nouns are frequently omitted.
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Consider, for example, the brief segment of conversation given in (6.278), where in
the first sentence the speaker establishes that the subject of the sentence eats hetari,
a particular species of fish. In the following sentence, in which the speaker comments
on the same subject consuming more than just one fish, the full NP patiro hetari
‘one hetari’ is reduced to patiro ‘one’, since the parallelism of the two sentences
renders the omitted NP easily recoverable.

































‘He doesn’t eat (just) one (hetari).’ (= ‘He eats a lot of hetari.’)
In fact, complex NPs are quite rare in everyday Nanti discourse, and speak-
ers seem to avoid them when feasible. The presence of more than one modifier in
a single NP is not attested. Apart from simple noun elision, just exemplified, an-
other important strategy for avoiding complex NPs is noun incorporation and and
classifier suffixation in adjectives and numerals (see §6.3.7.1.2). The use of classifier
suffixation is illustrated in (6.279a), where the addition of the fluid classifier to the
adjective suffixes to identify the referent, which could otherwise be expressed as a
free element, as in (6.279b).















‘She bathed with cold (water).’
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‘She bathed with cold water.’
NP coordination is attested in Nanti, although it extremely rare in everyday
discourse. Nanti exhibits two coordinating elements: intiri, which is employed when
the NP following the coordinating element is third person masculine, as in (6.280);
and ontiri, which is used all other cases, as in (6.281).72



















‘Barentin and Bisarota and Rerpin went there briefly.’

















‘We went, he and I (fem.).’
In all attested cases, the coordinated NPs appears as a post-verbal topic
expression, suggesting that coordinated NPs cannot appear in argument position,
and that their weight leads them to be postposed to the verb.
6.4.1.6.1 Pronominal elements Nanti exhibits several paradigms of pronom-
inal elements, which appear in either topic or focus positions. These include topic
pronouns, contrastive focus pronouns, and three paradigms of portmanteau elements
72The gender-based alternation of these forms makes it probable that the coordinating element
developed from the copula nti.
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that combine pronominal and temporal meanings, which I describe in this section.
Nanti also exhibits reflexive pronouns, which are described in §6.4.2.1.3.
Nanti topic pronouns, enumerated in Table 6.15, exhibit the full range of
number, gender, and inclusivity distinctions of which Nanti is capable. Plural topic
pronouns are formed with the nominal plural suffix -hegi. Topic pronouns appear in
clause-peripheral topic expressions, and also function as demonstrative pronouns.
Table 6.15: Nanti topic and focus pronouns
topic pronouns focus pronouns
person singular plural singular plural
1 naro narohegi naro
2 biro birohegi biro
3 masc. iriro irirohegi iryo
3 non-masc. iroro irorohegi iro
1 pl. incl. harohegi haro
Nanti contrastive focus pronouns show the same gender and inclusivity dis-
tinctions as do topic pronouns, but do not combine with nominal plural suffixes,
leaving the first person plural inclusive form haro as the only plural focus pronoun.
In order to express plural number for arguments realized by focus pronouns, the
verbal plural suffix -hig must be employed, as exemplified in (6.282).

























Note that the number-encoding behavior of focus pronouns exactly parallels
that of person clitics in this regard. Focus pronouns are uniformly disyllabic, unlike
topic pronouns, and the third person focus pronoun forms exhibit phonological re-
duction, resulting in distinct topic and focus forms in these parts of the paradigms.
Focus pronouns only appear in the preverbal focus position.
Both topic and focus pronouns were clearly formed from the Pre-Proto-
Kampa person markers na ‘first person’, bi ‘second person’, iri ‘third person mascu-
line’, and iro ‘third person non-masculine’ by the addition of the suffix -ro. Though
the meaning of the latter suffix is not clear at this point, it should be noted that
suffixation of this sort is a widespread strategy in Arawak languages for forming
phonologically independent pronouns from phonologically dependent person markers
(cf. Aikhenvald, 2003b; Danielsen, 2007; Parker, 1995). Focus pronouns in addition
exhibit the loss of the segment /r/ from this suffix, an instance of the widespread
historical process of loss of intervocalic-/r/ in the Kampan languages.
Nanti also exhibits three paradigms of ‘temporal pronouns’, which are port-
manteau morphemes that incorporate both pronominal and temporal meanings.
The meanings of these pronouns indicate that they were diachronically formed by
addition of the temporal morphemes =tya, =ra, and =ketyo to person markers, but
it is clear that they are now lexicalized, as evidenced by the presence of the archaic
person markers na- and bi- (see above). In this section I describe the syntax of the
‘recent’ and ‘first’ pronouns; ‘overlap’ pronouns are employed in temporal overlap
clause-linking constructions described in §6.4.3.5.
‘Recent’ and ‘first’ pronouns share the morphosyntactic properties of con-
trastive focus pronouns. They appear exclusively in the preverbal focus position,
and are in complementary distribution with person clitics. As with contrastive focus
pronouns, only singular forms are attested for temporal pronouns.
‘Recent’ temporal pronouns indicate that the action denoted by the verb was
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Table 6.16: Nanti temporal pronouns
person recent gloss overlap gloss first gloss
1 natya ‘I recently’ natyara ‘when I’ naketyo ‘I first’
2 bitya ‘you recently’ bityara ‘when you’ biketyo ‘you first’
3m itya ‘he recently’ ityara ‘when he’ iketyo ‘he first’
3nm otya ‘she recently’ otyara ‘when she’ oketyo ‘she first’
realized recently, as in (6.283). These pronouns optionally appear with the temporal
adverb maika ‘now’, which indicates that the action was realized very recently, as
in (6.284), or with the temporal adverb inkahara ‘earlier’, which indicates that the










‘Did you arrive recently?’















‘I saw it just now for the first time.’
‘First’ temporal pronouns indicate that the argument expressed by the pro-
noun is the first to realize or be affected by the action denoted by the verb, as in
(6.285). First temporal pronouns most commonly appear in -ankicha focus con-
structions (described in §6.4.3.1.1), as in (6.286).


























I took her first (Oroma) (as my spouse), then I took Eroba (as my spouse).’











‘He did not run away first.’
6.4.2 Syntax of monoclausal sentences
In this section, I describe the basic monoclausal sentence types in Nanti: declarative,
interrogative, imperative, and interjective. Since all non-declarative sentence types
can be economically described in terms of how they differ from declarative sentences,
I discuss the principal syntactic operators (e.g. focus and negation) in my description
of declarative clauses.
6.4.2.1 Declarative sentences
6.4.2.1.1 Basic structure of simple declarative sentences Much of the
basic syntax of declarative sentences has already been treated in the preceding dis-
cussion of argument positions and argument realization. The basic structure of
sentences consisting of a single declarative clause with a transitive verb is given in
(6.287). With the exception of ostensive declaratives, which I discuss below, ev-
ery Nanti declarative sentence must have a verb. Only subjects are fully formally
obligatory, as objects may be omitted if recoverable from context. At most one
core argument can be realized as a phonologically free NP, and this argument may
appear in either an unfocused argument position, or in the preverbal focus position.
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At most one topic expression, coreferential with either a person clitic, unfocused
NP, or focused NP, may appear in any given sentence.
(6.287) [topic] [external neg] [internal neg] [pred focus] [arg focus] S V
O OBL [topic]
In principle, all other positions may be simultaneously filled in a sentence.
Arguments supporting the relative placement of the various focus positions, negation
positions, and topic positions depicted in (6.287) are provided below.
6.4.2.1.2 Ostensive declaratives Ostensive declarative sentences are struc-
turally very restricted, consisting of a referential NP followed by a demonstrative,
as in (6.288). This sentence type is only employed in conjunction with a gesture
that identifies the referent ostensively. Ostensive declarative sentences are unusual








‘This is a bayana (plantain variety).’
6.4.2.1.3 Reciprocals and reflexives Nanti exhibits distinct reciprocal and
reflexive constructions. The reciprocal construction is formed with the derivational
suffix described in §6.3.1.3.2.3, to which the reader is referred. The reflexive con-
struction is formed with a reflexive pronoun chosen from the paradigm given in
Table 6.17.73 Note that reflexive pronouns, like their focus pronoun counterparts
and unlike their topic pronoun counterparts, do not exhibit plural forms (§6.4.1.6.1).
Reflexive pronouns exhibit lexically-specified leftmost stress.
73The expected first person plural inclusive form, predicted to be hakiro, is unattested in my
corpus.
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As evident in (6.289), verbs in reflexive constructions are syntactically in-
transitive. Reflexive pronouns may occupy an argument position, as in (6.289), or


























‘I shot myself with an arrow.’
6.4.2.1.4 Negation Nanti exhibits a relatively complex system of negation,
which includes three clausal negators, a negative existential verb, and a set of neg-
ative pronouns. Negation interacts in a complex manner with reality status, and
imposes restrictions on aspect.
6.4.2.1.4.1 Clausal negation Nanti exhibits three clausal negators, te,
ha, and matsi, which are distinguished by their scopal properties and their selec-
tional properties with respect to the reality status of their complements. The negator
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matsi expresses external negation, while both te and ha express internal negation.74
The latter two forms of negation select for the notional reality status of their com-
plements, with te selecting for notionally realis complements, and ha selecting for
notionally irrealis complements. I first describe the morphosyntactic properties of
the internal negators and then turn to the external negator matsi.
6.4.2.1.4.2 Internal negation The internal negators te and ha are monomoraic
elements, which phonologically cliticize to the element to their right.75 They typi-

















‘I do not, as I was saying, own it.’
In some cases, the negator cliticizes directly to a preverbal, phonologically
free nominal element, as in (6.292). In the absence of any intervening phonologically
free element between the negator and the phonological word that includes the verb,
the negator cliticizes to the verb itself,76 as in (6.293).





















74Internal negation, also known as narrow-scope negation or constituent negation, has scope
over a constituent in the clause, while external negation, also known as wide-scope negation or
propositional negation, has scope over the entire proposition.
75Note that Nanti exhibits a disyllabic minimum word requirement, which would not permit the
negators in question to form independent phonological words.
76Note that in such circumstances, the negation forms a phonological word with its host, but
remains extrametrical, and neither participates in foot formation nor receives stress.
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‘I didn’t say to him, “Please come here.”’













‘I didn’t give (it) to him.’
The internal negators te and ha frequently form a phonological word with
the clitic =ra, a polyfunctional element with a variety of clause-linking functions.
The resulting forms tera and hara appear to be semantically equivalent to the ‘light’
forms te and ha, and appear to be obligatory only in utterances where no other
element is available to serve as a host for the internal negators (e.g. in single word
utterances), or when stress is placed on the negator to express contrastive focus,
as in (6.294). In these contexts =ra is effectively a dummy element that serves to
satisfy the minimum word requirement for the negative element.















‘Are there those who say, “You cannot clear (this land).”?’













‘He would not, he does not say (that).’ (i.e. ‘Nobody says that.’)
Internal negation occupies a syntactic position immediately to the left of
the focus position, as evident in (6.295), and immediately to the right of the topic
position, as evident in (6.296).
77Note that I, the speaker, make a grammatical error in this sentence by employing an existential
verb in the main clause, which is not permitted with this particular relative clause type.
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‘I will not cook it.’















‘That Choteri, he didn’t speak.’
The two internal negators subcategorize for the notional reality status of
their complements. The ‘realis negator’ te selects for notionally realis complements,
while the ‘irrealis negator’ ha selections for notionally irrealis complements. The
morphological realization of reality status in negated clauses interacts in a complex
manner with internal negation, as discussed below.
The selectional properties of te and ha can be seen by comparing the positive
polarity sentences with realis and irrealis clauses in (6.297a) and (6.298a), with their
negative polarity counterparts in (6.297b) and (6.298b).
The notionally and morphologically realis clause in (6.297a) is negated with
the realis negator te in (6.297b). The resulting negated clause takes irrealis marking,
which is consistent with the notional basis of irreality, which encompasses states of
affairs that are either ‘unrealized’ or ‘unknowable’ (Mithun, 1995). The negative
polarity clause in (6.297b) expresses a proposition regarding a state of affairs that
failed to obtain prior to the moment of speaking, which is arguably the prototypical





















‘He is not coming.’ ∼ ‘He did not come.’
The notionally and morphologically irrealis clause in (6.298a) is in turn
negated with the irrealis negator ha in (6.298b). The resulting clause is, of course,
notionally irrealis, and could easily be seen as ‘doubly irrealis’ – once due to future
temporal reference and second due to negation. Unexpectedly, the verb takes realis
marking. And indeed, the irrealis negator ha always triggers realis marking on the
verb, as evident in its appearance in conditional (§6.4.3.3), counterfactual (§6.4.3.4),




















‘He will not come.’
There are two broad approaches to understanding this phenomenon. One is
constructional: doubly irrealis clauses are simply marked by the discontinuous mor-
phemes hara . . . -i. On this view, the understanding of the morphological behavior in
these contexts will ultimately be grounded in a development of a historical account
of the Kampan negation and reality status system. A second approach, sketched in
Michael (2007), treats this phenomenon as an result of scopal interaction between
negation and reality status operators. For our present descriptive purposes, the
constructional approach is perfectly adequate.
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The interaction between negation and reality status is summarized in Table
6.18.
Table 6.18: Negation and reality status marking
polarity notional reality status
realis irrealis doubly irrealis
positive -i n- . . . -e NA
negative NA te n- . . . -e hara -i
Finally, it should be noted that the presence of internal negation neutralizes
the perfective/imperfective distinction in that clause (see §6.3.1.1.2.1).
6.4.2.1.4.3 Existential negation Nanti exhibits a negative existential
verb, mameri ∼ mame, which is the negative polarity counterpart of the existential
verbs aityo and ainyo (see §6.3.1.5). The verb may take either a nominal or a









‘There is no meat.’
When mameri takes a clausal complement, an additional locative sense ob-
tains, just as a locative sense obtains with clausal complements of positive polarity
existential verbs (§6.3.1.5). In particular, the negative existential indicates the nega-
tion of the complement with respect to a specific location, as in (6.440) and (6.300).
















‘You will not see manioc beer again (where you live).’
6.4.2.1.4.4 External negation The external negator matsi demonstrates
starkly different morphosyntactic properties from the internal negators te and ha.
Matsi appears to the right of topic expressions, as in (6.301), but to the left of pos-
itive polarity markers, such as ari ‘indeed’, (6.302), and internal negators, (6.303).
The presence of the external negator has no effect on reality status marking on the
verb, as is evident in (6.302), where the verb retains realis marking despite the pres-
ence of external negation. In the presence of internal negation, the verb would take
irrealis marking in this context. Note that matsi does not select for the reality sta-
tus of its complements, and that external negation may even co-occur with internal
negation, as we can see in (6.303).































‘Oburoki, it is not the case that you will see it there where you live.’



















‘It is not the case that you, indeed, live there.’















‘It is not the case that you are not happy with this.’
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6.4.2.1.4.5 Negative pronouns Nanti negative pronouns are binomial
expressions consisting of an internal negator – either tera or hara – and an interroga-
tive pronoun (see §6.4.2.2.2). For example, the negative pronoun tera tsini ‘nobody’,
exemplified in (6.304), is formed with the interrogative pronoun tsini ‘who’. A neg-
ative pronoun formed with hara is illustrated in (6.305).























‘Nobody went downriver to fish with a throw net?’











‘I will go nowhere.’
The negative pronoun always appears in the preverbal focus position, as
evident in (6.306) and (6.307), which feature object negative pronouns.























‘He said, “I wasn’t doing anything, I was (just) visiting.”’















‘He said “I took nobody (as my spouse).”’
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The reality-status marking on verbs that have negative pronouns as argu-
ments matches that which we expect for the given negator, i.e. irrealis marking with
te and realis marking with ha.
6.4.2.1.5 Focus constructions Nanti exhibits both NP and predicate con-
trastive focus constructions. Nanti NP focus constructions include two distinct
constructions for focusing verbal arguments: one that makes use of a syntactic
preverbal focus position, and a second ‘cleft’ construction that makes use of a rel-
ativization strategy. Nanti also exhibits a possessive pronoun focus construction.
Predicate focus in Nanti is indicated by the marker onti, which appears in clause
initial position.
6.4.2.1.5.1 Preverbal focus position The most common strategy for
focusing a verbal argument is to place it in the preverbal focus position. Subject,
object, and oblique NPs may all be focused with this construction, as exemplified
in (6.308), (6.309), and (6.310), respectively.













‘I gave (it) to them yesterday.’













‘I visited him there.’


















‘You only sing here in Montetoni.’
As all three of the preceding examples illustrate, adverbs can intervene be-
tween the focused NP and the verbal phonological word. This clearly distinguishes
the preverbal focus position from the subject position, as adverbs cannot intervene
between the subject and the verb, even when the subject is phonologically distinct
from the verb (see §6.3.5).
6.4.2.1.5.2 ‘Cleft’ focus constructions Nanti exhibits a subject focus
construction which has the same structure as a Nanti deranked relative clause. This
cleft focus construction can be identified by the fact that the verbs in the construc-
tion undergo derivation with one of two suffixes also found on verbs in deranked
relative clauses: -ankicha, the perfective deranked relativizer, or -tsi, the imperfec-
tive deranked relativizer (the reader is referred to §6.4.3.1.1 for details regarding






















The derivations in question apply only to verbs with a single nominal argu-
ment: that is, either strictly intransitive verbs or verbs that take clausal comple-
ments, as in (6.313). Note that the complement may be elided, as in (6.311).
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‘It was not I (but rather someone else) who said to him, ‘Come back here,’
contrary to what you imply.’
In cleft focus constructions, the subject – the focused element – must be ex-
pressed by a phonologically free element. The focused status of one of these subjects
is illustrated in (6.314), which presents two adjacent sentences from a longer stretch
of discourse. In the first sentence, the speaker quotes another individual, Bikotoro,
as expressing his intention to live in Marankehari, the community downriver from
Montetoni. In the second sentence, the speaker expressed that he, in contrast, will
continue to live in Montetoni.





































‘That Bikotoro came and said, “I will live there in Marankehari.”’



















‘I said, “Fine, I (in contrast to you) have to live here.”’
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It should be noted that coreferential topic expressions may co-occur with
the focused element, and are normally used to clarify the reference of the focused
element, as in (6.315).

















‘His manioc beer was the first to begin (i.e. We drank his manioc beer
first.).’78
Cleft focus constructions differ in one way from the deranked relative clauses
which they so closely resemble: while negative polarity deranked relative clauses are
unattested, negative polarity cleft focus constructions, as in (6.316), are perfectly
acceptable.













‘She did not run away first.’
I have not encountered any evidence that there is a difference in meaning
between the cleft focus construction and the preverbal focus position construction.
It should be noted, however, that it can be difficult to distinguish unfocused subjects
from subjects focused by means of the preverbal focus position construction. The
latter are distinguished from the former only by word stress and by the fact that the
latter permits adverbs to intervene between the NP and the verbs, while the latter
does not. The use of the cleft focus construction makes it very clear that the subject
is being focused, suggesting that its use may be motivated by the desire of Nanti
speakers to disambiguate the information structure status of focused subjects.
78Occasionally, manioc beer (oburoki), though always made by women, is identified as pertaining
to the male head of the household, (iburoki), in as much as he has the freedom and obligation to
invite other men to partake of it.
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6.4.2.1.5.3 Predicate focus Predicate focus in Nanti is indicated by
the free syntactic element onti, which appears in clause initial position, as we see
in (6.317). In this example, the speaker seeks to assure his addressee that a third
man is only joking about making overtures to the addressee’s spouse. The speaker
employs contrastive predicate focus in his second utterance, thus contrasting the
actual state of affairs with the addressee’s possible fears.

























‘He is joking around.’
6.4.2.2 Interrogative constructions
6.4.2.2.1 Polar interrogatives Polar interrogatives are distinguishable from
their declarative counterparts by their characteristic intonation contour, which con-
sists of a rising-falling contour over the last syllables of the utterance. Polar interrog-
atives also exhibit a reduced range of NP positions in comparison to their declarative
counterparts, although the restricted NP distribution in polar interrogatives is not
sufficient to unambiguously identify this construction type.
Both argument and topic NPs exhibit restricted distributions in polar inter-
rogatives, relative to their declarative counterparts. Free argument NPs in inter-
rogative constructions obligatorily appear in the pre-subject focus position, as in
(6.318) and (6.319), whereas in declarative constructions, they may also appear in
non-focus position. The object argument NPs in (6.318) and (6.319), for example,
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could appear in either the post-verbal object position or the pre-subject focus posi-
tion in the declarative counterparts to these sentences, but can only appear in the


























‘Did she give you fish?’
Topic NPs are also limited in their syntactic distribution in polar interroga-
tive constructions, where they obligatorily appear at the right margin of the clause,















‘Is your son going over there?’















‘Don’t you have a spouse?’
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6.4.2.2.2 Content interrogatives Content interrogative constructions are char-
acterized by the presence of an interrogative pronoun in sentence initial position,
and the concomitant omission of the person marker that would have the same gram-
matical relation to the verb as the interrogative pronoun. Interrogation of core ar-
guments is thus characterized by the same person clitic gap strategy found in focus
constructions (see §6.4.1). The interrogation of non-core arguments does not exhibit
concommitant person clitic gapping, since non-core arguments are not marked on
the verb. The full set of Nanti interrogative pronouns is given in Table 6.19.




tyani ‘which one (animate)’
tyati ‘which one (inanimate)’
tya(ra) ‘where’, ‘how’
The interrogative pronouns tsini ‘who/whom’ and tyani ‘which one (ani-
mate)’ have very similar morphosyntactic distributions, since both can be used
to interrogate human core arguments, as can be seen by comparing (6.323a) with
(6.322). In so far as I have been able to observe a difference in their use, tsini ap-
pears to be used principally in contexts where the speaker appears to have no idea
about the possible candidates, while tyani appears to be used in situations where
the speaker has some idea about the answer to the question.

















‘Who in the world will give (you) clothes?’
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Note that there are gaps in the interrogative pronoun paradigm, including
elements corresponding to ‘why’ and ‘whose’. As I discuss below, Nanti makes use of
applicative morphology and periphrastic strategies to expand the set of interrogative
constructions beyond the set of simple interrogative constructions described here.
The interrogation of core arguments is exemplified in (6.323) by two distinct
interrogative constructions formed on the transitive verb neh ‘see’ and the interrog-
ative pronoun tsini ‘who/whom’. Subject interrogation is illustrated in (6.323a),
where the subject marker has been omitted, and object interrogation is illustrated
in (6.323b), where the object person marker has been omitted. In both cases, the
omission of the given person marker permits us to identify the grammatical relation
of the interrogative pronoun to the verb. The declarative sentence corresponding to
the interrogative sentences is given in (6.323c).




































Note that when the argument being interrogated is an applied argument, the
identity of the semantic role that is being interrogated is determined by the applica-
tive. For example, the interrogated object in (6.324) is an applied object, whose
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semantic role is determined by the purposive applicative -ashi. Thus, although tata
‘what’ normally serves to interrogate theme or patient arguments, as in (6.325), it
























‘What are you eating?’
The interrogation of a non-core argument is illustrated in (6.326), with
the intransitive verb ken ‘head in a direction’ and the interrogative pronoun tya
‘where’/‘how’. No person marker is omitted on the verb, since the interrogative










‘Where did you head?’
Note that interrogative constructions may be formed off the bare instrumen-
tal construction (see §6.4.1.5). This interrogative construction is identifiable by the
fact that the interrogative pronoun is tata ‘what’, which normally interrogates an
argument, but there is no corresponding person clitic gap. In (6.327), for exam-
ple, the fact that neither the subject nor object marker of the the verb oguso ‘tie















‘What did you tie it together with?’
6.4.2.2.3 Interrogative identity verb The irregular verb ita appears in in-
terrogative constructions that seek information regarding the identity or type of a
given referent, as in (6.328). This verb always pairs with the interrogative pronoun
tata ‘what’. The verb does not take inflection, but does take a third person subject
proclitic. Interestingly, these subject proclitics undergo none of the vowel hiatus
resolution processes typical in this morphosyntactic environment (see §6.2.3). As
a result, one finds the verb forms oita and iita, instead of the form ita, which one
would expect on the normal application of vowel hiatus resolution rules. Note that
the blocking of this lexical phonological process serves to maintain the morphological









The basic construction given in (6.328) also appears embedded in interrog-
ative constructions with lexical verbs, as in (6.329). The resulting construction
expresses a demand for specificity regarding the interrogated argument.













‘What exactly is it that you want?’
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6.4.2.2.4 Periphrastic interrogative constructions Nanti does not exhibit
dedicated interrogative pronouns that serve to interrogate reasons or causes (i.e. a
counterpart to ‘why’ ), possessors (i.e. an analog to ‘whose’), or quantities (i.e. a
counterpart to ‘how many’ or ‘how much’ ). Instead, Nanti speakers make use of
either periphrastic constructions or applicative morphology in conjunction with the
more limited set of interrogative pronouns already mentioned. The use of applicative
morphology in this regard was discussed above; in this section I describe Nanti
periphrastic interrogative constructions.
Interrogatives constructions that serve inquire about reasons or causes are bi-
clausal ones, in which the first clause consists of the intransitive light verb kant ‘hap-
pen’,79 preceded by the interrogative pronoun tya ‘how’, as in (6.330) and (6.331).
The second clause denotes the state of affairs that is the subject of the question.



























‘Why did you sleep there?’
In some cases, the main verb of the second clause bears the subordinating
clitic =ra, as in (6.331). It is not clear if this variation is due to fast speech elision
of the clitic, or if it is simply optional.























79This root, it will be noted, is homophonous with the form for ‘say’. The verbs are distinguishable
by their verb classes: ‘say’ is an i-class verb, and may take a speech report complement, while
‘happen’ is an a-class verb and cannot take a clausal complement.
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‘Why did you lose interest there in Tayakome?’
The interrogation of possessors normally requires the use of the verb ashint
‘own’, as in the monoclausal question in (6.332).80











‘Who owns this mature/abandoned garden?’
Questions that might call for the use of possessive interrogative pronouns in
languages that possess them are handled in Nanti with a relative clause construction,
as in (6.333).

























‘Who owns the mature garden that I saw yesterday?’ (cf. ‘Whose mature
garden did I see yesterday?’)
Interrogative constructions that serve to inquire about quantities or sizes
require the use of the verb kara ‘come to an end, measure up to’ (cf. kara ‘cut in
two’) and the interrogative word tya ‘where’/‘how’, as in (6.334). Note that sense
of quantity expressed by this construction is very general, encompassing count and
mass quantities, and even size.
(6.334) Tya okarati?











‘How many were there?’ or ‘How much was there?’ or ‘How large was it?’
6.4.2.2.5 Ostensive interrogatives Interrogative constructions that seek in-
formation regarding the identity of a referent that is identified by means of a demon-
strative pronoun constitute one of few verbless clause types in Nanti. The only
interrogative pronouns attested in this construction are tata ‘what’, as in (6.335);

















Interestingly, in ostensive interrogative constructions it is possible to directly
interrogate a possessor of an NP, as in (6.337), which otherwise requires the use of
the lexical verb ashint ‘own’, as discussed above.







‘Whose house is this?’
397
6.4.2.2.6 Embedded questions Embedded questions are attested exclusively
in direct speech complements to verbs of communication, as in (6.338). As such,
embedded questions in Nanti are identical to non-embedded ones.





























‘I did not ask, “Who said, ‘You will not take a woman (as your spouse).’?”.’
6.4.2.2.7 Rhetorical questions Nanti speakers make extensive use of rhetor-
ical questions.81 Nanti exhibits two main types of rhetorical questions. The first
type makes use of the second position ‘non-congruent’ clitic =npa (see §6.3.6.1.2),


















‘Where in the world would she wade (across the river)?’ (= ‘There is
nowhere to wade (across the river).’)
The second type makes use of non-specific relative pronouns (see §6.4.3.1.3)
in place of interrogative pronouns, and indicates that the speaker does not know the
answer to the question, as in (6.340).
(6.340) Tyaka ipaita?
81For present purposes I define a rhetorical question as an utterance that shares basic structural
features with an interrogative construction, but does not carry interrogative illocutionary force.











‘What in the world is his name?’ (= ‘I have no idea what his name is.’)
6.4.2.3 Imperatives and polite directives
The imperative in Nanti is characterized by irrealis inflection on the verb and the










Because imperatives systematically strip the person subject marker of the
verb, stem initial vowels are deleted, as in (6.342).83 The object of a transitive verb
in an imperative construction may be expressed by a person marker, as in (6.342),
or by a non-focused referential NP, as in (6.343). Topic NPs and topic pronouns are



















83See §6.2.3 for a discussion of this general morphophonological process.
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Note that Nanti does not exhibit a negative polarity imperative construction;
negative polarity directives are instead formed via the polite directive construction,
discussed below.
Nanti also exhibits two suppletive imperatives: i) tahena ‘come!’; and ii)
tsame ‘get going!’ or ‘let’s go!’, shown in (6.344), which can also be interpreted as
‘get on with it!’ in contexts in which a motion interpretation not readily available.
Note that tahena also functions as an adverb with the sense ‘right away’, as in
(6.345).
























Nanti exhibits a polite directive construction, which, while structurally dis-
tinct from the imperative construction, fulfills a similar interactional function by
expressing a directive to an interlocutor. The polite directive construction is struc-
turally identical to the future temporal reference declarative construction, being































‘Please take care of it.’
As mentioned above, negative polarity directives are formed with the polite
directive construction in Nanti. As one would expect, given that the positive polarity
polite directive is irrealis-marked, its negative polarity counterpart takes the irreali














‘Don’t pull on it (a piece of fabric)!’
6.4.2.4 Interjections
Nanti exhibits an interjection construction characterized by realis marking on the
verb and omission of the subject person marker (and any corefential NPs and free
pronouns), as in (6.349). The interjection construction is restricted to intransitive
verbs with third person notional subjects and that denote past events. This con-
struction does not permit the addition of any adverbs or adverbial expressions. The
construction is typically employed to express a rueful evaluation of a state, change



























‘(The water) got cold!’
6.4.3 Conceptual linkages and clause-linking constructions
6.4.3.1 Relative clauses
Nanti exhibits three distinct relative clause constructions. The first one we consider,
the deranked relative clause construction, is characterized by presence of either of
the derivational suffixes -annkicha or -tsi on the verb of the restrictive clause. Verbs
derived with these suffixes do not show reality status marking, yielding the name
for this construction. The second construction type we consider, the ranked relative
clause, is characterized by the presence of the second position clitic =rira in the
restrictive clause. Restrictive clause verbs exhibit the full range of inflectional mor-
phology. The distribution of deranked and ranked relative clauses is determined by
syntactic features of restrictive and main clauses. Restrictive clauses in deranked
relative clause constructions must be positive polarity, and its verb must be a ‘nom-
inally intransitive’ lexical verb (this latter restriction is explained at length below).
In addition, existential verbs are forbidden in the main clauses of deranked relative
clause constructions. Restrictive and main clauses that violate the restrictions on
deranked relative clause constructions force the use of ranked relative clause con-
structions. The third major construction type we consider is the non-specific relative
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clause construction, which is formed with a distinctive set of non-specific relative
pronouns.
Nanti relative clauses exhibit a very limited range of relativizable positions,
being restricted to subject relativization, in the case of deranked relative clauses; or
to subject and object relativization, in the case of ranked and non-specific relative
clauses.
Both the deranked and ranked relative clause constructions exhibit two struc-
tural subtypes: a ‘standard’ relative clause and a correlative clause. A standard
relative clause is characterized by the presence of a single NP which serves as an
argument of both the main and restrictive clause. A correlative clause is character-
ized by the absence of a shared argument, and instead, the presence of coreferential
pronominal or demonstrative elements in both the main and restrictive clause. The
distribution of standard relative and correlative clauses is determined by positional
requirements on NP constituents, as discussed below. Deranked relative clauses in
addition exhibit a headless subtype, characterized by the omission of the argument
of the restrictive clause (note that this is distinct from the non-specific relative
construction mentioned above).
6.4.3.1.1 Deranked relative clause constructions The deranked relative
clause construction is characterized by the presence of the derivational verbal suffixes
-ankicha or -tsi on the restrictive clause, as in (6.352) and (6.353).

















‘It is Barentin’s, who just recently went to the Serehaa (a river).’




















‘Hose, he who was running towards us, said, “Watch out!”’
The derivational morphemes -ankicha and -tsi strip the verb of all reality
status morphology and displace normal aspect morphology. The two suffixes, how-
ever, encode an aspectual contrast: -ankicha is perfective, while -tsi is imperfective.
Quasi-inflectional morphology such as verbal number and directionals are retained
under derivation with -ankicha and -tsi. The subject of the derived verb must
be a phonologically free element:84 either a referential NP, as in (6.352) above; a
contrastive focus pronoun, as in (6.353);85 or a demonstrative, as in (6.354).

























‘That one who died, Samohero, he lived in Koginiro.’
As mentioned previously, the deranked relative clause construction imposes
restrictions on the main and restrictive clauses. The major restriction imposed by
this construction is on the verb of the restrictive clause, which must be ‘nominally
intransitive’. A nominally intransitive verb is one that has only a single nominal core
argument. This class of verbs includes strictly intransitive ones, such as shig ‘run’, in
(6.353) above, and kam ‘die’, in (6.354); verbs which take clausal complements, such
as kog ‘want’ in (6.355); and verbs which take optional bare peripheral arguments,
such as ha ‘go’, as in (6.352).
84In the non-specific deranked relative construction the subject is omitted entirely.
85In this example the proper name Hose is a topic expression coreferential with the focus pronoun.
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‘He said, “Don’t permit those who want to visit for a long time to pass by
again.”’
Further limitations imposed by this construction include a restriction against
negative polarity restrictive clauses, and a restriction against existential verbs in
the main clause. Relative clause constructions whose restrictive verbs obey the
nominal intransitivity restriction but violate these restrictions on the main clause
and on polarity are formed with ranked relative clauses, as exemplified in (6.370)
and (6.368).
Deranked relative clauses exhibit three structural subtypes: standard relative
clauses, correlative clauses, and non-specific relative clauses. The standard subtype
is characterized by the presence of a single NP that serves as an argument in both
the main and the restrictive clause, as in (6.352) and (6.356). In this construction
type, relative clauses are always postnominal.



















‘I visited my brother, who was drinking there.’
In the correlative clause construction, no NP is shared by the two clauses;
instead an element with pronominal characteristics appears in each clause, as in
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(6.353) and (6.357). Coreference between the two relevant pronominal is not overtly
marked, and must be deduced from context.



























‘Those who came, I did not give them permission.’ (= ‘I did not give
permission to those who came.’)
Standard and correlative clauses are functionally equivalent, in that they
both serve to provide clausal modification to a referent in the main clause. Struc-
turally, however, the two are in complementary distribution. Standard relative
clauses only occur when the head of the relative clause is the unfocused object of
the main clause. This restriction stems from two constraints: first, that the head
precede the restrictive clause; and second, that the head occupy an argument posi-
tion in the main clause. These two constraints rule out the possibility of the head
being either a subject or a focused argument in the main clause, because in either
preverbal position, the restrictive clause would not be permitted to intervene be-
tween the head and the main verb.86 Correlative clauses appear in precisely the
contexts in which standard deranked clauses are not permitted, namely, when the
referent being modified is the subject of the main clause or a focused argument
appearing in the preverbal focus position.
The third structural subtype, the headless non-specific deranked relative con-
struction, is illustrated in (6.355) and (6.358). In the attested examples, the subject
of the main clause is expressed by a person clitic, and the coreferential null head of
the deranked clause is interpreted as non-specific.
86No material may intervene between a subject NP and a verb (see §6.4), and only adverbs may
intervene between a focused argument and the verb (see §6.3.5).
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‘Then, whoever it was that came told (us), “This is the Camisea River.”’
6.4.3.1.2 Ranked relative clauses Ranked relative clauses are distinguishable
from main clauses by the presence of the relativizer =rira, which appears in second-
position in the restrictive clause, as can be seen in (6.359) and (6.360).87 Ranked
relative clauses are in complementary distribution with unranked ones, generally
requiring a transitive restrictive clause verb (some exceptions are addressed below).

























‘I will straighten the arrow cane that I got yesterday.’





















‘The one (the two-way radio) you brought works (lit. speaks).’
The preceding examples illustrate that there are two distinct subtypes of
relative clause constructions: a ‘standard’ relative clause construction, and a cor-
relative clause construction. In standard relative clause constructions a single NP –
87In the following examples the restrictive clause is delimited by square bracket and labeled with
a subscripted ‘RC’. The head of the relative clause is also indicated with a subscripted label, while
coreferential pronominal elements are indicates by matched indices.
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the head of the relative clause – functions as an argument in both the main clause
and the restrictive clause. In (6.359), for example, the NP chakopi, functions both
as the object of the main verb kotsi ‘straighten’ and as the object of the restrictive
clause verb ag ‘get’. In the correlative clauses, in contrast, although a referent is
shared by the two clauses, no argument is shared between the main and restrictive
clauses. Instead, the shared referent is marked by a distinct person clitic in each
clause. In (6.360), for example, the shared referent is a radio, but this referent is not
expressed by a referential NP in this sentence. Instead, this shared referent is indi-
cated by a subject person clitic in the main clause and and an object person clitic
in the restrictive clause. Correlative clause constructions are typically ambiguous,
and contextual factors are normally necessary to identify the shared referent.
The complementary distribution of ranked standard relative clauses and
ranked correlative clauses is governed by same basic syntactic factors that govern
their unranked counterparts.
6.4.3.1.2.1 Standard relative clauses A standard relative clause may
either be headed, as in (6.361a), or unheaded, as in (6.361b).























‘An agouti dug up the manioc that I didn’t weed.’





















‘An agouti dug up (what) I didn’t weed.’
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Both subjects and objects may be relativized, as exemplified in (6.362) and
(6.359), respectively. Relativization of obliques or of any relation higher on the
relativization hierarchy is unattested.























‘Did you see that (one) who engendered Horiha?’ (= ‘Did you see Horiha’s
father?’)
The heads of standard relative clauses may either be RC-external, in which
case they exhibit a gap case recoverability strategy88 as in (6.361a); or RC-internal,
in which case they appear in situ, as in (6.359). The alternation between RC-
external and RC-internal heads appears to be governed by the requirements of the
main clause verb regarding the position of its arguments. That is, the position of a
given relative clause head with respect to a restrictive clause is determined by the
positional requirements imposed on the same constituent by virtue of its being an
argument of the main clause verb. Consider, for example, (6.361a) in which the
head of the relative clause, sekatsi ‘manioc’ is the unfocused object of the main
clause. In this case, the head of the relative clause is forced to be RC-external, since
it is the object of the restrictive clause. Were the head to appear in RC-internal
position, following the restrictive clause verb, it would be unable to occupy the
unfocused object position in the main clause. Contrast this state of affairs with
that exemplified by (6.359). In this case, the relative clause head, chakopi ‘arrow
cane’, is the focused object of the main clause, meaning that it must appear in the
preverbal focus position of the main clause. This, in turn, forces the relative clause
88Note that this gap strategy is pervasive in Nanti, and serves to identify the grammatical relations
of interrogative pronouns and focused NPs (see §6.4.1).
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head to appear RC-internally, in situ, in order for the head to occupy the focus
position of the main clause. Note, incidentally, that the positional requirements
on the relative clause head also determine the position of the relative clause with
respect to the main clause, since the head cannot be separated from the restrictive
clause. The set of possible combinations between matrix and restrictive clauses, and
the elements that are relativized in each case are given in (6.363).89
(6.363) 1. S V OS [ V (O) ]RC
2. S V OO [ S V ]RC
3. [S V ]RC SO V (O)
Note that the preceding considerations also govern the complementary dis-
tribution of ranked standard relative clauses and ranked correlative clauses. The
three clause combinations given in (6.363) are those that can be formed via the stan-
dard relative clause construction, while all others must be formed with correlative
clauses. In particular, the clause combination given in (6.364), can only be realized
by means of correlative clauses.
(6.364) Si V (O) [ Si V (O) ]
6.4.3.1.2.2 Headless ranked relative clauses Headless ranked rela-
tive clauses display the same basic features as their headed counterparts, except
that the head is omitted. Specifically, they obey the same restrictions as headed
relative clauses on relativizable elements and on the relative position of main and re-
strictive clauses. Similarly, they can be distinguished from correlative clauses by the
absence of coreferential person clitics in both main and restrictive clauses. It should
be noted that headless relative clauses do not yield a non-specific interpretation of
89The constituents bearing subscripts in the main clause are the heads of relative clauses. The
subscripts on the heads indicate their grammatical relationship to the verb of the restrictive clause,
while the empty (underlined) position indicates the position from which the head was relativized.
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the null head.90 To the contrary, the overt head is omitted only when the referent
is easily recoverable from context. In this respect, headless ranked relative clauses
are unlike their unranked counterparts, which yield a non-specific interpretation for
null heads.























‘I finished the one (a pot of oburoki) that she did not cover.’
6.4.3.1.2.3 Correlative clauses Correlative clauses exhibit coreferen-
tial arguments expressed by pronominal elements markers. The pronominal element
of the restrictive clause is typically a person clitic, as in (6.366), but may also be a
determiner, as in (6.367). Only person clitics are attested in the main clause.
Unlike standard relative clause constructions, correlative clause constructions
impose no restrictions on clause ordering, as can be seen by comparing (6.366a) and
(6.366b).

























‘She who has not heard it (a recording of chanting), will come.’
(intended reading)
‘She who was not heard by her, will come.’ (alternate reading)
b. Oinpokake [terira oinkemero]RC .
90Nanti exhibits a distinct non-specific relative construction, discussed below.
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‘That one who knows him, Esekera, would say, “He can come.”’
If we define ‘relativization’ as including coreference relations between a per-
son marker in a restrictive clause and one in the main clause, then we can say
that correlative clause constructions permit the relativization of both subjects, as
in (6.366), and objects, as in (6.360).
6.4.3.1.2.4 Intransitive ranked restrictive clauses As indicated above,
the =rira construction relativizes the arguments of transitive verbs – but there is
one exception. If the main verb is one of the existential verbs aityo (inanimate) or
ainyo (animate), the relative clause is obligatorily formed with the =rira relativizer,
whether the verb of the restrictive clause is transitive, as in (6.368), or intransi-
tive, as in (6.369). Another characteristic of these constructions is that they require
person clitic heads.















‘Is there any manioc beer that you mashed?’
b. Aityo [birorira tinki[ro]i]RC oburokii?


















‘Is that (chicken) which almost died here?’























‘It is good for you to go take what is not yet taken.’
6.4.3.1.3 Non-specific relative clauses Nanti exhibits a non-specific relative
construction, where the head of the relative clause is a non-specific relative pronoun.
The pronouns are formed from an interrogative pronoun (see §6.4.2.2.2) with the
addition of the indefinite suffix -ka (see §6.3.6.2.3). The paradigm of attested non-
specific relatives is given in Table 6.20.






tyaka somehow, wherever, however
Free relative pronouns behave syntactically like focused pronouns, appearing
in the preverbal focus position, and are in complementary distribution with person
markers, as exemplified by the non-specific relative tataka ‘whatever’, in (6.372).
Both subjects and objects may be relativized in non-specific relative construc-
tions, as in (6.371) and (6.372), as well as NPs in temporal and spatial adverbial
expressions, as in (6.373).
























‘Whoever spoke (on the two-way radio) said, “My mother died.”’



































‘There, you will not see it (the food eaten in Montetoni), rather (you will
see) whatever you eat there.’





















‘Wherever he goes, I will follow him.’
6.4.3.2 Complement clauses
Nanti exhibits a small number of complement-taking verbs.91 All regular Nanti
complement-taking verbs share a number of properties that can be mentioned at
the outset. First, all complements are post-verbal, and most alternate with object
NPs. Verbs of communication, cognition, and perception may have non-coreferential
subjects in main and complement clauses, but all other complement-taking verbs
require coreferential subjects in two clauses. With the exception of verbs that take
direct speech complements, only the main clause may be negated.92
91I have identified 19 complement-taking verbs, but there are likely more that are simply rarely
employed.
92Thus, equivalents of ‘I don’t want to be sick’ are possible, but not ‘I want to not be sick.’
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It should be noted that verbs derived with the applicatives -ashi ‘purposive’
and -ant ‘instrument’ may take clausal complements in place of the applied object.
These specific constructions are described in §6.4.3.9 and §6.4.3.10.
The single largest set of complement-taking verbs in Nanti are verbs of com-
munication, which all take direct speech report complements, as in (6.374), which
exhibits two such verb kogako ‘ask’, and kant ‘say’, easily the most ubiquitous mem-
ber of its class.



























‘I did not ask, “Who was it that said, ‘Don’t take a woman (as your
spouse).’?”.’
Other verbs that take direct speech complements include kahem ‘call out,
exhort’, kamant ‘tell’, kenkitsa ‘narrate’, and nih ‘speak’. The complements of
verbs of communication optionally take a quotative proclitic, which appears in the
initial position of the complement, as in (6.375) and (6.376).





















‘He narrated, “I went there.”’



























‘I did not exhort him, “Come back here!”’
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Nanti displays two verbs of cognition which resemble verbs of communication
in their ability to take direct speech complements: sure ‘think’ and pintsa ‘decide’,
exemplified in (6.377) and (6.378), respectively.







































‘He thought, “He is sitting (there), I will not go to visit my son.”’



















‘He decided, “I will not listen to the park officials.”’
Unlike verbs of communication, these two verbs of cognition also permit
indirect complements, in which the values of deictic elements are calculated with
respect to a speaker-centered origo, as in (6.379) and (6.380). This construction
is distinguished from the previous direct speech complement construction by the
requirement that indirect complement be irrealis-marked, regardless of the temporal
reference of the clause. In both (6.379) and (6.380), for example, the complement
clause denote actions that have already transpired, but the verbs in these clauses
are nevertheless irrealis-marked.
























‘You thought that you would come for your own reasons.’

























‘He decided that he would go back.’
The complements of these two verbs of cognition may take the quotative, just
as do verbs of communication. Significantly, the use of quotatives has extended even
to the indirect complement construction, as illustrated in (6.380). This suggests that
the grammatical function of the quotative is extending, and that it is in the early
stages of being grammaticalized as a complementizer.
The only other complement-taking verb of cognition of which I am aware in
Nanti is ogo ‘know’. The reality status of the complement clause matches that of














‘Do you know how to knot-weave?’93

















‘I don’t know how to fish with a throw net.’
93Knot-weaving, kitsog, is a technique used to make tseroki, strong mesh bags.
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Interestingly, ogo ‘know’ does not take factive complements94 or embedded
interrogatives. Instead of using a verb of cognition with a factive complement, Nanti
speakers employ a complement-taking verb of perception that either indicates the
mode of sensory access that they had to the state of affairs; or in the case of igno-
rance, the mode of access though which one would expect to have knowledge of the
state of affairs. Similarly, instead of employing an embedded interrogative comple-
ment to ogo ‘know’, Nanti speakers employ periphrastic constructions in which the
interrogative clause forms a distinct sentence, as in (6.383).















‘What is it? I don’t know.’ (= ‘I don’t know what it is.’)
Nanti exhibits two complement taking verbs of perception: neh ‘see’ and kem
‘hear’. When the verb neh ‘see’ takes a complement, two slightly different senses
arise: a straightforward perceptual sense, exemplified by (6.384) and (6.385); and
another with cognitive and factive sense. In examples showing instances of the latter
sense, such as (6.386), the verb indicates the subject having become aware of the
proposition expressed in the complement by virtue of direct experience.

















‘I saw Reŕısuha arrive back.’
(6.385) Tera nonehe onpokera Reŕısuha.
94A factive complement is one that expresses a proposition that is presupposed to be a fact about
























‘I did not see Reŕısuha come.’













‘I saw that he was a moral person.’
The reality status marking in complement clauses of verbs of perception
matches that of the main clause, as can be seen by comparing (6.384) and (6.385).
The complement clause is sometimes marked with the subordinate clause clitic =ra,
as in (6.385), but this is relatively infrequent.
There are two main types of complements to kem ‘hear’: hearsay com-
plements and auditory sensory access complements. Hearsay complements, as in
(6.387), are employed to indicate that the speaker acquired knowledge about the
state of affairs expressed in the complement via a speech report, without specifying
the source of that report.95 Hearsay complements may also be employed in conjunc-
tion with a quotative evidential, as in (6.388), which serves to defease the inference
that the speaker was an immediate witness to the quoted utterance.



















‘I heard that he saw him there.’
(6.388) Nokemake ika mameri, te iragahero.
95This construction is no doubt the context in which the reportive clitic ke grammaticalized from






























‘I heard he said, “There isn’t any (∼ it isn’t there), he didn’t get it back.”’
Auditory access complements, as in (6.389), denote states of affairs to which
the subject of the main clause verb has auditory sensory access.

















‘Didn’t you hear her cry?’
Complements of kem exhibit the same reality-status marking as that of the
main verb, as can be seen by comparing (6.387) and (6.389).
The final major group of complement-taking verbs we consider are the phasal
verbs tsiti ‘begin’, apakuh ‘stop’,96 agat ‘complete’, and tsonka ‘finish’.
In this class of verbs, the subject of the main and complement clause are
neccessarily coreferential, and the realis mood marking of the complement matches























‘He finished giving gifts.’
96The phasal complement-taking verb apakuh ‘stop’ probably developed from the homophonous
transitive verb meaning ‘drop’.
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‘I have not yet finished clearing.’
Beyond verbs of communication, cognition, and perception, complement tak-
ing verbs form a fairly heterogeneous set: kog ‘want’, agabeh ‘be able, be appropri-
ate’, and kameti ‘be good’. Within this heterogenous set we find perhaps the most
frequent complement-taking verb in Nanti discourse, other than kant ‘say’: kog
‘want’. Its complement is obligatorily irrealis-marked, regardless of whether the
main clause is realis-marked, as in (6.392), or irrealis-marked, as in (6.393). The
subject of the main and complement clauses are necessarily coreferential.





















‘He wanted to go there.’



















‘I don’t want to visit.’
The next verb we consider, agabeh ‘be able/be appropriate’, yields different
senses, depending on the reality status of the complement clause. When the clause
refers to a specific event, reality status marking on the main clause follows the gen-
eral principles for reality status marking in monoclausal sentences, and the reality
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status marking on the complement clause matches that of the main clause. Thus,
for example, speaking about a past event, we find realis marking on the main and
complement clauses, as in (6.394). If however, the sentence articulates a general
principle of appropriate behavior, the main clause verb behaves as if it were no-
tionally irrealis, as does the complement. Reality status morphology is predictable
from clause polarity, as in the notionally irrealis positive polarity (6.395), and as
in the notionally doubly irrealis negative polarity sentence in (6.396). In both con-
struction subtypes, the subjects of the main and complement clause are obligatorily
coreferential.



















‘It was appropriate that he drank manioc beer.’





























‘It would be appropriate for him to say, “There is (manioc beer).” to a man.’
( = ‘It is appropriate for me to invite men to drink manioc beer.’)



























‘It would be inappropriate, on the other hand, for me to speak to a woman.’
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The final complement-taking verb we consider, kameti ‘be good’, displays
some morphological irregularities. This verb behaves as a morphologically regular
verb only in negative polarity clauses, as in (6.397). In this case, the main and
complement clause both obligatorily take irrealis marking, and the subject of the
main clause verb is always expressed as a third person masculine person clitic. In
positive polarity clauses, in contrast, the verb uniformly lacks any expression of a
subject, as can be seen in (6.398). The complement may be either realis or irrealis
marked, in accord with the temporal reference of the clause.







































‘It is good that he returned.’
6.4.3.3 Possible and epistemic conditionals
Nanti conditional constructions are formed with the second position conditional
clitic =rika, which appears on the condition clause. Nanti distinguishes ‘possible
conditional’ and ‘epistemic conditional’ constructions. The possible conditional con-
struction involves either hypothetical conditions or ones that can only be satisfied
in the future, while epistemic conditionals involve conditions that have conclusively
already transpired or failed to transpire, but about which which the speaker is
ignorant or uncertain. The possible and epistemic conditional constructions are
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distinguished by their reality status marking and the form of negation employed.
The condition clause overwhelmingly precedes the result clause in both possible and
epistemic conditionals, but the opposite order is also attested.
Both the condition and result clauses of Nanti possible conditional construc-
tions are notionally irrealis. Accordingly, the verbs of positive polarity condition
clauses take irrealis marking,97 as illustrated by the form nonkogerika ‘if I want’
in (6.399); while negative polarity condition clauses are notionally doubly irrealis,
and consequently take the irrealis negator ha, to which the conditional clitic =rika
attaches, as in (6.400).







































‘If I were to want to go, I could go.’





































‘If there were no medicine, I would not say, “Please live here.”’
Similarly, positive polarity result clauses in possible conditional constructions
take irrealis marking, as in (6.401), while negative polarity ones take the irrealis
negator hara, as in (6.402).
97Existential verbs, as in (6.401), are an exception to this generalization, as they do not distinguish
realis and irrealis forms.
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‘Were there someone who wanted (her manioc), she would say, “I will
harvest your manioc.”’




















‘If he shot (only) one (monkey), it would not be appropriate (for me to go to
eat at his home).’
Epistemic conditional constructions differ from possible conditional construc-
tions in that the condition clause is notionally realis. Consequently, positive polarity
condition clauses take realis marking, while negative polarity clauses are singly ir-
realis, and take the realis negator te, as in (6.403). The reality status marking of
the result clause depends on its temporal reference and polarity.

























‘If he did not shoot (an animal), he will not bring meat.’
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6.4.3.4 Counterfactual conditionals
The Nanti counterfactual conditional clause-linking construction is formed with the
second-position clausal counterfactual clitic =me. The counterfactual clitic must
appear on the clause expressing the counterfactual condition, as we see in both
(6.404) and (6.405). Note that positive polarity counterfactual clauses are obligato-
rily irrealis-marked.
There are two subtly different subtypes of this construction, only one of
which takes the counterfactual clitic on the result clause as well. The first subtype,
shown in (6.404), expresses a counterfactual conditional relation in which the coun-
terfactual result is no longer available as a possibility. In this construction type, the
result clause takes the counterfactual clitic. The second subtype, shown in (6.405),
expresses a conditional relation in which the condition is known not to hold (i.e. is
counterfactual), but which remains open to being satisfied. In this case, the result
clause does not bear the counterfactual clitic. The condition and result clauses are
freely ordered with respect to one another, but the strong discursive tendency is for
the condition clause to appear first.

















































‘He would be able to (settle here), were he to want to (which he does not).’
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Negative counterfactuals are formed with the irrealis negator ha, which, be-
cause it frequently appears in clause-initial position, hosts the counterfactual clitic,
as in (6.406) and (6.407). As is typical of clauses formed with the irrealis negator ha,
negative polarity counterfactual conditional clauses are obligatorily realis marked.

























‘Had I not dreamed of a jaguar, I would have gone into the forest.’















































‘Were she not to return (which she has), it would be appropriate for me to
go and visit over there.’
6.4.3.5 Temporal succession
The successive temporal ordering of events can be expressed through two similar
but distinct clause linkage constructions. In each construction, the clauses appear
in time-iconic order, and one of two possible free syntactic elements appears in
the initial position of the second clause. This free element may either be inpogini
‘then’,98 or more commonly, its shortened form inpo, as in (6.408); or irompa ‘sud-
denly’, as in (6.409).
98This form appears to be a deverbal adverb derived from the root inpogi ‘go after’ (cf. ohiba ‘go
before’).
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‘He eats posuro (a wild plaintain), and then he gathers hetari (a small fish).’

























‘He slept there for a long time (i.e. for many days) and then suddenly he
went back away.’
The difference in meaning between inpogini and ironpa appears to be that
the latter indicates an interruption, typically an abrupt one, in an enduring activity
or course of action; whereas the former simply indicates succession, without adding
any further information about the characteristics of the alternation in activity.
Note that there are not restrictions on the subjects of the two clauses in tem-
poral succession constructions. They may either be corefential, as in the preceding
examples, or not, as in (6.410).























‘He built your house, and then I said “Let’s go!”’
There appears to be no dedicated construction for expressing temporal pos-
teriority in Nanti (i.e. a construction analogous to clauses with the after clause linker
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in English), and that time-iconic temporal succession provides the sole means for
indicating that one event follows another.
6.4.3.6 Brief temporal overlap and spatial overlap
In Nanti, the same set of clause-linking constructions is employed to indicate brief
temporal overlap between two events and to indicate that the location of two events
overlap. I will begin by discussing the use of these constructions for expressing
temporal overlap. It should be noted that the temporal and spatial overlap con-
structions are very similar to the purposive construction, discussed below, and in
certain contexts, are indistinguishable from it.
Brief temporal overlap between the events in two clauses is indicated by
marking the verb of the semantically supporting clause with the subordinate clause
marker =ra, as in (6.411). The reality status of the subordinate clause must match
that of the main clause, which is determined by temporal reference and polarity.
Either both clauses are realis-marked, as in (6.411), or both are irrealis-marked, as
in (6.412). The main clause typically precedes the subordinate clause, as in (6.411)
and (6.412), but may follow it, as in (6.413).























‘You bought (it) a long time ago when you passed through Lima.’












































‘When it (the river) drops, he comes back.’
The same construction can be employed to indicate spatial overlap between
the actions expressed by two clauses, as in (6.414) and (6.415). In many cases, only
interactional context determines the appropriateness of either the temporal or the
spatial overlap reading.






































‘Please put it (firewood) where it is dry.’
6.4.3.7 Prolonged temporal overlap
Prolonged temporal overlap between the events expressed in two linked clauses is
indicated by the presence of a temporal pronoun in the subordinate clause. The
temporal pronoun may occur in focus position, as in (6.416), or in topic position,
as in (6.417). The clause in which the temporal pronoun appears always describes
a prolonged action or event, such as being sick, as in (6.416), or building a house,
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as in (6.417). The clause bearing the temporal pronoun always precedes the other
clause of the construction.























‘When he was ill, she should have brought him.’



































‘When he put it (i.e. built his house) here, he didn’t have any manioc here.’
6.4.3.8 Temporal anteriority and posteriority
The Nanti temporal anteriority clause-linking construction is characterized by the
collocation tetyara ‘when not yet’ in the initial position of the temporally anterior
clause. Tetyara is formed from the realis negator te, the temporal second position
clitic =tya ‘yet, still’, and the subordinate clitic =ra. The ordering of the temporally
anterior and temporally posterior clause is free, as can be seen by comparing (6.418)
and (6.419).































‘Before she enters (her menarche seclusion), she is allowed to ferment
(manioc beer).’
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‘I went to Kinkateni several times, long ago, before I knew Emiriha.’
As mentioned in §6.4.3.5, Nanti exhibits no temporal posteriority clause-
linking construction; temporal posteriority is instead expressed by iconic ordering
of sentences or by the temporal succession clause-linking construction.
6.4.3.9 Purpose
Nanti exhibits two structurally distinct types of purposive clause-linking construc-
tions, which are functionally distinguished by the directness with which the action
of the main clause is instrumental in bringing about the desired goal expressed by
the subordinate clause.
In the first construction type, the relationship of the action expressed in the
main clause to the goal expressed in the subordinate clause is direct and immedi-
ate. This construction exhibits distinct variants for positive and negative polarity
purpose clauses. The positive polarity purposive clause variant exhibits a subordi-
nate irrealis clause, as in (6.420). Note that verb of the subordinate clause typically
carries the subordinate clitic =ra.99
(6.420) Yagutake niha irobiikenpara.
99Since the subordinate clitic =ra is never footed, it is highly susceptible to fast speech elision.
However, whenever I have asked Nanti individuals to carefully repeat an utterance in which I would
expect the subordinate clitic, they have clearly produced the subordinate clitic. This suggests that























‘He (a howler monkey) climbed down to drink water.’



















‘He did not come to visit.’
The negative polarity variant of this construction is formed quite differently,
with the negative purpose element hani ‘so that not’ in subordinate clause-initial
position, as in (6.422). The verb of the subordinate clause is obligatorily realis, as
one would expect from the relationship of ha-negation to reality status marking.





















‘I will dry (the arrow cane) so that it does not decay.’
For both the positive and negative polarity variants, clause order is rigid,
with the main clause preceding the subordinate one. Note that the subject of the




















‘Bring (it), so that he can see it.’
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The second type of purposive clause-linking construction is characterized by a
main verb bearing the applicative purposive suffix -ashi, which licenses a purposive
complement clause, as in (6.424). This construction differs functionally from the
prior type in that the relationship between the action of the main clause and the
goal expressed in the purpose clause is relatively indirect. In (6.424), for example,
the making of a garden only indirectly facilitates fishing, by resolving food supply
issues raised by the remoteness of the fishing site.

























‘He made his garden (there) in order to fish for kobiri, mamori, and
sankenapoha.’
For this construction type, only positive-polarity purposive clauses are at-
tested, which are obligatorily irrealis-marked. As evident in (6.425), the order of
the main and subordinate clauses is flexible, although it is far more common for the
purposive clause to follow the main clause.

































‘Her mother made a mat in order to put her in menarche seclusion.’
It should be noted that the suffix -ashi also has an adverbial, non-clause-
linking function. In this adverbial function, the suffix indicates that the action was
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carried out intentionally or deliberately, with some unspecified goal in mind, as in
(6.426) and (6.427).





































‘That young man (lit. new one) will deliberately conceal it; he will say, “I
won’t tell.”’



























‘He went there of his own volition; he went to your place intentionally/with
something in mind.’
6.4.3.10 Reason, cause, and result
In Nanti discourse, relationships of cause and effect between propositions are rarely
explicitly marked and are instead normally left for speakers to infer, either between
apposite clauses, as in (6.428) and (6.429), or between clearly distinct sentences, as




















‘He came towards (the village), (because) he had become hungry.’
100Note that the only criterion for distinguishing between apposite clauses and distinct sentences
in Nanti is intonational contour, and the distinction is not always clear.
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‘Don’t cultivate (that land), (because) it belongs to the park officials.’






















‘She shouldn’t go. She would drown.’


















































‘It is not the case that I am the first to approach and say, “Please bring me a
throw net.” I don’t know how to fish with a throw net.’
Although they are used infrequently, there are nevertheless two grammati-
calized clause-linking constructions that indicate a causal relationship between the
events of the two clauses. The first one we consider makes use of the light verb kant
‘do’,101 which appears in the clause that marks the reason why the action in the
other clause was carried out. The light verb is obligatorily realis-marked but may
101Note that the root of this verb and the root of the verb ‘say’ are homophonous. The two verbs
are distinguished by their verb class: ‘do’ is an a-class verb, while ‘say’ is an i-class verb.
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appear either with the perfective, as in (6.432), or without, as in (6.433). The cause
and result clauses may appear in either order, as the two examples illustrate.



































‘Then, because she had her menarche, her mother put her in menarche
seclusion.’































‘He followed heri, because, you see, Abororoi, he was emotionally attached to
heri.’
The next causal relation construction we consider is formed with the instru-
mental applicative -ant, which appears on the verb in the consequent clause, as
in (6.434). In a variant of this construction, the clause is replaced by the inter-
clausal anaphoric element irota (see §6.3.6.1.1), whose antecedent is an immediately
preceding clause, as in (6.435). The two clauses may appear in either order.
























‘Its raining, and consequently, he has not gone yet.’























‘He said then, “He presumably gave him permission.”’



















‘He came because of that.’
The final construction we consider is not a clause-linking construction per se,
but one that indicates a causal relationship between the propositions expressed in
two distinct sentences. In this construction, the first sentence expresses the cause,
as in (6.436a), and the second sentence, where the element irobenti ‘consequently’
appears in sentence-initial position, expresses the consequent, as in (6.436b). The
two sentences may be uttered by a single speaker, as in the example given, or may
be uttered by different speakers.























‘Now I hear that she is pregnant.’














‘That’s why he didn’t speak.’
6.4.4 Contrast
Nanti exhibits two clause-linking constructions which serve to indicate a contrast be-
tween the events described in the two clauses. The first construction is characterized
by the use of the frustrative derivational suffix -be in the first clause, as in (6.437).
This contrast construction indicates that despite the action of the first clause being
realized, its desired sequel did not obtain, but instead, the action described in the
second clause occurred. Only positive polarity realis clauses are attested for the first
clause of this construction, while there appear to be no restrictions on the polarity
or realis status of the second clause.























‘Although I spoke to him, he did not listen.’
The second contrast clause-linking construction is characterized by the pres-
ence of the free syntactic element onti in the initial position of the second clause.
Recall that this element is employed to indicate predicate focus (§6.4.2.1.5.3)There
are two variants of this construction. In the first, the clause bearing the predicate
focus marker denotes an event that is unexpected in light of the event or state of
affairs described by the other caluse, as in (6.438).






















‘He has a spouse, but he left her.’
In the second variant, the first clause consists of the negation of a supposition
held by an interlocutor, while the second clause consists of a statement of the actual
contrasting state of affairs, as in (6.439) and (6.440). Only positive polarity clauses
are attested for the second clause.





























‘He didn’t give (them) to me, on the contrary, he denied them (to me).’

























‘He doesn’t farm at all (there), rather, he eats posuro (wild plantain species).’
It should be noted that onti also serves to indicate contrastive predicate
focus, and that this clause-linking construction could be considered to stem from
the apposition of a predicate-focused clause to the clause with which it contrasts.
6.4.5 Coordination
Clausal coordination is very rare in Nanti discourse, but the element ontiri, which co-
ordinates NPs (see §refex:nounphrases), can also be employed to coordinate clauses,
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as in (6.441). The rarity of its occurrence in Nanti discourse makes it difficult to
determine the functional role of clausal coordination.































‘She will make her leave (her menarche seclusion) and she will bathe with
cold water.’
Disjunctive coordination is not attested in Nanti discourse.
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descrição. Editora da Universidade do Amazonas.
Rivet, P., Tastevin, C., 1919-20. Les langues du Purús, du Juruá et des régions
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